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ABSTRACT
This essay constitutes yet another approach to the fields of
inquiry variously known as discourse analysis. discourse grammar, text
grammar, functional syntax, or text linguistics. l
An attempt is made to develop a fairly abstract unified
theoretical framework for the description of discourse which actually
helps explain concrete facts of the discourse grammar of a natural
language. 2 This plan is reflected in the division of the study into
two parts. In the first part, a semiformal framework for describing
conversational discourse is developed in some uetail. In the second
part, this framework is applied to the functional syntax of English.
The relation of the discourse grammar of Part II to the
descriptive framework of Part I can be instructively co~pared to the
relation of Tarskian semantics to model theory. Tarski's semantics
defines a concept of truth of a sentence in a model. an independently
identified construct. Analogously, m¥ rules of discourse grammar
define a concept of ~ropr1ateness of a sentence to a given context.
The task of the firs~art of the essay is to characterize the relevant
notion of context.
Although ~ original statement of the problem was linguistic:
how to describe the meaning, or function, of certain aspects of word
order and intonation, Part I is largely an application of various
methods and results of philosophical logic. The justification of the
interdisciplinary approach is the simplicity and n~~uralness of the
eventual answers to specific linguistic problems in Part II.
Part II of the monograph provides new definitions to such
traditional text linguistic concepts as discourse coherence and cohesion,
discourse topic and subject. theme and rheme, and given and known infor-
mation. Applied in rules of discoLrse grammar to data from actual and
constructed discourse examples, the new definitions explain previous
- 3 -
observations and unearth new facts about English sentential connective~
and stylistic rules of word order.
Thesis Supervisor: R. Paul K1parsky
Title: Professor of Linguistics
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INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER
1. Discourse Analysis
The present work is an essay in discourse analysis. By
discourse, in a wide sense, can be understood any sustained stretch of
speech (sequence of individual sentences). Discourse analysis in a wide
sense, then concerns "all those relations among linguistic entities which
are statable ... in terms of wider spans tha~ those which fall within
the limits of the sentence".l This delimitation sets off discourse
analysis (and discourse grammar) from traditional (sentence) grammar:
as James Harris put it in 1751, "the longest extension with which Grammar
has to do, is the Extension here consider'd, that is to say, a sentence.
The great Extensions (such as Syllogism, Paragraph, Sections, and com-
plete works) belong not to grammar but to Arts of higher order; not to
mention that all of these are but Sentences repeated."2
Discourse, then, is the subject matter of discourse analysis.
What sets it off from other discourse related fields like rhetori~t
stylist1cs, poetics, or literary criticism, is the topical question it
is addressed to.
In the words of Labov([23], p. 252), lithe fundamental problem
of discourse analysis is to show how one utterance follows another in a
rational, rule-governed manner - in other words. how we understand
coherent discourse." The problem. in brief. is to explain what is
coherent (i.e. t well-formed) discourse. For illustration, I quote
Coulthard ([6], p. 7):
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Discourse, then, does not consist simply of a string of
grammatically well-formea utterances or sentences. The
following examples from Labov (19~O) are grammatically
unexceptional yet noticeably odd:
A: What is your name?
B: well, let's say you might have thought you had ~omething
from before but you haven't got it any more.
A: 11 m going to call you Dean.
A: I feel hot today.
B: No.
In both examples B's contribution obviously breaks rules for
the oroduction of coherent discourse. One of th~ fundamental
aims of discourse analysis is to discover these rules, but
an even more fundamental question is the nature of the units
whose structure and occurrence the sequencing rules will
describe.
~y approach to di scourse ana lys1S, ti1e di a1ague garne approach,
constitutes a partic~lar attempt at an answer to the fundamental problems
posed by Labov and Coulthard.
In my approach, the fundame'ltal unit of description of discourse
is a theoretical construct called a cialogue gam~. This construct admits
the foliowing characterization of well-formedness of discourse:
A discourse is coherent if it can be extended into a well-formed
dialogue game.
The problem of characterizing coherent discourse is thus reduced to the
task of describing a certain class of games.
2. Language-games
The idea of comparing language to a game of course goes back
to Ludwig W1ttgenste1n. "No one will deny that studying the nature of
the rules of games must be useful for the study of grammatical rules,
since it is beyond doubt there is some sort of similarity between them. 114
As the slogan goes, liThe use of a word in the language is its meaning.
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The grammar describes the use of words ;n the language. So it has
somewhat the same relation to the language as the description of a game,
the rules of a game, have to the game. IIS
The force of Wittgenstein's idea from the poin~ of view of
discourse analysis is not in the easy observation that language, like
~ames, is an (at least partly) conventional, rule-bound activity. The
language game idea is not just a restatement of the structuralist view
of language as a calculus governed by conventional rules.
Rather, its strEngth lies in the following points. First,
Wittgenstein's language games serve to connect a calculus to a form of
life. Language games are what establishes the link between language,
conceived as a calculus, to the reality interpreted, described and
transformed by it. 6 It is lithe whole, consisting of language and the
actions into which it is woven"] that constitutes a language game: "here
the ternl 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that
the speaking of a language is part of an activity, or a form of life."B
A similar point has been emphasized by Labov as the first and most
important step ;'" the analysis of discourse: it is essential lito dis-
tingu1sh what is said from what is done; that is, discourse analysis
must be concerned with the functional use of lanyuage. 1I9
Second, the game comparison brings out the goal-directed
character of language use, recently emphasized by Paul Grice in his work
on the logic of conversation. 10 The importance of the notion of the aim
or purpose of a game was dawning on Wittgenstein in the following para-
graphs of Philosophical Grammar.
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But ; t m; ght be asked: Do I understand the ',Iord jus t by
describing its application? Do I understand its point?
Haven't I deluded myself about something important?
At present, say, I kpow only how men use this word. But it
might be a game, or a form of etiquette. I do not know why
they behave in this waYt how language meshes with their life. l1
We said that when we understood the use we didn1t yet
understand the purpose of the word IIperhaps li • And by
IIpurposell in this case we meant the ri..'l€ 1n human life. 12
To master a language game it " _~ not suffice to know its
admissible moves, but one has to understand its point, its internal aim,
or rule of winning:
What constitutes winning and 10s;ng ;n a game (or success in
patien~e)! It isn't,of course, just the winning position. A
special rule is needed to lay down who is the winner.
How do I know if someone has won? BeCdUS~ he is pleased, Ol'
something of the kind? Rea l1y what the rul e says ; s "you nlust
try to get your pieces as soon as possibletl~tc. In this
form the rule connects the game with life.
The internal aim of a game must not be confused with the
external purpose of playing the game. Wittgenstein makes this point in
a comparison of a language game to a pianola:
You might then say that the se~se of the signs is not their
effect but their purpose. But consider this, that we1re
tempted to think that this purpose ;s only a part of the
larger purpose served by the pianola. - This purpose, say,
is to entertain people. But it's clear that when we spoke
of lithe sense of the signs" we didn't mean part of that
purpose. We were thinking rathpr of the purpose of-the
signs within the mechanism of the pianola. - And so you
can say that the purpose of an order is its sense, only so
far as the purpose can be expressed by a rule of language.
"I am saying 'go away I because I want you to leave me alone",
"I am saying 'perhaps' because I am not quite sure. 1I14
Of course, the internal aim of a given game may be externally
motivated:
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Are the rules of chess arbitrary? Imagine that it turned out
that only chess entertained and satisfied people. Then the
rules are~5t arbitrary if the purpose of the game is to be
achieved.
Neverthel~ss, such a practicality, even if true, has no place in the
definition of the game:
liThe rules of a game are arbitrary" means: the concept 'game-
1s ~gt defined by the effect the game is supposed to have on
us.
By the same token, it is only the notion of the internal, conventional
aim of a language game that is linguistically significant, for
Language is not def1ged for us as an arrangement fulfilling
a definite purpose.
3. Gamp Theory
W1ttgenste1n did not intend to develop his idea into a systematic
theory of language-games. 18 On the contrary, he did not think such a
project feasible: the very notion of a game seemed to him to defy precise
definition. 19
Now there ;s a very precise definition of a game (of strategy)
in the mathematical theory of games developed by Otto ~0rgenstern and
John von Neumann [30].20
Central concepts in this theory are the concepts of a strategy,
payoff, and solution of a game. A game is determined by specifying each
player's strategies in the game, and the payoff (gain or loss) for each
player lit each play of the game (choice of .it."'ateg1es for each player).
A solution of a game is the specification of optimal strategies in the
game: strategies which maximize each player's payoff in the game subject
to his strategic options.
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The concepts of strategy and payoff can be considered refinements
of the concepts ot ru1es and aims of a game: the rules of a game specify
the admissible moves in it for each player, and these in turn constrain
the players' strategic options in the game. The aim of the game deter-
mines the players' preferences over different turns the game might take,
which preferences may be numerically represented by a payoff function.
The concept of a solution of a game can be considered a
mathematical explication of the informal concept of rationality. A
rational agent is one who uses the most efficient means available to him
to further his goals, i.e., one who follows his optimal strategies. The
main virtue (and occasional weakness) of game and decision theory is its
ability to explicate this key concept of goal-oriented action.
4. Applications of Game Theoretical Ideas
The concepts and results of game theory have been already used
to sharpen the informal idea of language game in a theory of natural
language semantics developed by Jaakko Hintikka and his associates. This
application is known as Hintakka's game theoretical semantics. 21
H1ntakka's semantics is a version of model-theoretic semantics. A key
concept is that of the truth of a sentence at a possible world or model.
The leading idea is to define the truth of each sentence 5
of [a fragment of English] by reference to an associated
semant1cal game G(S). This game is a two-person, zero-sum
game. The truth of S means that one of the players [the
proponent of the sentence] has a winning strategy in G(S).
The fals~ty of S means that the other player [the opponent
of the sentence] has a winning strategy tension of it -
will have to be thought of as unanalyzable (atomic) ones,
and their truth-values are assumed to be determined unproble-
mati~dl1y. At each stage of the gan~ an Eng11~h sentence is
being considered, beginning with S. I win a play of G(S) if
it ends with a true atomic sentence, lose if it ends with a
- 16 -
false one. In a sense, G(S) may thus be considered as an
attempt to verify $, as far as [the proponel~ iS~ concerned,
against the schemes of a recalcitrant opponent. 2
G(S) is fixed by a set of rules which specify for any sentence
whether a move is to be made by the proponent or the opponent
and which kind of move is to be made; in each non-terminal
move, a sentence is p1ck~d in accordance with these rules with
respect to which the game is then continued. The sentences
chosen are progressively reduced in complexity; after a
finite number of moves an atomic sentence re~ults, and no
further move is possible. 23
What makes game theoretic semantics a genuine semantics in the sense of
Wittgenstein, Morris and Tarsk1 is the character of the activities which
the players are occupied with in the course of the moves of the game.
The players do not just swap sentences, but actually have to go out to
the world and look for the right sorts of individuals and relations to
exemplify their claims. Language games with quantifiers, for instance.
involve the nonlinguistic activities of seeking and finding actual
objects of different descriptions. On the other hand, what makes game
theoretic semantics genuinely game theoretical is the fact that the
semantical games are mathematical games. The existence of a well-defined
truth value for sentences of the fragment of English is a corollary of
the von Neumann and Morgenstern theorem that two-person zero-sum games
with perfect information have a value (an equilibrium in pure strategies).
Game theoretical ideas have been applied in logic and the
philosophy of language by others as well. 24
In a number of recent publications, H1nt1kka has been
developing a theory of 1nformat1on..seek1ng dialogues with potential
applications in the philosophy of science and in proof theory. Although
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these ideas have influenced my approach, the two lines of work are largely
independent.
5. Dialogue Games
The dialogue games I set out to develop in the present essay
differ from the semantical games of Hintikka in a number of important
respects. The comparison is easiest to organize following the usual
format of the game theoretical description of a game.
First, there is the number of players. Dialogue games will
range from the general case of a n-person conversation through two-
person dialogues to the monologue of a lone player. 'Dialogue' as a
technical term will not be restricted here to its usual meaning of a
two-person exchange, but covers all of the above mentioned cases.
Next comes the question of the strategies of the players. Moves
in a dialogue game will consist of complete sentences put forward by
dialogue participants and addressed to other participants of the dialogue.
Unlike the semantic games. the successive sentences put forward in a
dialogue game need not be related to each other structurally or lexically.
Nothing like the subformula property implicit in the semantical gam~s
need hold.
The dialogues considered here are question-answer dialogues:
the only admissible moves consist of declarative and interrogative
sentences. Consequently. the dialogue games considered here are what
H1nt1kka ([15]. p. 81) calls 'indoor games': the activities the players
are 1nvr1ved in are activities of reception. processing. an~ transmission
of information. This limitation is a practical one rather than a matter
- 18 -
of principle. There is no reason why the present games could not be
enriched for instance by including moves by the rules of the semantical
games.
An extension of the dialogue games to sentences of imperative
mood would obviously necessitate extending the players' strategy sets by
various practical activities. Such extensions will be left for another
occasion. 26
Next comes the question of the aims of the game. In the
present work, one particular choice of internal aim has been made. My
dialogue games are cooperative activities of information exchange: the
players strive to achieve a common understanding on a true and informative
answer to some problem or question on the basis of observation and
considered opinion.
This delimitation of aims is not in any way uniq~e (though it
may be in some sense quite fundamental). It would be possible (and
probably rewarding) to let the aims of conversation vary systematically
and register its effects on conversational coherence.
The concept of rational game strategy inherent in the game idea
provides room for a Gr1cean logic of conversation. 10 Grice's main point
is that conversational 1mp11catures ought to fallout from a general
characterization of the aims and means of linguistic exchanges together
with assumptions of the rationality of the participants. The o1alogue
game framework can be looked upon as a systematic development of this
general idea. Gricean 'maxims of conversation' become part of the aims
of a dialogue game.
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o. Logic and Rhetoric
The above delimitation of the aims of dialogue connects our
approach to the traditional art of rhetoric. Rhetoric, according to
Aristotle, IImay be defined as the faculty of considering the possible
means of persuasion ill reference to any subject whateve!'.1127 Now the
aim of the players of rny dialogue games is to convince themselves and
each other of the optimal answer to the topic of inquiry that interests
them. Rhetoric, thE'refCire, has its place as a theory of optimal strate-
gy i~ dialogue games.
Aristotle's most important contribution to the art of rhetoric
is ~is insistence on the central position of logic in rhetoric. Rhetoric,
for Aristotle, is essentially an application of dialectic: lI argur.1ents
are the only thing that properly belong to the art, everything else is
merelyaccessoryll.28 This insight of Aristotle finds full recognition
in the present work. My description of dialogue games essentially
depends on methods and results obtained in the fields of deductive,
inductive, epistemic and erotect1c logic.
7. Context
Another thing that distinguishes dialogue games from the
semantic games is increased explicitness about the context of discussion.
An essential consideration in planning one's conversational strategy
concerns what one's audience already knows and what it wants to know.
Such considerations place my dialogue games squarely in the domain of
- 20 -
linguistic pragmatics, the study of lithe relations of signs to
interpreters ll • 29 According to a recent statement, IIPragmatics is
concerned with the ways in which the interpretation of syntactically
defined expressions depends on the particular conditions of their use
in context ll ,30 with the weight of the definition obviously on the notion
of context.
Context, in the present work, is explicated by a description of
a dialogue game situation. This is essentially a possible worlds repre-
sentation of what players of a dialogue game have on their minds at a
given stage of the game. Pragmatic rules of interpretation, say, rules
for words like •perhaps , and for the subjunctive mood will make reference
to dialogue context, thus explfcated. 3l
My possible worlds representation of players· information in
a dialogue game leads to a major departure from the received notions of
game theory. As a result of it, my dialogue games are not a special
case, but rather a generalization, of the game theoretic notion of a game
in extensive form. In consequence, the game theoretic notions of strat-
egy, outcome, and solution are not generally applicable to dialogue games.
I have not worked out how these notions should be generalized so as to
approach a definition of rational game strategy in a dialogue game. I
believe that such a generalization can be given; in any case, the
received definitions apply in the special case where dialogue games do
reduce to games in the sense of game theory.
These shortcomings, with the concomitant absence of an explicit
definition of a dialogue game from this work provide the reason for
calling the present essay an approach to discourse analysis rather than
- 21 -
a fully spelled-out theory.
8. Plan of the Work - Part I
The disposition of the work roughly follows the traditional
division of rhetoric into invention and arrangement of arguments on the
one hand and style and delivery on the other hand.
Thus, the first Part of the essay is concerned with the
structure and logic of dialogue. The first chapter "Aims of the Game"
StC1t~tS with an informal statement of the aims of dialogue as a list of
putative conversational maxims. These maxims turn out to constitute
desiderata for a familiar decision theoretic approach to inductive logic.
As explained in an Appendix, this approach can be used to give a refined
explication of the aims of the game in the form of an ep1stemic utility
function. The inductive rule of acceptance based on the epistemic
utility function can then be considered as part of a solution of a
dialogue game.
The second Chapter "Propositional Attitudes" develops a
representation of the propositional attitudes of the players in a dia-
logue game. The representation is a fairly straightforward application
of Hint1kka ' s semi-syntactic model set semantics for epistem1c logic.
The problem of "logical omniscience" is avoided by leaving it up to the
player to worry about the logical consistency of their propositional
attitudes.
The third Chapter uQuestions" analyzes the critical notion of
an answer to a question. This analysis is an elabot'at1on of H1ntikka l s
- 22 -
work on the semantics and pragmatics of questions.
The fourth Chapter "Dialogue Garne Rules" considers what
strategies players can use to communicate their propositional attitudes
to others. A number of important types of conversational move are
described.
The fifth Chapter "Structure of Dialogue" studies the
contribution of the representations and rules of the previous chapters
to the structure of a conversation.
The sixth Chapter "Logical Game Rules" outlines a system of
natural deduction for a fragment of English, based on the rules of
H1ntikka l s semantical games.
The seventh Chapter ilLogic of Dialogue" shows how the rules of
the previous chapter can be used by the players to test their assumptions
for consistency and to examine their logical consequences.
The eighth Chapter "Question-Answer Dialogues" applies the
dialogue game framework to the analysis of the interrogative mood. The
leading idea here goes back to Wittgenstein; more recently, it has been
developed by Stenius (1967). The idea is that dialogue games can be
taken to constitute a theory of meaning for sentential moods. To
explain what the interrogative mood means, one has to describe the
language games in which it is at home. Th~ findings of this Chapter
seem to vindicate W1ttgenste1n's warning:
If you do not keep the multiplicity of language-games in
view you will perhaps be inclined to ask questions like:
"What is a question?" - Is it the statement that I do not
know such-and-such, or the statement that I wish the other
person would tell me ••• ? Or is it the description of my
mental state of uncertainty?32
- 23 -
The dialogues studied in this Chapter rule out any too facile answers to
Wittgenstein's question.
9. Plan of the Work - Part II
The second Part of the essay is concerned with questions coming
under the traditional heading of style. As Aristotle put it,
Our next subject will be the style of expression. For it is
not enough to know what we ought to say; we must also say it
as we ~ught; much help is thus afforded towards producing
the right impressiun of a speech. The first question to
receive attention was naturally the one that comes first
naturally - how persuasion can be produced from the facts
themselveSj The second is how to set these facts out inlanguage. 3
Linguistic stylistics has been characterized as the study of
contextual conditions of choice among paraphrases (logically equivalent
expressions).34 If we define discourse grammar as the study of the
dialogue function of words and grammatical constructions, discourse
grammar becomes part of stylistics. Differences of function in a dia-
logue contribute to choices among logically equivalent stylistic variants.
The second Part of this essay is devoted to the study of the dialogue
function of a selected number of words and constructions in English.
As was p~inted out earlier, the right choice of primitives is
a more fundamental question than the precise formulation of rules in
terms of those primitives. If the primitives are well chosen, the rules
can be expected to come out s1~ple and elegant. In this essay, three
discourse grammatical primitives are introduced: the notion of topic
of a dialogue. the concept of themat1c1ty, and the notion of a dialogue
subject. The characterization of these notions 1s the main task of this
II
•
•
•
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Part of the essay.
This part is structured as follows. In the first Chapter, I
layout my main theses in discourse analysis and discourse grammar.
First and foremost is my answer to the fundamental problem of discourse
analysis, quoted in the beginning. The second thesis asserts the autonomy
of discourse grammar from sentence grammar, and the modularity of dis-
course grammar.
In the second Chapter, I examine the functional constraints
and differences among a number of natural language connectives. It turns
out that these constraints and differences can be stated naturally in
terms of the notions of dialogue games. The dialogue game approach is
compared to and contrasted with generative semantics.
The third Chapter "Old and New Information" is devoted to the
concepts of theme and rheme. These notions are defined as properties of
constituents of sentences relative to a dialogue context. Essentially,
a constituent is thematic if it repeats a constituent from dialogue
context and rhematic otherwise. The notions of theme and rheme are put
to use in a number of rules of dialogue grammar fot· word order and
topical1zation.
The fourth Chapter "Given vs. Known Infonnation" contrasts
thematicity with syntactic subordination. Certain aspects of the notion
of presupposition are discussed. Discourse rules for cleft sentences
are fonnulated.
The fifth and last Chapter "Aboutness" starts with a review
of some of the text linguistic tradition. The intuitive notion of 'about-
ness' is distinguished from the notion of g1venness, leading to the
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recognition of a notion of dialogue subject. Dialogue s~bjects are what
dialogues are about, in one of the senses of the versatile proposition.
The notion of dialogue subje~ ~s is put to use in rules of dia"los Ie grammar
for anaphora and dislocation phenomena.
In the traditional order of things, the discussiun of style
should be followed by a discussion of delivery. Omitted from this work
is a series of chapters on discourse intonation. Preliminary research
on the topic appears in Carlson [4].
PART I
DIALOGUE GAMES
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Chapter 1
AIMS OF THE GAME
1. Functions of Language
Language is a tool for thinking and telling. Its two main
functions are representation and processing of information about the
environment, and infonnation transferral between user's (communication). 7
For the individual user, the capacity of representative thought
;s an important tool for guiding and organizing action. Isn't it just
their superior capacity of representing the environment, process1ng such
representations and realizing them again in the environment that gives
humans their edge over other animals? Studying the situation, cornr>aring
different contingencies open in it and steering one's action to suit
them involve a cap3city of representative thought.
This connection of language as ~ means of representation with
practical action motivates some basic requirements of wel1-formedness
of anyone's representative thought, his beliefs about the status quo and
his plans about possible alternatives to it.
First of all: Think consistently. There are two parts to the
requirement of consistency. First, a theory or a plan of action must
be at least in principle feasible, otherwise it has no chance of being
realized. This principle may be called the principle of sat1sfiability.
Second, one ought to follow through the consequences cf one's ideas.
Theories and plans must be examined thoroughly to see what will follow
if they are realized. This principle could be called the principle of
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cogency.
Second: Believe what is true. Realistic plans must be based on
a correct representation of the status quo. Knowledge is power! We may
call this maxim the maxim elf truth.
Deriving these maxims from practical considerations has the
advantage of explaining their relativity. It is not impossible, nor even
unusual. for people not to follow them. Except being violated because of
human imperfection, they may relax when they are not needed. No matter
if sma~l children hol~ inconsistent beliefs about imaginary characters.
It ;s not likely to cause them or anyone else any harm, and it keeps them
(and others) entertained.
Adults, too, relax their standards at mo~ents of leisure.
Besides. being systematically inconsistent can be a good way of seeking
information. Things are apt to go wrong only when imagin~t1on is mistaken
for fact: wher. f~ru_ial actions are based on beliefs that are false to
fact or on plans which cannot be sati~fied or have unexpected conse-
qu~n~es.
The above maxims of thought make no reference to the social
function of language. Indeed, the function of language in information
transfer seems to presuppose a capacity of information representation in
the communicating subjects, which shows the capacity of thought concep-
tually prior to the capacity to communication.
Genetically. it has been maintained for long times. the two
functions are reciprocal. Popular speculation on the ~hylogenet1c
origin of language has derived language from the need of cooperation. or
coordination of action toward common goals, among a number of
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i,dividuals. Whatever the historical value of such speculation, it does
suggest a 'transcendental deduction' for a further conversational maxim.
In analogy with the individual case, one may consider a group
of individuals as a collective agent whose aim is to agree on aims and
means to achieve them. This simple analogy immediately suggests an
intersubjective \nalogue for the maxim of consistency. Just as an indi-
vidual has to agree with himself about his aims and means, a number of
cooperating agents had better agree with each other on their interests
and acceptations. Else no consistent common plan of action is likely
to be followed.
This condition can be formulated as the conversational maxim of
agreement: one of the conventional aims of communication is achieving
a common understanding among the participants of the exchange.
An explication of the concept of common understanding is in
order. What we have in mind is an arbitrarily 1nterable loop of propo-
sitional attitudes as exemplified by the iteration in (1):
(1) Ev~ry player accepts that p
Every player accepts that every player accepts that p
Every player accepts that ... that every player accepts
that p etc. 2
A point that should be appreciated about the representation of arbitrarily
iterable loops like (1) is this: although the set of sentences in (1)
is infinite, it is satisfiable in a finite model, actually in a system
of possible worlds with just one sole possible world consisting of
nothing else than p. It suffices to let that possible world alone
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constitute the field of all players' accessibility relations; the truth
of all the sentences in (1) follow~. A possible worlds representation
of propositional attitudes will enable a finitary representation of such
apparently infinitary notions as (1) in the theory of dialogue.
The general aim of agreement is to a degree independent of the
choice of means of arriving at an agreement, leaving room for further
preferences about those means. A friendly discussion and a fierce debate
may both aim at common agreement. (They would be no need to dispute if
there were no interest in achieving agreement: why not just leave each
other alone?) There is just a difference as to whose opinion should
preferably prevail.
Again, we do not have an absolute maxim. Counterexamples can
be expected to come from cases where cooperation - a common understanding
and a conrnon plan of action - is not sought. If one is out to get t ..2
others, lies and deceit are called for. Their intention is precisely to
create a hidden disagreement between the beliefs of the interlocutors.
Agreement is not sought either when language is used to offend. At best,
one wants to give the other side "a piece of onels mind", whether or not
they accept it. At worst, the intention to offend may overrule all of
the maxims: whatever will cause offense will do, whether acceptable,
true, or even consistent. But note that these violations of the conver-
sational maxims would not have the effect they do if they were not
interpreted against the background of the maxim~.
Now all of the foregoing goals can be trivially reached in a
discussion if all players agree in having no beliefs at all: then all
that they believe is true and consistent and everyone has just the same
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beliefs. Surely then the foregoing aims are not exhaustive; far from it,
they only represent boundary conditions for a more fundamental goal,
namely search for information. As Aristotle once put it, man by nature
desires to know. 3 Typically, however, the participants of a communica-
tion situation are not motivated by a boundless hunger for knowledge,
but they are interested in some particular problem or topic. I shall
represent such topics of a discussion by means of questions. The parti-
cipants of an information sharing dialogue will do their best to satisfy
their curiosity with respect to the topi~al question of a rlictlogue they
are involved in: i.e., ceteris paribus prefer adopting a (partial or
comp:ete) answer to the topical question to remaining agnostic to it.
Let us tenm this preference the maxim of information.
2. Aims V5. Means
The different ep1stem1c aims of dialogue discussed in the
previous section are ideally in no conflict with each other. There is an
ideal situation where everyone of them is optimally satisfied, viz. when
all players in agreement accept a complete true answer to each topical
question of the dialogue.
If the discussants were so ideally equipped that they could
immediately recognize true answers and knew that others were equally
capable, no discussion or deliberation would be needed to attain the
ideal situation. Each player would be justified in presuming that the
maxims are satisfied at the outset.
That such a situation remains an ideal is what motivates
dialogue in the first place. Players cannot be assumed to hold true,
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consistent, compatible and complete answers to the topic of discussion
at the outset. Some players may know what others do not; players may
fail to r~cognize inconsistencies in their assumptions, or hold consistent
but divergent points of view.
Such failures from omniscience can be corrected by discussion.
Privileged information may be made publici inconsistencies may be brought
out by logical argument. and agreement may be reached by an exchange of
opin~ons.
The limitedness of individual players· means of attaining the
ideal end point of the game is what motivates the multiplicity of con-
versationsl maxims, too. If the maxiM of truth could be followed without
impediment, other maxims would be ~at1sfied without extra effort. But
since the maxim of truth is hard to realize in practice. one may be
forced to choose among a number of feasible compromises which realize
one or another aspect of the ideal situation. For instance, adopting
some hypothesis at the risk of error or even inconsistency may be better
than indecision; or reaching a consensus may be necessary for cooperation,
whatever the price in terms of other maxims.
The problem of mixing the different maxims of dialogue so as to
define a consistent preference relation over alternative outcomes is a
complex question. Different assignments of relative weight to different
maxims can be made to reflect different personal traits of character;
for instance. a conservative prefers old views over new ideas, an
individualist puts little premium on agreement, and a skeptic values
certain truisms over uncertain information.
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More systematically, different weightings can again be
externally motivated by as~umptions about the external goals of a
dialogue. A social conversation on matters of small importance ~ay put
more value on agreement than on literal truth; a scientist interested
in extending his knowledge may risk being wrong more willingly than some-
one whose life or economical situation depends on his guess.
As a special case, one might concentrate on finding a basis
for choosing between alternative hypotheses that would fit the aims of
rational inquiry: how to choose what to believe when the evidence is
inconclusive, so as to maximize one's expectancy of reliable information.
When is it rational to accept a sentence? There are three
traditionally recognized methods that will be considered: observation,
deductive inference and inductive decision.
In any simple-minded account of rational inquiry, observations
form the rock-bottom of knowledge. In more refined accounts, observa-
tions can also be refuted; yet there are certain preferences as to what
to keep and what to throw out in case of a conflict, and observations
tend to be pretty high in this reliability ordering. In our account,
observations will be represented as Nature's revelations to other
players. Nature being truthful and reliable, her contributions can be
accepted by other players at their face value. If the refinement is
needed, observations may be assigned probabilities which reflect their
reliability: if one is hard of hearing, the reliability of hearsay is
accordingly lowered.
Clearly, a player can add to his set of assumptions any
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logical entailments of those assumptions without fear of violati:tg his
epistemic maxims. If the premises are true, so are the consequences;
and no new inconsistencies can be created which were not already implicit
in the assumptions. To the contrary, a player could not deny any entail-
ment of what he already accepts without falling into inconsistency, and
failing to accept them would go against the maxim of cogency.
But it stands to reason that a rational dialogue participant
can sometimes accept sentences tha.t are not implied by what he already
knows or believes or observes. Othen-Jise, how could anyone tell anybody
anything new? However, a rationa'l dialogue participant cannot just
swallow anything that he may be told by anybody even supposing that what
he is told is consistent with what he already knows (or believes). For
one thing, he has to have some method of choosing what to believe when
several players tell him incompatible things. More than that, a rational
dialogue participant can be assumed to be open to change his own mind
when presented with reliable contradicting evidence. Such considerations
indicate that a rational player must be provided with some method of
weighing plausible arguments when the truth of a matter is not immediate-
ly obvious.
3. Gambling with Truth
This approach to solving the preference logical problem takes
us in the middle of the discussion of rules of acceptance in inductive
logic. 4 This discussion is especially germane for our point of view,
for it construes the problem of inductive acceptance as a game (or
decision) theoretical problem. Here' is how:
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The inductive decision situation is described as a one-person
game against Nature. Nature chooses, unbeknownst to the other player,
the actual "state of nature" concerning the problem setting at hand. The
player has to choose a hypothesis among a given set of alternative hypo-
theses so as to maximize his preferences over the alternative outcomes
of the game (determined by the two players' choices). The game is
described by (1) a specification of the problem situation (the players'
strategy sets), (ii) the second player's preferences over the outcomes
(Nature is assumed to be a d~sinterested partner); and (iii) the second
player's state of information about Naturels moves. The solution of the
game is a rule that determines the second player's optimal strategy, i.e.,
his rational choice of hypothesis in the problem situation.
In accordance with our formulation of the maxim of information,
this approach restricts inductive decision making to a rather narrowly
defined sort of problem situation. It assumes as given an exhaustive
class of mutually exclusive alternatives, which can be thought as a set
of alternative complete answers to a topical guestion. These alternative
answers represent the depth (and width) of the 1nquirer l s present interest
in the problem he is trying to solve: the alternatives are each defini-
tive with respect to his cognitive interests and they exhaust the range
of alternatives that he is considering at the moment. The complete ans-
wers thus can be thought of as representing Nature's alternative moves
in the problem situation at hand: it is up to Nature to decide which one
of them is true.
The class of relevant complete answers to the initial problem
induces a class of partial answers to it, these being all the logically
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distinct disjunctions of some of the complete answers. As a limiting
case, the disjunction of all ·he complete answers may be taken to repre-
sent the starting point of the problem, or the presupposition which the
inquirer already accepts. The class of all the (complete or partial)
answers to the initial question then constitute the second player's
range of strategy choices: his task is to accept one of them as his
best bet.
The next step toward a game theoretical solution of the
inductive decision problem ;s to describe the decision maker's utilities
over alternative outcomes.
As it happens, the epistemic maxims we have singled out nicely
match the desiderata used in inductive logic. It is assumed that a
rational inductive decision rule satisfies the following conditions of
consistency and deductive cogency:
(1) The set of sentences acceptable by a rational rule of inductive
acceptance ;s consistent
(2) Any logical consequence of a set of acceptable statements is
likewise an acceptable statement: or, the set of acceptable
sentences is closed under logical consequence.
F~rthermore, it is assumed that a decision maker's utilities
O'i~r alternative outcomes of an inductive decision problem are determined
by some mixture of the preferences registered by the maxim of truth and
the maxim of information. The main problems in defining an appropriate
utility function to this effect concern the characterization of informa-
tiveness and the adjudication of the relative weights of the two maxims.
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In an Appendix, I describe the essentials of Levi's [46] and
Hilpinen's [42] solutions to these problems. The upshot of their propos-
~ls is a probabilistic rule of inductive acceptance which recommends the
rejection of a hypothesis if its epistemic utility stays below a ~iven
threshold. The rule weighs the probability of a hypothesis against its
informativeness subject to an adjustable parameter which represents the
investigator's measure of caution. If the index is set to 0, the
utility of an answer equals its truth value. The weight of information
vanishes and the epistemic utility function is based exclusively on the
maxim of truth. Higher values of the index reflect less cautious induc-
tive attitudes, varying from player to player with personality and
occasion. Naturally enough, some situations w~rrant more caution than
others: compare for instance casual conversation and profe~s1onal
advice.
For definiteness, I shall assume some version of such a
probabilistic decision procedure to form part of the statement of the
player's optimal strategies in a dialogue game.
4. The Maxim of Agreement
The above solution to the preference logical problem pays no
attention to the maxim of agreement, the only genuine maxim of conver-
sation among our putative maxims of dialogue. It only concerns the ques··
ticn of optimizing a rational enquirer's chances of forming correct and
informed opinions about some question he is interested in.
In a way, this is not at all surprising. It is natural to
assume that a rational decision maker is one who cannot be persuaded,
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but at best convinced: in other words, he never prefers agreement when
it would imply abandoning a position which is epistemically optimal as
defined by reference to the maxims of rational inquiry alone~ Other
dialogue participants' arguments can make him change his mind only
through changing the epistemic utilities of different alternative hypo-
theses. A rational dialogue participant thus treats other people's
opinions and arguments only as so much more evidence for or against a
position. If an interlocutor is a reliable source of information, he
is willing to go along with him; if the person is likely to be wrong, he
prefers to convince him.
But even if other maxims override the maxim of agreement, it
does not make the maxim superf~uous. A player of a dialogue game still
prefers agreement over disagreement; the other maxims just decide what
opinions he wants everyone to agree upon.
It is lmportant to realize that my maxims of dialogue say
absolutely nothing about the external question what initially motivates
players to wonder about certain questions, and what motivates them to
enter or not to enter a given dialogue game (just as the rules of chess
do not specify why one should play chess).
Given that players do wonder about certain questions, and that
they do agree to play dialogue games on them, the game rules explain
what else they are com1tted to do and believe.
Assume someone asks someone a question. Is the addressee
committed to answer it? Only if he agrees to enter into a dialogue game
whose topic is the question proposed. If he does not and, say. just
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stares, turns his back or pretends not to hear, the game does not even
get started: it takes two to carry a conversation. Of course, as a
rule, people are cooperative and polite; if they have no overriding
interests, they oblige. However, they are not obliged to by our maxims.
Whether they will or not enter a conversation is a matter external to
the rules of dialogue games, and depends on what external interests and
obligations the players have. 5
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Chapter 2
PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES
1. Information Sets
A third central consideration in the game theoretical
description of any game concerns the players' knowledge of the game
situation at each stage of the game. If each player knows what the
actual game situation is at each stage of the game, we have a game of
perfect information: else the game ;s one of imperfect information.
The game theoretical description of a game of imperfect
-information can be illustrated by a simple inductive decision problem
of the sort discussed in the pr~vious chapter. Such a decision problem
can be described as a one-person game. or rather, a game against Nature
as a disinterested partner. The first move of the game is by Nature,
who chooses the right answer to the decision problem. Say the problem
is to decide whether it will rain today. The presupposition - and the
weakest answer - is that it mayor it may not. There are two alternative
complete answers: that it will rain, or that it will not. Nature
decides or. the outcome, of course, unbeknownst to the decision maker.
The deci~1on maker has the next move. His aim is to make an educated
guess about the weather, given some probabilities over Nature's alterna-
tives. His alternative moves are the different predictions he can make:
he may say it will rain, that it won't, or that it mayor may not,
passing the qu~st1on. His payoff over the alternative guesses depends on
the informat':oFl value of each guess and the actual "state of Nature".
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The game can be represented as the following tree:
(1) Will it rain or not?
-------N: It w·ll rain- -------N: It will not rain
~--A: It will A: It wqn1t A: I pass A: I pass A: It wor1t A: It \tiill
, ~------~
L ~-------~--------------~ I--------------------------------------~
The decision maker's state of information at each game
situation is depicted by his information sets, described in the figure
by dotted lines. Each information set includes game situations which,
though they are distinguishable to an objective observer, the player
cannot tell apart when he ;s at one of them. In (1), the decision
maker does not know Nature's move when he is making his own, though he
can of course tell what answer he has his money on himself.
Now dialogue games are obviously games of imperfect
information: is it not their main function to make people's information
about each other's assumptions less imperfect.
However - and this ;s of crucial importance - players in a
dialogue game can suffer an even more radical imperfection in their
knowledge of the actual game situation: more often than not, players
are not only imperfectly informed but downright misinformed about the
real game situation, including the truths of the matter, their inter-
locutors' aims and attitudes, possibly even their own state of mind.
This more radical imperfection takes us out of the bounds of standard
game theory to the less developed field of games with misperception. l
Standard games in game theory, whether perfect or imperfect
in information, satisfy the following condition (actually, an analogue
of the reflexivity condition of ep1stem1c logic): at each game
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situation, the actual situation is a r'eMber of every player's information
set at thdt situation. Eve~ if a player does not know exactly where the
game is at. at least he is not totally off the mark.
Which is what players in a dialogue game often are. In order
to do jus~fce to this eccentricity of players' 1nformat·o~ in dialogue
games. we cannot any more meke do with the simple device of concentr1~
information sets. Instead, we have to as it were allow each player his
own representation of the game to serve ~s the guide in strategy choice.
Among other things. this wi 11 requ', ""e a redefinition of establ ished
strategic notions as well, in particular, the whole question of ration-
al tty (detennination of optimal strateg1!S as the solution of t~,e game)
will come up to reconsiderat1op.2 However. these notions are to be
extended to dialogue games, we shall try to ensure that they will be
proper extensions of the corresponding concepts of standard games:
dialogue games will reduce to standard gaMes when the reflexivity
assurnpt1 on ;.~1ds.
So let us start pondering how to generalize the game theoretic
notion of information set.
Of course. the description of a game as one of perfect or
imperfect 1nfonmat1on depends o~ the aims of the game. If players in
a dialogue game want to find out facts. the ga~e situations must dis-
tinguish false sentences from true sentences. If the playe are only
interested in agreement, game r1tuations will be essentially different
only when players agree or disagree, whatever the facts. In each case,
the game will be one of imperfect information if there remain
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essentially different game situations which players cannot distinguish
from each other.
It is clear from our statement of the aims of the players of
a dialogue game that an objective description of a game situation must
distinguish at least
(1) Whether a given answer to a topical question is true or not
and
(11) Wh~ther any given player accepts a given answer to the topical
question or not.
Further, it is assumed that players may have imperfect (even incorrect)
information about ~ame situations which differ with respect to (i) and
( i ; ) .
Our representation of a typical dialogue game situation ought
to have, then, at least the following properties. It determines for
each player a set of sentences which represent the assumptions the
player accepts at the stage of the game (as answer to topics of discus-
sion or as background assumptions). Among the players, we include a
designated "silent partner" called Nature. Nature 15 supposed to hold
the right answers to all questions the other players are interested in.
This assumption allows us to subsume (1) as a special case under (11)'.
In particular, it should be possible to read from the
representation what each player assumes the others to assume. and so
on indefinitely. Fortunately, there already exists a framework for
representing iterated propositional attitudes in the epistem1c and
doxast1c logic developed by Jaakko H1nt1kka [61-72]. In the following
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few sections, I propose to turn Hintikka's seMantics for epistemic logic
into a description of a dialogue game situation that avoids some of the
drawbacks of standard developments of possible worlds semantics.
2. The Problem of Logical Omniscience
Perhaps the most serious single objection to a possible worlds
semantics for propositional attitudes involves the so-called problem of
logical omniscience. 3 The probleM concerns the validity of the following
epistemic analogues of alethic modal logic:
(2) r P
•
r- A knows that p
(3) A knows that (p &q) =A knows that p &A knows that q
On the assumption that (21)-(22) are valid truths about
knowledge, a possible worlds seMantics for knowledge suggests itself.
In it. 'A knows that' is translated into a universal quantifier over a
range of possible contexts of reference, or possible worlds. In this
case, the universal quantifier is naturally thought of as ranging over
such conceivable situations, or alternative states of affairs, as are
compatible with everything A knows --- in other words. such possible
circumstances which would not force A to revise his knowledge.
As the logic for an idealized epistem1c notion like
(4) It follows from what A knows that r
the principles (2)-(3) seem uncontrovers1al. Unfortunately, the
idealized concept (4) seems far removed from the everyday ep1stem1c
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concept of knowing: the words '·it follows from \'/hat U make a huge
difference. If the rule of necessitation (2) were true of everyday
knowers, who would need logicians, as even the remotest results of
logic would be obvious to everyone. (2) and (3) together imply another
principle of logical omniscience (known as the rule of regularity in
moda1 1ogi c) :
(5) ~- p q
r" A knows that p A knows that q
(5) is hardly true of even the keenest intellect: even Sherlock Holmes
at his dull moments fails to draw an essential inference. Denser types
may be unable to see even the simplest consequences of what they know.
Clearly, (?)-(5) at best pertain to a quite idealized sense of knowing.
something like the geometrical knowledge which Plato ascribes to the
serf boy in the Meno, or the tacit kn~lledge of grammar Chomsky ascribes
to his competent speaker in the Aspects.
However, as Hintikka already argued in his Knowledge and
Belief, this does not make the idealized concept (24) devoid of interest.
(24) does represent an important idealization, the logic of knowing for
a perfectly logical person. It is significant that we take a person's
ability to follow the consequences of what he knows as a measure of his
intelligence rather than his learning. Furthermore, whatever one infers
from what he knows is accepted as something he knows without further
argument: we do act as if the inferential knowledge uhad already been
there" in the person's head. Such aspects of the everyday concept of
knowledge can be explained if (4) is a correct idealization of the
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everyday concept of knowledge.
Fo11ovJing this train of thought, we can construe the epistemic
principles (2)-(3) as representing norms or constraints on epistemic
inference rather than surefire inference tickets. At the very least,
epistemic logic distinguishes inferences that fail because of human
obtuseness from ones that fail for reasons of principle, such as
(6) A knows that p or qi
therefore A knows that p or A knows that q.
We shall see how this point will be accommodated in our dialogue
• semantics for epistemic notions.
3. Model Sets and Model Systems
One important point about Hintikkals epistemic logic ought not
to be missed: its insights into reference and quantification in epistemic
contexts are cc~ceptual1y independent of the assumption of logical omni-
science. All that is involved in the former insights is the idea of
modality as ref:.rential multiplicity: the idea that each epistemic
context involves a multiplicity of possible contexts or points of refer-
ence on which the truth of individual sentences and the reference of
referring expressions may depend. 4
It is therefore worth inquiring whether the former insights
could be kept while relaxing the assumption of logical omniscience. For
this purpose, we have to see where the assumption of logical omniscience
exactly comes into the picture.
The first thing to realize about Hint1kka l s semantics for
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epistemic logic is that it is not literally a possi~le worlds semantics
at all. Possible worlds do not enter it as a set of unanalyzed semantic
primitives. Rather, the job of possible worlds is done by partial
syntactic descriptions of worlds, consisting of sets of sentences
Hintikka calls model sets. 5
What makes model sets a very useful logical tool is their
position as a bridge between semantic and proof theoretical ideas.
Semantically, a model set can be looked upon as the shortest syntactic
description of a possible world which is guaranteed to have an extension
into a complete theory of some model or other.
Syntactically, they give us a very simple and natural proof
procedure. To prove that a given set of sentences is consistent, it
suffices to show that it can be extended into a model set.
Hintikka's semantics for propositional attitudes is an extension
of the methods of model sets to modal logic. The main new feature
compared to the extensional case is that, owing to the multiplicity of
contexts of reference introduced by modalities, a whole set of model
sets may have to be constructed to show a set of modal sentences consis-
tent. one mode1 set for each different type of context (model or possible
world) that needs to be considered.
Such structured sets of model sets are called by H1ntikka model
systems. A simple set of rules for constructing model systems suffice
for a quantified version of the ep1stem1c logic characterized by (2)-
(3).6
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4. Impossible Possible \lorlds
We are now in a position to explain how Hintikka's episteMic
logic comes to embrace the principles of logical omniscience (21). (25).
What is at fault is that every model set that goes into an epistemic
model satisfies model set conditions which guarantee its logical
consistency.
That this assumption is what validates the principle of logical
omniscience ;s easy to see. According to the possible worlds transla-
tion rule for A kno~/s that, A could fail to know some logical consequence
of what he knows only if that consequence could be false, for all he
knows. i.e., its negation could be embedded into some model set alongside
with everything he does know. But then such a model set would be logi-
cally inconsistent and hence certain to violate the extensional model
set conditions.
In other words. what is at fault is the requirement that all
the epistemic contexts compatible with what someone knows can be extended
to full consistent descriptions of poss1bl( worlds. worlds in which all
the SJme laws of logic hold as in our own. To put it in the form of a
slogan. logical omniscience follows from the assumption that all epis-
tem1cal1y possible worlds (contexts compatible with what someone knows)
are also logically possible worlds.
If one thinks of possible worlds as serious alternatives to
the real world, this assumption may seem unavoidable: how could a real
world contain contradictions? Taking a less absolute position, consider-
ing a possible world any structure with an associated interpretation of
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a language in that structure, it is easy to imagine othe~Jise. There
are then several ways of making sense of the idea of an uimpossible
possible world". One may complicate the structure of possible worlds.
Or one may let the interpretation of a language be deviant at an
impossible world: 'p and not p' is a contradiction only if the meanings
of 'p', 'and', and 'not t are the standard ones. Alternatively, one may
allow the structure of a model to change imperceptibly as one proceeds
in evaluating sentences with respect to it: this also would create an
impression of a contradictory world. 7
In the syntactic approach to model theory we have been
considering of late, one can just continue to consider sets of sentences
as their own mo6els: a model for an impossible world is simply a con-
tradictory set of sentences, one not closed under model set conditions.
The results of this relaxation are disastrous for completeness
theorems: the modal logic determined by such a semantics has in the
extreme case no interesting structure at all. But that is a move in
the right direction when the everyday seMantics of knowledge (and even
more, that of belief) is concerned. People do have contradictory beliefs,
and that has to be recognized in any realistic semantics of belief sen-
tences. What is important, though we lose a logic. we still have a
semantics. The essential insight of possible worlds semantics of modal-
ity as referential multiplicity is retained: the emphasis in "several
possible worlds" is not on possible but on several. Hint1kka's insights
into quantifying in and in the de dicto-de re distinction are not lost.
What is more. we can see epistem1c logic arise again as a limiting case
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of the more general semantics, when all epistemic alternatives happen
to be logically consistent.
5. Assumption Lists as 'Small Worlds'
The reader may have started to guess the relevance of the
above discussion to the dialogue game approach. The starting insight
is that the assumpt~on lists involved in the dialogue games are nothing
but other sets of sentences. What we plan to do is reinterpret the
assumption lists of the dialogue games as epistemic contexts of reference
of a sort, a sort of "small possible ~/orldsu. One appeal ing upshot of
this idea will be that the logical consistency of such "possible worlds"
will be up to the players themselves: keeping one's set of assumptions
in harmony with a set of model s}~tem conditions will be part of the aim
of the game. A player's success in a ~ialogue gane will depend on his
ability to think consistently, i.e., to make sure that no hidden contra-
dictions are buried in the assumptions he entertains.
Another advantage is that our standard descr1pticn of a
dialogue game situation will be a familiar sort of structure, i.e., a
model system as already known and extensively studied in possible worlds
semantics.
The essential step that has to be made is to replace the unique
set of assumptions assigned to a player so far with a whol~ class of such
sets of assumptions. as partial descriptions of such alternative epis-
temic states of affairs that he is prepared to face: these sets of
sentences will do for us the work of the several possible worlds of
possible worlds semantics.
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The original set of assumptions which represented the player's
actual acceptations will now be the intersection of all the alternatives
he is prepared for: they are the sentences that he expects to find true
whichever epistemic alternative turns out to be correct.
Note that we cannot define the set of the alternative epistemic
states of affairs for a player conversely as the set of all maximal
extensions (complete theories) consistent with the player's beliefs, for
these beliefs, and the alternatives themselves, may be inconsistent to
start with. The set of alternatives must be taken as a primitive notion.
We do not want to put any r~ady-made constraints of completeness and
consistency on the epistemic states of affairs descriptive of a player's
mental state (epistemic attitude). It is just the fact that they are
"small worlds", not closed under logical consequence, that allows the
player to entertain them as real alternatives.
The standard form of description of a dialogue game situation
will now be simply a generalized epistemic model system: a set 5 of
(possibly inconsistent) assumption lists. on which there are N binary
alternativeness relations defined, one for each player in the game and
a designated alternative singled out as Nature's list of assumptions.
Nature's alternativeness relation can, if needed, be defined as the
identity relation: in each s~tuation, Nature knows everything there is
to know.
Any given player's epistemic alternatives in a game situation
are then simply the assumption lists accessible from Naturels list of
assumptions by that player's accessibility relation.
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The assumption of imperfect information ;n the diaiogue games
now means that a player, in general, can not distinguish between model
systems which keep his own alternativeness relation invariant; he cannot
tell what Nature's assumptions are nor does he generally know with any
precision how the other players' accessibility relation~ actually look
like.
Relative to such a description of a typical game situation,
we can formulate the following simple truth definition for acceptance:
(7) Player P accepts sentence S at the alternative A iff
S is included in the intersection of p's epistemic alterna-
tives to A.
The term laccept l is used here as a noncommittal cover term for a number
of related propositional attitudes: if true ~nd backed by appropriate
evidence, acceptance counts as knowledge. if suitably steadfast, as
belief; if its object is a question rather than a statement, acceptance
counts as interest or wonder. I shall occasionally use these or other
more colloquial words intending the present technical sense.
As is implicit in the above. an important novelty about (7)
is that it is designed to be independent of the grammatical mood of S:
we shall be speaking indiscriminately about accepting or rejecting ques-
tions as well as declarative sentences. 8
The intersection condition in (7) ensures that P has to actually
consider or entertain S at A in order to (actively) accept S: S must
occur in one and in all of piS epistemic alternatives. A player may
fail to accept a sentence for several different reasons. It may be that
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he accepts the denial of S; if he is consistent, S will be absent from
his epistemic alternatives. Or perhaps he has just not thought about S:
both S and its denial are absent from his assumptions. Or P may be
entertaining S but does not include it in every epistemic alternative of
his: for instance. its denial may be also considered a live possibility.
To spell out explicitly the weaker (though not quite dual)
notion of entErtaining a sentence, I introduce the definition
(8) Player P admits sentence S at the alternative A iff
S is included in the union of piS epistemic alternatives
to A.
6. An Example of a Dialogue Game Situation
To make it easier to visualize a dialogue game situation. let
us draw an example. We shall consider the following situation. Three
applicants are e1amined for a certain position. say they are girls trying
to get elected as the Dallas Cowboy cheerleaders. They are told before-
hand that at least one of them is going to pass the exam - but possibly
more, even all. Each applicant can watch the others doing the tests
and can tell whether they will pass or not. But it is impossible to tell
what the judges are thinking when one is going through one's own number.
After everyone has done the tests, each girl is anxious to
know if she passed: all that she knows is that the other two did. 9
This game situation can be depicted by the following diagram.
(9)
F\
A failed
B failed
C pat:ed
A failed
B passed
C passed
W
A
F\
A failed
B passed
C fa; led
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c
The seven groups constitute the epistemic
alternatives in the game situation. The actual situation, or Nature's
alternative, is the center one: all girls were accepted. The network
of arrows connecting the lists describe the accessibility relations for
each player. Each girl's information set consists of Nature's alterna-
tive together with that alternative which is connected to Nature's
alternative with a bidirectional arrow labeled by the girl's initial.
Thus interpreted, the diagram (9) tells everything the gir'ls
know and don't know about the outcome. For instance. A does not know if
she passed or failed: she cannot tell between the two alternatives in
her information set. But Aknows that B dnd C know whether A passed.
Furthermore, she knows, or can infer, that neither B nor C are sure of
their personal success, for she knows B to know that C passed, and C
to know that B did. (Only if a girl had seen both of her competitors
eliminated could she be sure of winning.)
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What is even subtler, A can't be sure that ~ can exclude the
possibility that C already recognizes herself as the winner. For all
that A knows, B may already know that A has flunked, and not knowing her
own fate, B may fear tnat C has been able to draw the obvious conclusion.
All this rather subtle information is reflected in a concise
form in the diagram (9).
7. The Aims of the Game Revisited
The possible worlds description of a dialogue game situation
as a model system allows a reformulation of the aims of a dialogue game.
The starting point is the assumption that Nature, as a designated player,
is ideally situated with respect to the informational ai~s of the
dialogue. She always satisfies the maxiMs of consistency, information,
and truth to an id~~l degree. To wit:
(i) Nature is consistent, i.e., satisfiable and cog~nt. Her
assumptions are closed under logical infer'ence and she
agrees with herself.
(ii) Nature is informative. Her list of assumptions includes
every true topical question in the dialogue; she has a
complete answer to everyone of them; she only has one
epistemic alternative. 10
(iii) Nature is truthful. Her list of assumptions contain only
true sentences.
Then the first three dialogue maxims can be condensed into one
maxim: Try to agree with nature. The maxim of consistency implies that
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the player imitates nature by trying to keep his assumption lists clcred
u~der the logical game rul~s and rejecting alternatives which contain
contradictory assumptions. The maxim of information implies that the
player aims at a minimum number of completely answered ep1stemic alter-
natives. and the ~axim of truth implies that he tries to zero in on
Nature's alternative in doing so.
The rema;~1ng maxim of conversation, the maxim of agreement.
is also ultimately aimed to simplify the outcome of the ga~. According
to it, players prefer for everyone to end up adopting identical positiors.
Eventually, su~h sharing of information will diminish the number of
epistemic altern~~1ves, approaching Nature's designated alternative as
a limit.
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Chapter 3
QUESTIONS
1. Indirect Questions
The possible worlds analysis of epistemic notions derives
particular interest from the insight it gives into the logic of questions.
It is easy to give indirect question compleMents of 'know' simple and
revealing analyses in the language of H1nt1kka's epistemic lo9ic. l
Consider the paradigmatic question types below:
(1) A knows whether he won (or not).
(2) A knows whether he (won) or B (won) cr C won.
(3) A kn~i who won.
(4) A knows who wants tea and who wants coffee.
(5) A knows who wants what.
Hintikka observes that these question types have simple paraphrases in
tenms of the construction A knows that p plus SOMe logical (propositional
and quantificational) apparatus. Thus the simple sentential (yes-no)
question (1) can be paraphrased in either of the ways
(6) A won and A knows that (he won) or
A did not win and A knows that (he did not win).
(7) If A won A knows that (he won) and
if A did not ~1n A knows that (he did not win).
It is easy to ~ee that the disjunctive paraphrase (6) is logically
equivalent to the conjunctive (or conditional) paraphrase (7). Note that
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the natura1ness of both paraphrases ; s di rect ly con fi rmed by gr'ammati ca1
fact: the disjunctive form of (6) is in evidence in the optional tag or
not in (1), while the conditional paraphrase (7) motivates the use of if
in the place of whether in the more colloquial locution
(8) A knows if he won.
A won and A knows that (he won), or
B won and A knows that (B won), or
C won and A knows that (C won).
If A won, A knows that (he won), and
1f B won, A knows that (B \~on) t and
1f C won t A knows that (C won).
(10)
Similar paraphrases are available for the choice question (2):
(3)
This time the two paraphrases (9)-(10) are not automatically equivalent.
The disjunctive paraphrase implies the conditional one only if at most
one alternative is true (at most one player won), and conversely the
conditional paraphrase implies the disjunctive one only if at least one
alternative is true. We may call the last mentioned condition the
existential presupposition of the disjunctive question, and the former
condition its uniqueness presupposition. Using 'either-or' to indicate
exclusive disjunction. (9)-(10) are equivalent on the combined presupposi-
ti on that
(11) Either A (won) or B (won) or C won.
It does seem that a disjunctive question like (2) often carries the sort
of combined presupposition (11) that makes the two putative paraphrases
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(9)-(10) equivalent.
It is not difficult to recognize sentential questions as a
special case of choice questions.
A search question (or wh-question) like (3) has analogous two
~araphrases in terms of quantifying into a knowledge context:
(12) Someone won and A knows that he won.
(13) If anyone won, A knows that he won. 2
Again analogously, the existential paraphrase (12) implies the universal
one (13) only if at most one player won and the converse implication
holds only if at least one player won. We may call
(14) Someone won
the existential presupposition of the search-question (3) and
(15) At most one won
the uniqueness pn~suppos1t1on of (3). Again, it is not uncommon for
(3) to presuppose both of (14)-(15). But the tendency is not quite
watertight. Some uses of question clauses suggest only one or another
of the two paraphrases. An existential paraphrase is appropriate for
a "for instance" sense such as in
(16) A knows how he can win
which only says that A knows at least one winning strategy, whether or
not he is aware of others. The existential reading is also encouraged
by the subjunctive mood:
(17) A knows who might help us.
A knows who wants what.
If anyone wants anything, A knows that he wants it.
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(17) can very well mean that A ~nows at least one he"lpful individual,
he need not be able to rattle off an exhaustive list. Yet there is no
implication that there might not be more than one putative helper. In
these examples, it is clear from context that the interest of the
questioner is satisfied by anyone example. This point may be quite
explicit in the question too:
(18) What is an example of a perfect number?
The semantics of (18) nakes it ~uite clear that any one exampl~ will do.
On the other hand, there are questions which have a 'list'
sense, such as (4):
(4) A knows who wants tea and who wants coffee.
Here, the obvious paraphrase is a universal one:
(19) If anyone wants tea, A knows that he wants tea, and
if anyone wants coffee, A knows that he wants coffee.
Conjunctive questions like (4) can actually be considered as instances
of multiple questions, questions like (5), whose ~ost natural paraphrase
is (20):
(5)
(20)
The close relation of (4) to (5) is particularly evident when
what in (5) ranges over tea and coffee: then (4) and (5) are actually
equivalent.
One way of looking at (4) is in fact to see in it a double
question combining a search question (who?) with a choice question
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(coffee or tea?). There;s even some temptation to rephrase (4) quite
faithfully to this analysis as
(21) Who wants coffee or tea?
The fact that (21) can mean the Sdme as (4) 1s exp1a1ne'J by
noting that the choice connected with the disjunction ~ in ques~ions
is left to the answerer(s). From the point of view of the questioner
of (21), ~ represents an opponentls move, i.e., becomes equivalent to
and. (This phenomenon of duality switch is known in deontic logic as
the free choice permission paradox.)3
It might seem that, however things might be with simple search
questions, multiple ones at least only admit of a universal reading.
This impression, I submit. is misleading.
Naturally, a multiple search question echoing a foregoing
assertion does not expect a list as an answer:
(22) "Ann was in trouble. All she r·eally wanted was advice. She
had found out something about somebody and wanted to know
what to do about it. 1I
"What had she found out about who?"
III don't know. She wouldn't tell me." Rex Stout: Not Quite
Dead Enough, p. 12
However, (22) can be discredited on the grounds that A's previous
claim amounts to a uniqueness presuppos1t1on, in which case, as we noted,
the universal and existential readings coin~1de.
What is more to the point, I do not find a uniqueness assumption
necessary to make sense of an incredulous question like
(23) A: Was it not awful the way those people lied to each other?
B: What do you mean? Who did you think lied to whom?
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B ;s challenging A to produce SOMe examples: there is no implication
that exactly one lie was told, if any, nor does B need a complete list
to be convinced.
Another example comes from literature:
- What was Lawson doing in Gorsemere in that evening?
- He was being set up to be murdered, said Henry grimly,
but he imagil'ed that he had a date with Harry Heathfield
to discuss the purchase of Lady Griselda. Heathf1eld
had no appointment with Lawson, of course, but Pennington
assured Lawson it was all arranged. In that way, he
knew exactly where Lawson would be, at what time. (Moyes:
The Curious Affair of the Third Dog, p. 211)
It seems to me that what the named Pennington accomplished by setting up
the false appointment was determine one particular space-time juncture
at which he could be sure to locate his victim. Here, it would be absurd
to claim that Lawson's space-time coordinates were unique, nor does the
story imply that Pennington was aware of Lawson's complete itinet'ary and
timetable.
2. Direct Questions
The above paraphrases of indirect questions in terms of
epistem1c logic have proved useful in the analysis of direct questions
via the introduction of the notion of the desideratum of a direct ques-
tion. In H1nt1kka's analysis, a direct question amounts to a request by
the questioner that the addressee bring about a certain epistem1c state
in the questioner (provided that the presupposition of the question is
true): thus, e.g., the choice question
(24) Is he mad or drunk?
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can be paraphrased as
(25) Assuming that he is either mad or drunk,
bring it about that:
I know that he is mad or I know that he is drunk.
Here the first line of (25) represents the presupposition of the direct
question (24), the second line its optative operator (its mood as a
request), and the third line repre~ents its desideratum (the ep1stem1c
attitude the questioner wants to be brought about). The appropriate
desideratum may vary according to need and circumstance: for instance,
an examination question would have as its desideratum that the examiner
knows whether the subject knows the right answer to the question (the
examiner may know it already).
My analysis of the function of direct questions in dialogue
can be construed as an attempt to describe a semantics for the paraphrase
(25) for (24) (and similar pairs). In particular, the contribution of
the interrogative mood (represented by the imperative or optative opera-
tor of (25) is described by spelling out conditions of appropriate
(rational) use of direct questions as moves in dialogue games.
Similarly, the notion of the desideratum of a question will be
absorbed in the game-theoretical description of the aims of a dialogue
game.
These analyses aim to do away with the syntactic concepts of
optative operator and desideratum in favor of a semantic account of the
meaning of questions. These syntactic concepts will therefore not play
any explicit role in the following discussion. useful as they are as
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an intermed~ary level of abstraction.
An analysis of direct questions along the lines of (29) forces
an important distinction between syntactic conditions of answerhood and
functional ones. The linguistic form of each type of question suggests
canonical linguistic forms of answer to that type of question. But
observe that the analysis of the function of direct questions exemplified
by (25) is quite independent of such considerations. Functionally, any-
thing can serve as an answer to a question that fulfills its aim, i.e. t
brings about the truth of its desideratum. We shall see that both aspects
of answerhood are rather straightforwardly and illuminatingly captured
by the present analysis.
A rough characterization of the syntactically simple form of
answer for each type of question is easy to give. The syntactical direct
answers to any question are the several immediate 5ubformulas of its
presupposition. where the presupposition ~f each type of question can be
obtained by simply dropping epistemic operators from the desideratum.
This means that in choice questions, direct answers consist of the
disjuncts of the respective presuppositions; while in search questions,
direct answers consist of substitution instances of the existential pre-
supposition. 4
Thus for instance, the direct answers to a sentential question
(26) Will he win?
will be the two disjuncts of its presupposition
(27) He will win or he wi)l not win.
It is easy to see why the syntactically direct answers to (26) are
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usually functionally adequate andwers to it, too. For the desideratum
of (26)
(28) I know that he will win or I know that he will not win
is satisfied by letting the questioner know either of the two direct
answers: either of
(29) I know that he will win
(30) I know that he will not win
imply the desideratum. If putting forward either of the direct answ~rs
to (26) does suffice to bring about one of the states (29)-(30), that is
all the addresses will have to do. But note that even less may suffice,
whatever is enough to bring about (28) - for instance, a gesture. And
conv~rsely, more may be needed, say if the questioner is deaf or doubts
the addressee's words. What is essential are the functional demands of
answerhood as spelled out by the desideratum.
Using the distinction between syntactically direct answers and
functionally sufficient answers, we may sharpen the pretheoretic notion
of answerhood. On basis of syntax, we can distinguish direct answers
from indirect answers. An indirect answer can still be decisive, if it
entails, with or without other assumptions that the questioner accepts,
a direct answer. Thus Did he win? is decisively if indirectly answered
by He losti the reply He did not lose in contrast, is likely to be
indecisive in the absence of suitable background information. In the
case of yes-no questions, it seems fair to say that a decisive answer
normally counts as a functionally sufficient or complete answer. We
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shall see that this is by no means true for search questions.
3. Answers to Search Questions
For search questions. the notion of a complete (vs. incumplete
or partial) answer splits into at least three different distinctions. We
shall call them respectively definiteness, exhaustiveness, and conclusive-
!!ill.
To give an intuitive feeling of these three aspects of
completeness, we may present an example dialogue for each of the corres-
ponding species of incompleteness. For depending on the respect in which
an answer falls short of being complete, the questioner's response ;s
typically different:
(31) - What did you find?
- I found a tool.
- What tool did you find?
- I found an awl.
(32) - What did you find?
- I found an awl.
- Did you find anything else?
- No.
(33) - What did you find?
- I found an awl.
- What is an awl?
- An awl is a tool.
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In the first dialogue (30), the answer is indefinite. The
corresponding notion of definiteness of an answer ;s not identical to
the syntactic notion of definiteness. In syntax, one usually means by
a definite noun phrase a proper noun, a demonstrative, relat1~e, or
personal pronoun, or a phrase whose determiner ;s either the definite
article (the) or the genitive form of a definite phrase.
The present notion of definiteness is different. According to
it, the definiteness of an answer depends on the identity criteria which
the questioner is assuming in asking a question. For instance, the last
line of (31) may well be a definite answer to the questioner's original
question despite its indefinite form. This is the case if the questioner
was only interested in the kind of thing found: as a name of a kind,
an a~l is as definite as the questioner cares. The questioner's original
desideratum could be formalized by using a special style of variables to
quantify over kinds of things:
(34) (EX)I know that (Ex) you found x & X(x).
Now in our sense, an answer is definite with respect to a
search question if it identifies a unique value for the initial quantifier
of the desideratum of the question within each epistemic alternative for
the questioner.
Thus the definiteness of an answer is relative to the
questioner'~ beliefs and interests, in particular. to the criteria of
identity he uses to establish the range of the initial quantifier, and
to his supply of background assumptions. The definiteness of an answer
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is thus clearly a pragmatic or context-depen~ent notion.
The follow-up question in the case of an indefinite answer ;s
typically a repetition of th~ question accompanied by some clarification
of the range of the initial quantifier of the desideratum. A simple way
to convey the criteria of identity assumed is to use a sortal noun phrase
as in (31). The identity criteria to be used then are those associated
with the accompanying sortal noun phrase: for instance, it is clear in
(31) that what is being quantified over are different (sorts of) tools.
Below, we shall refer to the just discussed notion of
definiteness by the term 'dialogue definiteness'.
Exhaustiveness, which is checked for in dialogue (32), concerns
quite another dimension. It has to do with the quantifier character of
the question ~uantifier. If a question is intended as an existential
one, e.g., as in
(35) What is an example of a perfect number?
any definite and conclusive answer of course also exhausts the interests
of the questioner. However, if a question is understood as a request
for an exhaustive list, as in
(36) Who wants tea and who wants coffee?
a single substitution instance may still fall short of exhaustiveness.
An answer to a universally understood search question, say (36), is not
exhaustive until it satisfies the desideratum, in the case of (36),
(37) If anyone wants tea, I know that he wants tea, and
if anyone wants coffee, I know that he wants coffee.
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Hence an exhaustive ~nswer must take into account every value of 'anyone'
present in the universe of discourse for which the conditional clauses
are satisfied.
Here, the follow-up question is a straightforward inquiry
about further instances of the same sort.
Finally, in (33), we are dealing with what Hintikka has termed
the conclusiveness condition of an answer. The problems connected with
the conclusiveness condition are difficult enough to warrant a somewhat
longer discussion. That will be undertaken in the following three
sections.
4. Conclusiveness
The typical syntactically direct answer to a question like
(38) Who won?
is a singular substitution instance of its presupposition
(39) Someone won,
say,
(40) A won.
When will an answer like (40) satisfy a questioner? Obviously not every
definite answer to (38) will be found satisfactory, at least not
(41) The winner won.
What is unsatisfactory about (41) is that the que~tioner is not made
any wiser by the answer: he will not know who the winner is if he has
to ask (38).
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As it happens, this intuition is already accounted for by the
principles of epistemic logic. For the desideratum of (38) is likely
to be
(42) I know who won.
On the other hand • all that an answer of the fonns (43) can
accomplish is that the questioner comes to know it is true, i.e., he
can trul~' say
(43) I know that A won.
When does (43) suffi~e to imply the desideratum (42)? That ~s easy to
~ee from the respective logical forms of (42)-(43) in epistem1c logic:
(44) (Ex) I know that p(x)
(45) I know that p(a)
The missi"9 premise which justifies the step of existential
Qeneral1zation from (45) to (44) 1S, according to epistem;c logic,
(46) (Ex) I know that (x = a)5
whose verbal rendition in the case at hand is
(47) I know who A is.
This argument neatly shows wny (41) fails to add anything to what the
questioner already knows: for the missing premise thdt would make (41)
a satisfactory answer is (48). nothing else than a r~1terat1on of the
original desideratum:
(48) I know who the winner is.
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We have shown. then, that the questioner of (38) will not be satisfied
with (40) unless he has an answer to the follow-up question
(49) Who is A?
A prob·em with this result is its apparent circularity: for
any answer for (49) 1n turn, 3ay
(50) A is B.
prompts a further identity question
(51) Who is B1
and so on ad infinitum, it would seeM. Of course, the regress is stopped
if the questioner actually knows who A is under some description or other.
But if he does not. how can he ever be satisfied? In plainer words, how
can new individuals ever be introduced to a questioner if he does not
already know them? On a superficial reading of what Hint1kka says of
this question in Knowledge and Belief, it looks as if there fs no way.
for he says there (p. 150):
[The conclusiveness condition] involves the recognition of
what may be called a logical conservation principle.
[According to it] no sentence in which a bound variable occurs
~1th1n the scope of one of the ep1stem1c operators ... will
be implied by sentences at least one of which does not have
this property. This fact may be thought of as [a] formaliza-
tion of the rough intuitive principle that ... a contlusion
in which the identity of at least one individual is assumed
to ~e known can be drawn only from premises at least one of
wh1c~, embodies the same assumptoion.
Yet it would seem that people can be introduced to someone's
acquaintance by no less mysterious methods than providing enough de:crip-
t1ve information about them: if a person or thing is described to me
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with full enough detail, there will be a point when it is justified for
me to say that I know who (or what) that person or object is as well as
anybody.
Actually, the contradiction is only apparent. In order to see
Hintikka's point in the above quote, we have to look at the semantics of
the conclusiveness condition (47). Hint1kka r s semantics for (47) is
simple enough in words, but it introduces quite intriguing conceptual
problems. According to Hintikka, (47) is true if and only if 'AI names
one and the same individual in all the epistemic altematives of the
quest; oner.
But when is an individual in one context of reference the same
is one in another context of reference? This is known as the problem of
cross-identif1cdtion across possible worlds (rather than within one). In
Knowledge and Belief. Hintikka notes that trans-world cross-identification
is dependent on the identity criteria assumed in each case:
In practice it is frequently difficult to tell whether a
g1 'len sentence of the form tl a knows who b is" ... is true
or not. The criteria as to when one may be said to know
who this or that man is are highly variable. Sometimes
knowing the name of the person in question suffices; some-
times it does not. Often Ifacquaintance" of some sort is
required. (p. 149)
The point of the previous quote seems clear now. As far as
the logic of knowing who is concerned - i.e .• formal relations of entail-
ment between knowing who-sentences and other sentences of epistem1c logic
(or their natural language translations) is concerned. the conclusiveness
condition is not easily improved on. In different contexts of use.
sentences of the form (47) can be satisfied in different ways, all
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according to the criteria of identity applied. Because of this
variability (and occasional vagueness) of trans-world identity criteria,
and the consequent instability of the truth conditions of knowing who
sentences. there are no formally valid relations of logical entailment
from descriptive (de dicto) knowledge to identifying (de re) knowledge. 6
This amounts to saying that there is no syntactic
characterization of trans-world identity: no verbal definition of 1nd1-
vidual essence in effect. There is no more reason to expect there to be
one than there is for assuming definability of identity even within a
possible world.
In semantic terms. a properly cross-identified individual can
be represented by a world-line: a (possibly partial) function from
possible worlds to indivi~uals in their domain.] Our syntactical analogue
of such an individuating function would be a function from descriptions
of possible worlds (i.e., sets of sentences) to descriptions of indivi-
duals in them (sets of sentences in which some particular name occurs
prominently). This simplification already glosses over one source ~f
difficulty for defining trans-world identity, as such a syntactic1zed
world line cannot depend on unverbalized aspects of a possible world.
Vet enough interesting complication remains for the simplification to
be instructive.
For one thing, the description of a properly cross-identified
individual may well depend on, and vary with. each context of reference.
No one description need hold of an individual in all the contexts or
possible worlds where it is found: an individual need not have any
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sort of essence which remains stable in every possible world, no real
definition which picks it out no matter what. It follows. among other
things, that to know who or what an individual is it is not necessary
nor sufficient to know that some particular description applies to it.
Secondly, it also follows that one may find out who someone
is by learning new information which is in no obvious sense about that
individual. For such background information may suffice to rule out
enough epistemic alternatives with the result that some individuating
function which was only partially defined in one's epi~temic alternatives
becomes everywhere defined in the remaining alternatives. This is how it
is that Sherlock Holmes can figure out the identity of the murderer by
purely circumstantial evidence - say by eliminating all other candidates.
These observations already suffice to exclude any overly
simplistic approach to refining H1ntikka's criterion for knowing who.
It becomes clear that it can be improved on only by analyzing questions
case by case and ascertaining what the relevant criteria of identity are
in each case. In the following few sections, we shall take up some such
special cases.
5. What-g~est1ons
Despite their variability and occasional vagueness, genuine
identity criteria can be expected to satisfy some minimal requirements
of well-behavedness.
One plausible condition proposed by H1ntikka is that
individuals characterized by one and the same set of identity criteria
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cannot split or merge into one another: individuating functions based
on the same criteria of identity must be identical if they intersect at
all. In epistemic terms, well-known individuals cannot be confused with
one another: if one knows who or what A and B are, one is bound to know
whether A is the same as B or not. a
This requirement can be turned into a test of conclusive
answerhood: a conclusive answer to a search question must enable the
questioner to distinguish the object inquired about from any other
objects which he already knows (relative to the same identity criteria).
Another, more superficial test suggested by Hintlkka is
appending the words "I do not know but" to an answer: the addition 1s
not appropriate if the an5werer considers the answer already conclusive.
Armed with th~se tests. we can make at least some of the most
-
important distinctions among diffe~nt criteria of identity. The most
obvious - though little discussed - observation is that by far the most
inquiries concern kinds of object rather than individuals. 9 For instance,
the archetypal identity question
(52) What is that?
typically asks for the kind of object pointed at rather than the indi-
vidual specimen. Hence it can very well be conclusively answered by a
syntactically indefinite noun phrase such as
(53) It is an awl.
Indeed, it would sound quite odd to qualify (53) by "I do not know butlt.
Note that an adjective or a non-sortal noun would command such a
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qualification:
(54) I do not know, but it is sharp (a nuisance).
Now Hintikka's conclusiveness condition predicts that (53),
if really inconclusive as an answer to (52), would elicit a generic
follow-up question:
(55) But what is an awl?
(55) is the question to ask if one is ignorant of the identity criteria
of awls (the kind of tool), i.e., the criteria of application of the
noun awl. Thus a fully conclusive answer to (55) in turn would be some-
thing like a dictionary definition of an awl. describing its main
descriptive and functional characteristics in more familiar words.
The first mentioned identity test agrees with the above
analysis. I can know in some conclusive sense what I just had in my
pocket (i.e., a fountain pen) ~nd what my neighbor holds in his hand
(a fountain pen, too), without knowing whether he has my pen: wh,~t I
do know is that it is the same kind of thing (a fountain pen) in E!ach
case.
On the other hand, we also realize that it is not a loose sense
of cross-identifying individual pens that is involved here: for my
knowledge does not allow the inference that his pen ~ my pen in any
sense, however loose.
To clarify the distinction between definiteness and
conclusiveness, note what might happen if (52) were answered by
(56) (I do not know but) it is some tool.
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The questioner might impatiently retort
(57) I know that it is a tool, but what tool is it?
The retort clearly indicates that the questioner is after a sortal answer
rather than an individuating one. What is wrong with (56) is not that
the questioner would not know what tools are. What is wrong is that the
answer is not definite enough. The questioner wants a more specific
answer: the criteria of identity he assumes do not allowing identifying
any two tools as the same sort of thing.
Though easily confused, definiteness and conclusiveness thus
clearly concern different dimensions. Definiteness pertains to individua-
tion within an epistemic alternative: the question is whether an answer
succeeds to pick out a unique value for the question quantifier in each
epistemic alternative in turn. Conclusiveness concerns cross-world
identity: the question whether an answer succeeds to pick out the same
value from all epistemic alternatives. Conclusiveness is thus a strictly
stronger notion than definiteness.
We may summarize the observations made in this section as
follows. The word what can frequently be replaced without change of
meaning by what kind of (thing): accordingly, it can be .definitely and
conclusively answered by an indefinite noun phrase of the form an X,
provided only the questioner knows what XiS are (conclusiveness) and is
prepared to identify any two XiS as the same sort of thing (definiteness).
6. Who-questions
The generic interpretation is in evidence in who-questions too.
For instance, the question
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(58) Who is the most powerful man in Finland?
can be conclusively answered by
(59) The President
even if the questioner does not know who the President is. What he is
asking for is an office or a social station rather than an individual
person. Accordingly, an answer like
(60) Kekkonen
;s likely to elicit the further query
(61) But who is Kekkonen?
asking the addressee to identify Kekkonen's position of power rather than
to describe him as a private person. For instance. (59) will be a satis-
factory answer to (61) if the questioner knows what sort of an office
the President's office is.
The only difference here to previous examples is that the kind
of person sought for is an exclusive one: just one actual person may
exemplify it in any context of reference. In more fashionable terminolo-
gy, the last example looks for an in~1vidual concept rather than for a
comnon kind.
Perhaps the most trivial individual concept conceivable is one
associated to a proper name. But as Hint1kka noted, even a name may be
a conclusive answer to a who-question in sam', contexts, e.g., in the
context of a sports quiz. Acontestant is considered to know who won
some event or other 1f he can come forwa rd wi th the name of the pe\'son
(and perhaps, his or her nationality). The conclusiveness cond1t1~n
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here boils down to little more than the requirement that the answerer
gets the name right (does not confuse it with other names). The sports
context also provides an example of a who-question that can be satisfied
by a syntactically indefinite answer: the question
(62) Who won?
can be conclusively answered by
(63) A Russian.
if the questioner is interested in nationalities rather than individuals.
A more idiosyncratic example of search for a kind of individual
•is found in Conan Doyle's story The Adventure of Charles Augustus
Milverton. The story starts with Dr. Watson picking up a visiting card
with the name, address. and profession of a certain Charles Augustus
Milverton printed on it. His curiosity about the man is not satisfied
by these facts: he asks his friend
(64) Who is he?
Holmes answers.
(65) The worst man in London,
and goes on to compare Mr. Milverton, rather unfavorably, to murderers
and snakes. Even th1S does not yet satisfy Watson, who asks ~gain
(66) But who is he?
Now Holmes replies,
(67) I'll tell you. Watson. He is tne king of all blackmailers.
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following up with a detailed description of Milverton's particular
method of blackmail. This seems to constitute a conclusive answer for
Watson, for in the sequel, he speaks of 'the fellow' as a familiar sort
of figure.
It is rathe. clear what sort of sortal identity criteria
.
Watson is operating here, given his friend's profession: he wants to
find out what kina of person Mr. Milverton is that Holmes would have
business with him: ;s ~e a client or a quarry, the victim or the per-
petrator of some kind of crime or other. His card or character do not
yet decide this question of identity.
Another example in which the intended conclusiveness condition
is spelled out in so many words is the following one from Agatha
Christie's The Man in a Brown Suit:
- Who is Colonel Race? I asked.
- l-hat's rather a question, said Suzanne. He's pretty
well known as a big-game hunter, and, as you heard him
say tonight, he was a distant cousin of Sir Laurence
Eardsley, I've never actually met him until this trip.
He journeys to and from Africa a good deal. There's a
general idea that he does Secret Service work. I don't
know whether it is true or not. He's certainly rather
a mysterious creature.
- What I want to know is. I said with determination, what
has Colonel Race yot to do with this? He's in it some-
where.
What the questioner wants to know is the role Colonel Race
plays in the complicated mystery and intrigue going on in the book:
her q~est1on will be conclusively answered when she can assign him a
unique role in the plot she is in the process of unraveling.
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In the following example, the relevant classification is in
terms of haves and have-nots: (P.G. Wodehouse, Cocktail Time)
- Who is this girl he's marrying?
- I told you at lunch. Belinda Farringdon, commonly known
as Bunny.
- No, I mean who 1! she? What does she do?
- Shels a commercial artist.
- Any money?
- I imagine not. Still, what's money? You can't take it with
you.
- No, but you can do a lot with it here .
•Hintikka ([130], p. 46) points out yet an example of this kind
from Anthony Powell's novel At Lady Molly's. I quote his own description
of it:
Everybody ;s interested in Lady Molly's new guest, but the
narrator to his surprise recognizes him as one of his
schoolmates:
"I know him."
"Who is he?"
"He is called Kenneth Widmerpool. I was at school with him
in fact. He is in the City."
III know his name of cour~. And that he is in the City. But
what is he like?"
Powell's narrator also intimates why the second speaker, Mrs.
Conyers, does not accept poor Mr. Widmerpool's name and
profession as a satisfactory answer to the question "Who is
he?". This infonnation is not enough for her to place
Widmerpool socially and morally in her world, to find his
'essential properties' for her purposes.
H1ntikka's description of the example suggests that Mrs.
Conyers would have been satisfied by an answer placing Mr. Widmerpool
into one of her social pigeonholes, e.g., by identifying him as 'a wel1-
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to-do marriageable gentleman". No matter if Mrs. Conyers knows nothing
more 0f him: it suffices that she wil I not misplace him socially, e.g.,
mistake him for a prince or a beggar.
If that is the case, Mrs. Conyers would not be likely to-claim
yet that she knows who Mr. Widmerpool is as an individual. Her informa-
.
ticn about him leaves all too much undecided about his life and character.
For one thing, she cannot be sure of identifying him among a number of
different well-off bachelors.
7. Personal Identity
This brings us to the awkward question, why can the narrator,
unlike Mrs. Conyers, say he knows who Mr. Widmerpool (the man) is. One
way of rephrasing the question is this. Suppose each were given a number
of different descriptions of Mr. Widmerpool, say, sets Ot~ sentences where
the name IIMr. Widmerpoolll occurs prominently. The narrator, who knows
Mr. Widmerpool, can be expected to be able to say off hand of many such
descriptions that they cannot be true of Mr. Widn~rpoolt while Mrs.
Conyers can exclude just a few.
We can now ask, how well must one clear such identification
tests in order to know who Mr. W1dmerpool is as an individual person?
Recall our syntactic characterization of an individuating
function: it is a function, partially defined in a set of de~cr1pt1ons
of alternative states of affairs, which picks out wherever it is
defined some description of an individual or other.
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The 'neal' Mr. Widmerpool is picked out by some such individuating
function; in particular, that function will pick out Powell's description rf
Mr. ~~~dmerpool in the different novels where this character makes an
appearance.
On the other hand, the name 'Mr. Widmerpool' is associated with
another function from alternative state descriptions to descriptions of
individuals: this is the trivial function which picks out whatever descrip-
tion (if any) sur.'ounds the name '~'r. Widmerpool' in each alternative. Now
since the narrator knows who Mr. Widmerpool is, his epistemic alternatives
form a subclass of such state descriptions where the two functions coincide
in values: where the ureal" Mr. Widmerpool matches ~he ulocal" description
- of Mr. Widmerpool.
From this we can derive an answer cf sorts to the question raised
at the beginning. Of course, the narrator does not have to be able to
recognize Mr. Widmerpool from any and every description - he does not have to
know everything there is to know about him. Why, it is a long time since he
last saw his old schoolmates; for all that he knows, the man might have been
abroad, got married, or started a business. There may be many descriptions
of Mr. Widmerpool of which he cannot say outright whether th~y are true or
not: any of them might be embedded into an ep1stemic altennative of his
without inconsistency.
But one condition stands: whenever the narrator fails to exclude
a description that is actually false of Mr. Widmerp,)ol, that is only because
he cannot rule out some alternative to the actual course of affairs where
that description would not be out of character for Mr. W1dmerpool to satisfy.
Say the narrator does not know if Mr. W1dmerpool is married; then it cannot
be out of the question that Mr. Widwerpool, being the man he is, could have
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got married had things turned out in a certain w~y that, as fa,· as the
narrator knows, they may have turned out.
In other words, for any description which the narrator thinks just
might be true of Mr. Widmerpool, he must allow some factual expla~ation com-
~~tible with his knowledge and with Mr. Widmerpool's personality.
This explication is of course perfectly circular, an explication
of meanlng as it is. It does not amount to a real definition of individual
essence, which would be too much to expe~t here anyway.
Are there cases where a who-qu~~tion does actually amount to an
inquiry intc personal identity? The following denouement from a detective
story is as good an example as I have been able to find (Pennington, of
course, is' whoduni t' here):
- But there is a whole lot more to explain. Who is this Pennington,
anyway, and how does ne come to be mixed up in all this?
- T~atls a very good question, Jane. Henry said, uecause it goes
right to the heart of the matter. Once you understand who Albert
Pennington is, it becomes very much easier to understand why he
did what he did.
- ~el1, who is he?
- He's the son of the late Sir Humphrey Pennington, a large~-than-
life, hard-drinking. heavy-gambling character from the fifties,
w.:') ran through most of his crnsiderable inheritance - iargrly
tnanks to his string of thoroughbred horses. Albert 1nher";ted
IIhJt was left of the rooney - still Enough to leave him a r'ich man
Ly most standards - together with tendencies to compulsive gambling.
transvestism, homo~exuality, violence, and - above all - slumming.
He couldn' t comp~te in the really wealthy world of horserac1ng,
so he tumed fI i s attenti on t\l the humb1er dog track. For some
ye~rs now he has been dmusing himself by assuming two personali-
ties. On the onp nand, the mustachioed, upper-class Mr.
Penni ngton t eran.,! of Major Watherby, acqua1 ntance of S1 r Arthur
aratt-Cunningham and n1s charming daughter, and beh1nd-the-scenes
Mr. 81g of th~ Red Dicky Marsh dogtrack mob. On the other, and
always 1" drag, a formidable, foul-nnuthed female - the "lYsterious
unnamed boss of the Larry Lawson gang. With his warped sense of
humor, he must have a lot of giggles. turning one gang against
the other and wt'tching the fun from hi3 elegant Chelsea house.
(rat .• c1 a Moyes t The Curi ous Affa1 r of the Th1 rd Dog, p. 208)
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We can see that giving an anywhere near adequate understanding of a
person's individual identity may require quite ,nvolv~d explanations of
his background and personality. W~at is particularly gratifying about
the above example. it vindicates Hintikka's condition of adequacy for
knowing who sentences: in order to know who Mr. Pennington is. one has
to be clear which characters of the plot he can be identified with.
Fortunately, it is seldom necessary to go into full detail
about anybody's personal identity. As Lord Icke.lham puts it in
Wodehouse's Cocktail Time to Barbara Crowe:
- God bless you, Frederick Ickenham. And who is Albert
Peasemarch?
- An intimate friend of mine. To tell you all about him -
his career, his adventures by flood and field, his favourite
breakfast food and so on - would take too long. What will
probably in~erest you most is the fact that he will very
shortly be marrying Phoebe.
Here, the last-mentioned fact is conclusive, for it is all that is needed
to remove the la~t obstacle from anoth!r successful plot of Lord
Ickenham's of spreading sweetness and light into his fellow beings'
lives.
8. Descriptive vs. Demonstrative Criteria
In one respect, the situation described in the Powell example
is a typical one for asking individual identity questions. In it,
W1dmerpool is at hand in person for the interlocutors to point at (or if
that is a social taboo. otherwise identify demonstratively). In
H1nt1kka ' s terms. there is a demonstratively identified individual span-
ning the questioner's as well as the answerer's perceptual alternatives
(alternative states of affairs that mdtch the speakers' perceptual
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field) .10
In Jur syntactic terms, we can think of such alternatives as
alter!1ative verbal des~riptions of ttie speaker's view, placing different
objects in them in such 'relations to each other as they might have as
seen from his point of view, and assigning them any properties they
might have as fa .. as he can see. Across such alternatives, the viewer
will demonstratively identify objects that occupy the same position with
respect to his own standing point (i.e., any objects are identified which
would appear the same to him from where he is).
What a questioner of a demonstrative search question like Mrs.
Conyers I
(68) Who is he?
wants to accomplish is to align the perceptual world line of 'he' or
'that man there' with a descriptive individuating function that spans
her epistem1c alternatives: as far as she knows, 'that man' could be
anyone. If she cannot do any better by looking more closely (so as to
eliminate further perceptual alternatives). someone has to help her
exc 1ude the excess of her epi 5 temi cal ternati yes unt 11 the ..'e remai n on 1y
such alternatives in which the demonstrative world line associated with
'that man' coincides with, say, the descriptive world line of Mr.
Wi dmerpoo1•
This duality of cross-identification methods is a common
source of questions of individual identity. Demonstrative cross-
identification may be what is sought too: for instance someone overhear-
ing the conversation in the above example might feel like asking the
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question
(69) Who is Kenneth Widmerpool here?
expecting no more than a demonstrative answer (e.g .• 'that man there'
accompanied by a gesture).
The positional nature of demonstrative methods of cross-
identification can be used as a clue to recognize their presence: (69)
is meant as a demonstrative question if it can be paraphrased by a
where-question:
(70) Where is Kenneth Widmerpool here?
9. Relative Identification
The range of a question quantifier is often restricted to some
given set of alternatives. When this is the case, the question word to
use in English is whi~h. Which resembles the definite article the. in
that it carries a pre~upposit1on of contextual uniqueness. For instance.
in the dialogue
(71) - Which man woni
- The best man won.
the question quantifier is likely to be restricted to some contextually
available ~las~ in which it expects to find just one true answer. It
is answered as e~pected by an equally context-dependent definite
description.
In particular. the range of which may be specified 1" the
question itself:
(72) Which one of A, B. and C won?
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As a result, the notion of a complete answer can also be relativized to
the class of antecedently given alternatives. In order for a putative
answer, say t
(]3) The best one
to be conclusive, it is enough for the questioner to be able to keep
the Iworld lines l of lA', IB I and Ie' apart and have just one of them
coincide with that of the best one - no matter if none of At Bt C, is
actually well-defined to the questioner as an individual. It seems that
this sort of relative identification is often all a questioner is after.
Then the range of the question quantifier is restrlcted to the 'individual
concepts I determined by the answer alternatives. An indication of this
is that on this assumption (72) is equivalent to the disjunctive question
(74) Did A win or B win or C win?
whirh (72) clearly often is. For another example, one may ask
(75) Which is ',eavier t an electron or a protC'n?
without Implying any deeper interest in knowing what an el~ctron or a
proton is; ':;e quest1on can be restated wi thcut 1ass of (nean i n9 by
(76) Is an electron heavier or lighter than a proton?
This concludes our discussion of the semantics of questions.
We 3re now in a position for an informed ~tscuss1on of how questions and
their answers are put to use in dialogue.
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Chapter 4
DIALOGUE GAME RULES
1. Simplest Theory of Dialogue
The simplest theory of dialogue would have just one rule: ~
player may put forward any sentence in any order. Such a rule should not
fall all too short of being observationally adequate: there are few
absolute restrictions as to what sequences of sentences might by hook or
crook be construed as possible dialogues. One can do a lot by judicious
choice of background assumptions and interpolation of suppressed steps
of reasoning.
So let us accept the simplest theory as our starting point and
see what can be done with it. The first rule of dialogue will be
(D. say) Any player may put forward any sentence.
An obvious restriction on (D.say) is that dialogue games are linear and
discrete: players move in turns, so that each play of a rialogue game
is a finite sequence of linearly ordered moves. Whatever the ultimate
explanation of this restriction in terms of. SaY. limitations of human
information processing capacity. this restriction gives rise to Uturn-
taking conventions" as dpscribed by Sacks. et al. [215]. The following
is a condensed version of their rules:
(1) The player ~t turn may indicate the next player to move.
Else the turn goes to the first player to move.
What (1) does is simply ensure a more or les~ orderly sequence of moves
by (0.54Y),
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I believe that (1), to the extent that it represents a valid
generalization at all, can be explained by reference to the linearity
requirement and general considerationsof dialogue strategy. Therefore,
I shall not include (1) or any other explicit turn-taking convention into
the theory of dialogue.
The minimal theory of dialogue consisting of (D. say) together
with the linearity requirement accords with certain observations made by
Sacks, et ale [215] about free conversation. They contrast conversation
to e.g. I rituals by noting that in conversation, what parties say is not
specified in advance (by the rules of dialogue):
( ... )
the turn-taking organization for conversation makes no
provision for the content of any turn, nor does it constrain
what is (to be) done in any turn. ( ... )
But this is not to say that there are no constraints on what
may be done in any turn. ( ... )
We note only that in conversation, such constraints are
orqanlzed by systems external ~u the turn-taking system.
One aspect of conversational flexibility is a direct and
important consequenc~ of this feature ~f its turn-taking
organization: its turn-taking organization (and thus
conversational activity per se) operates independently of
various character1zatlons of what occupies its turns,
the 'topic(s)' in them. (p. 710)
I take this to be a convoluted way of saying that there are next to no
fixed, content-independent rules to structure a dialogue over and above
(D.say) and linearity of dialogue. Any further structure dialogues havt!
can be inferred from the aims of dialogue part1c1pants and the expressive
means (language) at their disposal by essentia'l game-theoretical
(strategic) reasoning. In other words, the only further pressure a
dialogue exerts on its players is the strategic maxim: be relevant.
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2. Relevance
The concept of relevance thus becomes a central concept of the
theory of dialogue. The crucial consideration in the well-formedness
of a dialogue will be whether its individual moves have bearing on the
topic or subject matter of the dialogue, or whether they are irrelevant,
idle. or beside the point.
The dialogue game framewor~ ~~em~ potentially well suited for
the explication of the ~lus1ve concept of relevance. For, it seems to
me, the essential logic of r!levance is best visible in a number of its
goal-directed near synonyms: important, useful, helpful.
Two important points emerge from these paraphrases. First,
relevant is a relational world: a move may be relevant (useful) for one
purpose but irrelevant (useless) for another. Second, relevance
is relative to is the aims of a discussion - or the aims of individual
discussants if their aims diverge.
Hence to determine whether a given move in a given dialogue is
relevant, one has to determine whether it furchers the aims of one or
more participants of that dialogue. This is the core intuition which
particular examples and explanations sho~ld go back to. For ~nstance,
an answer is relevant to a question if anything is. Why? Because the
aim of the questioner is to create a consensus about the (or an) answer
to his question, and answering is the best way to further that aim.
Relevance judgments may vary dep~nding on the presence of a
furthet maxim of dialogue we have kept in low profile, viz. the maxim
of brevity:
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(2) Prefer a short dialogue over a longer one.
In a serious information-seeking discussion, the aim may be to share the
available information with the least possible speech effort. In such a
discussion, long-winding answers are likely to be dismissed as ir'relevant.
In social conversation. where one aim is passing the time pleasantly,
the same meanderings may be quite welcome and not at all "irrelevant ll •
In brief, the dialogue game explication of the notion of
relevance is in essence "utility relative to the dialogue aims of the
participants of the dialogue". A full game-theoretical formalization
of the concept of relevance would hence involve solving a dialogue game
for each player. i.e. I finding the optimal strategies of each player.
In practice. we shall be content with local qualitative comparisons of
relative relevance.
The present definition of relevance creates a link between the
concepts of relevar.~e and rationality. A rational player is by defini-
tion one who fol1o~s his optimal strategy (or strategies) - i.e., those
which (according to the theory) most effectively further his aims. This
means that a rational dialogue player makes only relevant moves. This
implies that the Gr1cean maxim of relevance becomes a corollary of the
game-theoretical reconstruction of dialogue. In the dialogue game con-
text. 'Be relev~~t!' says nothing more than 'Be rational! I.
3. Meaning Conventions
The players are free to put forward any sentences for the
other players to access according to the rules of the game. But what use
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is this freedom to them? In order to render this liberty useful, a bridge
must be provided from saying sentences to accepting them. I call such
bridges meaning conventions, as they spell out what players mean by what
they say.
The basic and most common principle of this character is what
I shall call the earnestness (or seriousness) convention. This convention
can be spelled out as a rule of dialogue games.
(D. earnest) Put forward a sentence only if you accept it.
At first blush, (D_earnest) sounds like another maxim of
conversation: actually, a close relativ~ to it is listed as one half
of Grice's maxim of quality.] The way we have sliced up ,natters, mean-
ing conventions are linguistic conventions. What mear,ing conventions
like (D.earnest) a~complish is a link from the sentences one says to
positions one accepts: they thus fix salient means for making one's
acceptations known. What makes them - including the earnestness conven-
tion - conventional is the fact that they have alternatives which serve
this same purpose equally well. To pick the most obvious alternative,
consider what might be called the irony (or sarcasm, or rhetoric) conven-
tion:
(D. irony) Put forward a sentence only if you accept its contrary.
{A contrary is often stronger than a mere contradictory of a sentence;
for instance, the contrary of 'That's great!' is not just 'That's not
great!' but rather 'That's awful! ,.)2
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As is well known from familiar SmlJllyan-type puzzles, a speaker
consistently following the irony convention ;s quite as informative as
one who consistently says what he means. This is what makes (D. earnest)
conventional. 3 Naturally, in some intuitive sense, the earnestness
convention is fundamental. (It is also simplest to state.) It is the
principle followed in uncomplicated, unsophisticated matter-af-fact
information exchanges. The irony convention and the other more compli-
cated alternatives can serve subordinate purposes, e.g., those of being
offensive, colorful, modest, or funny. They accomplish these subsidiary
purposes just because the earnestness convention is the first one that
comes to mind.
Of course, the usefulness of obeying a meaning convention at
all is predicated on the acceptance of the goal of information-sharing
in the first place. If other aims of language exchange override the aim
of information sharing, there is no need to follow any rule linking what
is being said to what is being accepted; whatever is funny, offensive,
colorful, or whatnot, will do.
Another tempting but misleading way of reading (D. earnest) ;s
to see in it a moral principle, an injunction against lying, in the spirit
of 'thou shalt not bear false witness'. This temptation is in evidence
in Searle's terminOlogy.4 Searle, in his analysis of speech acts,
singles out for each kind of speech act a p~cul1ar felicity condition
called the sincerity condition. For assertions, the sincerity ~ondit1on
says that the author of an assertion believes the proposition he p~ts
forward - apparpntly a restatement of (D.earnest). Actually, making the
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identification would be mis~~presenting Searle. Like Grice, Searle does
not recognize alternatives to the earnestness convention as real alter-
natives. His "normal input and output conditions" for speech acts rule
out "parasitic fonns of communication such as telling jokes"; presumably,
being sarcastic is excluded too. S
In our approach, considering the earnestness convention a
condition for sincerity would be a mistake. One does not have to say
what one believes in order to be sincere: on~ can well be sincere while
being sarcastic and saying the opposite of what one believes. In our
terms, being insincere equals cheating in whatever game one is playing.
Cheating, in turn, is violating the rules of the game intending the
violation to go unnoticed. In particular, lying ;~ playing the game of
cooperative information sharing with the private aim of creating a dis-
agreement of opinions known only to oneself. For this definition of
lying, it is immaterial what one says in order to induce the misunder-
stan j~ thus one can lie while speaking the truth (if one is misin-
formed oneself), even while saying what one believes (if one lets the
other think one is being sarcastic).6 From this, it is clear that it
is only under the "nannal input and output conditions", i.e., under
(O.earnest), that saying what one does not believe amounts to being
insincere.
More obviously, {D. earnest) is distinct from the fifth
commandment, rephrased as
(3) 00 not put forward falsehoods.
In our terms, (3) represents an amalgam of the earnestness convent1or
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with the maxim of truth. The maxim of truth can, if so ;s wished, be
construed as an ethical principle. However, (3) is a far more exacting
principle than 'do not lie'. As we noted~ one can lie while speaking
the truth; conversely, it is possible to say falsehoods with the sincerest
of intentions.
4. Suggestions
It is often useful for players to put forward sentences that
they do not actually hold, but do not reject either. This;s also infor-
mation about their ep;stemic attitudes, and being able to express it may
trigger off arguments that would otherwise pass unnoticed. For instance,
one may want to suggest an explanation, or make a guess at an answer to
a question, in the hope that others may judge whether they are acceptable.
Questions may repres~nt guesses too: thus a suggested
explanation for a search question in terms of a sentential instance is
nothing else than a guess:
(4) Who is it? Is it Jack?
The interpretation of an unadorned sentence as a suggestion
is provided for by another meaning convention:
(D. guess) Put forward a sentence only if YiU admit it.
As a marked option, (D.guess) is in nced of a disambiguating
context, lest one's contribution be taken in earnest. Such disambigua-
tion can be offered by an explicit request (Guessl ) or by the use of
appropriate intonation and gesturing.
- 97 -
There are ways to make guesses without relinquishing (D.earnest),
too. Suggestions anrl guesses can be explicitly marked as such by any
of a numbe~ of modality adverbs: perhaps and maybe ~~ing the most common
ones.
The ability of perhaps to defuse (D.earnest) can be captured
by the following rule of interpretation:
(O.perhaps) A player P accepts a sentence of form
x - perhaps- Y
if and only if P admits
x-v.
Thus, whenever a player entertains a sentence 5, he can accept the
sentence perhaps S. and henc~ is a1 lowed to put it forward in full
accordance with (O.earnest).
Note an interesting feature of the above rule of meaning for
·perhaps'. It does not have the form of a Tarskian truth condition 'S
is true if and only if p': it is not a condition for truth but a condi-
ticn for acceptance. In other words, the meaning of a word like 'perhaps'
is not a matter of semantics (truth conditions) but pragmatics (conditions
of use).
This can be seen as a vindication of W1ttgenstein's special
concern for the meaning of the word 'perhaps': it does constitute a
problem for the extension of the picture theory of meaning which the
Tarsk1an theory of truth has been taken to represent.] Note that I am
not saying that model theoretic methods could not be used to explicate
such pragmatic rules of meaning - that is just what I am doing! What
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'perhaps' shows is that the theory of truth for English does not exhaust
the theory of meaning for it.
5. Suppositions
As was indicated earlier, we want to go even further and allow
players at times to put forward sentences which they need not even admit.
It is often a good strategy vO assume something just for the sake of the
argument, to see if it is a viable position.
The main point to realize is that conducting an argument from
doubtful premises is no different from arguing from accepted ones. The
only difference is that the set of assumptions being developed does not
reflect anyone's doxastic alternatives via some meaning convention or
other.
Let us think what actually happens when one conducts a
counterfactual argument. Intuitively, one supposes something, i.e.,
lays down one or several hypotheses as the starting-point of the argument,
and follows through the consequences of the hypotheses. The steps and
methods of argument which one uses to extend the original set of hypo-
theses are the very same ones of deductive inference and inductive deci-
sion one uses to extend one's epistem1c alternatives.
Thus the problem of counterfactual conditionals: what would
happen if 5uch-and-such were the case, is no simpler than the general
problem of theory construction. In each case, one is faced with the task
of finding the best complete explanation of a number of evidential facts.
What is more, the counterfactual problem is seriously underdeterm1ned as
compared with the factual problem.
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In the factual case, where one's hypotheses do not decide a
auestion, one can go out and find out more facts. But what can one do
in the imaginary situation: where does one find imaginary facts? What
we actually do is make a conserv~t1ve assu~ption: where the hypotheses
of the counterfactual supposition do not decide one way or another,
assume the counterfactual situation is 11ke the actual situation.
This strategy has some interesting limitations. It may leat,e
many counterfactual questions undecided. if the actual situation has
nothing to say of them. Or there may be a number of competing ways of
extending the counterfactual situation, about equally plausible. This
indetenminacy creates such familiar paradoxes as
(5) White to Black: If I were you, I would give up.
Black to White: If you were me, you would not.
White imagines the players simply switching side3, while Black points
out that if White had Blackls personality he would be equally obstinate.
With its limitations, this seems to be a fair description of
how people in actual fact create epistemic alternatives. They start out
as counterfactual imagination; if they turn out to be inconsistent or
false to fact, they are rejected; if they pass the muster of inductive
deductive exam~nat1on and inductive evaluation, they become part of a
playerls system of belief.
To illustrate the uses of counterfactual argumentation, let
us consider some examples.
(6) A person who hurts no one who hurts him hurts himself.
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It may not be apparent that (6) is self-contradictor:t. But it can be
shown so by a counterfactual argument: 8
(7) For suppose some perscn A hurt no one who hurt hiffi. Then A
would hurt A. On the other hand, A would hurt no one who hurt
him. So A would not hurt A.
The counterfactual ait~rnat1ve violates (C.cons) and has to be rejected.
A more everyday use of counterfactual argument is to show a
supposition false to fact. The counterfactual alternative is internally
consi~tent here, but it is in conflict with the player's earlier accepta-
tions:
(8) It wasn't one of your regulars. For if it had been one of
your regulars, you would have recognized him. But you did
not recognize him.
There are two importantly different ways to handle such conflicts. A
conservative (and quite instinctive) way is to treat all and any earlier
acceptations as unquestioned evidence: one develops counterfactual
alternatives as so many extensions of the intersection of one's epistemic
alternatives, rejecting any inconsistent or impro~Jble ones. A more
rational approach is not to accord a privileged status to received
opinion, but to weigh each counterfactual alternative for its own merits,
using as evidence for the decision only such ass jmptions as are not
questioned in the situation at hand. (These may include independent
observations and other hypotheses whose acceptance does not depend on
the solution to the problem at hand.)
Thirdly, counterfactual argument is used in developing theories
and plans in a noncommittal fashion:
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(9) If I left now, I would avoid the rush and there would be
time to stop and shop.
Quite likely, the plan in (9) will actually be put into use, which serves
to show that being counterfactual need not mean being averse to the
argument.
Now a common indicator of counterfactual argun~nt in English is
the subjunctive mood. But what exactly is its contribution to such argu-
ment? We may first note that it is not an indispensable index: CQunter-
factual arguments are also conducted in the indicative. It seems to me
that whatever counterfactual force is associated to a conditional like
(7)-{9) above remains w.len the sentences !re rephrased in the indicative ..
Briefly, I sub~1t that as to logical force, a past subjunctive sentence
is equivalent to its indicative counterpart. 9
This assumption is confirmed by the observation that a
subjunctive conditional licenses detaching an indicative consequent given
an indicative antecedent:
(10) A: If it were raining, I would be in trouble.
B: It is raining.
A: Then I am in trouble.
An apparently serious objection comes from sentences like
(11) I would not try that.
which does not seem to imply
(12) I will not try that.
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However, it seems that the reason why (11) does not imply (12) is that
(11) is actually elliptic for
(13) I would not try that if I were you.
It is a general fact that elliptic sentences cannot be taken at face
value, whatever their mood: for instance one who answers the question
(14) What wil' you do if he comes?
by
(15) I will leave.
cannot be said to have promised to leave come what may. If it is clear
that all the necessary conditions are present, the inference from subjunc-
tive to indicative seems warranted:
(16) "Vou've moved the table."
"Certainly." ... "We were told things could be moved. II
"Yeah, the inspector would, with members 1n the high brackets.
If it haa been a dump he'd have kept it sealed for a month. II
The first speaker's subjunctive would seem to imply acceptance of the
second speaker's indicative ~.
Yet clearly, the past subjunctive is not wholly without effect.
The way I construe it. it serves an important dialogue function. I shall
try to spell it out by the following rule and definition:
•
(D. subjunct1 ve) Put forward a sentence in past subjunctive only
if you suppose it.
(17) A player P !upposes a sentence 5 iff S is a member of a hypo-
thetical alternative for P.
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By a hypothet1ca~ alternative I shall understand a list of assumptions
a player may construct by tne usual methods of model set construction
without (yet) deciding whether or not to include it among his epistemic
alternatives. We shall allow players to hold any number of hypothetical
altematives alongside their bona fide epistem1c alternatives at any
stage of the game. Such alternatives represent the players' suppositions t
thoughts or plans during the cor"ersation.
In words, what the subjunctive mood indicates is the relevance
of a sentence to a discussion: by using the subjunctive t the speaker not
only makes known an assumption of his, but also indicates where it is to
be put to use in the dialogue, viz. in som~ counterfactual argument or
other he is construct1ng. 10
Such counterfactual arguments are where one is to look for the
missing suppositions of elliptical sentences like (11). This force of
the subjunctive to suggest unexpressed provisos is what explains its use
in cautious or polite statements and questions:
(18) This would seem to confinm his statement.
(19) Could you open the window?
In (18), there is a suggestion of some qualification: "unless I am
bdd1y mistaken" or the 11kei in (19) the subjunctive helps construing
the question as part of a plan to get the window opened: could you do
the job if I asked you to?
6. Examples of Dialogue Strategies
So the only pr1m1t1vf dialogue game rule we have is (D.say).
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Of course, this minimum of rules is possible because all of the
interesting structure lies elsewhere: in the description of possible
game situations (model systems). in the epistemic explication of the
question-answer relation, in the statement of the aims of the game
(utility functions based on conversational maxims). the linearity
requirement, and meaning conventions.
To see how this substructure works to create structure to a
dialogue. let us derive a typical question-answer dialogue from it. Let
the dialogue be the following:
(20) A: Who are you?
B. I am Beth.
A: So yOJ are Beth.
B. Yes, I am Beth.
What happened? Simple: A put forward the topical question -
one she is interested in for whatever ulterior reasons - by the rule
(O.say). B can infer, by (D.earnest), that A accepts the question, i.e.,
wants an answer for it. Being cooperative, B is ready to join the game
and accept the question herself. Having accepted it, she also wants an
answer for it. Not surprisingly, she has little difficulty in finding
one among her assumptions. Faithful to the maxims of conversation, she
also wants to share it with A. This she does by putting forward her
answer by (D. say). Hearing it, A can use (D.earnest) to infer that B
accepts what she says. This is good evidence for the answer being true,
so A is just1f1e~ in accepting it too. Following the maxim of agreement,
she prefers letting B know this, which she does by repeating the answer.
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Applying (D.earnest) again, 3 now knows that A accepts the answer too.
B may still complete the hermeneutic circle of common understanding by
acknowledging A's acceptance. Both players now ~now who B is and know
the other knows it too. The discussion on the topic of B's identity has
thereby reached its aim ~nd the players can go on to further tOPics. l1
Interesting confirmation of the above account comes from a
statistical study of typical topic-closing moves in conversation (Weiner
and Goodenough, [180]). Recall the function of the two final repetitive
moves in (16): they du not introduce new information on the subject of
thQ 1;scussion, but serve to create a consensus on the information
already obtained. As soon as the consensus is reached, the dialogue
has attained its aim and the topic can be dropped. This prediction is
nicely confirmed by Weiner and Goodenough's data. They make the fol1ow-
ing observations about the function of the sort of "passing" moves we
are discussing:
Typically, no substantive moves occur on the same topic
after a p jsing mOVt pair. However, additional housekeeping
moves on the same topic may follow. For example, either
speaker may summarize the topic discussion or assess the
progress of the conversation at that point before advancing
to the next topic. These additional housekeeping moves
appear to be optional. however, since one of the speakers
often introduced a new topic directly after the passing
move pair:
Example 2: (Doctor-patient study)
Doctor:
Patient:
Doctor:
Patient:
Doctor:
Patient:
Doctor:
- and you say, as far as you know, you don't have
any other illnesses?
No, not to my knowledge.
High blood, or diabetes.
No.
OK.
MmhfYlll.
And you desire to lose weight. (p.219)
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In the last lin~ of the above example, the Doctor, satisfied that the
ai~ of the inquiry about the medical history of the patient has been
reached, opens another topic. Notice that this satisfaction is guaran-
teed by a pair of acknowledging moves.
The above example also exemplifies anot~er important type of
di a1ague roove. That 1s the Doctor' s mo\'~ of ins tant1 ati on from •any other
illnesses' into the individual diseases 'high blood or diabetes'. The
step here is one of logical inference. l'·s function may be that of
gathering further confirmation for the patient's claim. The doctor
may feel, with justification, that the patient's answers are more
reliable when they concern the iWdividual illnesses. Again, we have a
dialogue step whose rationale is given by our statement of the aims of
information-sharing dialogue.
7. Rules vs. Strategies
In games, there is sometimes a certain give and take between
the concepts of rule and strategy. I illustrate this with a (somewhat
fictional) example from chess. In chess, the game rules specify the
admissible moves at each stage of the game and the winning positions,
with the understanding that the players of the game aim to win. A
chess strategy is a particular scheme or plan of moves designed to
further the aim of the scheming player. A particular stra~egy is deemed
good or bad depending on whether it serves the aims of its maker.
Rules, in contrast, are given at the outset. They can be
considered good or bad only from an external point of view, whether ~hey
serve the purposes of the users of the game. For instance, chess is
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often played from quite cooperative motives: each player wants to
entertain and to be entertained. Yet White does his best to defeat
Slack and vice versa: thIs is even essential for the game to be e,lter-
taining. That is, the choice of the rules of th~ game (say, chess
rather than checkers) can be described as a more inclusive game whose
mo"es include alternative games complete with their rules. Then a
particular choice for a rul~ of chess can be a good or a bad strategy in
the game of game choice.
Consider from this point the option of resigning the game when
defeat is obvious. It is customary among proficient chess players to
admit defeat as soon as it is obvious for both parties that one of the
players has a win~ing strategy in the rest of the game. By now, resigna-
tion is an option duly registered in the rules of chess. At an earlier
point, it might have been better described as a convention of opting out
from a game at a point when it has lost its excitement: when playing
the game no more served the ulterior aim of entertainment. By incorporat-
ing thlS external strategical option into the internal rules of the game
it is ensured that the game is better apt to serve its ulterior purpose.
This fict1t1ou~ history of chess could be pushed further. In
chess as it is, all other pieces except the king can be captured
(replaced by an enemy piece and removed from the board). The original
purpose of the game may have been to capture the enemy king. However.
by current rules the game is already ended when a king can no more avoid
imminent capture. Of course, to actually capture a king once it has no
place to go would be futile, and to expose one's king to imminent capture
would be suicidal. Such obviously unexciting moves are actually ruled
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out in modern chess. Again, there is a gain for the interest of the game,
as the amended rules prevent certain obviously uninteresting game possi-
bilities. Here, then, may be another case where obvious strategic consid-
erations have become part and parcel of the rules of the game. These
rules are not at all unmotivated: actually, they reflect aspects of the
optimal strategies in the unamended game.
Analogous situations seem to arise in the theory of dialogue.
Sometimes, the question arises whether some feature of communicative
behavior should be considered a conventional rule of language games, or
as a likely (because effective) chnice of communication strategy. For
instance, is it a rule of language, or just a good strategy of informa-
tion exchange, to answer a question if one ca~? Or, is it a linguistic
convention or just common sense t~at one does not ask what one already
knows?
The natural inclination of course is to leave as much as
possible to be systematically explained by strategic considerations
rather than enumerated by arbitrary rule. For instance, surely it ;s no
grammatical mistake to ask what one already knows. It is just a foolish
thing to do if one wants to learn something new. In other contexts J it
may be quite rational. for instance, in a quiz or in court.
Ideally, rules ought to state only conventional f~cts: they
ought to register what cannot be explained by more general considerations.
Rules state what is arbitrary in a game: when a choice is imposed by
the rules of a language on its users.
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But as the chess example shows, the arbitrariness criterion
works on several levels. A good communicative strategy may, by force of
convention, get relegated into a rule of language. For instance, a parti-
cular form of question may get stabilized as a conventional expression
of request. Again, there is a gain in the shortcut. Given the conven-
tion, the complicated route from literal meaning to illocutionary force
via conversational implication is saved and correct understanding
expedited.
Yet ar~in, the resulting rule of meaning is not totally
arbitrary. The conversational implication is still there, explaining
why this choice of expression is a natural one. ~onetheless, it has
,
'become a convention. Another language may prefer another roundabout
construction for indirect request, equally well-motivated conversationally
but equally conventional. Each preference is arbitrary in the face of
the alternat1ves. 12
We can expect similar situations to arise when we start
formulating rules for dialogue games. Some communicative strategies,
though well motivated by general strategic considerations, may have
become the rule by force of convention. Such 'theorems of dialogue'
will be considered in the remainder of this chapter.
8. Derived Rules
The simple theory of dialogue developed above has the
advantage of having a minimum number of primitive concepts. As is
familiar from the study of formal systems in logic, this is an advantage
when one is out to prove metatheorems t i.e., to describe the system
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rather than to use it. In exchange, a simple system may be complicated
to use: proofs in it get long and tedious in the lack of auxiliary
lemmas and derived rules of inference.
This alone is a motivation for enriching the system of dialogue
rules beyond the absolute minimum. In addition comes the conventionality
argument from the preceding section. As in chess, so in dialogue, some
particularly common strategi~s may have become conventional enough to
deserve individual attention, and proper names. The very existence in
English of terms such as guestion, answer, reply, objection, and the
like ;s proof of this.
For th~se reasons, I shall go on to define a number of derived
dialogue rules. Their effect is to induce a hierarchical functional
structure to a dialogue over and above the linear sequence of its moves.
In addition ~o following each other in a temporal sequence, the moves of
a dialogue will thus be functionally related to each other in ways not
determined by temporal sequence alone. It is such functional dependencies
that the derived dialogue game rules will register. By their means, we
will be able to capture explicitly the fact that one and the same
sentence (or sequence of sentences) may serve many quite different func-
tions in dialogue, as its intended relations to other utterances in the
dialogue vary.
The set v( dialogue game rules to be defined in the following
sections thus form the basic material for spelling out the functional
structure of a dialogue, or the way how the flow of information is
organized in a conversation.
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Approachi ng the prob1em froH~ ar. abstract angl e, we may expect
to find moves divided into several general types. First, there is likely
to be some rule or rules for starting a conversation: for instance, some
formul~s of greeting have this function.
In oppos1t1o~ to such initial moves th~re will be what T shall
call countermoves: moves related to earlier (explicit or implicit) moves
as responses or replies to them.
In addition to countermoves, we shall consider a set of what
will be called continuation moves. They are moves that look back to
(are defined with reference to) other dialogue moves, but have the addi-
tional restriction that they are made by the same player as the moves
they respond to. Such moves therefore are called dialogue moves by
courtesy only, a~' they will be as much at home in a monologue, a soliloquy
conducted by a lone player.
9. Game Rules for Questions
We start Jut by writing quite abstract genelvl dialogue rules
for asking questions and answering them. The rules will refer to defini-
tions of answer and presupposition for each type of ~uestiont which we
shall jive below in the form of logical game rules for questions and
answers.
There will be one initiating rule for asking questions, which at
the SA~e time serves as an initial rule of dialogue games:
(0. ask) Any player may ask any player a sentential (polarity) question.
As the rule makes no reference to preceding discourse, a move by (D.ask)
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is at hand only when none is being made, either: to make a move by
(O.ask) is to start a dialogue, to open a new topic of discussion.
The point of making the initial rule of dialogue games a rule
for asking questions should be clear: in our view, dialogues are topic-
centered, and top;cs are introduced by questions which describe the
questioner's informational interests. The special prooerty of sentential
questions that makes them particularly suitable for the purpose of open-
ing a discussion is that they are safe: their presuppositions are
tautological. Thus before opening a discussion around some more informa-
tive inquiry players can first establish whatev~r presuppositions such
more informative questions are predicated on by putting them into question
by (D.ask).
Following the intention of H1ntikka's paraphrase of direct
questions, the rule for asking further questiJns will run as follows:
(D. question) When a player nas put forward the presup~osition of a
question, any player may ask him the question.
Observe that (D. question) is formulated as a countermove rule. It
requires as a precondition for raising a question that the presupposition
~f the question has put in an appearance in the dialogue. (We shall see
later that this does not imply it has been said out loud or even
accepted implicitly.)
Note that the presupposition of a question is construed as an
addressee's move rather than the questioner's. A motivation for this
is seen in the contrast between the following two dialogues:
I
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(21)
(22)
A: You said something.
B; I did not say anything!
A: What did you say?
A: You said nothing.
B: I did say something!
A: What did you say?
It seems to me that (22) is much more natural and fluent than (21). In
(22), the questioner denies the presupposition of the question he is
asking, but the addressee accepts it. In (21), the opposite is true:
the questioner accepts the presupposition but his addressee denies it.
In (21), one gets the feeling that the questioner is not paying
any attention to his interlocutor: he does not realize that a precondi-
tion of his question is not fulfilled. In (22), A is listening to B.
Quite possibly, he may actually believe B, and be asking his question
seriously (accept it ~s admitting of an answer).
There is another alternative, too. A may not actually accept
B's claim, so she is not asking the question in earnest. She is almost
sure she is not going to get an acceptable answer. Then A is not asking
the question seriously under (D.earnest) , but noncommittally or even
ironically. She might have used the subjunctive mood to show her doubt:
(23) What would you have said?
Finnish would use a particle which nicely captures this nuance of the
question: it is muka 'allegedly', related to the postposition mukaan
'according to'. The Finnish translation of the doubtful question (23)
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would read 'What did you say, according to you?', nicely attributing the
question, and its presupposition, to the answerer. A good example of
such an incredulous question is the girl's query in
I said gently, "What do you do with yourself down here?1I
She shrugged her shoulders, "What is there to do?"
"Haven't you any hobbies? Don't you play games?
Haven't you got friends around about?
"I'm stupid at games. There aren't many girls around here,
and the ones there are I don't like. l;,ey think I'm awful. 1I
(Agatha Christie, The Moving Finger, p. 20.)
The shrug of shoulders eloquently conveys the noncommittal character of
the girl's question. Note that the first speaker correctly reaus the
intention of her question, for he puts his suggestions in the negative
form of the expected answers. The girl confirms his guess by demolishing
all the alternatives in turn.
In most 'normal' cases of questioning, of course, the questioner
himself accepts the presupposition of his question. It is easy to show,
using rules of inference given in later chapters, that acceptance of a
question implies the acceptance of its presupposition (it would be
dialogically inconsistent to accept a question and deny its presupposi-
tion). Hence whoever asks a question in earnest (accepts it) must also
accept its presupposition.
10. Answering
Rules for asking questions would have little use without the
complementary rule for answering them. As Sten1us [35] points out. the
point or meaning of a direct question is actually incorporated in the
game rule for the answerer.
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The dialogue game rule for answering will also refer to an
independent explication of the semantics and pragmatics of the answerhood
relation:
(D.answer) When a player has put forward a question, an addressee
may put forward an answer to it.
The dialogue game rules for asking and answering are exceedingly
simple. This is because the complicated aspect about questions is their
semantics, and that aspect has been relegated to the semantic game rules.
The only thing that is left for the dialogue game rulc~ for asking and
answering to explicate ;s the meaning of the 'optative operator' in
Hintikka's analysis, or the meaning of the interrogative mood.
As we noted earlier, the dialogue game construction as a whole
and the dialogue game rules for asking and answering in particular
provide ~n cl~planation how it comes about that a questioner manages, by
putting forward a direct question to an interlocutor, to put him under
a commitment to provide an answer to the question. The crux of that
explanation is the assumption that the questioner and the addressee
agree to playa dialogue game following the rules of the game and accept-
ing the aims it assigns to them.
The rest, i.e., the inference of the players' beliefs and
intentions ;s simple game theoretical reasoning.
Note that this language game explication of the meaning of the
interrogative mood confirms W1ttgenste1n ' s insight about the difference
in meaning between questions and assertions. A question is not a
disguised assertion. It is not just accepted or denied, but answered or
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not. Although it often conveys a questioner's desire for knowledge (and
hence, his lack of it), it does not assert that desire or ignorance. They
can only be inferred irom the assumption that the questioner is playing
the game of asking and a~swering according to the rules of the game and
following a rational strategy choice relative to appropriate background
assumptions.
To appreciate this point, note that none of our rules make
reference to the desideratum of a question. They are quite neutral about
the intention uf a question, whether it is a simple request for informa-
tion, an examination question, or perhaps a rhetorical one. We shall
see that all of these question types represent rational discu:~sion
strategies under different appropriate background assumptions.
11. Logical Moves
The moves we shall consider next are inferential and explanatory
steps of reasoning in a dialogue. An example of each sort may be in
order:
(24) Everybody is kungfu fighting.
Then the President is kungfu fighting.
25) Not everybody is kungfu fighting.
The President is not kungfu fighting.
Inferential moves are often marked as such by various markers
of inferential tie (e.g., then, so, therefore, hence). At the surface of
-- -
a real-life dialogue, the inference need not be formally valid (logically
binding).
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Even with enthymematic premises made explicit t the argument may
be just a probable one (an inductive inference).
Explanatory moves are reciprocal to inferential ones. An
explanandum is related to its explanantia in much the same way as an
inference is related to its premises. Thus an explanation need not be
a complete one on the surface of a dialogue, and it may remain probabil-
istic even when fully spelled out.
I propose the following dialogue game rules for inferential
and explanatory moves:
(O.infer) When a player has put forward a sentence, he may infet~
another sentence from it.
(D.expla1n) When a player has put forward a sentence, he may put
forward an explanation for it.
The way I have defined (D.;nfer) and (D.expla1n), inferential
and explanatory moves are continuation moves, i.e., moves by the same
player as the moves they act as responses to. This seems intuitively
right, as a putative second speaker of the dialogues (24)-(25) seems to
implicitly accept his interlocutorls claim by his inferential and
explanatory moves. His moves will be analyzed as continuation moves to
his own implicit intervening moves or acceptance.
Surely, a player may suggest to his interlocutor inferences
and explanations for assumptions he does not himself subscribe to. But
note that in that case, his tone of voice is different: in making a
suggestion he is actually prompting his interlocutor to draw the inference
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or adopt the explanation. Intuitively. in such cases, it ;s correct to
append his move by a question mark to convey this questioning tone of
voice. Such usage thus rather supports than speaks against our formula-
tion of (D. infer).
12. Arguments
When an interlocutor refuses to accept an answer, what one may
do is argue for it by producing evidence for it. Such relevant evidence
are of course sentences that confirm the answer.
Hence argumentation is relative to some explication of the
relation of confirmation. We shall employ the probabilistic notion of
confirmation presupposed in the chapter on inductive acceptance: a
sentence is evidence for another sentence if it adds to the probability
of the latter. More formally, a sentence e confirms a hypothesis h if
p(h/e) > p(h); if p(h/e) < p(h), then e disconfirms h and confirms the
denial of p, else e is independent of hand (inductivel J ') irrelevant to
it.
This character1z~tion of the confirmation relation is
symmetrical as is evident from the definition of conditional probability
p(h/e):
(26) p{h/e) = P~~:) .
For e is relevant to h if and only if
(27) pf~~~i1:T ; ,
and then e and h obviously are relevant to each other (if not always to
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the same extent). For instance, any sentence is conclusive evidence for
its own logical consequences, and hence conversely is confirmed by them
to various degrees.
Evidence will be allowed to enter a dialogue game by the
following game rule:
(D. argue) When a player has put forward a sentence, he may
argue for it by a sentence that is evidence for it.
As a limiting case, of course, any sentence is conclusive
evidence for itself, so (D.argue) provides for the (common if somewhat
silly) argument by the simple repetition of a c1aim. 13
(D. argue) also provides another motive for putting forward
logical consequences of one's claims.
The way (D.argue) is fonnulated, it al~ 'ws players to defend
their own claims only. Of course, one can argue against others, too:
i.e., attack another player's claim by producing disconfirming evidence
for it. However, such counterevidence will be construed here as evidence
for the denial of the claim (or some other incompatible claim). As an
afterthought. an explanation can be recognized as a limiting case of
inductive argument.
13. Repl1 es
One more type of game rules needs to be introduced: they arb
rules for declarative countermoves to declarative sentences. The most
straightforward reaction to an interlocutor's assertion is to assent to
it or to dissent from it:
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(28) A: He won.
B: (Yes,) he won.
e: (No,) he did not win.
Assent and dissent take a definite stand with respect to the assertion:
assent is a sign of acceptance, while dissent implies denial, or rejec-
tion. of the claim. But sometimes a claim may prompt a more indirect
reaction:
(29) A: I like tea.
B: Most people like tea.
Note that B does not take a definite stand for or against A's assertion:
his reply does not imply it nor rule it out. What B seems to be doing
is rather to brush A's comment aside as being of little importance or
interest: A is not wrong but he is irrelevant.
This intuition is explained if it is assumed that a const\~ues
A as attempting an answer to a more general question than the form of
his assertion suggests: perhaps it is the question
(30) Who likes tea?
What B does is suggest an alternative answer to the same question which
has higher information value than the one A was able to come up with.
B doe~ not deny A's answer; he just passes it because its ep1stemic
utility is low.
These considerations lead me to propose the following game rule
for replying to a declarative sentence:
(D. reply)
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When a player has put forward an answer to a question, any
player reply to him by putting forward his answer to the
same question.
The important feature about (D. reply) is that anyone who replies to a
claim has to decide first what the issue is: what question he takes the
claim as an answer to. This feature seems to me to capture a central
insight about assertion-reply dialogues; people in a conversation do
not just exchange assumptions, but arc led by their perceptions of what
the conversation is aiming at, i.e., what questions are on their mind,
what they think the topic of the discus~1on might be.
What is nice about (D.reply), it includes as a special case
assent and dissent to a previous assertion on its own right. For the
simplest que$tion which any assertion answers is the question whether it
is true or not. To that question, there are two direct answers: yes
and no. Thus the dialogue (28) above can actually be understood as a
series of answers to the simple question
(31) Did he win (or not)?
••
•
•
•
•
•
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Chapter 5
STR~CTURE OF DIALOGUE
1. Structure at Dialogue
As even casual observation of actual conversations shows t no
simple theory of the structure of dialogues can be right. In particular,
one can at once dismiss a simplistic view of a dialogue as a linear
sequence or Markovian chain of moves where each move is r-elated tOt or
depends on, only the preceding move in the linear order of utterance~
Such dialogues of course occur: for instance, a dialogue may start with
a question, which is answered, the answered rejected, the rejection argued
for, and so on.
However, that is only a vdry special case. More generally, one
has to allow for topic change in real life dialogues: the current topic
may be dropped and another picked up in mid dialogue; challenges may be
ignored, and whole new topics introduced. In general, the assumption
that a move in a dialogue can always be construed either as in initial
move or a countermove or continuation move to an immediately preceding
move ;s all too restrictive. The move-countermove structure of a dialogue
does not have to coincide with the linear order of moves: these are
two independent orders of structure .
In fact, it appears to be an overly restricting assumption to
assume that any dialogue move must even have a unique premise at all -
i.e., that each dialogue move is a response to at most one antecedent
move. To take a trivial example, a teacher may put forward a sentence
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as a correction to a whole number of ~lternat;ve guesses by his students.
Inferences, too, often depend on multiple premises.
More interestingly, recall the format of the game rule
(D. reply): according to it, a reply repre~ents an alternative answer
to a previously expressed or understoud topical question - thus it serves
two purposes at the same time, being a correction or confirmation of the
answer it surpasses and an answer to the topical question. In fact, it
seems that the phenomenon of multiple antecedency ;s quite common.
Another example is the following dialogue. Speaker A accepts the
following sentences:
-(1) If anyone won, it was Jack or Bob. Someone won. Who was it?
The following dialogue ensues between A and another player B:
(2 ) A: Did Jack win? 1
B: NCJ. 2
A: So Bob won. 3
B: No. 4
A: But then no one won! 5
Move 3 represents at the same time an inference from move 2 and an answer
to the questioner's implicit question in (1). Similarly, line 5 ;s
simultaneously an inference from 2 and 4 and an argument against accept-
ing these premises in the face of (1) (as signaled by but).
The example illustrates at the same time a third, all-important
source of surface complexity in a real life dialogue. It is obvious
that dialogue mov(~s often are not addressed to ~ of the actuallY
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expressed preceding moves in a dialogue, but to some related implicit
assumptions held by some participant or other, or inferred from their
assumptions.
Very often the intermediate steps of reasoning in a dialogue
may be quite complicated, and this can lead to difficulty of 'seeing
the point' of someone's contribution. Yet a dialogue serves its purpose,
and is by all means well-formed. as long as the gaps can be filled out in
an appropriate way. Hence there is not likely to be any concept of well-
formedness of a sequence of explicit moves in a dialogue in abstraction
of the whole description of the implicit game situat~on as we have been
in the process of constructing it. There may be textudl principles which
are sensitive to the difference between explicit moves arId merely implied
or tacitly unde~tood ones. 1 The fact remains that a good many such rules
and principles must be formulated so as to pay equal atten~ion to explicit
and merely understood moves.
A fourth complicating factor is the phenomenon which I shall
describe as the use of subdialogues to do the work of individual moves.
For instance, when one invites one's interlocutor to guess at an answer
to his question instead of giving a st~aightforward answer, one is making
a guessing subdialogue do duty for a simple application of {D.answerO.
These are some of the structural complications that any theory of
conve~ational discourse has to come to grips with. 2
2. Parameters of a Move
These considerations already indicate some ,of the parameters
which describe a move in a dialogue game.
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The first one that come~ to mind is of course the sentence, or
more generally, the expression the move actually consists of.
Next, the type of a move and its place in dialogue is indicated
by specifying the dialo~ue(s) it belongs to, the rule{s) which justify
it. and the moves which motivate it (its topical precedents or premises).
Third comes an important triple of indices, which might be
called the signature of the move: it consists of a specification of the
author. the addressee{s), and the audience of a move. 'Author ' is a
noncommittal name fur the speaker, utterer, writer, or whoever puts a
sentence forward and is responsible for it. The author of a sentence is
the referent of the first-person pronoun 1. The addressees of a sentence
are the referents of the second-pe,·~on pronoun you: these are the players
who are invited to answer a question. take stand to a claim, comply to a
request, and so on. They are also the bearers of vocative noun phrases.
The audienc~# f4~al1y, includes all those players who are within earshot
of the move, to whom the dialogue move is accessible. I summarize the
seven indices of a move in ~he following list (in the order I shall be
indicating them).
(1) The author of the move
(11) The addressee(s) of the move
(iii) The audience of the move
(1v) The senten£! of the move
(v) The game rule~ which justify the move
(vi) The premises of the move
(vii) The dialogue(s) the move is in.
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Instead of further formalization, I shall again use English
as its own metalanguage and describe a typical dialogue move by an
English sentence, say:
(3) A says to B in the presence of C that S as an answer to 5'
( i ) ( 1; ) ( ; i i ) ( 'j v) (v) (v1)
i~ the dialogue d.
(vii)
There are a number of questions to ask about the possible
combinations of the indices in the signature. Is the author always in
his own audience? Can one address oneself? Can Nature put forward
moves? What would that mean?
As a recompensation, Nature is in the audience of every move.
"God sees and hears everything." She can herself have other players in
her audience. Such moves by Nature will represent sundry observations
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accessible to other players: facts they see, hear, feel, or observe any
other way. Observations may be privileged: Nature may reveal her
secrets only to players that face a certain way, do the right experiments,
or whatnot.
Remember that we have characterized Nature as the ideal player
who is right about everything. Hence 'Nature says that' equals lit is
true that'. Any 'free-standing' truth about Nature can therefore be
dressed as an admissible dialogue move by setting its author, addressee,
and audience equal to Nature. Conversely, any player in Nature's audience
is justified to accept what she says as a bona fide observation, for he
is assured that it will be to his advantage (in accordance with dialogue
maxims).
A player is in his own audience if and only if he is conscious
of what he is putting forward. A player who makes an inadvertent slip
is not in his own audience: he does not realize what he is actually
saying. The same would hold of one who speaks in his sleep or delirious-
ly. Naturally, the unmarked assumption is that one is in one's own
audience. and accordingly, I shall not always be explicit about making
that assumption. However. I shall not rule out the marked possibility
in principle.
Self-addressed moves occur, too. It is not at all odd for a
player to ask himself a question (that is called in English wondering
about a question; the French is actually ~e demander 'ask oneself'). or
to address oneself with a declarative clause. (There is a choice between
pronouns 1 and you in these cases.)
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(Dialogically) silent moves are moves whose audience ;s
restricted to a minimum (oneself and Nature, if the move is conscious;
else Nature alone.) It matters little whether the move is said aloud
with nobody within earshot, or said silently to oneself: the main thing
is one is alone in the audience.
3. Internal Dialogues
Our approach to ep1stemic logic and the solution to the problem
of logical omniscience is built on the idea that each person is himself
responsible fer his own ep1stemic alternatives. How a player's epistemic
alternatives will look at each game situation is up to him.
This means that a player will be allowed, and supposed to,
construct, modify, and delete his own epistemic alternatives to his best
ability so as to conform with his preferences.
How will a player go about constructing and rejecting epistemic
alternatives? An exceedingly simple and natural answer is already avail-
able to us: by using operations given to him by the dialogue game rules -
by raising questions for himself Dy (D.ask) and (O.question), deriving
further questions from them by (D.expla1n and (D.1nfer), answering his
own questions by (D.answer). reasoning further by (D.1nfer), (D.expla1n)
and (D.argue) - in short. by playing the dialogue games with himself.
Now let us ask: what is a player doing when he is occupied
with such private activities? My answer has been already anticipated
by Plato in his middle dialogues: he is th1nk1ni. Working on one's
assumptions and suppositions is very much like conducting an internal
dialogue with oneself: asking questions of oneself. suggesting answers
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for them as hypotheses, following their consequences so as to explain
them or refute them. Let me quote Plato's own words:
So. - ... Do you accept my description of the process of
thinking?
Th. - How do you describe it?
So. - As a discourse that the mind carries on with itself
about any subject it is considering. You must take
this description as coming from an ignoramus: but
I have a notion that, when the mind is thinking, it
is simply talking to itself, asking questions and
answering them, and saying Yes or No. When it
reaches a decision - which may come slowly or in a
sudden rush - when doubt is over and the two voices
affirm the same thing, then we call that its 'judgment ' .
So I should describe thinking as discourse, andjudgment as a statement pronounced, not aloud to some-
one else. but silently to oneself.
(Plato, Thea~tetus l8ge; cf. Sophist 263d.)
Let us stop and think what it would mean to take Plato dead
seriously here. What it would imply is again reinterpreting our epistemic
alternatives or epistemical1y possible worlds, this time construing them
not as unordered sets of sentences, but as such sets structured as so
many dialogues (or monologues), or perhaps as sets of small dialogues.
Given this reconstruction, it would be immediately clear how such sets
are to be extended given the rules of dialogue games.
So let us do that, why not! From now on, our ep1stemic
alternatives are no more just sets of sentences, but structured sets
of dialogue moves, each move annotated by the indices (i)-(vii) listed
earlier. Exactly the same rules and principles which govern the wel1-
fonmedness of explicit dialogues are now extended to apply in the internal
dialogues.
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This innovation allows a refinement of the principles of
application of dialogue rules, in particular how internal dialogues
influence the flow of actual dialogues. An actual d1alogJe, or a .dialogue
sequence (as distinguished from a complete dialogue game) is repre:sented
by a sequence of explicit dialogue moves in Nature1s epistem1c alterna-
tive, e.g.,
(4) Aasks B: Who are you?
B answers A: I am Beth.
A replies to B: So you are Beth.
B replies to A: I am Beth.
Embedded in the dialogue game, each player has their internal
representation of the game in progress, as well as their conjectu,~es for
their partners' conceptions of the dialogue. These internal representa-
tions of course are what guide the players' choices of strategy in the
actual dialogue. Now the internal representations may typically go
beyond what is actually said in the actual dialogue sequence: they may
describe extensions of the dialogue which no one will ever put into so
many words.
It naturally follows that players may address their actual
dialogue moves to such merely virtual moves: they may answer qUf!stions
just hanging in the air, or forestall criticisms which have not been
spoken out. It is this further license which accounts for the often
strikingly fragmentary character of everyday conversations.
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4. Playing for Others
Each epistemic alternative of a player is of course
characterized in the first place by the sentences it includes. On the
other hand, each epistemic alternative is a member of the model system
constituting a game situation: hence it assumes some particular position
in the field of the alternativeness relations for different players.
Assume for instance player A is considering an alternative
where the following sentences are true:
(5) B accepts that Awon or B won.
(6) B accepts that B did not win.
Is A justified to infer that
(7) B accepts that A won?
In order to figure that out, A must put himself into B's shoes: try to
second-guess what is going on in B's mind. In virtue of the truth-
definition of acceptance, A infers that the sentences
(8) A won or B won
(9) B did not win
are included in the intersection of B's epistemic alternatives. Now if
B is careful to follow through the consequences of hisacceptat10ns - i.e."
goes through the trouble of trying to find a consistent explanation for
his position - he will reject any alternative including (9) along with
the right disjunct of (8). A can therefore conclude that the left
disjunct of (8) will appear in every remaining epistemic alternative of
B's, so the inference goes through.
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But note one thing here. In drawing the epistemic inference,
A must gauge very carefully SiS in~~11ectual powers: for the inference
is justified only if B actually draws it. It is no good for A to see
that (7) follows, if B does not see it. At best, A can then argue the
conclusion for Bt i.e., make him see the consequences of his accepta-
tions. The only thing that A can infer ·for sure is that if B is rational,
he will accept (7) if he accepts (5)-(6). And this is exactly the ideal-
ization that is involved in the rules and principles of epistemic logic.
The upshot of these considerations is that each player must
not only keep order in his own epistemic alternatives, but he must watch
all the alternatives for each player to his alternatives, trying to keep
them in accordance with his estimates of his fellow players' mental
processes. Ideally, this iterates arbitrarily far: a perfectly rational
player would have to consider also what his fellow players would be
willing to attribute to him and others, and so on. Of course, in prac-
tice, model systems can be expected to stay quite limited as far as
such iteration of second-guessing is concerned: most real-life conversa-
tionalists spend precious little effort in trying to see things from
their interlocutors· points of view.
5. Dialogue Games
The extreme conceptual complexity of a fully specified dialogue
game may not have become clear from the necessarily piecemeal process
of construction we have been involved in. We started out by describing
abstractly an assumption list as the set of sentences accepted by a
player at a certain stage of a game. This description was elaborated
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by allowing a player to entertain several possible alternative lists
simultaneously, which lead to replacing the notion of an assumption list
by the notion of epistemic alternative.
A result was the description of a momentary game situation as
a model system, a set of epistemic alternatives ordered by an accessibil-
ity relation for each player.
Most recently, we imposed a fdrther order of structure within
each epistemic alternative, by reinterpreting these unordered assumption
lists as so many collections of dialogue ~eguences, i.e., sequences of
dialogue moves related to each other by dialogue game rules. This
innovation induces a second order of structure among the moves of a
dialogue representing functional relationships among dialogue moves.
A dialogue game (in extensive form) is an object of yet a
higher order of complexity, as it in turn consists of dialogue game
situations ordered in a particular way.
The recursive structure of a fully specified dialogue game
is easiest to illustrate by taking as a starting point the last move in
some dialogue sequence in some designated epistemic alternative. This
move may bear two sorts of relationships to other moves in the game:
in terms of playtime, it follows the earlier moves in the same sequence;
in terms of functional dependency, it may constitute a countermove or
continuation move to one or several earlier moves in the same sequence
or in its epistemic alternatives.
Looking back in the game tree from the alternative we started
from, we find a decreasing sequence of initial segments of the dialogue
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sequence, representing earlier stages of the same actual dialogue, each
embedded in a predecessor of the epistemic alternat;v~ we started from.
This gives us the game history of the play we are considering. Looking
down in the game tree, we can discern an indefinite number of possible
continuations of the dialogue, spelling out what might happen at the
next move.
Looking sideways, we see even more complexity. For each
player in the game, we find a number of epistemic alternatives to the
dialogue situation we started from, representing their individual views
of the move at hand and its relations to earlier moves. Once we step
over to one of these alternative views, the whole story can be started
again from the beginning. from a move to 1t~ neighbors in the same
alternative, from the alternative to its historical predecessors and
successors, and ~o its epistemic alternatives for each player.
Fortunately, thanks to the limitation3 of human imagination, epistem;c
alternatives are likely to get progressively less elaborate as we move
farther away from Naturels own alternative, drying up completely rather
quickly.
To get an idea of the structural complexity of even the
simplest two-move dialogue, consider the following simplified diagram:
A N B - 135 -
0~ n (J
{l 0) Who ;s B? ( A Who ;s B? B ) B ;s Beth
i 1AB B ;StBeth.~ lr Who ;s B1~hO ;S B? 9) B is Beth
A asks B: Who are you? B is Beth. A asks B: Who are you?
A asks B: Who are you? Who is B1
1
Who is B1
B ;s Beth.
A asks B: Who are you?
B answers A: I am Beth.
M
The middle column of the diagram describes three successive steps of
the actual dialogue in Natur-e's epistemic alternative. Nature knows
all the way the answer to A's question about B's identity (though she
does not tell). The left column describes A's view of the game at each
stage of the game: following the vertical arrows, we can figure out
what A believes, remembers or conjectures} about earlier and later
stages as well. Analogously for B. As the diagram indicates, at the
end of the exchange, the players have come to a common understanding:
A, B, and Nature share just one epistemic alternative.
6. Turn-taking and Topic Hierarchy
Let us take a closer look at the turn-taking convention
proposed by the ethnomethodologists (Sacks, et al., [215]). The conven-
tion has two essential subrules:
(i) If the turn so far is so constructed as to involve the
use of a 'current speaker selects next' technique, then
the party so selected has the right and is obliged to
take next turn to speak; no others have such rights or
II
- 136 -
obligations, and transfer occurs at that place.
(ii) If the turn so far is so constructed as not to involve
the use of a 'current speaker selects next' technique,
then self-selection for next speakership may, but neea
not, be instituted; first starter acquires rights to
a turn, and transfer occurs at that place. (p. 704)
In simple-minded language, whoever speaks first speaks next, unless
someone has been particularly given the floor by the previous speaker.
If I have understood correctly, the crucial technique for
speaker selection intended in (i) is addressing someone by name or
gesture; this technique work~ most effectively when the move addressed
is a 'first pair-part' in an 'adjacency pair', e.g., a question, an
invitation, or a greeting. The expected countermove, of course, will
be the corresponding 'second pair-part', i.e., an answer, an acceptance,
or return of a greeting.
These rules would seem to work as a first approximation.
However, they miss an important systematic source of counterexamples
because they ignore the deeper functional motivation of the sequence of
moves in a conversation. We have argued that an answer is a likely
response to a question because, and just when, it is the best way to
further the aims of a conversation. Accordingly, we may expect other-
wise whenever there are more urgent matters to tend than answering the
question asked. In particular, turns may be jumped quite naturally
when the intervening move addresses a superordinate topic which consti-
tutes a necessary condition for the preceding move. Consider the
following examples:
(11) A to B: Are you with him?
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(12)
(13)
C to A: What did you ask?
A to C: I asked if he was with you.
A to B: Did you take my pen?
C to A: I took it.
A to B: Do you want this?
B to A: Do you want it?
In none of (11)-(13), does the player addressed by a question immediately
answer it. In (11)-(12), another player makes the next move. Yet all
of (11)-(13) are fully natural and fluent dialogues. (11) is a kind of
counterexample that Sacks, et al., recognize under the name of 'repair
question' (p. 709, 720). Note that CiS question to A addresses a higher
topic, viz, what was A's choice of topic.
This feature is shared by the second counterexample. A has
lost his pen: the topic he is interested in ;s
(14) Who took my pen?
Instead of asking (14) directly, A does some detective work.
He sees that B is wielding a pen exactly like his, so the question
arises if B has taken A's pen. C, who is watching the situation, can
guess that the source of A's question in (12) is the more general
question (14) and answers it directly. This satisfies A's interest,
so the dialogue is satisfactory although B never got around to answering
A's qup.stion. The structure of (12) is described in fuller detail in3
II
•
•
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(15) A to A: Who took my pen?
I I
Ato A: Did 8 take my pen? C to C: Did I take ; t?
I' IA to B: Did you take ~ pen? C to C: I took it.
I
C to A: I took i t.
Example (13) is somewhat different. The situation is familiar:
there is just one cocktail sandwich left, and two hungry but polite
players. Their politeness consists in that each wants the bread if and
only if the other does not. Neither can answer the question whether he
wants it before the other has answered the analogous question. Here, the
two topics are not hierarchically ordered but interdependent. The only
solution to the vicious circle is for one of the players to yield either
to temptation or to the other player. However, the fact remains that it
is a rational strategy for B in (13) to reply by another question: hence
the apparent violation of adjacency is actually no violation at all.
The exceptions to turn-taking conventions, as well as the conforming
instances, turn out to be consequences of more fundamental considerations
of rational dialogue strategy. 7
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Chapter 6
LOGICAL GAME RULES
1. Logical Game Rules
The dialogue rules (D. infer) and (D.explain) can be used to
.
spell out a sense in which the semantic games of verification of
Hintikka's game theoretical semantics can be viewed as special cases of
dialogue games. Looking away from its genuinely semantic aspects and
concentrating on its syntax, a sel~~ntical game can be looked upon as a
game of debate whose moves are restricted to applications of (D. infer)
and (O.explain). Any move of the proponent of ~ sentence put forward in
a semantical game replaces t~e original sentence by one which logically
implies the original sentence: thus it is a special sort of an explana-
tory move. Any move by the opponent invites the proponent to defend a
logical cc,sequence of the original sentence: it thus involves a move
by (D.1nfer) forced on the proponent by the opponent. The game rule of
negation switches the players' roles as opponent and proponent.
What I propose to do is to put this idea to use in the ~o11ow1ng
way. we shall turn a number of the rules of the semantical games into
as many rules of dialogue ganes. They will essentially be natural
language equ1vdlents for the model set conditions that were discussed in
a previous chapter. We then define inference and explan ion in terms
of these model set constru-·ion principles. Any complicated chains of
reasoning will be ultimately reduced to iterated applications of the
mcdel set proof procedure and the inductive decision procedure described
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earlier. (As will be seen, the former can naturally be looked upon as
a special case of the latter.)
The following are a list of such natural language natural
deduction principles:
(c. and) From a sentence of the form
X - Y and Z - W
infer either of the sentences
X - y - W
X - Z - w.
I
tI
(c. or)
(c. if)
(c. an)
Explain a sentence of the form
X- Y or Z - W
by either of the sentences
X- y - W
X - Z - w.
Explain a sentence of the form
Xif Y
by X or by the denial of Y.
Explain a sentence of the form
X - [a (n) Y Camp V - t - W] - Z
by a sentence of the form
A be a(n) V, V - P - W, and Y - P - z.
I
I
'pi stands for a pronoun whose antecedent is A. (The cash value of
this antecedency is the truth of the identity P be A.)
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The game rule for some ;s an exact copy of (C.an).
The following rule will do for the definite article.
(c. the) Explain a s~ntence of form
X - the Y - Z
by a sentence of form
A be (a(n)) V, any Ybe (a(n)) At and X- P - Z
Here (and elsewhere) I let the infinitive be do duty for whatever
inflected form of the copula is appropriate in each context.
For bet we have the rule
(c. be) Infer from sentences of the form
A be B, X- A - Y
the sentence
X - B - Y.
The meaning of the locution the same Y as B is captured by rewriting it
as the Y that be B.
Universal quantifiers obey the rule
(c. every) Infer from a sentence of the form
X - every Y - Z
any sentence of form
if A be (a(n)) V,
X- P - Z
The game rules for !nl and each will be copies of (C.every).
(c. no) Infer from a sentence of the form
X- no V- W
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the denial of any sentence of the form
A be (a{n)) Y and X- p - W
(These rules are just special cases of more general and detailed rules
that no one has seen so far. But they once more suffice to illustrate
a principle.)
It remains to give a game rule for negation. The effect of
a negation is to reverse the direction of explanation and inference in
the following sense:
(c. neg) Infer from the denial of a sentence X
the denial of any explanation for X.
The concepts 'inference' and 'explanation' are interchangeable in the
rule (C.neg) in virtue of their reciprocity:
(1) A sentence X is an explanation for a sentence Y
if and only if Y is a consequence of X.
That is, it follows from (C.neg) and (1) that the denial of a sentence
can be explained by the denial of anyone of its consequences.
The above rules make reference to the denial of a sentence.
By that should be understood the most immediate expression of the
contradictory of a sentence. For a positive singular sentence with no
quantifier words, the negation transformation of Chomsky (1957) will work.
Conversely, if the uppermost semant1cal operator in a sentence is not,
the denial is obtained by simply leaving not out. I shall not try to
define 'denial' more closely. In case of doubt, the cop-out prefix 'it
is not the case that' w111 do.
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Note that there is nothing in the above rules that prevent them
from applying to questions so as to produce further questions from them.
In fact. it will be assumed all through that all of the above rules apply
to questions equally well as they do to declarative sentences.
In applying the rules of inference and explanation, one has
to be careful to apply them in the right order. as specified by a set
of ordering principles familiar from the semant1cal games of verification.
The following are rough versions of the general constraints that guide
the order of application of the rules:
(C.comm) A rule which applies in a main clause has precedence over
a rule which applies in a subordinate clause.
(O.LR) A rule which applies to an earlier phrase has precedence over
a rule which applies to a later phrase.
Particular. lexically governed order1nQ principles specify exceptions
to these general ordering principles in terms of individual game rules.
For instance, (C.some) goes before negation against (O.LR) while (C.every)
yieids to itt (C.any) goes before (C. if) in violation of (O.comm).
Specific constructions may import further exceptions. One is
Hintikka's ([130]:127) finding that unmoved question phrases take pre-
cedence over the preposed interrogative pronoun in multiple search
questions. Thus the likely direct answers to (2)-(3) are different:
(2) Where did Mary buy what?
(3) What did Mary buy where?
In each case, the answer is likely to start by specifying values for
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the unmoved question word first: (2) goes with (4) and (3) with (5).
(4) The hat, ~'ary bought at Filene's, and the gloves, at Bonwit
Teller's.
(5) At Filene's, Mary bought the hat, and at Bonwit Teller's,
the gloves.
The mechanism of these answer preferences will be d~scussed in Part II
(Ch. 111.6).
To do justice to quantified modal logic, care must be taken
in choosing the substituends 'A' and 'B' in the quantifier rules and in
the rule (C.be). For one thing, 'A' and 'B' are meant to act as
singular terms (proper names, definite descriptions) with respect to
the criteria of identity assumed in the quantifier phrases they replace.
This does not always imply that they need be syntactically definite;
for instance, quantification may be over kinds of things rather than
individual objects:
(6) There is something I hate, and that is a wise guy.
Here the indefinite (or generic) phrase 'a wise guy' serves to
instantiate the quantifier 'something' in an intensional context: the
quantification is over kinds of things, and a wise guy does make
definite reference to a particular kind of person.
Secondly, a quantifier phrase which quantifies into an
intensional context must be replaced by a term which designates one
and the same 1ndi~idual throughout that context. In English, personal
pronouns may be the best approximation for such 'logically proper names',
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so we use them for free bindable variables.
Third, we want to restrict (C. be) to apply only in extensionctl
contexts, in analogy with the rule (C.=) of Appendix II.
2. Logical Game Rules for Questions
We shall now try to encapsulate some of H1ntikka ' s insights
into the semantics and pragmatics of questions in the form of logical
rules of dialogue games. We do this by devising another set of rules
of explanation and inference, dissecting complicated questions into
simpler ones until a trivial characterization of answerhood is applic-
able.
The majority of writers on questions assume that simple
questions like
(7) Did A win?
are not semantically that simple: semantically, they have the underlying
form of a disjunctive yes-no question. Thus (7) is actually short for
(8) Did Awin or (did A) not (win)?
I will take a slightly different approach. In my analysis,
positive simple questions like (7) are actually semantically ambivalent.
As Hintikka and others observe, (7) does do duty as an abbreviation of
(8). However, it also has a meaning on its own right, as a semantically
elementary guestion. Simple negative questions like
(9) Did A not win?
will always be elementary questions in my a~"roach.
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What makes an elementary question elementary ;s its semantic
simplicity: an elementary question requires no further analysis to be
answered appropriately.
For semantically elementary questions, an exceedingly simple
rule of answering suffices:
(c. answer) Answer an elementary question by its declarative form.
The declarative form of a simple question is, of course, the transforma-
tional source of that question, or its inverse transform under the rule
of subject-auxiliary inversion.
Thus the elementary question (7) has as its only direct
answer(s) the corresponding declarative sentence(s)
(lO) A won (or: A did win),
and the negative elementary question (9) is only answered by
(11) A did not win.
The idea of an elementary question may seem at first self-
defeating: who would need to ask a question which has but one answer.
I shall argue later that we all often do. Even that aside, the concept
is far from useless: with the help of rules (e.or) and (C.answer). it
yields just the intuitively correct explication of answerhood to senten-
tial questions. For according to (C.or), the inquiry (8) must be
explained by either of the elementary questions (7), (9), which in turn
are answered by one of (10)-(11). By inference, to answer (8), one
must put forward either one of the answers (10), (11).
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More generally, a question of the form
(12) X - Y1 or Y2 or ... or Yn - Z
is explained by any of the elementary questions
(13 ) x - y. - Z,
and hence is answered by answering anyone of them.
One may observe that the semantic ambiguity of (7 ) can lead
to an infinite regress, if (7) is repeatedly expanded to (8) and reduced
back to (7) by (C.or).
There is, actually, a precedent in sentences of the form
(14) A is a man.
Sentences like (14) are also ambiguous. On the other hand, they
represent semantically elementary predicate attributions (meaning, roughly,
that A is a member of mankind); but they also double as existential iden-
tity sentences, as is predicted by the fact that (C.an) is applicable in
them to produce something like
(15) A is S, and B is a man.
To stop a regress, the second conjunct of (15) had better be understood
as an elementary attributive sentence.
In the same vein, whenever a simple question emerges as the
outcome of (C.or) from a disjunctive question, it is best construed as
an elementary question requiring no further semantic analysis.
3. Game Rules for Search Questions
To capture the meaning of simple and multiple search questions,
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two further dialogue rules of explanation and inference will be proposed.
First, a rule for explicatirg existentially understood questions.
(C.wh-e) Explain a search question of the form
x - [V - [wh-word W]] - Y - t - Z
where t marks the source of the parenthetized question phrase,
by any sentence
(i) i(X - Y- V- A- Z),
(ii) is A (a(n)) W, and
(iii) wh-phrase is T - A - U
where lA' is a dialogue definite phrase of the same category
as '~h-word W]' and (i i) ; S omi tted ; f \~ ; s empty.
A number of auxiliary syntactic concepts in (C.wh-e) need
explanation. (C.wh-e) is formulated so as to apply to preposed wh-phrases
as well as to unmoved ones. In the former case, X is empty, in the
latter, Y. We call 'A' the substituend of '[wh-word W]'.
;(5) is the interrogative form of the sentence S, defined to
be the sentence itself if it is a direct question, and the result of
applying appropriate question transformations to produce a direct ques-
tion if it is not (i.e., wh-movement and subject-auxiliary inversion).
Let us look at the motivation of the clauses (i)-(i1i) one by
one. (;)-(i;) represent the actual explication of the original question:
the questioner considers the original question satisfactorily answered if
he obtains an answer to (1)-(11) provided he also has an answer to (iii).
(111) expresses the conclusiveness condition. i.e., the condition that
the questioner knows the substituend in the sense of the identity cri-
teria of his original question. The conclusiveness clause (iii) is
~I,
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formulated quite loosely so as to allow a player to spell 0ut the identity
criteria of his question more explicitly in the process of applying
(C.wh-e). For instance, in a sports context, the question
(16) Who won?
can be explicated by (C.wh-e) as
(17) Did Vainio win t and what is the name and nationality of Vainio?
In the simplest case, 'wh-phrase' in (iii) equals' [wh-word W]' and T,
U are null: then (iii) yields an unadorned identity question, in the
above example, the question
(18) Who is Vainio?
Assuming the simplest explication of the conclusiveness condition,
(C.wh-e) produces from the examples
(19) Who won?
(20) Who did A play with? With who did A play?
(21) What did A win?
(22) Where did A play?
(23) What game did A play?
(24) Which one of A and B won?
(25) Who played who?
(26) Who played who in what game?
the respective explications
(27) Did A win, and who 1~ A?
(28) Did A play with Bt and who is B1
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(29) Did A win a medal, and what is a medal?
(30) Did A play inside, and where is inside?
(31) Did A play tennis, is tennis a game, and what game is tennis?
(32) Did A win, is A one of A and B, and which one of A and B ;s A?
(33) Who played B and who is B1
(34) Who played who in tennis, is tennis a game, and what game is
tennis?
The universal interpretation of search questions is captured
by a companion rule of inference to (C.wh-e):
(C.wh-u) Infer from a search question of the form
x - [V - [wh-word W]] - Y - t - Z
any sentence
1(X - y - V- A - Z) and wh-phrase is T - A - U,
if A is (a(n)) Wand p(X - y - V - A - Z)
subject to the same constraints as in (C.wh-e).
One new syntactic definition ;s needed: the presupposition p(S) of a
question S is defined as follows. 2
(35) The presupposition of a choice question is the declarative form
of the question.
The (existential) presu~position of a search question is the
result of replacing every (direct) interrogative pronoun in
it by a corresponding indefinite (existential) pronoun.
The definition of presupposition leads to ambiguous results in
syntactically simple sentential questions depending on whether the
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definition is applied before or after the question is completed to a
disjunctive form. This ambiguity will be put to use later in explaining
the functional differences of positive and negative simple questions.
For example, (C.wh-u) generates the following sequence of
inferences from (36):
(36) Who played who in what game?
(37) Who played who in tennis, and what game is tennis, if tennis
is a game and someone played someone in tennis?
(38) Who played B in tennis, and who ;s B, if someone played B
in tennis?
(39) Did A play B in tennis, and who is A, if A played B ;n tennis?
4. Which-questions
To do justice to the peculiarities of which, the following
addition to (C.wh-e) is indicated.
(C.which) (An appendix to (C.wh-e):) If the wh-word mentioned in the
rule is which, infer from (i)-(;i;) any sentence of form
(iv) Is B A if p(X - Y- V- B - Z) and B is (a(n)) W.
Let us see if this addition suffices to capture the sal :ent
facts about which. The first one that meets the eye is that simple
which questions imply uniqueness of answer: it would be quite unexpected
to get (41) as an answer to (~O).
(40) Which player won?
(41) A won and B won and C won.
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This expectation of uniqueness is independent of grammatical number.
If several teams of players are competing,
(42) Which players played well together?
may equally expect that just one team did; it would be odd to have an
answer like
(43) The Germans did and the Dutch did and the Italians did.
This assumption of uniqueness is spelled out in so many words
in (C.which). The questioner of a which question cannot be satisfird
with an answer to his question before he has made sure that any alterna-
tive answer is either unacceptable or identical with the answer first
offered. Thus (C.which) forces the quastioner of (40) to raise the
further questions (44)-(45) on hearing (41):
(44) Is A B if B won and B is a player?
(45) Is A C if C won and C is a player?
A negative answer to these identity questions would constitute a viol.tion
of the speaker's presuppositions given that A is an acceptable answer
to (40).
(c. which) predicts among other things that which-questions
cannot be asking for examples: (46) and (47) do not share this inter-
pretation.
(46) What would you like to drink, whisky, or gin, or vodka?
(47) Which would you like to drink, whisky, or gin, or vodka?
(48), unlike (46), expects a unique choice of poison.
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A second characteristic of which we observed earlier is its
context-dependence. I am not referri~g to the fact that a free-standing
which such as in (48) always harks back to some head noun explicit or
implicit in the context; this fact can be captured synta~t1cally by
stipul!ting that which is a determiner whose head may be omitted when it
is ob~1ous from context. What is more intriguing is the fact that even
when a head noun is supplied, a which question makes no definite s(nse
until its field of search, or the domain of discourse it ranges over.
;s made clear. Thus, e.g., (49), if asked just out of the blue, is
ql.iite puzzling:
(49) Which co1v.· is the sky?
(49) makes sense only if some well-defined spectrum uf choices is supplied
from the context, e.g., a list of samples.
As we obs~rved earlier. a similar context dependence
cndracter1zes the definite article:
(50) Close the window!
makes definite sense only if 0 unique choice of window is obvious from
the context - including the sentence intro1uc1ng the article. Thus in
(50) the window meant can be the only window in sight that is open, as
it is the only choice that makes the command rational.
In each case, I submit, this context dependency is a simple
matter of logic. All quantification is sensitive to the choice of
universe, but uni~ue quantification is excepticIlal1y so. While existen-
tial quantification 15 preserved under extensions of the model and
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universal quantif1:ation under submodels, uniquely quantified sentences
satisfy no simple preservation theorem. 3 In order to make sense of a
unique quantification. one has to carefully define the field of search.
Thus in order for (49) to have a definite answer, the spectrum of colors
has to be narrowed down so that there is only one way to describe the
sky in terms of it. what. in contrast. might admit any number of correct
answers.
Having disposed of the two main peculiarities of simple
occurrences of which, let us proceed to multiple which sentences. To
begin with, note that we have no modifications to (C.wh-u) in respect of
which. Consequently, we can expect multiple which questions to be open
to a quite straightforward universal interpretation. This expectation
seems fulfilled in examples like
(51) The timetable tells which local train has a connection with
which express train.
It seems clear to me that (51) need make no assumptions about the
uniqueness of connections. For instances, (51) is perfectly in order
even if
(52) Ev~ry local train has a connection with every express train.
Kar~tunen ([243], p. 22) agrees, with an interesting reservation.
Commenting on his example
(53) Which boy likes which girl?
Karttunen says, "if there is any uniqueness implicature at all t it
perhaps has to do with each girl being paired with at most one bc~, altd
- 155 -
vice versa, but I am not sure about this. 1I Hirschbuhler (24~] seems
inclined to agree with Karttunenls ir.tuitions. 4
It is therefore interesting to observe that precisely the
intuitions reported by Karttunen are predicted if one of the two which
phrases in (53) is first handled by (C.wh-u) and the remaining one by
(C.wh-e) as modified by (C.which).
A couple of minor points remain. First, Karttunen's [243]
treatment of the uniqueness implicature of which predicts that (53)
expects one and only one pair of boy and girl in a liking relationship.
Our treatment does not have this effect. Even if both occurrences of
which in (53) are played off using (C.wh-e) and (C.which). there rem~1n
differences in the uniqueness implications depending on the manner of
application of the rules. If the rules apply linearly. the uniqueness
entailments are accordingly asymmetric. If they apply left to right.
(53) implies
(54) Only one boy is someone who likes only one girl
and if they apply right to left, we obtain
(55) Only one girl is someone who is liked by only one boy.
However, these readings seem inferior to a "third reading" to (53) which
does allow one and only one pair in a liking relationship. Now a similar
third reading is available to
(56) Only one boy likes only one girl.
as well. In another paper, I suggest that such "third readings" arise
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from parallel (simultaneous) applications of game rules to several
quantifier phrases. 5 I shall bypass this complication in the present
contexts.
Second, nothing in our rules eliminates the possibility of
universally quantified occurrences of simple which questions. They are
certainly pretty hard to find, but I think that they do exist. Thus I
find it admissible to paraphrase (57) by the conjunction of simple which
questions in (58):
(57) Some of the babies ~ere are boys and some are girls.
Doctor Spack here can tell you which baby is which.
(58) Some of the babies here are boys and some are girls.
Doctor Spack here can tell you which baby is a boy and
which baby is a girl.
5. Conclusiveness
A qui~k inspection shows that the rule (C.wh-e) is recursively
applicable to its own Qutput. As the clause (iii) in it indicates. a
search question is not conclusively answered until a question about the
identity of the fresh 5ubst1tuend is conclusively answered.
In order to stop a regress. we have to assume some independent
characterization for conclusive answerhood to identity questions of the
sort (iii). I cannot do better that restate the informal characterization
of 111.4: an identity question of the form (59):
(59) (Wh-word X) is A t?
is self-answering, i.e., conclusively answered by
(60) A be A
in a given set of ep1stem1c alternatives, if the "world line" associated
with 'A', i.e., the function that picks out from each of the given set of
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alternatives the description of A in that alternative, describes a bona
fide individual in the sense of the identity criteria associated with
the question phrase in (59}.6
A minimum requirement for the above informal condition to hold
has already been mentioned: two well-defined individuals should not get
confused with each other. For instance, if the police know who committed
one murder and they know who committed another one, they ought to know
whether both murders were committed by the same individual or not. If
they cannot answer that question, it seems dubious that they really know
who the culprit is in each case.
This requirement of well-definedness is easy enough to spell
out as a further game rule of inference.
(C.wh-id) Infer from the questions
(wh-word X) be A t?
(wh-word X) be B t?
where both questions have the same rriteria of identity
associated to them, the question
Be Athe same X as B or not?
with the same criteria of identity associated to the same X. 7
Let us take an example. In a prize quiz. a contestant is asked
the following two questions.
(61) Who is the author of the book The Sex Life of the Savages?
(62) Who won gold in steeplechase in the Moscow Olympics 19801
The contest gives both questions the same answer:
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(63) Bronislaw Malinowski.
Surprisingly, the answer is correct each time. However, the
quiz master wants to test whether the contestant actually knows who he
is talking about: he asks the further question
(64) Is the author of the book the same Bronislaw Malinowski as
the gold medalist?
The contest does not know that; indignantly, he argues that he is not
supposed to know who Bronislaw Malinowski is. All he is asked ;s to
supply the name of the person in each case, i.e., the conclusiveness
clause of the quiz is obtained by replacing uwho" by "what is the name
of the person who" in each question. And the name Bronislaw Malinowski
is Bronislaw Malinowski, whoever the man be in each case. Although he
does not know conclusively who the person is in each case, he knows the
name full well: he can even spell it right.
The rule (C.wh-id) is a useful test for solutions of detective
story whodunits. For instance, in the adventures entitled A Case of
Identity and The Man with a ]wisted Lip, Sherlock Holmes cracks the case
by testing out such identity hypotheses. In the former, the mysterious
Hosmer Angel is actually no one else than the greedy father-in-law Mr.
Wind1bank; in the latter, the suspect Boone character - the man with
the twisted lip - turns out to be the missing Mr. St. Clair cleverly
disguised.
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Chapter 7
LOGIC OF DIALOGUES
1. Consistency
In this chapter, I want to show how players can use the dialogue
rules to keep order ~'ithin their epistemic alternatives. Let us first
consider how one may check for the consistency of one's assumptions. Let
the topic of interest be the question
(1) Who won?
about which the subject already holds the assumptions
{2} A is a player, B is a player, A is not B, and A won.
Then someone comes and suggests to him
{3} B is the player who won
The player wants to see if he can accept (3) along with his other
assumptions. In order to know, he has to explain what (3) actually
means. Applying (C.the), he tries the explanation
(4) A is a player who won, any player who won is A and B is A.
But a simple application of (C.and) forces him to infer 'B is A',
contradicting his earlier assumptions. So that explanation will not
work. The only alternative ~xplanation is
(5) B is a player who Non, any player who won is B, and B is B.
This time there is a problem with the second conjunct, for (C. any)
allows the inference
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(6) If A ;s a player who won, A is B.
(6) in turn must be explained by (7) or the denial of (8).
(7) A is B
(8) A is a player who won.
(7) contradicts (2). Denying (8) in turn would imply denying all of
its instances, including
(9) A is A and A is a player and A won.
derived from (8) by (C.an). The denial of (9) again must be explained
by one of
(10) A is not A
(11) A is not a player
(12) A did not win.
(10) is a self-contradiction, and (11)-(12) contradict (2). Finding no
way of making consistent sense of (2)-(3) together, the player cannot
add (3) to his assumptions if he wants to keep (2). If he accepts (2),
he has to reject (3) and vice versa.
Let us make the intuitive procedure followed in the example
more precise. It is a simple modification of the model set disproof
procedure discussed earlier. First, we need to spell out the elementary
conditions of non-contradiction which were appealed to in the example.
These principles can be registered as two further analogues of model set
conditions:
(c.cons) Do not admit a sentence together with its direct denial.
(c. self) Do not admit any sentence of form A is not A.
-explana-
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(c. cons) of course does not forbid admitting contradictories into
separate alternatives: it just rules out contradictory alternatives.
What gave the player the right to reject an extension of (1)-
(2) by (3) was the fact that there was no way of explaining that list
of assumptions without violating (C.cons) or (C.self). To make this
more precise, we have to spell out what we mean by a complete explanation
of a list of assumptions (the dialogue game analogue of a model set).
Intuitively, it is clear that a player cannot trust a list of assumptions
before he has explained everything that is in need of explanation in it.
On the other hand, to be satisfied about the consistency of an
tion the player needs to consider all of its consequences.
Let us call a sentence that can be explained by some explanatory
game rule directly explainable. Similarly, a sentence is directly
inferrable from a given set of assumptions if it is the result of an
application of a rule of inference to lexical material already present
in the list of assumptions. (Both sentences and noun phrases mentioned
in the structural description of the rule must be found among assumptions
already in the list.) Using these auxiliary notions, we may write the
definition
(13) A list of assumptions is completely explained if
(1) every directly explainable sentence in it has an
explanation in it
(11) every sentence directly inferrable from it is included
in it.
Then, in virtue of H1ntikka 1s results, we may state
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(14) A list of assumptions is consistent if it can be completely
explained without violating (C.cons) and (C.self).
(14) presents the players with a method (not always effective,
but often so) which helps them conform to the maxim of consistency.
Although the players may not be able to recognize consistency on the
face of an assumption list, they can test for it by recursive application
of the dialogue game rules. This lets the players themselves take care
of the consistency of their assumptions: A player who is negligent with
his logical game rules may conform to the principles (C.cons) and (C.self)
on the surface of his epistemic alternatives but still entertain hidden
inconsistencies.
2. Indirect Inference
The above described method of eliminating inconsistent epistemic
alternatives can be turned into an indirect method of establishing arbi-
trarily complicated conclusions. What the player has to do is to generate
a family of exhaustive and exclusive epistemic alternatives and eliminate
any inconsistent ones among them. The remaining alternatives represent
a gain in information obtained by purely deductive means.
To have an example, let us turn the argument from the previous
section into a deductive inference. The player accepts the sentence
(15) A won, A is a player, and B is not A.
The other player's suggestion
(16) B is the player who won
••
•
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naturally raises the question whether it is true, i.e., the questi~n
(17) Is B the player who won or not?
There are two exhaustive and exclusive alternative answers, (16) and
(18):
(18) B is not the player who won .
The player forms two epistemic alternatives, one including (15) and (16),
the other (15) and (18). Following the steps described in the previous
section, he finds out that the former alternative is inconsistent, so
in virtue of the maxim of consistency, it has to be rejected. As a
•
result, (18) is now true in one and all of the p1ayer 1 s remaining epis-
temic alternatives, so he has ended up accepting (18).
3. Inductive Decision
But the player could have reacted to the interlocutor's
suggestion in a different way. Instead of questioning it using his own
answer as evidence to resolve the question, he might have asked a less
biased question:
•
• (19) Did A or B win?
•
•
•
Again, the question has two exhaustive and exclusive alternative answers,
the player's own
(20) A won
and the interlocutor's suggestion
(21) B won.
- 164 -
Since the present problem setting (19) puts (20) into question,. it ;s
only fair that it is not treated as evidence. The player ends up with
the following two epistemic alternatives this time:
(22) A won, B did not win, A is a player, B is a player, and
A is not B.
(23) B won, A did not win, A is a player, B is a player, and
A is not B
Both alternatives are internally consistent, so nothing is gained by
purely deductive methods. But there is indirect evidence for each
alternative, namely the fact that the player himself accepts (20) while
his interlocutor accepts (21). If the player has enough confidence in
his own knowledge, or if he values his interlocutor's opinion highly
enough, he may be able to exclude one of (20)-(21) by an inductive
procedure of the sort described in Chapter II. If he rejects one of the
exclusive alternatives, he ends up accepting the other. The procedure
of inductive decision making followed here is closely similar to the
above deductive decision method. In fact, the deductive method can be
viewed as a special case of the inductive one, as the epistemic utility
of an inconsistent alternative is always smaller than that of a consis-
tent one. The most striking difference, therefore, between the two
approaches to opinion formation just described, is not in the certainty
of the inference (whether deductive or inductive), but in the treatment
of earlier acceptations. In the deductive example, the player treated
his accepted beliefs as evidence (or ~rem1ses) against which he tested
his interlocutorls conflicting claim. In the present case, the player
••
•
•
•
•
I
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reconsidered any of his own conflicting claims together with the new
suggestion against whatever independent evidence he had at his disposal.
4. Answerhood
So far, we have only defined answerhood for an artificially
simple class of questions (the so-called elementary questions). But a
hint was already given as to how the definition of answerhood is to be
extended to more complicated questions.
The extension will employ an analogue to the notion of complete
explanation introduced above. We shall call an assumption list completely
answered if it ;s compl~tely explained and closed under (C.answer) , or
more explicitly,
(24) A list of assumptions is completely answered if it is completely
explained and every elementary question in it has an answer in
it.
This is not yet a definition for the notion of a complete
answer to a given individual question. As we observed earlier, the
concept of a complete answer cannot be defined in the abstract, without
reference to the context of asking a question, but it is a function of
what the questioner already accepts. Roughly, anything counts as a
complete answer to question whose acceptance implies the satisfaction
of the question, i.e., the truth of its desideratum. Thus the notion
of complete answerhood involves some notion of consequence among questions
and their answers: acceptance of a complete answer should imply
satisfaction of th~ question.
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We approach the problem of defining the appropriate relation of
entailment again indirectly, by the way of the dual concept of inconsis-
tency of rejecting a question while accepting an answer to it. To do
so, we first have to clarify what we mean by acceptance and rejection
of questions.
Our earlier definition of acceptance is not 5pecific as to the
mood of an accepted ~entence: according to it, a player accepts a ques~
ticn iT that question belongs to the intersection of hlS epistemic a~ter­
natives. Now I want to explain what the acceptance - or rejection - of
a question means.
The idea is simple enough, given all that has been said of
questions and the aims of the players. To accept a question ;s to prefer
for its desideratum to become true: a player who accepts a question
wants to find an answer to it. That is what acceptance of a question
should intuitively mean, and that ;s what it will be understood to mean
in this essay.
Conversely, then, rejecting a question should mean being
indifferent or averse to looking for an answer to the question. A
question may be rejected for different reasons. It may be that the
question has no answer because its presupposition is not true; clearly,
a player is justified to reject a question if he rejects its presuppo-
sition. A question may be rejected for other reasons too, which are
outside the scope of the very rationalistic considerations of this essay_
A player may consider a question intrusive, out of place, or just unin-
teresting, all according to some ulterior motives or prefer'ences he
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holdS. However, our task is not to devise rational rules of choosing
topics of discussion, but just to look at rules for rational conduct in
a discussion given some choices of topic. Therefore, we shall assume
that the players are free to choose topics for discussion as long as
their choices are consistent.
To spell out what it means to ask questions consistentiy, we
need to be able to represent the !!Jection of a question in our syntactic
terms. An appropriate representation is not difficult to find w!len one
follows closely the analogy of declarative sentences. A player rejects
a d~clarative sentence if he accepts its denial. What we have to look
-for is an ~~otet1c analogue for the denial of a declarative sentence.
Now the way to reject, e.g. t
(25) Someone won
is not accepting its syn~actic negation
(26) Someone did not win
but (for instance)
(27) It is not true that someone won
Ana1ogous1Y t to ~·eject
(28) Who won?
one does no~ ask
(29) Who did n\.,t win?
but says something to the effect of
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(30) It is not interesting (important) who won.
Or, to choo~g a simpler phrase:
(31) Never mind who won.
Now it is intuitively right to call a player inconsistent if he accepts
(31) and yet accepts (is willing to ask) (28), just as it would be
inconsistent to accept (27) alongside (25). Accordingly, we shall define
the denial of a question as follows:
(32) The (or a) denial of a direct question is the result of
prefixing never mind to the corresponding indirect question.
To form the corresponding indirect question out of a direct question,
it suffices to take its declarative form (inverse transform under subject-
auxiliary inversion) and, if the question is sentential, to prefix it
by if or whether. For example, the denials of (33)-(35) are (36)-(38),
r~spect1vely;
(33) Did A win?
(34) Who won?
(35) Who played who?
(36) Never mind if Awon.
(37) Never mind who won.
(38) Never mind who played who.
In order to extend four model set methods of inference for
en:~~lment among questions and answers, it suffices to add a ~imple
condition of consistency for a player's interests and his information.
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A~ we argued earlier, to be disinterested in a question means being
indifferent to its answers: it would be inconsistent for a player to
deny an interest in a question he prefers to hold an answer to. This
intuition is spelled out in the following principle of consistency:
(C.consq) Do not accept an answer to a question you deny.
For instance. someone may quite well accept
(39) The number of planets is even or odd
and yet deny any interest in which is the case, i,e., he may also accept
(40) Never mind whether ttle number of planets is even or odd.
What he cannot accept. still holding on to (40), is either of
(41) The number of planets is even
(42) The number of planets is odd
though of course he may admit both as conceivable alternatives. What he
cannot do is adopt either into the intersection of his epistemic alterna-
tives.
The notion of a comp~etely answered list of assumptions and
the rule (C.consq) allow us to characterize the notion of complete
answer to a given question relative to some assumed set of background
knowledge. For instance, why is it that
(43) B lost
counts as a complete answer to the question
(44) Did B win or not?
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A necessary piece of background information is the zero-sum assumption
that
(45) If B lost, B did not win.
If a player accepts (45) and adopts (43), he cannot feign a lack of
interest in (44), i.e., (43). (45) are inconsistent with the denial of
(44) in the sense of (C.consq). For from the denial of (44)
(46) Never mind whether B won or not.
one can infer
(47) Never mind if B did not win;
but on the other hand, given (43), the only consistent explanation of
(45) is
(48) B did not w1n
and accepting (47) and (48) together would violate (C.consq).
On the other hand, given the very same background assumptions,
(49) B did not lose
does not constitut~ a complete answer to (44). For (49) leaves open the
possibility of a draw: B did not lose nor win. (49) is a complete
answer only if the converse or (45) is true, viz.
(50) If B did not lose. he won.
To take a more complicated example. why is
(51) Who played who?
completely answered by
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(52) Everyone played everyone
assuming that the identity question
(53) Who is everyone?
is already completely answered? Now (54), as the denial of (53) under-
stood as a universal (exhaustive list) question
(54) Never mind who played who
must be ultimately explained by some sentence of form
(55) Never mind if A played B.
On the other hand, whatever the choices of A and Bt (52) together with
(55) implies
(56) A played 8
- a contradiction of (C.consq). On the other hand,
(57) Everyone played someone
is not a complete answer to (51) given the same background assumptions,
for indepedent explanation~ may exist for (54) and (57), say (55) for
(54) and
(58) everyone played C.
for (57).
The insight that emerges from these examples can be summarized
in the following def'n1t1on of a complete answer to a direct question:
(59) Sentence S constitutes a complete answer to question Q (rela-
tive to a list of assumptions A) if S entails Q (given A).
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5. Imp' ied Questions
The present method of indirect inf~rence is equally applicable
for deriving questions from other questions. Perhaps it is good first
to explain what should be meant by a question being a logical consequence
of another one. According to Hintikka's explication, a question is the
expression of a request for an addressee to make the desideratum of the
question true. The desideratum of the question is a declarative sentence
which entail~ other declarative sentences. Among its entailments may be
in particular desiderata for certain further questions. Not it is a
reasonable assumption that an ideally rational player's preferences are
consistent (satisfiable and closed under logical con~equence), so that
a player who prefers (perhaps, under some conditions) for a sentence to
be true also prefers ~'or its entailments to be true on the same conditions
- i.e., a rational agent should consider all the consequences of his
actio JS when he weighs their value to him. Therefore a player who
prefers for some desideratum to be brought about should prefer that any
entailed desiderata be brought about as well. Such implied requests can
then be expressed as further direct questions.
Let us look at an example of an inference of a question from
another question. Imagine the famous private detective Sherlock Holmes
is investigating a murder, i.e., trying to solve a particular question
(60) Who is the murderer?
Applying his usual methods, Holmes is able to deduce that
(61) The murderer wears square-toed boots.
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Naturally enough t the next question he poses t to the surprise of everyone
present, is
(62) Who wears square-toed boots?
To see how (62) follows from (60) and the partial answer (61), we try
to deny (62) while accepting (60)-(61). (60) is first explained in
virtue of (C.wh-e) by some pair of sentences
(63) Is the murdered N.N.?
(64) Who is N.N.?
(63) can only be answered by
(64) The murderer is N.N.
From (64) and (61) it follows in virtue of (c. be) that
(65) N.N. ~ears square-toed boots.
On the other hand t (62) rdnnot be denied without denying one of
(66) Does N.N. wear square-toed boots?
(67) Who is N.N.?
Either way, a violation of (C.consq) is countenanced, for we already
have accepted (65) and (64).
6. Dialogical Entailment
The function of a sentence as a move in a dialogue permits
certain inferences from it which would not be valid were the sentence
considered by itself out of context. Actually, it would be morp correct
to say that it is not the sentence itself that permits such dialogical
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inference, but the fact that the sentence functions as a move in a
dialogue. However, it is a convenient - and, if the basis of the infer-
ence ;s kept clear, innocuous - simplification to speak of the sentence
as dialogically implying certain other sentences.
What makes an inference a dialogical inference? The answer is:
an inference is essentially dialogical if its reconstruction as a logical-
ly binding inference essentially involves describing a dialogue game:
if some of the steps of the argument involve application of dialogue
game rules, or if the argument is binding only in the condition that
players in a dialogue game are following their optimal strategies.
One particular type of dialogue entailment is exemplified by
the feel of self-contradiction in the Moore type sentences like
(68) The cat is on the mat but I don't believe it.'
In dialogue terms, the contradictoriness of (68) has a most strai~\lt­
forward explanation. (68) is put forward by the referent of 'I' as a
dialogue move. His audience is then justified to assume th~t the author
of the move is obeying a meaning convention, say (D.earnest).
(D.earnest), applied to (68), permits the inference that
(69) I believe that (the cat is on the mat but I don't believe it).
where III still refers to the author of (68). (69), in virtue of the
logic of belief, given a minimum of logical acumen to 'me', entails
(70) I believe that the cat is on the mat.
(68), on the other hand, already implies the contradictory of (70),
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(71) I don't believe it.
Hence an attempt to construe (68) as a serious move in a dialogue game
leads to attributing to its author of a pair of contradictory sentences.
That it is not what the sentence (68) says, but its use in
dialogue that leads to contradiction, is seen from the fact that the
feeling of contradictoriness disappears when the sentence is turned
into third person:
(72) The cat is on the mat but he does not believe it.
An application to (D.earnest) to (72) would only assign incompatible
beliefs to two different subjects, the author of (72) and whoever ;s
referred to by 'he ' . Therefore (72) need not describe a confused mind,
but just a disagreement between two minds.
7. Conversational Implicature
In our framework, the so-called conversational implications
of Grice (1967) come out as dialogue entailments. These ~re inferences
that are valid only in the context of a dialogue with suitable background
assumptions about the ep1stemic aims and attitudes, together with the
crucial assumption that the players play the game rationally, i.e.,
follow strategies that are optimal with respect to their aims.
To say that conversational implications arise from violations
of conversational maxims would be quite misleading. At best, one could
say that they playa prominent role only when they are brought in to
account for apparent violations of the maxims. A conversational implica-
tion is an assumption that has to be made about a player's aims or
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assumptions in order to construe his choice of strategy as a rational
one. Often, the logical step is not even deductive at all, but inductive,
a guess at an explanation. 2
A conversational implication can convey new information to a
player who needs to add it to his own assumptions in order to recognize
the well-formedness of a dialogue. What is more, a conversational impli-
cature can be intentially invited by a player'_ A player may know that
some move of his will appear irrational to his partners because they
are not correctly informed about his aims and attitudes. However, he
may proceed to make the move anyway expecting his audience to be able
to fill in whatever premises are necessary to construe his move as a
rational choice of strategy. In this manner, he may succeed to convey
some of his acceptations without ever putting them into words.
The point of the whole exercise is that despite appearances,
there will be no violation of the rules of the game: the author of the
move does accept the necessary premises, and expects his audience to
be able to figure them out too.
Actual violations of the rules of dialogue games and irrational
choices of strategy do happen. However, then conversational implications go
awry too. A ~chem1n1 player may make an irrational move intentionallYt
knowing that his partners will assume him to play rationally; the result
is deception by conversational implication. An accidental slip of
tongue is apt to shake out unwanted 1mplicatures.
The way we have defined utility functions in a dialogue, the
different maxims of conversation never clash, there is always a definite
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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tradeoff. To explain why Gricels example
(73) A: Where does Clive?
B: Somewhere in the South of France .
implicates that ~ knows no better, it suffices to assume that the move
B is putting forward is epistemically optimal given his evidence, i.e.,
B ;s playing rationally .
There are other examples too whose treatment in our account
differs from Grice's. By treating irony as a meaning convention on a
par with serious conversation, we have moved irony from the field of
conversational implicature into linguistic convention. Some varieties
of exaggeration and understatement can be correlated with manipulation
of the index of caution: a cautious pe,·son is apt to understate, while
an audacious one says more than he has evidence for.
8. Self-Transparency
Given the idea of dialogical implication, it is easy to see
why the principle of transitivity of belief (or acceptance)
(74) If anyone accepts that p, he accepts that he accepts that p
should have certain intuitive appeal as an axiom of the logic of rational
belief (acceptance).
Intuitively, what (74) says is that people's beliefs should
be evident to them: no one in his right mind should be lble to sincerely
deny accepting something he in fact accepts.
In terms of the dialogue game setup, it is easy to see why (74)
is so appealing. Its strongest intuitive appeal comes from inspecting
- 178 -
one's own beliefs. 3 As Hintikka puts it in Knowledge and Belief,
explaining the argument from introspection,
It may seem that a mind cannot help being aware of its own
states, among which there are the states of knowledge and
belief. At the very least, it seems impossible to doubt
that a mind can always become aware of its own states. If
I actively believe something, it might be said, surely I
must be able to recogn~ze that I do. What could there be
preventing me from knowing my own mind? (n. 53)
To illustrate this, assume someone is actually able to verify
an instance of tre antecedent of (74).
(75) I uccept that p.
According to the dialogue truth definition of acceptance, this means
that the subject can find out whether p holds in all of his own epis-
temic alternatives. But of course· anyone has free access to his own
alternatives, hasn't he conjured them up himself!
In order to verify the consequent of (74), he must next pass
this 'outside information' about his epistemic alternatives to his
various lalter egos' within those epistemic alternatives. This is a
prima facie innocuous assumption too, for what could it mean for him to
be identical to his alter ego~ if not that he shares his thoughts with
them? Therefore, these alter egos can end up in the privileged epis-
temic position of knowing everything about their worlds that the actual
subject, as their maker, has first hand information of.
When the argument from introspection is spelled out thus
crudely, it is obviously not logically binding. The first assumption,
that maker's knowledge is somehow privileged. is doubtful; for instance,
one who draws a picture with his eyes blindfolded has little idea of how
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the picture will look like. Too, it ;s easy to forget what one has once
accomplished.
Even more doubtful is the assumption of conservation of
information in personal cross-world identification. Surely, a person
can gain or lose knowledge while staying the same person. What is even
more destructive, consider a subject who has no conception of its own
self. For in~tance, a baby can well have beliefs about its environment
without having any notion of its own role in it. It then has no beliefs
about itself, as it has not (yet) formed a concept of itself. Then there
is no way of even making the cross-identification between the two occur-
rences of 'he' in (74).
Thus there seems to be reason ~nough to suspect (74) as a
conceptual truth. However, it does have quite a lot of practical
interest: as a matter of fact, we often are able to inspect our own
epistemic states so as to be able to make tY·ue statements about them.
As it happens, this possibility is alre~dy provided for by our
framework. Recall that we allow players to make observations in th~
course of an actual dialogue. Such observations are represented as so
many declarative moves by Nature, who m~y or may not allow a designated
number of players the privilege of being in her audience. The nicest
property of Nature's moves was their reliability: Nature could be
relied upon not to tell jokes, lies, or falsehoods. As d result, players
can safely transfer any moves by Nature they happen to catch upon over
to their ep1stemic alternatives.
Moving over to an arbitrary epistemic alternative, any
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sentences accepted there will be also represented as so many moves by
Nature: they are sentences true in that ep;stemic alternative. A
player who takes the trouble to consider what his alter ego in that
alternative can observe will be in a position to move such a move
another step deeper in the dialogue, into the epistemic alternatives of
his epistemic counterpart in that alternative - provided that the counter-
part is in the audience of that internal observation! And that depends
on how good an internal observer one considers oneself. If one ;s
inclined to doubt one's own capacity to introspection, one may well allow
room for mismatches between one's internal and external powers of
observation. It;s quite possible (and even ekely, what with all this
modern stuff about subliminal observation, levels of consciousness and
whatnot) that not all assumptions registered in one's epistemic alter-
natives get transferred to one's epistemic alternatives to those alterna-
tives: one m~y believe a thing without ever becoming aware of believing
it, or be mistaken about one's own acceptations. It may require an active
effort of introspection, often helped by interview and experimentation, to
make valid observations about one's propositional attitudes.
Summing up, the applicability of the transivity axiom (74) is
a contingent fact. It is up to players of a dialogue game to assess how
reliable their powers of introspection are. At best, we can construe (74)
as another principle true of an ideally equi~oed player, an all-observant
1ntrospect1on1st. 4
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Chapter 8
gUESTION-ANSWER DIALOGUES
1. Language Games vs. Speech Acts
My dialogue game approach to the use of language in general
and the meaning ~f grammatical moods in particular shares many assump-
tions \.ith Searle's thecry of spee~h acts. We both UhypC'thesize that
spe..:.king a language is engaging ~n a rule-governed form of behavior",
using familiar parlor games as objects of comparison. and subscribe to
the view that a theory of (the use of) language is well considered a
part of a theory of action. 1 It is therefore of interest to set! where
the most conspicuous differences ~~em to lie between the speech act
approach and the language game approach.
The crucial difference is in evidence in the respective rames
Of the approaches. It is a difference in the basic unit in the descrip-
tion of the use of language. Sedrle's hypothesis is that the speech
act ~s the oasic unit of communication: 2
The basi': fonn thdt this hYPCJthesis will take is tt"at speak1nq
a langua9t is performing speech acts, acts such as making
..:tatement~. giving conmands, asking questions, making promi~es.
ana ~c In .•. p. 16
Therefore, the tyrt1~al question Searle asks is, "What are the different
kinds of speech acts s;:>eakers perfonn when they utter expressions?1I3
Accordingly, h1~ primary research aim is lito fannulate sets of constitu-
tive ruies for tha performances of certain kinds of speech acts ll • 4
In contrast. the basic unit of description in the present
approach is a c~rnplete languase game. Speech a_t~t if they need be
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singled out in our approach, are represented by the several possible
moves of language games considered in the tontext of one particular
language game or other.
What possible gains might accrue from our appr~ach over
Searle's? Without claiming that there are any irreducible differences
between our global approach and Searle's more atomistic starting-point,
I wish to suggest that the language game framework offers certain
heuristic 3dvantages. Let me mention thr~e.
(i) The language gaR,e framework forces one to study individual
speech acts in the wider context of a whole conversation. This helps
avoiding too categor1c~1 descriptions of the felicity conditions of
different dialogue mo\'es. and naturally extends the study of individual
speech acts into th~ study of speech act sequences. 5
(i1) The game parameters suggest a natural basis of
classification of different speech acts. It enables one to derive
certain repetitious felicity conditions of individual speech acts from
the mora general boundary conditions on rational action involved in the
game theoretical concept 'f solution (optimal strategy) of ~ game.
(111) The game framework forces a clear separation of the
aims of the players of a language game from the strategies (means of
expression) available to them, explaining the wide variability of uses
of expressions. By this means, the language game approach seems to avoid
a somewhat embarrassing question raised by Coulthard [6], p. 17:
How many different functions of performat1ves does one have
to recognize? Austin suggests that the number of functions
is equivalent to the number of performat1ve verbs, which he
estimates at between one and ten thousand.
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There are two questions to be asked at this stage: the first.
posed by Searle (1965) ;s whether there are 'some basic
il1ocutionary acts to which all or most others are reducible' ...
The second question is whether it is wise to rely on natural
language as a means of categorization ...
In our approach, it is not necessary to assume that each move in a
dialogue has anyone well defined aim or function. which may be described
by a suildble performative verb. Some moves may have several independent
aims or functions, and the precise force of some moves may be quite hard
to put into words. I think it is symptomatic that in attempts to develop
the performative analysis into a systematic theory, it has been found
necessary not to take performative verbs (or individual speech acts) as
primitives, but rather to try and define the meaning of performat1ve
verbs by a systematic description of their proper conditions of use.
This Sdems to me to suggest that the interesting structure does not lie
so much in individual performative verbs as in the contexts of use which
define their meaning. Instead of describing use of language in terms
of performative verbs. one ought to describe the meaning of performative
5verbs in terms of an independent descri~tion of lan~uage James.
To illustrate these points. let us compare Searle's treatment
of the interrogative mood to ours. Searle's research strategy is the
following.
In order to give an analysis 0 4 the 111ocutionary act of
[asking a question], I shall a~k what conditions are necessary
and sufficient for the act of [~sking a question] to have been
successfully and non-defectively performed in the utterance
of a given sentence. I shall attempt to answer this question
by stating these conditions as a set of propositions such that
the conjunction of the members of the set entails the propo-
sition that speaker [asked] a successful and non-defective
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[question]. and the proposition that the speaker made such
a [question] entails this conjunction.
If we get such a set of conditions we can extract from them
a set of rules 7for the use of the illocutionary force indi-cating device.
The felicity conditions for questions include. as a preparatory condition,
that the author of the question does not know 'the answer' to the ques-
tion. and as a sincerity condition that the author wants this information.
The essential condition is that the question counts as an attempt to
elicit this information from the addressee. If any of these conditions
fail, the act of asking the question is defective. These conditions of
successfu1 questioning are to go over as so many rules for the use of
the relevant 111ocutionary force indicating device, the interrogative
mood. A question, by implication. will be inappropriate (infelicitous
or insincere) whenever the above conditions are not satisfied.
My aim in the following sections is to show by example and
adjoining argument that this theory of questions is all too narrow.
Its main wea~ness is the incorporation of likely dialogue aims (strategic
motivations) of questions as part of the meaning of the interrogative
mood. All that is needed to characterize the interrogative mood are the
dialogue rules of asking and answering. A reflection of these can be
discer"ed in Searle's essential condition. Even that condition seems
too strong as it stands.)
In contrast, the (likely or unlikely) motivations of asklng
a question need no separate attention in the rules for t~e interrogative
mood. They can be syst~nJat1cal1y inferred from the aims common to all
moves in information-sharing dialogues and the opportunities the rules
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for asking and answering provide for realizing those aims.
Searle recognizes one limitation of his statement of the
felicity conditions of questions. In a comment appended to his rules,
he admits that there are two kinds of questions. 'real questions' and
'exam questions'. In exam questions, the sincerity condition of real
quest1on~ is replaced by the condition that the author of the question
wants to know if the addressee knows the answer to the question.
In the following sections, we shall see that there are a lot
more uses for questions than even these two. The best generalization
one can make ;s this: use questions wheneve~~ they are relevant to the
dialogue. In other words. a~k a question when asking it can be calculated
by the rules of the game to further the aim of the game. This aim has
been described in the games of cooperative information sharing as that
of creating a common understar~4'ng (consensus) about the topics of a
dialogue (the questions asked in it) as well as about the answers
accepted to thf! topical questions. 8
2. Pleading Ignorance
Our rules for question-answ~r dialogues appear to have a
conspicuous gap. They do not seem to provide for one of the most common
responses to inquiries, the plea of ignorance, as in
(1) A: Did you make it?
c: I don't know.
This gap, however, is no accidental oversight. I have been saving my
account for it until the discussion of iterated acceptance in a previous
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section. To expose the correct logic of dialogue (1), I submit, we need
to interpolace in it an implicit step of inference. C, in (l), is
actually not answering A's literal query directly, but is putting forward
a direct answer to another question, quite immediately suggested by A's
actual question. That question is of course nothing else than
(2) A: 00 you know whether you made it?
To justify this analysis of dialogue (l), we have to show that
question (2) is actually entailed in some sense by Al s original question
in (l). To see this, assume the contrary: A is asking her question in
(1) while she denies (2). i.e. t accepts
(3) Never mind whether you know whether you made it.
We want to show that A cannot accept (3) and still expect C to answer
her original question in (1) without violating (C.consq).
It is very easy to see why. Assume C were able to answer A's
question in (1) directly, say by
(4) C: I did make it.
In order to understand what C means by ('r), A cannot hel~ drawing some
definite consequence about CiS epistemic attitude. Assuming C is being
serious, A must infer by (D.earnest).
(5) C accepts that she did make it.
But (5) already constitutes a positive an~wer to (2), making it
impossible for A to deny interest in (2).
I~ brief, if A expects B to be able to answer her original
question, she expects a pos1t1~e answer to the implicit question (2).
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It ;s this implicit presupposition which S's answer denies in (1) by
answering the implied question (2).
Note an extremely interesting feature of the above line of
inference. The entailment here is not logical, but rather dia-logical.
It is not the question in (1) in the abstract that entails the question
in (2). That is, A might be able to obtain an answer to her original
question in (1) without being informed about (2), if she doesn't ask
C directly but makes more roundabout inquiries. Rather, it is the asking
of the question of C in (1) that makes it impossible for A to deny an
interest in (2). This is an example of a genuinely dialogical inference.
3. Rejection of Questions
Similar explanations apply to another common class of apparent
responses to questions, exemplified in the dialogues
(6) A: Wh~t did you say?
B: I did not say anything!
(7) A: What did you say?
8: Never mind what I s~1d.
These dialogues represent rejections of proposed topics of discussion.
In (6), a question is in effect rejected through a rejection of its
presupposition. In it, B is not actually ~ddressing A's question
directly, but his reply is directed one st~p higher up in the dialogue:
(8) A: Did ~ou say anything? (D.ask)
r
A: You said something ...... B: I did not say anything. (D. reply)I (D. answer)
A: What did you say? (O.question)
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This reconstruction of presupposition-denial construes the denial as a
move by (D. reply) in the preparatory dialogue whose topic is the presup-
position.
Dialogue (7) represents a more radical rejection of a topic
for discussion. From the point of view of the dialogue initiated by A's
question, B is not even playing: he is not obeyi~g the maxim of agree-
ment. In order to reconcile (I) with conversational maxims, a higher-
order dialogue must be interpolated around the topic of choosing an
appropriate topic:
(9) A: Would ~ou accept 'What did you say?' if I ask~d you?
, t
A: You would (D.answer) B. I do not (D. reply)
A: What di~ you say? B: Ne~er mind what I said
In the higher order game, possible answers are possible choices of topic
(possible first-order dialogues). Thus. a's rejection of A's answer
for the higher order top1~ amounts to opting out from the dialogue A
wants to initiate. B is still being cooperative, albeit only one level
up from A.
4. Eliciting Questions
The most generally recognized "exceptional" context for asking
questions which one knows the right answers to is an exan11nation
situation. There. the questioner knows the answer to his question; what
he wants to know is whether the addre~see does too.
In our terms, this is in no wayan exceptional situation, nor
does it require any addition to the rules and principles we have already
•I
I
I
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laid down. For recall the statement of the aims of players in an
information sharing situation: the players aim to arrive at a common
understanding on the topic of the dialogue. They do not only want to
each adopt an epistemically optimal answer to the topic at hand, but
they want to agree about the answer, and know that they do; all this ;s
implied by the concept of common understanding as defined. For this
reason, players want to know what the others think of the question at
hand whether or not they have set opinions about them on their own.
This statement of aims embraces the aims and attitudes of an
examining teacher, intent upon securing that the students have assimi-
lated the answers that have been offered them, as well as those of an
ironical Socrates, who knows that his interlocutors do not know the right
answers to his questions any more than hinlself but wants to make them
realize their ignorance and share it with him.
Thanks to the rules of asking and answering and the meaning
conventions, questions are an excellent way of eliciting opinions,
whether for acceptance or rejection. What;5 less generally observed,
questions are also used to elicit further guestions. Questions are
commonly us~d to create an agreement about topics: to arouse other
people's interest in what the questioner is interested in - and quite
~ossibly knows the answers to.
For instance, one may hide something behind one's back and
ask:
(12) what do I have here?
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not to test the addressee nor to expose his ignorance - that is being
assumed all along! - but to make him share an interest in the question,
and preferably to get him to ask it himself:
(11) Well, what do you have there?
Such eliciting can be accomplished in a more roundabout way, too, by
asking a question which is dialogically implied by the real topic of
interest:
(12) 00 you know what I have here?
In orjer to catch the drift of (12), the addressee must find an explana-
tion to the questioner's interest in (12); finding the obvious one (10),
he can join the game and aSK (11). This sort of ploy is very common in
starting conversations where the first task is to create a consensus
on the topic of interest.
An eliciting question can have a function even when the players
already have a consensus about the answer to it. As a response to
another question, such an eliciting question may serve to suggest an
answer to the first question. Our earlier Sherlock Holmes example might
well have this interpretation:
(13) W: Who is the murderer?
H: Who wore square-toed boots?
We may assume Watson already knows who wore the boots, and knows Holmes
does, and both know the other ~nows it, and so forth: in short there is
a common understanding about that matter. Why, then, should Holmes ask
that obvious question? Some intervening step of inference must be
••
- 191 -
interpolated. The shortest interpolation sentence is of course
(14) The murderer wore square-toed boots.
Given (14), one particular answer to Holmes' question automatically
answers Watson's mystery; if there was just one pair of square-toed
boots around, Watson can conclude from (14) and his answer to Holmes'
question the identity of the murderer. Thus the necessity (g1ve~ Holmes·
reputation as a close and cogent reasoner) of finding a logical connec-
tion between Watson's question and Holmes· counterquestion lets Watson
guess at Holmes· hidden premise (14). Holmes' apparently superfluous
question turns out to give away the key to the mystery.
A more colloquial example of the same dialogue strategy is
the following:
(15) A: Who won?
B: Who do you think?
B's question enta~ls (and explains) A's query given the interpolation
sentence
•
(16) Who you think won won .
•
•
•
(Of course, there are other possible interpretations of (15): B might
be sincerely interested in, and ignorant of, A's opinion. In that case,
the connection between A's and B's moves is dialogical rather than
logical: if A's question is ac~epted as the topic, the players deriva-
tively accept an interest in each other's assumptions concerning it,
in accordance with the aims of cooperative information exchanges. Hence
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S's interest in At~ guess.)
A further interesting case of eliciting question is the
sarcastic interchange in (17):9
(17) A: I~ Reagan republican?
B: Is the Pope catholic?
Here, B retorts to A's question by (what he thinks is) another question
with an obvious answer: by analogy, A is to figure out that the correct
answer to his question is equally obviously positive. What is the mecha-
nism which leads A to actually draw the analogy?
It is, I suggest, the need, and search, for a common topic to
the two questions. Why should B reply by asking A another question? I
mean, what is the logical cont'ection between the questions? Asking him-
self this question, A is expected to try to construe both questions as
entailed, as subordinate queries, by som~ common topic. In (17), the
\nded topic ;s of course something like
18) What is obvious?
In other words: to grasp the analogy, A has to find what the two
questions in (17) have in common, what they have in common is expressible
as a common topic they both address. And the search for the common topic
is ensured by A's need to see the relevance of B's counterquestion to
his own query.
Note that the conversational ploy employed in (17) is quite
versatile the essential point in it being the suggestion of a common
topic. One may indicate that a question is inappropriate:
• (19) A: Are you Jewish?
B: Are you gay?
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•
•
•
•
One may apply the same methods to assertions:
(20) A: Reagan will solve the economic crisis.
B: Yeah, and all good children will go to heaven.
Here, the topic B is rhetorically elicitinq could be either of
(21) What else is new?
(22) How gullible ~an one get?
depending on one's convictions.
5. A Three-Person Dialogue
Recall the game situation with the three cheerleader
apPlicants. 10 As we noted, each girl was desperate to know how she had
fared in the exam. However, they just cannot bring themselves to ask
the others directly about their own fates. It would be just too cruel
to hear a negative verdict from a more fortunate competitor! Therefore
A, who is a resourceful girl, decides to go about it in a more roundabout
way. She asks C:
(23) Did you make it?
(of course A already knows that C made it, and she also knows that C
does not know that. Yet the question has a point!) Predictably, C
•
•
answers,
(24) I don't know .
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fllowing time for the answer to sink in, A then turns to B and asks her
the same question, and B answers in the same way. Triumphantly, ~
embraces her companions and cries:
(25) So we a'il made it:
The task now ;s to reconstruct this somewhat surprising dialogue.
Let us go over the background once more. What each girl knows
as background information about the test is the follow"ing:
(26) Every girl knows that every girl knows of every other girl
whether she passed or not.
(27 Every girl knows that -every girl knows that some girl passed.
-
What A could tell in pvrticular was that
(28) B passed and C passed.
She also knows that every girl ;s inter1ested in the question
(29) Who passed?
Applying (C.wh-u), she derives from (29) three conditional Guestions:
(30) Did C pass if C passed?
(31) Did B pass if B passed?
(32) Did A pass if A passed?
The only question which is still open is the last one. Now A can
explain it, in virtue of (C. if), in either nf two ways, by assuming a
positive answer to the main clause
(33) Did A pass?
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or by assuming the denial of the conditional clause, i.e.,
(34) A did not pass.
She decides first to tryout the latter possibility. What she tries to
figure out is what B will know in that case. Instantiating (26), she
can infer that
(35) B knows that C passed
(36) B knows that A did not pass
(37) B knows that C knows that A did not pass
(38) B knows that C knows whether B passed or not.
So she thinks it is worth taking a look at what is going on in B's pretty
head. Applying the possible worlds definition of acceptance, she finds
the following in the intersection of S's epistemic alternatives:
(39) C passed
(40) A did not pass
(41) C knows that A did not pass
(42) C knows whether ~ passed or not.
Furthermore, B can be assumed to ask hereself the question (31), and to
try to follow its consequences. Again. the.~e are two alternatives for
B, to answer the main clause of (31) in the affirmative. or to consider
the contrary hypothesis,
(43) B did not pass.
But if (43) is the case, (42) reduces to
(44) C knows that B did not pass.
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So B would do well to look what C might be able to infer in that case.
The intersection of C's epistemic alternatives to the
alternative A is assuming B to consider her~ contains the following
sentences:
(45) A did not pass
(46) B did not pass
and the question C is asking herself is
(30) Did C pass if C passed?
Now C knuws as well as the others (recall (27)!) that
-(47) Some girl passed
(48) Every girl is A or B or C.
These hypotheses already exclude the denial of the conditional of (30),
namely
(49) C did not pass.
Hence, if this alternative were correct, C could alre~dy conclude that
she passed, being a~le to eliminate the other two candidates. What A
aims to do in asking C (23) is test out this alternative she is conjec-
turing B to entertain. Of course, she (A) knows the correct answer and
she al~o knows what C's reply is going to be, but she specifically wants
B to be in the audience of the exchange. For when B hears that C,
contrary to the expectation of the current hypothesis, does not know
her own position, B can chuck that line of thought if she ever entertained
t
I
I
I
I
I
I
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it. At this stage, things get exciting for A. For she knows there are
now two alternatives left: either A failed, and then B can already infer
from CiS indecisiveness that she (B) passed; or no one failed. in which
case B cannot yet be sure of passing eit.ler. So A now asks B a million
dollar question: did she (B) pass?
Thank God, B pleads ignorance, so the only remaining
alternative which covers the facts is the one wilich answers A's question
(33) in the affirmative. Combining the results in (28) and the newly
gained piece of information, A is in a position to announce (25).
what is most instructive about this example of indirect
questioning, it shows that no all too narrow statement of the felicity
conditions of asking questions can be right. We have just witnessed a
case where it has been fully rational for a person to address a question,
which she already knows the answer to, to a person who stle knows not to
be able to answer the question. One must not forget one's audience:
often enough, questions are asked for the benefit of an audience rather
t~an the main characters. Once the general point is appreciated. it is
not hard to think of more everyday examples of it, say from courts of
law. 11
6. Questions Implying Ignorance
Once the dialogue logic of iterated acceptance is appreciated,
it is not difficult to exp11cat~ the use of questions as responses to
questions to indicate ignorance. The following example is a case in
point:
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(50) A: What will Jack say?
B: Who knows?
Bls question seems rhetorical, in the sense that B is not likely to
expect or even want an answer from A. Rather, B seems to be conveying
a mes~age about his uwn ability to answer A's question. Note that B
need not believe that no one cou1d answer her question - for instance,
there is no reason for B to ~xclude the possibility that Jack, for one,
might know. B's point seems to be a weaker one. She is only implying
that she cannot point to anyone who could answer A. Since in particular,
if.B knew the answer to A's question, B would be the first person to
know that, B's asking her question suggests that B do~s not know the
answer to Al s question. And t.a1s is the main thrust of B's message:
she might have said "Don't ask me!" instead.
We see that the reasoning behind B's counter-question is quite
similar to that in Section 2 above. A's asking B in (50) implies
an interest by A in the question
(51) Do you know what Jack will say?
But (51) in turn logically Implies its existential generalization,
the (existercial1y understood) search question
(52) Who knows what Jack will say?
which is precisely the question B puts forward in an elliptic form
1n (50).
How does B succeed to express his ignorance by ask1n~ A (52)?
Thp reasoning is not difficult to appreciate if the ep1stem1c context of
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(50) ;s understood. The natural context for (50) is one where A does
not have an answer to her question, where she assumes that B will have
one, and where 8 assume~ A to hold these assumptions. Then, if B is
playing rationally (obeying an optimal strategy dictated by the maxims
of cooperative information exchange), it is easy to show that he cannot
ha~e an answer to A's question in (~O).
For assume B did indeed have an answer to A's question, say
(53) Jac~ will say no.
If B assumed (~3), she could have simply put forward (53) as a direct
answer to (50). So why did she not do so? Moreover, B could infer
from (53) by (D.earnost)
(54) I know that Jack will say no.
But (54) immediately implies
(55) I know what Jack will say,
so B would also agree with A about one answer to ~52). Why should she
then ask (52)? There is no reason at all. To the contrary. the very
fact that B still finds (52) a live topic shows that she cannot agree
with A about (55).
One puzzle still remains to be solved. Why is a's question
rhetorical - how come is it clear that B is not likely to expect or even
want an answer to her question? The reasoning here is close.
Recall that B was lead to accept her counter-question by the fo ce of
A's willingness to ask B her own question. Now as we saw, B's counter-
question shows A that she will gain nothing from asking her question of
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B - she should go and ask others. A's loss of interest in asking B
therefore removes the reason for B to go on wondering about the counter-
question. As soon as A realizes that she should not have asked B in the
first place, both players can safely relinquish interest in B's counter-
question. The question becomes void on the very asking of it - it turns
out to be a mere rhetorical device, a self-defeating question.
7. B1ased Questions
It is well known that questions often import a bias as to
whlt the questioner thinks is the correct answer to them and what answer
he is expecting to get from his addressee. The v~ry notion of guestion-
1n[ some proposition carries a negative implication. suggesting that the
questioner is not convinced OT that proposition, that he doubts it or
downright disbelieves it. Questionable actually becomes a synonym of
doubtful or suspect.
I shall try to construe this property of questions as a special
case of a more general phenomenon. That is the general tendency of any
expressions of doubt or indecision to suggest disbelief or disinclina-
tion. To question something almost means to doubt something, and to
doubt something almost amounts to assuming the opposite. It often seens
as if Christ l s famous law of excluded middle in questions of faith were
valid: who is not with me is against me.
Given such a law of excluded middle, the scopes of verbs of
propositional attitudes and negation become interchangeable, so that
(56) comes to mean the same as (57):
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(56) I don't suppose he is right.
(57) I suppose he is not right.
The tendency of (56) to mean (57) is so strong that it has led some
linguists to propose a grammatical process of negative transportation,
actually moving the negation sign from the inside of certain proposition-
al attitude verbs to the outside of them; for instance. (57) would be
related to (56) by a meaning-preserving transformation. This trans-
formation would have to be lexically governed. as not all v'erbs of
propositional attitude are susceptible to it to a~ equal degree: (58)
is not equivalent to (59), for instance.
(58) I don't presuppose he is right.
(59) I presuppose he is not right.
The lexical selectivity of the negative transportation
phenomenon does suggest that whatever process creates it has become
a conventional rule in the clear cases. However. what interests me
more than the exact nature of that rule is the possibility of a dialogue
theoretical rationale for the existence of such a rule.
I think there is an obvious one, on the following gener~l 1~ne5.
In the case of a difference of opinions between dialogue participants,
it is more guarded. 3nd more polite. to express the disagreement in the
milder fonm of doubt (uncertainty).
To develop this idea, consider the following example.
(60) A: This is good.
B: Well. I don't know.
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Notice that the relevant attitude verb know is not one of the negative
transp~rtation verbs: (61)-(62) are not equivalent.
(61) I don't know that this is good
(62) I know that this is not good.
Rather, the right expansion of S's speech in (60) would be
(63) I don't know if this is good
i.e., a plea of ignorance.
Why is there a ':eeling that B's professed ignorance, or
suspen3ion of judgment, carries with it an implication that B has reason
to disagree with A - he actually has some evidence against A's thesis?
Actually, the inference is immediate from our treatment of rational
ep1stemic decision making.
We may assume that both speakers are addressing the topic
(64) Is this good or not?
Furthermore. we assume that both players are serious and that they
respect each other's judgment: each player's professed opinion on a
question is confirming evidence for that opinion. Assuming all this,
if B had no evidence for or against either answer to (64), he should
be inclined to accept A's opinion, unless he has special reason to
proceed with extreme caution,
Therefore the fact that B chooses to remain undecided in
the face of A's ~rotestat1ons suggests that B's prior probabilities
actually s~~ak against A's thesis. A's testimony is sufficient to
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make B suspend judgment: it does not suffice to tip the scales in A's
favor.
Actually, B may still prefer his original position to A's
thesis. and would stick to that if he had to choose between them.
However. he takes the more cautious option of suspending judgment.
Indeed, A's opposite opinion may have had the precise effect of
increasing B's index of caution concerning (64). B might have held the
opposite view until A's diverging opinion made him realize that the
question ;s open to debate. Even if A's testimony did not essentially
change B's preference for his own thesis over A's, it may scare him to
raise hJs index of caution. (B may be afraid of getting involved in
a dispute about a thesis he 1s none too sanguine about anyway.) Still t
on his less guarded moments. B will continue to prefer his original
opinion - hence the bias.
We said that politeness was a likely motive for passing a
claim rather than challenging it. The maxiM of politeness involved is
essentially be agreeable: i.e •• do what your beneficiary wants. 12
In a game of information seeking, this may amount to acting as if the
interlocutor knew better. Such an attitude is all too polite where it
actually overrules the ep1stem1c maxims. occasioning ep1stemically sub-
optimal moves. The maximally polite thing for B to do would have been
simply to agree with A even against his own better judgment; and he might
well have done so if the matter was Jf small 1mportanc~. Howevar,
assuming B finds it essential not to put forward straight falsities for
reasons of politeness, there is the option of increased degree of
caution. This serves to show that he feels he has to treat his
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interlocutor's evidence with great respect. At the same time, it makes
the interlocutor aware of a divergence of evidential base without
disputing his claim; moreover, it blames the divergence of opinion on
B's lack of conclusive evidence.
A thus can infer from B's guardedness that B has reason to
doubt A's the;isi knowing B to be a polite person, A can also suspect
that the evidence B has against A1s claim is quite strong: politeness
aside, B actually disbelieves A's thesis. The negative bias is
explained.
To connect this explanation of the negative bias to questions
another rationality argument has to be introduced. That is that in a
matter of fact dialogue, a player will not make a move which he need
not make: in more game theoretical terms, a player will ask a question
only if it is in an optimal strategy of his for attaining the goal of
shared information. In particular, a player will not ask a question
whose right answer is obvious to all participants of a dialogue, and is
mutually known to be so.
Consider how this straightforward corollary is applied in the
following example.
(65) A: He is all right.
B: !! he all right or not?
In (65), A has just told B that someone is OK: B replies by questioning
what he has been just told. Clearly, if A's thesis were sufficiently
confirmed, B would not need to question it, for he knows that A assumes
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it, and it would suffice for him to assent to it for there to be a
common understanding of the matter. Hence ass'Jming that B is convinced
in (65) would entail that he is speaking idly, following a subopt~.~~l
discourse strategy.
But. one wants to ask. is it any more rational for B to ask
a question Ahas in effect just answered? It is, if B (as we have
already argued) is suspending judgment because he has increased his
level of caution, and knov/s that A can infer that is the Cdse. Although
B knows what A is inclined to accept at the level of caution A was
initially op~rat;ng with, he will not know if A will still accept the
same answer as optimal if A also raises his level of caution. Hence,
it is rational for B to repeat the question, as the conditio~s of answer-
hood are going to be readjusted by the very repetition. The result is
that B is in effect checking A's answer against a higher index of caution
in (65): he wants to know how strong A's conviction in his answer is.
Thus we have been able to explain the intuition that B in (65) is
checking A's claim and therefore maybe politely chal1engi~ it.
This line of argument is supported by the fact that checking
questions typically exhibit intensifying adverbs:
(E6) Is he really? Indeed?
Presumably, the intensified sentence requires a higher degree of
confidence to be accepted than the unadorned sentence. Eliciting the
intensified sentence thus equals asking for a repetition of the original
sentence against an increased index ~! caution.
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Note also that a checking question can be paraphrased by an
explicit inquiry about the reliability of the claim or its evidential
base:
(67) Are you absolutely sure? How do you know?
8. Elementary Questions
So far, we have shown that the very act of questioning a fact
carries with it an element of doubt. What remains is to connect the
direction of the bias to the syntactic form of simple questions.
Cons; der
(68) A: It is all right.
B: Is it all right?
(69) B: It is not all rit]ht.
A: Is it not all rOI ght?
Intuitively, S's question in (68) suggests B has doubts about
A's claim, and is inclined towards its denial in (69). Conversely, A's
question in (69) indicates A is doubtful (perhaps even surprised) about
B's claim and is himself inclined to assume the opposite claim in
(68).13 An amusing illustration of this regularity is the following
dialogue from Ross Macdonald's novel The Doomsters (Chi 5):
"What do you intend to do about this alleged car theft?
You want to see Hallman punished, naturally."
"00 11"
"Don't you?"
U~o."
The direction of bias in simple questions can be explained with reference
to the notion of elementary question. Here is how the explanation goes.
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An elementary question is elementary in the following way: it
only has one answer. viz. the declarative form of the question itself,
and that answer is its presupposition as well. So when one asks an
elementary question, one naturally enough expects to obtain the only
answer it admits of. This is why the natural form of checking question
in (68)-(69) is just the corresponding elementary question, the interro-
gative form of the preceding presupposition. This is what links each
form of simple question to the expected answer. The questioner's ~
presumption (also called presupp~sition in much of the nontechnical
literature on the subject) is the opposite of the expected answer, for
reasons presented in the preceding section.
An essential link in the above argument is the as~umption that
simple Questions are not always alternative guestions. A syntactically
simple question may represent a semantically elementary question: a
question that has no other direct answer than its own declarative form.
Earlier, we recognized the possibility of doubt as to the utility of
such one-alternative questions: why ask a question which has only one
answer? True, such a question would be rather useless to wonder about:
one who accepts an elementary question and asks it under (D. earnest)
needs no help in answering it. However, as we have already seen, there
are a host of other reasons for asking questions.
Bolinger (1978) has independently arrived to the somewhat
surprising thesis I emphasize above. He also has an admirable list of
nQ less than twelve uses of sentential questions where the simple form
of the question is not replaceable by a disjunctive (yes or no) form.
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My interpretation for most if not all of these uses agrees w~th his:
these questions represent semantically elementary questions. Some of
them are loaded questions: questions which do actually expect just one
answer, viz. precisely the declarative form of the question, some repre-
sent likely guesses derived from a superordinate search question. To
the first batch belong Bolinger's classes
(i) Invitations: ~ou want some? - It is polite to expect a
positive answer of" the addressee, as an encouragenlent.
(ii) Self-evident facts: Are you still around? - There is no room
for doubt here. The questioner wants to raise the question
rather than hear the answer.
(iii) One-way questions: John, are you awake? - A negative answer
;s nG~ expected for obvious reasons.
(iv) Self-answering questions: Do you realize that today is the
tenth? - The factive presupposition gives away the answer.
(v) Ritual questions: OK, is everybody ready? Asked pro forma
before an event, expects silence as a sign of positive answer.
(vi) Requests: Will you help me? - Shows the questioner expects
help.
To the second category I put Bolinger's titles
(vii )
( vi i i )
(i x)
Suggested answers to search questions: What's the matter?
Are YrY'... tired? - The elementary question represents an explan-
atory rll~ve; its negation is not relevant for it would explain
nothing.
Specification questions: 15 today the seventeenth? - The
implicit main topic is a search question (What day is it?) and
the elementary question again represents the questioner's
guess; in Bolinger's words, "you are not interested in a
possible denial; you want the. date".
Queried inferences: Does he always snore? - Asked on hearing
someone snore. Again, the question suggests an explanation.
(Bolinger: "You can also pose this as a sU9gested answer to
a wh-question: \~hy? Does he always snore?")
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These examples ought to show impressively the imoortance of
elementary questions in actual usage. It is very useful to have a
category of loaded questions at one's disposal; the indirect force 0.
the lmplied expectations can be much more effective than explicit argu-
ment.
Elementary questions can of course be responded to against
expectation too. The only point to make about such denials (or affirma-
tions) is that theoretically, they do not constitute direct answers
to the relevant elementary questions but represent denials of their
presuppositions. The structure of the dialogue is roughly this:
(70) Are you tired or not?
Are you tired? (D.explain) Uo, I am not. (D. reply)
9. Rhetorical Questions
An apparent weakness in the above account comes forth in the
tenninology lIexpected answer"; for someone who asks a checking question
as often as not really expects to hear the denial ot the e~pected
answer, i.e., expects the addressee of the question to come round to
his point of view.
One can make the point nicely by saying that checking questions
are. as often as not. actually a sort of rhetorical guest10n: 14 the
questioner puts a question feigning interest in it but actually expects
th~ question to be unanswerable. What he expects to hear is not an
answer to the question but rather if anything the denial of the presuppo-
sition of the question. Thus one who asks - or exclaims -
(71) Isn't this delicious?
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would be as disappointed to hear the straightforward answer 'No' as one
who asks
(72) Who cares?
would be on hearing the bona fide answer
(73) I do.
This gives us the necessary clue for understanding the logic
behind such rhetorical questions. They turn out to be t1e erotect1c
counterpart of sarcastic (or ironic) assertions.
Let me spell this out more explicitly. ~Jhat distinguishes the
sarcastic or ironic interpretations of assertions like
(74) That's just great!
(as a comment on an evidently unpleasant ob~ervation) from their sincere
(or better, serious) counterparts is the choice of convention linking
what is said to what is believed (accepted). Instead of the straight-
forward seriousness convention (D. earnest) they obey the opposite conven-
tion. which we termed the ironx convention: 15
(75) Put forward a sentence only if you accept its contrary.
Now what I want to say about rhetorical questions of the sort
of (71)-(72) above is that they are questions produced in accordance
with the irony convention. One who asks a rhetorical question of this
sort conveys the message that he actually does not accept the question!
Earlier, we have discussed the reasons for a player to deny a
given que~t1on. First of all, a player may be simply uninterested in
I
I
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a question, whatever his reasons. He need not have any particular
beliefs one way or another as to whether the question admits of an
answer or not: he simply could not care less.
It seems to me in fact that precisely this interpretation is
involved in the idiomatic sense of the rhetorical question (72).
Consider the dialogue
(76) A: What will Jack say?
B: Who cares?
It is obvious that A for one is concerned in the question he is asking:
A doe~ care. Aware of this. B cannot easily be implying that he assumes,
for a fact. that no one cares. Rather. what B is implying is that no
one should care, and that ~ does not care: it is all the same for him
what Jack will say. How do these implications come out?
According to the present hypothesis, B's rhetoric question is
actl'ally equivalent to its serious denial. i.e .•
(77) Never mind who cares what Jack will say.
If (77) is what B (ser'iously) means by (72) t we can explain why a seems
to imply by (72) that
(78) I for one do not care what Jack will say.
without necessarily implying that he believes A does not care either.
For what (77) actually implies are the following denied questions:
(79) Never mind if A cares what Jack will say if A does care
what Jack will say.
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(80) Never mind if I care what Jack will say if I do care what
Jack will say.
How can (79)-(80) be explained consistently with what B already knows?
We assumed B recognizes that A does care what Jack will say - A's ques-
tion just implied as much. But then the main clause of (79) must be
true. 1. e .•
(81) Never mind if A cares what Jack will say
along with an answer to the very question it denies - a contradiction
of (C.consq). The obvious way out for B is that he simply ignores A's
concern - is simply not interested if A or anyone else cares. An ana-
logous argument applies to (80). Either B does not care whether he cares,
or he has decided he will not. Since it is likely that a player is
interested in his own decisions. the latter alternative is the more
likely one here. Summa summarum, B's question (72) is most naturally
explained by assuming that B does not care what Jack says, and does not
care if anyone else does.
More frequently, perhaps, a question is rejected because its
presupposition is. It is easy to prove that any question implies its
presupposition, so conversely, the denial of the presupposition of any
question implies the denial of t"at question. As a result, often the
most straightforward explanation of a rhetorical question is the assump-
tion that the author of that question denies the presupposition of the
question. For instance, someone who asks with a rhetorical flourish
(82) What do I know?
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is clearly not asking a serious question: for one thing he is likely
to know best what he knows, so why ask others. So we assume he is
asking a rhetorical question, i.e., in effect denying (82). Why? Is
he not just interested in the question? That is not likelYi in fact,
it would run counter to the cooperative maxim (the maxim of agreement).
So another explanation must be sought for - and is easy to find, for
clearly the author of (82) is implying there is no answer to his question,
i.e. t its presupposition fails. So the most likely explanation for (82),
hence its most likely serious paraphrase, is the denial of its presuppo-
sition, viz.
(83) I know nothing. 16
Now this explanation of rhetorical questions is easy to extend
to elementary questions like (71). It is important to realize that a
negative question like (71) has two easily distinguishable natural
environments, exemplified by (84)-(85):
(84) Why don't you go out with Jack? Isn't he nice?
(85) Jack sent me flowers. Isn't he nice?
The intonation of the question in these contexts is apt to differ
significantly. In (84). a rising question intonation is appropriate. in
(85) the natural intonation is the falling pattern of a declarative
sentence.
Accordingly. we shali ~rgue, (84) represents a serious question
under (D.guess) or (D.earnest), while (85) is a rhetorical
question.
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For evidence, notice that different expectations are connected
with (84) and (85). (84) is a serious question expecting an informative
answer; according to our rules, the expected (i.e., the only direct)
answer to (84) is
(86) He is not nice.
True, the questioner in (84) may well be biased against the expected
answer himself. the mechanism of that bias has already been explained.
What should not escape attention that there still is a clear expectation
in (84) that the direct answer ;s what the questioner ;s going to get.
The natural context of (84) ;s one where the questioner assumes - or
has assumed previously - that Jack is nice but suspects that the addressee
disagrees.
The situation is quite different in (85). Here, the speaker
has no reason to suspect there will be any disagreement about Jack's
agreeability. The speaker puts forward here a question which she thinks
does not have a direct answer at all: its presupposition (86) is simply
false. This is precisely what the speaker is trying to convey in (A5)
intuitively.
What is interesting, the difference of (84)-{85) actually has
a sjntactic reflex in at least one language, namely Finnish. Finnish
does not recognize rising question intonation, so the contrast between
(84)-(85) cannot be expressed by means of melody. Instead, Finnish uses
the two particles -kin ('too') and -kaan ('either'). The negative item
-kaan marks a negative question as a serious one expecting a negative
answer, while the positive item -kin marks it as a rhetorical one. with
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positive implications. Thus the respective translations of (84)-(85) in
Finnish would be
(87) Eiko han olekaan miellyttava?
not-whether he is-either nice
(88) Eiko han olekin miellyttava?
not-whether he is-too nice
If my analysis of the contrast between (84)-(85) is right,
the rhetorical question is not actually in need of an dnswer: no ques-
tion has really been asked. This prediction is nicely confirmed by the
following example from literature:
lilt was an illiterate sort of letter", I said thoughtfully,
"written by somebody practically illiterate, I should say. It
"Was it?" said Owen and went away. Thinking it over after-
ward. I found that "Was it?" rather disturbing.
(Agatha Christie. The Moving Finger, p. 15)
The narrator obviously finds the question disturbing because he cannot
miss its irony: the question is so much out of the question that the
doctor does not even stay to hear out the reply.
There is one more loose end to be tied. Intuition tells that
positive simple questions are less leading t~an negative ones:
(89) Do you like it?
is much more likely to be a neutral question 'chan
(90) Don't you like it?
which is anxious or coaxing. This asymmetry is explained by the option
of expanding a positive simple question like (89) into a full disjunctive
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question
(91) Do you like it or not?
before applying the definitions and rules. As a result, (90) can serve
as a topic-opening move by (D. ask) while (gO) can only be a checking
move by (O.question).
10. Tag Questions
In the preceding section, we found that elementary questions
come in two varieties, rhetorical ones (which expect the denial of
their direct answer) and sincere ones (which expect their direct answer).
This duality is also in evidence in the peculiarly English device of tag
question formation.
I should confess right away that I do not think there is a
need for a specific syntactic rule of tag formation in sentence grammar.
In my view, tag questions are a conventional use of certain elliptic
questions, formed by quite everyday methods of question formation, ana-
phora, and ellipsis, and predictably related to their premises by the
textual devices of thematicity and bias.
Be that as it may, it is the pragmatic question of bias that
is my concern here. Consider the fol1ow1n~ logically possible combina-
tions of polarity:
(92) Writers will accept suggestions, won't they?
(93) Writers won't accept suggestions, will they?
(94) Writers will accept suggestions, will they?
(95) Writers won't accept suggestions, won't ,they?
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There is a distinct difference in feeling between the two first and the
two last examples. The switch in polarity in (92)-(93) is so much the
commoner case that it is often made out to be the unexceptional rule.
Given our considerations of bias, this is not surprising. Reasonably
enough, one who seriously puts forward an assertion questions its denial
rather than his own point of view.
If the tag question is serious, the author of (92)-(93) may
have some reason to suspect that his interlocutor possesses conflicting
evidence; the tag then serves to elicit any possible objections. Quite
as often, the tag is a mere rhetorical device for prompting a noise of
agreement. The inflection of ~he tag wil1 differ accordingly.
That this account of the polarity switch is correct is
confirmed by comparing other ways of putting the checking question:
(96) Writers won't accept suggestions, isn't that so?
What stays invariant here is that the proponent of a claim doubts that
he is wrong, however he may phrase the question. Compare also
(97) I don't suppose they will, will they?
where the tag questions what the premise doubts.
What remains to be clarified is the status of the matching-
polarity sentences (94)-(95). The few transformational snurces which
recognize their occurrence at all grudgingly concede that they are
possible. if associated with "incredulous or sarcastic overtones". 17
What these writers seem to have overlooked is that match1ng-
polarity tags are used quite colloquially to check likely guesses.
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There is no incredulity or sarcasm in the following examples:
(~a) "You knew Sir Edward well, did you?" Henry gestured to
encompass the elder Barringtons. IIThat's to say - your
families were friendly on Tampica?"
(99) II ••• That's why Sam will leave most of the talking at the
Conference to Eddie."
"Oh, there's a Conference scheduled, is there?"
"Certainly there is. Didn't you know? Next week,"
(100) "You know Tampica we1', do you, Mr. Schipmaker?1I Emmyasked,
quite innocently. Henry had not repeated to her the conver-
sation at the Barrington home. There was a little pause.
Then Otis cleared his throat and said, "I've been there
before. yes, Some years ago."
(101) "So you and your husband are staying with Miss Pontefract-
Deacon, are you, Mrs. Barrington?"
"Yes, just for a few days. \le always come to Lucy when
we manage to get back to Tampica."
Clearly, the tags here are sincere requests for confirmation. The
essential difference to the preceding examples seeMS to be in the charac-
ter of the foregoing declarative move: As is clear from various
indications in the above examples (the inferential ~, and the surprised
Oh), the premise of the tag represents a conjecture rather than well-
founded opinion: this conjectur~ is immediately followed by a request
for a confirmation of the guess. The expected answer is the repet1tion
of the conjecture here, as predicted by our rules.
What is the bias of the questioner? In (98)-(101), the
questioners seem inclined to accept the conjecture. if anything. In
other cases. which seem to have had the limelight in earlier discussions,
the questioner is indeed incredulous, even ~arcast1c:
(lOla) "As soon as Mr. Wolfe finds the murderer everything will be
rosy ...
"You don't say- \~olfe's going to find the murderer, is he?
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That's damn kind of him." (Rex Stout, Not Quite Dead Enough,
p. 58)
(l02)
A strong element of scorn is felt in (102) as well:
So writers won't accept suggestions, won't they? Well, then
we won1t publish them!18
Here, the premise of the question is clearly something the writers are
responsible for, not the speaker, and therefore it is only natural for
him to question it. Compare again other ways of expressing the doubt:
(103) So writers won't accept suggestions, is that so?
Some informants tell me that there is a difference between
the double negative construction (95) and the double positive one in
(94): unlike the latter, the former cannot easily re~resent an unbiased
request of information. This difference is probably due to the asymmetry
between simple positive and simple negative questions noted at the end
of the previous section: only positive questions allow an unbiased
(presupposition-free) interpretat1on. 19
11. Echo Questions
One of the novel - and perhaps initially disturbing - features
of the present approach is the indiscriminate treatment of interrogative
and declarative sentences in our game rules. In our treatment, sentences
of both moods can be accepted or rejected, they may entail other sen-
tences and follow from them, they can be equivalent or contradictory.
This 1nd1scr1m1natory treatment pays off in an unexpected way in the
unified account it allows for the so-called echo guestions. 20
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Typical examples of echo questions are B's responses in (104) -
(11 0) :
(104 ) A: I am .Iungry. (105 ) A: I am hungry
B: You are hungry? B: You are angry?
A: Yes, I am hungry. A: No, I am not angry,
I am hungry.
(106 ) A: Ar~ you hungry? (107) A: Are you hungry?
B: AmI hungry? B: Am I angry!
A: Yes, are you hungry? A: No, never mind that,
but are you hungry?
(108) A: I am hungry. (109 ) 11: Are you hungry?
B: You are what? B: Am I what?
A: I am hungry. A: Are you hungry?
(110) A: What did you say?
B: \~hat did who say?
A: What did you say?
As the examples show, echo questions provide a device for
players to check what moves have been just put forward: here, the
premise of an echo question is some preceding move. which is repeated
as the correct answer to the echo question.
The examples also indicate the severe limitations that hold
of the syntax and phonology of echo questions. Sentential (polarity)
echo questions such as in (107)-(109) differ from their presuppositions
at most. in their intonational contour. It is worth noting that thC!re
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do not exist genuinely disjunctive (choice) echo questions: for instance,
(111) ;s quite odd. (112);s of course possible, as it construes the
echo question as sentential:
( 111 ) A: Are you hungry?
B: Am I hungry or angry?
(cf. Did you say hungry or
angry?)
A: Are you hungry?
(cf. I said hungry.)
(112) A: Are you hungry?
B: Am I hungry or angry?
A: No, are you hungry?
Search (wh-) echo questions are formed by simply replacing
any doubtful constituents of the topic sentence by corresponding inter-
rogative pronouns. The result is distinguishable from Ibona fidel
questions when a question word appears to have failed to move left - as
in (108) - or the result seems to violate cross-over constraints, as in
(110 ) •
As the ex~mples (104)-(110) clearly show, these methods of
echo question formation are quite impartial as to the mood of the topical
sentences. Also, the whole question-answer-reply routine works
here completely independently of the mood of the original move.
The latter observation is directly captured by our mood-
independent formulations of the notions of acceptance and rejection of
sentences, the mood-independent operation of the logical game rules for
questions and the abstractness of our pragmatic rules for asking and
answering. All that needs be said about the semantics of echo questions
over and above what has been said of bona fide questions concerns the
definition of the syntactic notions of declarative and interrogative
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form for these questions. For them, these notions are trivial: both
the declarative and the interrogative form of an echo question (or a
sentence derived from it by the logical game rules) equals that sentence
; tse1f.
It is not difficult to see how our definitions of
presupposition and (direct) answer apply to echo questions given their
simple syntax.
For the declarative sentential echo questions in (104) the
presupposition ;s simply the sentence itself: thus declarative senten-
tial echo questions are in effect elementary questions. Of course,
there still remains the possibility of replying to B's question in the
negative: but that amounts in our terms to denying the presupposition
of the question rather than to a straightforward answer.
Similarly for interrogative sentential echo questions. The
presupposition of S's question in (~06) ;s the same sentence as a bona
fide question attributed to A (modulo personal pronoun changes, of
course). What B is questioning here is A's acceptance of that question:
;s A really interested in (prepared to ask or asking) this question?
As for search echo questions, nothing new worth of mention
springs up in the declarative case (108). As for interrogative echo
questions in (109)-(110), their presuppositions can be computed to be
(113)-(114), respectively.
(113) Are you something?
(114) What did someone say?
And it is not difficult to prove. using the rules we have already
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des~r;bed, that A's respective questions in (109)-(110) do imply these
presuppositions.
The main formal differences between echo questions and bona
fide ones turn out to be these: echo questions can be formed out of
interrogative sentences as well as out of declarative ones, and they
have particularly simple definitions for the syntactic notions of
declarative and tnterrogat1v~ forms.
What about their func~1on? We must f1r~t observe that the
functional chat cterizat10n given at the outset was too restricted.
As Kuno and Robinson [144] point out, echo questions do not have to
repeat an actual earlier utterance. They are also quite popular in a
quiz or in court: 2l
(115) The Boston Marathon this year was won by who?
(116) vou w~re info~d of the fact on what day?
Bolinger [287J goes even furthef. maintaining that lithe end position is
quite normal for original questions: it merely presupposes more than
does initial position", citing the example
(117) "They're planning to buy a new house." - "And they're going
to pay for it with what, love and hope?"22
An echo question can be used also to forestall a ques~1on, as in the
common commercial ploy
(118) You won't want to be without this wonder product. What does
it cost? Only $99.991
Noone has asked a question, but the announcer assumes they would.
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In the following example, the questioner does not ask for
repetition but for d specification:
(119) "We get reports in every day from various places. II
"Reports from where?" she asked sharply. "What do they say?"
The ques~ioner would not be happy with 'various places' here: she heard
all right, but she thinks she has a right to hear more.
These examples suffice to show that echo questions are not a
mere hearing aid. Where they differ from the usual run of questions
is where their simple syntax is most helpful: they serve to indicate the
syntactic form of an explicit or implicit premise by copying it word by
word. Thus (115)-(116) suggest that an answer of the indicated form is
readily available to the quiz master or the examiner; (117) indicates
that someone at least ought to have given a thought to the financial
problem. SiMilar pressures are exerted by (118)-(119) on their
addressees.
I
I
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Appendix I
This Appendix describes the essentials of the decision
theoretic approach to induct1~e acceptance developed in Levi [46] and
H11pinen [42]. The program divides into two tasks. The first task is
to describe the ep1stemic preferences stated in the maxims of truth
and information in the form of an ordinal utility function. The second
task is to define a Bayesian rule of inductive acceptance which maximizes
expected ep1stemic utility in a probabi11stically defined decision situa-
tion~
1. From Preferences to Utilities
For the maxim of truth the utility function is trivial: all
hypotheses divide into two classes. the true ones and the false ones,
with no intermediate cases. A simple utility function which suffices
to characterize the contribution of the maxim of truth is the valuation
function which assigns each hypothesis its truth value (1 for truth and
o for falsity).
It is less obvious how to represent the utility of informat1un.
At the very least, a player ought to prefer a hypothesis to any of its
watered-down versions (proper consequences) if they have equal chances
of being true.
Such considerations constitute logical conditions of adequ3cy
for any function representing the utility of information. ConvAnt1ona~ Iy,
we may assume that the function is normalized to take values between 0
and 1. Naturally enough. a logical truth has the least information
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value and a logical contradiction a maximum one:
(1) (i) a ~ cont(h) ~ 1
(11) if h is logically true, cont(h) = 0
(iii) if h is logically false. cont(h) = 1.
Further, it seems reasonable to assume that information is additive in
the following way:
(2) ~~en p and q are mutually exclusive answers,
c0nt(p v q) = cont(p) - cont(-q).
The motivation of (2) is that the loss of information
occasioned by adding a disjunct to an answer should equal the information
value of denying that disjunct. As a special case, (2) implies that
the utility of any answer exceeds that of its entailments. We also get
a simple rule for negations:
(3) cont(-h) = l-cont(h).
(1)-(2) spell out the relation of informativeness to 1~g1cal
force. How to compare logically independent hypotheses in terms of
informativeness is a much trickier question. There are different alter-
native approaches to defining informativeness with different merits and
weaknesses. Two specific approaches may be mentioned.
Levi [46] assumes that the problem setting provides for an
equal weighting among alternative complete answers. The problem is
assumed to be formulated so that all of its complete answers would
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satisfy the inquirer's informative needs equally well. That is, in Levi
(4) whenever p and q are complete answers,
cont{p} = cont(q).
As a consequence, in Levi's approach. for any complete answer p.
(5) cont{p) =1 - 1n
where n is the number of alternative complete answers in the problem
setting. Note that the information content of a sentence can vary with
the context of inquiry (the number of alternatives available).
In H1lp1nen [42]. the information content of an answer is
assumed to be complementary to its a priori (or prior) probability, i.e.,
(6) cont(h) = 1 - p(h)
Thus it is assumed that the alternative answers to the problem come
with (possibly unequal) prior probabilities assigned to them: the more
likely an answer, the less infonmation is gained by accepting it. It
is easy to check that the definition (6) satisfies the logical conditions
(1)-(2). The prior probabilities may be thought of as logical probab11-
ities or as determined by some factual background information.
The next step is to define the tradeoff between utilities
based on the maxim of truth and those based on the maxim of information.
Naturally enough, we should give the maxim of truth the right of way.
(7) False answers are never preferable to true answers.
Among answers of like truth value, utility should grow with content:
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(8) Pmong answers of like truth valuet a more informative answer
is preferred to a less informative answer.
In order to arrive at an ordinal utility function satisfying the
conditions (7)-(8), a rule for comparing differences of epistemic
utility is needed. A simple assumption to make is that differences of
epistemic utility can be represented as weighted sums of utility differ-
ences in terms of the two component desiderata. 1
The utility of truth can be represented by the simple valuation
function which assigns a true sentence 1 and a false one O. Then the
simple rule of addition just mentioned can be represented by
(9) u(h) - u(k) = (l-a)(v(h) - v(k)) ~ d(cont(h) - cont(k))
where the coefficient a (1 ~ a ~ 0) represents the weight assigned to
information. If a is high, 1nfonnation is valued highly; if it is low.
truth is more important. However. it follows from (7) that a cannot
exceed the value 1t lest false answers be preferred to true ones.
With the help of some convenient normalization measures, we
can calculate from (9) formulas representing the ep1stemic utility of
true and false answer~:
(10) u(h) • 1 - qcont(-h) if h is true
u(k) • -qcont(-h) if k is false
(10) is obtained from (9) by setting conventionally
(11) u(k) • a if k is contradictory
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l-a
and replacing the coefficient a by an index q =--- taking values
a
between 1 and O.
The coefficient q intuitively measures the investigator's
caution. in the following sense. If q = O. the utility of an answer
equals its truth value. The weight of information vanishes completely
and the utility function is exclusively based on the maxim of :ruth.
When q = 1, the utility of information is maximized to the
extent that the utility of the least informative true answer (the pre-
supposition of the problem) actually equals the utility of the most
informative false answer (the denial of the presupposition), both having
utility O. For values of q in excess of 1, informative falsehoods would
gain preferen~e ov€r tautologies, violating (7).
Intermediate value~ of q reflect different inductive attitudes,
varying from player to player with personality and for the same player
from occasion to occasion.
2. An Inductive Decision Rule
With an ep1stem1c utility function at our disposal, we can turn
to the question of the decision maker's knowledge of the state of Nature.
It is obvious that the d~cision maker is not assumed to know
the state of Nature off hand. Else there would be no decision problem,
as the player could choose the optimal answer straight away_
The weakest assumption is that the decision maker has no idea
what Nature is likely to do; then the situation is called a decision
problem under uncertainty. Several principles have been suggested as
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solutions to decision problems under uncertainty, but there is little
consensus about them. 2
In inductive logic, a str~~~cr assumpt i In is usually made.
It is assumed that the decision maker has some evidence e at his disposal
which lends the different alternative answers (~ossibly unequal) probabil-
ities. so that
(12) p(k/e) = 0 if k contradicts e
p(-h/e) = 1 - p(h/e)
p(h v k/e) = p(h/e) + p(k/e) - p(h&k/e)
It follows that the presupposition of the topical question ;s its most
probable answer. As a rule, the probability of an answer grows as its
information content diminishes. Thus the decision problem usually
involves finding an acceptable balance between the risk of error and
the gain in information implied by each choice of answer.
The acceptance of an answer can lead to one of two possible
outcomes, depending on the state of nature: the answer is true or
false. In either case, an ordinal utility value for the outcome is
defined by (10).
Given an ordinal utility function and a probability
distribution, the Bayesian decision rule of maximizing expected utility
is applicable. The Bayesian principle recommends choosing an answer so
as to maximize the expected yield of ep1stemic utility. measured by the
sum of the utilities of the different possible outcomes weighted by
their probabilities.
- 231 -
This yields a simple formula for calculating the expected
epistemic utility of a given answer h:
(13) E(h/e) = p(h/e)(l-qcont{-h)) + (l-p{h/e)){-qcont(-h))
= p(h/e) - qcont(-h).
What is part~~ularly nice about the behavior of the expected
epistemic util ty function E thus obtained is its additivity. It is
not difficult to ~rove that
(14) E(hvk/e) = E(h/e) + E(k/e) - E(h&k/e).
When hand k are incompatible, the expected ep1stemic utility
of their disjunction equals the sum of their individual expectancies.
Therefore including a further complete answer as a disjunct to an answer
already accepted represents a gain in expected utility only if its own
expectancy is positive.
This observation allows formulating a simple rule for
eliminating complete answers from the presupposition of the problem:
(15) Reject any complete answer k for which E(k/e) < O.
What remains after application of (15) is the epistemically optimal
answer.
Depending on the measure of informativeness adopted, the
condition (15) can be rewritten in different ways. For Levi's defini-
tion. it assumes the form
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(16) p(k/e) < q/n, where n ;s the number of complete answers.
Hilpinen's definition in turn leads to the condition
(17) p(k/e) < qp(k). where p(k) is the a prior; (or prior)
probability of k.
The differences between Levi's and Hilpinen's solutions are in evidence
in (16)-(17). Levi's approach is tantamount to assigning equal a priori
prvoabilities to the alternative complete answers of an inductive deci-
sion problem. As a result, the acceptability of a given sentence may
vary with the context of inquiry: a sentence may be acceptable as an
answer to one question but unacceptable with respect to another, even
if the evidence remains the same.
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Appendix II
The following conditions (a ~light modification of Hintikka's
formulations) suffice to define a model set for extensional first-order
logic with identity:
(c.&)
(C.v)
(c. :»
(C.E)
(C.U)
(c.=)
(c.-&)
(C.-v)
(c.-:»
(C.-E)
(C.-U)
(c.;)
(c.-)
If 'p&q' is in m, then ' pi and 'q' are in m.
If 'pvq' is in m, then 'p' or 'q' is; n m.
If ' p::>q , is in m, then ,_pi or 'q' is 1n m.
If '(Ex)p(x)' is in m, then 'y = a' and 'p(y) , are in m for
some a and y.
If I (x)p(x)' and 'y = a ' are in m, then 'p(y)' is in m.
If 'a = b' is in m and 'p' is an atomic form~la in m, then
the result 'q' of replacing one or more occurrences of 'a'
by 'b' in 'p' is in m.
If '-(p&q)' is in m, then '-p' or '-q' is in m.
If '-(pvq)' is in m, then '-p' and '-q' are in m.
If '-(p:q)' is in m, then 'p' and '-q' are in m.
If '-(Ex)p(x)' and 'y = a' are in m, then '-p(y)' is in m.
If '-(x)p(x)' is in m, then 'y = at and I_p(y)' are in m for
some a, y.
No sentence 'a ; a' is in m.
If '_pi is a sentence in m. then 'p' is not in m.
In these rules, 'x' and 'ye stand for bindable variables. while 'a' and
'b' can be any singular terms (variables or proper names). Sentences
are fonnul as wi th no free vari ab1es. To see whether a set of sentences
is consistent or not, try to extend it to a model set by closing it under
the above principles. If this cannot be done without violating (C.;) or
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(c.-), the set is inconsistent. To prove that 'q' follows from I pi,
show that { P, -q} cannot be extended to a model set. l
To define a model system for quantified epistemic 'ogi~. add
to the extensional model set principles the following rules for modal;··
ties and identity:
'e.K)
:. -K)
.T)
K=)
. \.,. x=)
(c. x;)
If 'K pi is in m and n is an epistemic a-alternative to ffi,
a
then 'pl is in m.
If I-K pi ;s in m, then I_pi is in some epistemic a-alternative
a
n to m.
If IK pi ;s in m, then 'pi ;s ;n m.
a
If 'KaP(x}' is ~~ m, then 'Ka(x = b}' is in m for ~ome b.
If 'x =y' is in m and n is an ep;stemic a-alternative to m•
then 'x =y' ;s ;n n.
If 'x ; yl is in mand n is an epistemic a-alternative to m,
then IX ; y' is in n.
The last two identity rules prevent genuine individuals from
splitting or merging when one moves from a world to its epistemic alter-
nati ves.
These rules ensure that 'Kp(a)' implies '(Ex)Kp(x)' only in
the presence of '(Ex)K(x = a)', and that 'a = b' does not suffice to
derive 'Kp(a)' from 'Kp(b)1 while 'K(a = b)' does. Unlike Hintikka's
original rules, quantification according to the present rules is over
actually existing individuals. "There is someone I do not know who he
is" can be simply represented by
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(1) (Ex)-(Ey)K(x ~ y)
and II I know who everyboay ; sII by
(2) (x)(Ey)K(x ~ y).
It is not difficult to prove that (1)-(2) are two contingent but
contradictory sentences in the present system. 2
PART II
DISCOURSE GRAMMAR
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Chapter I
DISCOURSE GRAMMAR
1. Discourse Analysis and Discourse Grammar
The first Part of this essay has been conc~rnf:d with discourse
analysis, defined as the study of what makes a sequence of sentences'
coherent piece of discourse. My general answer to this main problem of
discourse analysis can now be formulated: a text is coherent (well-
formed) if it can be extended i~L~ a well-formed dialogue game.
The theory of dialogues developed in this work is of course
primarily a theory of conversational exchanges. It is my b~lief that
such exchanges bring out the essentials of text structure most clearly.
Yet the theory of dialogue applies to the analysis of monologue
as well - i.e., to the description of a connected text. The key to such
applications is the idea of textual interpolation. In order to reveal
the impl1L~t structure of a piece of discourse, extend it into a dialogue,
by adding implicit dialogue steps which make the connections between the
sentences of the text explicit. The function of the ~entences of the
original text will be spelled out by their role in the reconstructed
dialogue, and their connections to one another will be represented by
the sequences of moves that connect them in the reconstructed d1alogue. 1
Here is an illustrative example of such textu ' analysis.
The original sentences of ~ passage from Carrol"s Alice in Wonderland
stand out as 1tal1c1zed. 2
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And who took the March Hare's place? (D. and) to 6.
Did they move? Who moved when? (D.question) to 1.
"Let's all
into his
And Alice was a good d2~1 ~orse off than before, (O.answer)
to 12, (O.and) to 13.
Why was Alice reluctant to move? (D.question) to 9.
Did Alice perhaps lose in the change? (D.explain) to 10.
Who gained what in the change? (D.explain) to 11.
The Hatter was the only one who got any advantage from
the change, (D. answer) to 12.
For the Hatter got a clean cup (D.explain) to 13, (D. infer)
to 5.
He moved on as he spoke, and the Dormouse followed him.(D. answer) to 2.
Who got whose place? (D.quest1on) to 1.
The Hatter got a clean cup, while the Dormouse took
the Hatter's place. (D. infer) to 1,3, (D.answer) to 4.
Who took the Dormouse's place? (O.infer) to 4-5
The March Hare moved into the Dormouse's place, (D.answer)
to 6.
(1) 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11 •
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
This analysis is only illustrative, no claims of ultimate accuracy are
implied. In all its simplicity, it does point out some of the obvious
properties of the italicized paragraph. The excerpt is a description
of a change of seats at the mad-tea-party. The subject of the paragraph
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is given away by the first sentence of the text, which immediately
suggests the first sub-topics in 2 and 4. These topics are dealt with in
the moves 3-9. Move 9 serves as a point of transition to the final sub-
topic 12; this it does by inserting, apparently superfluously, a comment
on Alice's reaction to the Hatter's suggestion. The insertion indicates
that the motives of the players are relevant for the discussion, thus
raising the question 12. The conflict of interests between Alice and
the Hatter in 13-15 will contribute to Alice's decision to abandon the
party in the sequel, which connects the present paragraph to later devel-
opments.
How do we arrive at the interpolations in the example (1)1
The present approach does not offer any mechanical way of finding the
(or a) correct analysis of a given text. There is no algorithm for
generating appropriate dialogue contexts. In effect, we are faced with
a problem of content analysis: how to make the best possible sense of
an elliptic message. The success of a suggested reconstruction is ulti-
mately gauged by its ability to faithfully reflect the implicit inten-
tions of the author(s) of the discourse.
However, things are not quite hopeless. Certain grammatical
clues give definite boundary conditions to a proposed expansion: sen-
tences of certain syntactical shapes will be appropriate in certain
dialogue contexts but not in others. This observation can be turned into
a sort of transscendentftl deduction of the discipline of discourse
grammar. As the findings of Part I of this essay show, a dialogue has
an important further order of structure over and above the sequence of
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its explicit mcyes. Since this further order of structure is far richer
than the linear order, considerable ambiguity is left in the problem of
figuring out the structure of a piece of discourse from its explicit
sentences. It is therefore not surprising to find in natural languag~~
different grammatical devices whose function is to aid speakers in guess-
ing at the implicit structure of discourse from its explicit moves. The
study of such expressive means is the task of discourse grammar.
In this Part of the essay, I shall try to show by means of
case studies that the function and distribution of many devices of
discourse grammar can be accounted for in simple and natural ways by
the conceptual machinery of dialogue games. The success of the dialogue
game framework to account for facts of dialogue grammar will thus con-
stitute important support1'eg evidence for the dialogue game approach.
2. Appropriateness, Coherence, and Cohesion
The choice of a complete dialogue game as the basic unit of
text grammar has important consequence~ to the analysis of individual
sentences. The concepts and rules of discourse grammar are not directly
concerned with an absolute property of grammat1cality (acceptability) of
individual sentences. What they characterize in the first place ;s the
relative property of appropriateness of sentences as moves in dialogues.
From this relative property, absolute properties can be defined, as
indicated, by quantification over all well-formed dialogues: a sentence
is strictly admissible if it can be embedded in son. well-formed dialogue
gamei it is strictly ill-formed if it cannot be embedded in any dialogue
game.
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This creates a crucial element of indeterminacy in absolute
judgments of naturalness of sentences. When one is asked whether a
sentence - or some reading of it - is natural, how one sets about gene-
rating a judgment is by trying to imagine that sentence as a fragment of
a dialogue; in other words, one trie~ to embed it in a well-formed dia-
logue game. It follows that a naturalness judgment is a faithful index
about actual functional properties of a sentence only if the subject's
judgment is not impaired by irrelevant assumptions about the likelihood,
interest, ethical or aesthetic properties of the dialogue contexts to
consider. Chances are that a subject deems a sentence unnatural not
because it has no place in any well-formed dialogue, but just because
the subject does not come to think of, or rejected, certain possible
dialogues on the basis on what he assumes people usually are (or should
be) interested in, say or believe. 3
Another interesting consequence has been anticipated by
G. Lakoff [579]. Although the notion of well-formedness of a fully
specified dialogue is a decidable notion (it suffices to see if its
individual moves are well-formed and if all connections between the
moves obey the dialogue game rules), the question of the well-formedness
of an arbitrary piece of discourse is not, thanks to the extra existen-
tial quantifier in our characterization of the notion. To find out if,
say, a step of indirect inference is valid, one will have to d~c1de
if there is a proof for it from the log1cdl game rules. And this
question is known to be undecidable even for the minimum of logical
machinery implicit in our logical game rules.
- 242 -
Given a suggested dialogue reconstruction of a text, we can
check it for cohesion by making sure that the augmented dialogue is well
formed: i.e., that each move is properly related to its premises by
rules of dialogue grammar.
However, the analysis, to be successful, should also represent
a coherent dialogue: a dialogue whose participants are following reason-
ably rational dialogue strategies given our assumptions about their aims
and attitudes. We expect a well-formed discourse to make reasonable
sense besides hanging together by discourse grammatical criteria. This
aspect is what distinguishes a coherent text from the incoherent though
fluent speech of a schizophrenic patient.
These considerations suggest a neat distinction between textual
cohesion and textual coherence. Cohesion is a property of a well-formed
if not a well-played dialogue game: one whose moves conform to the
rules of dialogue grammar. Coherence pertains to considerations of
dialogue strategy: a coherent dialogue is one whose moves appropriately
serve the dialogue purposes of their authors. 4
3. Autonomy of Discourse Grammar
The main theses of my approach to discourse grammar are these.
First, I want to distinguish clearly between s~'~ucture (rules of forma-
tion) and function (rules of interpretation). Rules of formation define
a class of well-formed sentences with no reference to outside 1nforma-
tion: they are ~xclus1vely couched in the primitives of grammatical
theory, whether they be stated constructively, as in phrase structure
or categor1al grammar, analytically by means of rules which filter out
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grammatical strings from a~b;trary strings of formatives, or by mixed
means (as in transformational grammar). Rules of formation are thus
characterized essentially by their autonomy.5
Rules of interpretation, in contrast, relate grammatical
constructions to some further, independently defined structures, be it
the actual world (Bloomfield), some specified aspects of it (cognitive
psychology), a class of possible worlds or models (model theoretic seman-
tics), another formal language (Montague, or Katz semantics), or games
(game-theoretical semantics, dialogue game theory). Functional rules
thus are essentially relational. 6
Of course, the distinction is relative to the choice of
primitives of the grammatical theory. Grammatical theory can always
be reduced to rules of formation only, if enough of the domain of inter-
pretation is included into the primitives of grammar.? (This is what
happens in extreme developments of generative semantics.) Such shuffling
of grammatical primitives is of course ultimately constrained by consid-
erations of simplicity of the grammar. If the result of the inclusion
of further primitives leads to a very heterogeneous and unconstrained
class of grammatical rules, chances are that the power of the theory
would increase from factorization of types of rules into separate compo-
nents. This is of course the argument against generative semantics
raised by the grammarians of the standard transformational school.
In the modular extreme, it even makes sense to speak of
interpreting different orders of (what is traditionally considered)
grammatical structure onto another. It is customary to speak of one
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level of grammatical structure being translated into structures generated
by another component. Thus the difference between structural and func-
tional rules concerns the factorization of different rules of grammar
into components, or the modularity of grammar, to use the fashionable
term. 8
Thus what my insistence on distinguishing rules of formation
and rules of interpretation in text grammar really amounts to ;s a claim
for relative autonomy of dialogue grammar. Specifically, I want to keep
separate rules determining well-formed dialogue structure from rules
determining well-formed sentence structure. Certain sets of rules will
determine constraints on how sentences are put together from words and
how they are pronounced.
Another set of rules tells us how sentences can be embedded
into dialogue structure. In the process, some further filtering of
sentences may occur, if some grammatical sentences find no appropriate
contexts of use. Such sentences will be rejected as grammatical but
uninterpretable.
A second thesis is the autonomy of different cO~lponents of
dialogue grammar. The pragmatic lexicon, functional syntax, and prosody
operate independently of each other. They are coupled only by the fact
that they fulfill some of the same functions in relating sentences to
dialogue context. Any distributional constraints which emerge represent
interaction of independently defined rules. They need not be spelled out
directly by grammatical rule.
The components of dialogue grammar can be roughly divided by
the traditional categories of lexicon, syntax, and phonology.
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To the functional lexicon belong such words as connectives
(coordinating conjunctions) and, or, but; subordinating ones such as
while, whereas, if, although, unless, because, since; adjuncts like ~,
however, still, therefore, then, so, also, too, ~, Qnll, again, on
the other hand; anaphors including personal pronouns and words like one,
do, so, ~, no; certain intensional words such as know, regret, manage,
surprise, odd, and interjections such as Ohl, Aha!, or Well!
Functional syntax features prominently syntactic subordination
and linear order, certain specific grammatical constructions (existential
sentences, cleft sentences), and ellipsis (deletion).
Finally, a central phonological vehicle of text organization
is intonation, traditionally divided into prominence (stress), phrasing
(pauses, duration), and accent (pitch).
In the following case studies, I shall pick out from this
wealth of expressive means such as are specifically oriented towards
signaling the structure of a dialogue.
This part of the essay is organized faithfully following the
assumed modular structure of dialogue grammar. This presentation creates
certain expository difficulties, for the obvious reason that it is hard
to find examples where the different orders of text structure would not
interact in interesting ways. What is more, the most impressive argu-
ments for the autonomous treatment often come from the interaction of
the different textual means. In particular, some of the most interest-
ing observations about word order concern its interaction with intonation,
which topic will be completely omitted here. 9
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Chapter 2
CONNECTIVES
1. And
I start out by considering the use of the two commonest
.
coordinating conjunctions, and and or. I want to suggest that the elusive
constraints on the use of these conjunctions and the frustrating subtlety
of intuitions concerning their appropriateness are due to the multipli-
city of structural possibilities of dialogue games. Thanks to the
structural complexity of dialogue games, the game rules for and and or
can be left quite simple. The full complexity of acceptability judgments
can be left to be predicted by systematic variations of dialogue context.
The first observation that one is likely to make about and is
that not any two sentences can naturally be conjoined with it. Some
conjunctions do not seem to make much sense:
(l) Reagan is smart and a whale is a fish.
Certain further observations should follow close at the heels of this
one. First, (1) would be an odd couple even without the and: l
(2) Reagan is smart. A whale is a fish.
Second, the same two sentences can make a perfect, though sarcastic,
dialogue:
(3) A: Reagan is smart.
B: And a whale is a fish.
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Third, even (1) ceases to be odd if a good reason for saying it is
provided, for instance, the question
(4) What did you learn at school today?
All of these observations involve instances or violations of
the overriding principle already discovered in Part I: be relevant
(play rationally). A dialogue move sounds inappropriate in a given
context if it seems an irrational move to make in that dialogue, given
the aims and the attitudes of the part;ci~ants. By implication, a
sentence in isolation sounds odd or unacceptable as long as one is hard
put to find any good reason for anyone to say it in any dialogue context.
As soon as a suitable context is provided, the feeling of oddity subsides.
The particular trouble with (1) and (2) seems to be this. If
one tries to construe the two sentences in (2) as a single dialogue move,
one has a difficult time conjuring up an informational interest which
that move would satisfy, a common topic to which both halves of the move
could be addressed. As expected, the trouble is immediately alleviated
when such a topic is found. Sometimes, the topic may itself be a curious
one. For instance, (1) could be construed as a sadly misinformed teach-
er's answer to two of his students at the same time:
(5) A: Why is Reagan president?
B: And what is a whale?
C: Reagan is smart and a whale is a fish.
However, it is not too difficult how the double-barreled question in (5)
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might have arisen in turn, for instance as two questions that were left
unclear in the course of reading an assigned text. The common denominator
for them would be the teacher's question
(6) What is unclear in the text?
Let us return to (3). The workings of the sarcasm in (3) have
already Leen explained in Part 1. 2 In brief, B is suggesting that A may
subsume both of their contributions under one and the same topic, presum-
ably not very much different from
(7) What common misconceptions are there?
The interesting question is, why does the insertion of 'and' help B to
get this innuendo through here? The explanation lies 1n the dialogue
game rule for and:
(D.and) When a player has put forward a dialogue move, he may continue
it by conjoining a further sentence to it by and.
Thus 'and' in (3) indicates to A that B does not intend tc thange the
topic, but has in mind one that will cover both moves.
(D.and) has been formulated as a continuation move. This
explains why one who c~njoins another sentence to another player's move
implicitly accepts the first move:
(8) A: Who will buy this book?
B: I will buy it!
C: And I will buy it!
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Here, and is in order if there are several copies o~ the book for sale:
B will buy one and C another. It would be odd or inappropriate if there
is competltion for just one copy, for then C could not accept that B buys
the book as well.
The formulation of (D. and) helps narrowing down the possible
dialogue functions of a sentence begun by and. A sentence starting with
and must address the same topic in the same manner as its premise. Thus
it serves to turn a sentence which otherwise could be construed as a
reply or an explanation into a simple addition in
(9) A: Guld;s expensive.
B: And it is scarce.
The conjunction tells that B has in mind a topic that both sentences
may address, say, what is gold like.
The formulation of (D.and) ;s noncon1mittal as to the mood of
the sentences conjoined. What is required that the sentences conjoined
share dialogue function. Therefore, as a rule of thumb, sentences of
different moods do not freely conjoin:
(10) who are you, and I am Bob.
The first half of (10) is likely to be a move by (D.question), and thus
can only be continued by a further question. There would be nothing
wrong with
(11 ) Who are you, and who 1s i"le?
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The rule of thumb is not without apparent exceptions. The permutation
of (10) in (12) is quite natural:
(12) I am Bob, and who are you?
r think that (12) ;s really only an apparent exception. (12)
is just yet another case of a dialogue rule applying to a suppressed
premise. The structure of the turn in (12) actually involves two dia-
logue moves. The first constitutes an answer to a dialogically silent
question, and the second constitutes a continuation of the suppres~ed
question. The structure of the dialogue might be
(13) Who is who?
Who am I? - and - Who are you?
I a~ Bob.
This explanation also accounts for the asymmetry between (12)
and (10). In the converse case (10), a reconstruction similar to (13) is
not available, for there the missing first conjunct, an answer to the
first question, has yet to be supplied. Once it is at hand, the con-
tinuation is all right:
(14) B: Who are you?
C: I am Carol.
B: And I am Bob.
Another interesting corollary was pointed out to me by Paul
Kiparsky. The following dialogue sounds somewhat disjointed:
- 251
(15) A to 2: Who are you?
B: I am Bob.
A to C: And who are you?
C: And I am Carol.
Carol, one feels, should not have begun her answer by and..This is as
expected: although A is continuing his question to B by and, CiS answer
is in no way 3 continuation of B's answer to the first half of if,. By
using and, Carol as it were ignores the question A ;r oresently address-
ing to her and looks back to join her answer to S's contribution.
2. Or
The dialogue game rule for or differs only minimally from
that for and:
(D.or) When a player has put forward a dialogue move, he may
continue it by adjoining a further disjunct to it beginning
wi th or.
The dialogue properties of or also provide analogous arguments
to those supporting (D.and). Wildly disparate disjuncts are odd in the
same way as to~ical1y incoherent conjuncts.
For instance, it would be quite odd for someone named Smith
to blurt ou~
(16) Five men fit into a Fiat or my name is Smith.
Again, it is not difficult to imagine contexts where what seems
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nonsensical at first becomes eminently natural. One particular context
is of special interest, as it nicely illustrates the interplay of the
logic of or with its discourse properties. Assume it is common knowledge
that the name of the author of (16) is not Smith. Then (16) becomes a
fully idiomatic way of emphat1cal1y affirming the first disjunct of (16).
How does this implicature of (16) come about? The explanation
ties up (D.ar) with insights from deductive and inductive logic.
First note that (D.ar) creates an asymmetry between the
disjuncts of a disjunction. The first member of a disjunction alone
constitutes a bona fide dialogue move; for instance, the first disjunct
of (16) already constitutes an adequate answer to the question
(17) How many men fit into a Fiat?
In virtue of (C.ar), a dialogud move can optionally be amended by the
addition of a further disjunct, designed to take over the burden of the
answer in case the first disjunct fails. This is why (16) seemed wrong-
headed to start with: what has the speaker's name to do with the seating
capacity of a Fiat?
Fortunately, the asymmetry of (D.or) also suggests what the
connection is. In v;.·tue of the asymmetry, (16) is recognized as equiva-
lent to a particular conditional sentence, namely
(18) If five men do not fit into a Fiat. my name is Smith.
The riddle about (16) c~n now be restated as a problem of logical
inference; what on earth may establish a relation of consequencp as
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curious as (18)1 An answer is ready at hand: it is a familiar fact of
logic that from an impossibility, anything follows, any arbitrarily
chosen further absurdity included. In other words, given the indisput-
ability of the premise
(19) My name is not Smith.
both (16) and (18) turn out as logically equivalent to the categorical
assertion
(20) Five men fit into a Fiat.
Good: we have established that granted (19), (16) is only a roundabout
paraphrase of (20) - no matter if the second disjunct seems irrelevant
to the inquiry at hand.
However, something important remains unexplained - why is (16)
a particularly emphatic way of putting (20), not, say, a tentative or
perhaps just functionally indifferent paraphrase? This is where induc-
tive considerations enter the explanation.
The premises of the explanation are that the author of (16)
considers the first disjunct of(16) an adequate move in itself, say as
an answer to (17), and that he assumes it to be common knowledge - i.e. t
an assumption accepted by all with a high degree of confidence - that
his name is not Smith.
Given that the first disjunct is already optimal against some
reasonable index of caution, the second disjunct seems eminently foolish:
why should he weaken his position by an obviously unlikely assumption?
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There is one situation where an amendment may be in order:
that is if the index of caution th~ player is operating with is dramatic-
ally increased, with a consequent lowering of the rejection t~reshold
for the denial of the first disjunct (and for other equally unlikely
suppositions). Examples of disjunctive amendments in the presence of
increased caution are common: here are some from Patricia Moyes' novel
Death and the Dutch Uncle.
(21) You don't get outsiders here. Or if you do, they don't stay
long.
(22) - What's his name, by the way?
- Weatherby, sir. Or so he says.
(23) - Nobody else saw Pereira slip and fall.
- Ah well, that was just a matter of luck.
- Was it?
- Or bad luck, from the poor old - gentleman's point of view.
In each case, the author of the disjunct10n sees fit to watch his words
on second thought, involved as he is in a police investigation. In (23),
the increased caution is actually prompted by an incredulous checking
question from th~ interviewer.
As these examples illustrate, the addition of a disjunct to a
prima facie optimal answer may be rational if an increased index of
caution is indicated. How does this connect up with the sense of
affirmation in (16)1 The argument is simple. By appending the obviously
exaggerated proviso to his answer in (16), the author invites his audience
to figure out a conversational implicature: what assumption should be
made about the speaker to explain the amendment as a rational move. The
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simplest assumption ;s that the author is operating with an uncommon
high degree of caution, one inversely related to the improbability of
the preposterous disjunct. This balance helps the audience gauge the
degree of confidence with which the author accepts the first disjunct:
it is as high as the degree of caution needed to admit that particular
amendment. For anyone operating with a lower index of caution, (16)
therefore amounts to a particularly confident affirmation of the first
disjunct.
An extreme case of this dialogue strategy ;s the use of or
to introduce counterfactual reductio ad absurdum arguments:
(24) - But it wasn't one of our regulars.
- Of course not, said Henry. None of your regulars were here,
were they? Or you'd have recognized them.
Or again equals else: the counterfactual alternative is complementary to
the first disjunct. The logic of Henry's argument in (24) is clear:
Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that it were rational to amend
(25) None of your regulars were here
with its contradictory
(26) Some of your regulars were here,
which is the suppressed ~rem1se of the subjunctive clause. Given the
obvious axiom
(27) You recognize your regulars,
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(26) would indeed imply the subjunctive clause in (24). But, earlier in
the dialogue of which (24) is a fragment, it has been already agreed tnat
(28) You didn't recognize any of them.
Hence accepting (26) would lead to accepting contradictory sentences in
violation of (C.cons). This suffices to eliminate the hypothetical
alternative (26) so as to affirm just (25). A full dialogue reconstruc-
tion of (24) could look like
(29) 1. H: Was it one of your regulars? (D.ask)
2. W: It wasn't one of our regulars. (D.answer) to 1.
3. H: Of course not. {D. reply) to 1-2.
4. H: None of your regulars were here. (D.explain) to 3.
5. H: Were they? (D.questian) to 4.
6. H: Or some of your regulars were here. (D.ar) to 4.
7. H: Then you'd have recognized them. (D. infer) to 6, (23).
8. H: Did you recognize any of them? (D.question) to 7.
9. W: I didn't recognize any of them. (O.reply) to 7-8.
10. H. So none of your regulars were here. (D.1nfer) to 5-9.
Lines 6-10 violate (C.cons), so the counterfactual alternative
must be rejected. Notice how the subjunctive mood of the or clause gives
away the fact that none of it is (ostensibly) accepted (cf. Part I, Ch.
IV.S).
Example (24) is a good reminder that the key moves of a
dialogue may well remain implicit: the rejected alternative (26),
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which actually motivates or, is never said aloud but has to be inferred
from one of its consequences.
One point about or that needs attention is the application of
meaning conventions to a move and a disjunctive continuation to it. We
have to require that (D.earnest) and its alternatives are retrospectively
reapplied to the completed dialogue move. This is why one who adds a
further disjunct to a move need not continue to endorse its premise.
Neither does he have to accept the amendment. What he does have to
accept is the completed disjunction, whether by accepting one of its
disjuncts or by admitting several of them.
Examples of this observation are
(30) "It could have been Mario, though. He's so slim and pretty.
Or Sylvie, or Chantal, _"
"Or you!" Mario spat out the words.
Moyes, Season of Snows and Sins, p. 134.
(31 ) "He11 t Henry t don t t be thi sway. Look now. Nobody knew
about the leakage of information last night except you and
me. This morning Trapp knew about it. The note in the
typewriter makes that clear enough. So, by a simple process
of deduction, you must have told him. 1I
"Unless you did, or he found out himself,"
By completing the first speaker's move, the second speaker here indicates
he accepts it only as amended. Vet he need not consider the amendment
any more likely than the other alternatives.
3. Inclusive or Exclusive Or
Another long-standing puzzle about or is its apparent
vacillation between inclusive and exclusive senses. As has been pointed
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out by several writers, it will not do just to say that there are two
oris in English, one equivalent to logical inclusive disjunction and the
other to logical exclusive disjunction (contravalence, or contradictory
of material equivalence).3
One reason is that iteration of contravalence is not logically
equivalent to a multiple exclusive or in English. As McCawley has pointed
out, an iterated contravalence is not only true if one and only one of
its members is true, but also if any odd number of the members are true.
This extraordinary truth condition clearly fails the intention of the
exclusive or in sentences like
(32) Either I won or you won or it is a split decision.
(32), if understood as a three-way choice, does not allow all of its
members to turn out true at once.
The binary notion of contravalence is best matched by
connectives like else or unless. Iterations of these connectives may
be self-correcting:
(33) I won unless you won, unless it is a split decision.
(34) I won, else you won, else it is a split decision.
Here, the last alternative may actually cancel the first contravalence t
allowing for all of the disjuncts to turn out true. 4
A syntactic difference between Q! and the binary disjunctions
confirms the semantic distinction. We shall note below that and, unlike
the binary but, allows coordination of an arbitrary number of conjuncts
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into one conjunction, with the option of omitting all but the last
occurrence of and between the conjuncts. Or (whether inclusively or
exclusively understood) has a similar syntactic liberty, while unless
and else do not.
The best one can say about the exclusive use of or that it
goes with a uniqueness presupposition to the effect that precisely one
of its disjuncts is true.
But what sort of a requirement is this? Where does it come
from, and when is it present? To approach this question, consider (32)
which ;s not only acceptable but a completely ordinary thing to say
indicating that precisely one of the disjuncts should be chosen:
(35) Either I won or you won or we both won.
What is peculiar about (35) is that ordinarily, we would assume the last
disjunct to entail both of the earlier ones. But then the three alter-
natives are not exclusive after all!
In order to construe the three alternatives in (35) as mutual·ly
exclusive, they are best considered as three alternative proposals for
a complete answer to some underlying question, say
(36) Who won?
Although logically compatible, the disjuncts in (35) cannot all be
complete answ~rs to (36). Thus, it seems to me, the exclusivity of or
is a matter of dialogue grammar. As far as semantics goes, or has the
meaning assigned to it by (C.or), i.e .• that of an inclusive disjunction.
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Or seems exclusive when a uniqueness presupposition is conferred to it
by its role in a dialogue.
In our example (35), it is the function of (35) as a disjunction
of alternative complete answers to (36) that is responsible for the
uniqueness presupposition.
It is even easier to understand why or obtains an exclusive
interpretation when (38) is construed as an answer to the which-question
in (37):
(37) Which player won?
(38) A won or B won or C won.
Due to the uniqueness entailment of which, any direct answer to (37)
i~ at once a complete answer to it, and as such eliminates any other
alternatives.
This line of explanation leads one to expect that or ceases
to seem exclusive where it combines alternative answers to an existen-
tially understood question. (Recall that an existential question can
have any number of equally good and compatible complete answers.)
This expectation is actually confirmed:
(39) What do old people do for physical exercise?
(40) They walk or swim or play shuffleboard.
Surely, there is no implication in (40) that the alternative forms
of exercise exclude each other.
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Our examples so far have come from declarative sentences. I
do not think that anything new need be said to capture the behavior of
or in questions. Consider the following example:
(41) Did John visit Sweden, Norway, or Denmark?
It is well first to dispose of the possibility that (41) represents a
simple sentential question formed out of a disjunctive sentence. On
this analysis, (41) admits of only two answers, yes and no. This inter-
pretation is easiest to hear if one appends or not.
Two more interpretations remain, corresponding to the topics
(42) and (43), respectively.
(42) Which country did John visit?
(43) Which countries did John visit?
In the context of (42), (41) expects one and only one choice among the
alternatives, while in the context of (43), more than one alternative
may be right, and the questioner wants to know which. In the face of
these observations, it seems to me unnecessary to add anything to the
rules and principles we have for disjunctive questions. (41) represents
a unique-alternative question if it is offered as an explanation for
(42); it obtains a conjunctive interpretation if it represents a series
of guesses derived from (43) as the ultimate topic. There is nothing
in the structural description of (41) which decides for one of the
interpretations rather than the other.
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4. But
The English but exhibits even more surface divergence ;n its
distribution than and. This has led dictionaries and earlier linguistic
literature to distinguish several distinct if related senses of this
useful word. My intention again is to try to reduce a diversity of
different uses of but to just one dialogue rule, applied in the corres-
ponding multiplicity of dialogue contexts. 5
For this purpose, it is useful to have something of an overview
of the apparently different uses of but. A handy way to distinguish
them is to relate them to appropriate disambiguating adverbials, which
help to fix a specific sense of but when appended to the word or substi-
tuted for it. 6
The existence of such disambiguating words in a certain sense
justifies the subdivisions we shall make. Although they do not consti-
tute sufficient reason to say that but itself is ambiguous (it needs but
one rule, after all), they show that the subdivisions at least represent
possible senses of adversative conjunctions. The existence of such
disambiguating particles in English and in other languages lends the
present study particular interest. If the dialogue game framework helps
predict which particular subdivisions of the domain of but should occur
in English and recur in other languages, so as to yield the makings for
a universal typology of adversative conjunctions, there is good hope for
claims of universality for the approach.
With these vistas in mind, let us get to the facts.
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Perhaps the most commonly recognized but is the contrary-to-
expectation but, aptly paraphrased by yet:
(44) My name is Su~, but I am a boy.
(45) The President ;s past eighty, but he is still bright as '!
button.
(46) She is busy, but she helps us all the time.
Another fluent paraphrase for this sense of but is to subordinate the
first sentence to the second by although or despite. In these examples,
the first sentance constitutes inductive counterevidence for the second
sentence, whence the epithet 'contrary-to-expectation'.
However, as more than one author before me has observed, there
is no necessity of an inductive dependence between the two sentences
conjoined by but. There;s none in
(47) I like it, but I cannot afford it.
(48) Mary is intelligent, but she ;s ugly.
(49) He tried, but he failed.
In order to accept (47)-(49), it is not necessary to assume that people
as a rule prefer things within their means, that smart people are beauti-
ful, or that most trials are followed by success. This sense of but can
be paraphrased by however or on the other hand. Although and yet would
not be appropriate here.
Intuitively, the point about (47)-(48) is that they weigh the
evidence for and against some unspoken supposition: the author of (47)
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may be deliberating about a purchase, (48) may discuss Mary's chances of
success in male society, (49) whether someone did something or' not. In
all these cases, there ;s some uns~oken tertium comparat;onis (to borrow
a phrase from Abraham [390]) which induces the contrast. Let us call
this sense of but the 'tertium comparationis' but.
Finally, there is what Robin Lakoff [411] calls the 'semdntic
opposition' but:
(50) John hates ice cream, but I like it.
(51) John turned left, but Bill turned right.
(52) He spoke Spanish, but she spoke Itulian.
Here, the contrast between and and but is minimal: and could replace
but with only the slightest difference in nuance. Other natural pdra-
phrases are whereas nnd while.
Now what could be common to all these uses of but? My answer
is based on the following statement of the dialogue game rule for but:
(D. but) When a player has addressed a move to a given topic, any
player may rejoin to it by a ~entence heginning with but,
addressed to a coordinate but contradictory topic.
Two auxiliary definitions are needed. First, by addressing
a topic I mean making a countermove to it: as tile topic is a question,
a response to it will be a (partial or complete) answer to it, including
an inductive argument for one.
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What is meant by coordinate topics in (D. but) is easiest to
show by means of an example. Let us look at a likciy dialogue structure
of one of the simplest examples:
(53) Did he 10 it or did he not do it? (O.ask)
~
He did do t {O.answer) He did not do it (D.answar)
He tr1e~ (J.argu~) - but - He f~led (D.explain)
The motivation of but is graphically evident in (53). The
fila in top; c of the di a1ague admi ts of two contrad; ctory answers to wh ; ch
the two sides of (49) are addressed. The first half cf (49) constitutes
evidence for the positive answer, while the sectnd half verifies the
negative one. The structural condition of (D.but) is satisfied, and the
sentence passed.
The same structural explanation is easily extended to the
other instances of tert1u~ comparationis but in (47)-(4~). For (4R),
we might pr~pose the topic
(54) Is she a first-rate secretary?
and for (47)
(55) Will you buy it?
What is ~eant by coordinate topics 1" (O.but) is now
diagrammatically shown in (53): two topics are coordinate if they
represent functionally similar countermoves to one and the same
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superordinate topic.
The rules (O.and) and (D.but) seeM to capture the gist of
Leibniz' suggestions concerning the use of but as contrasted to and,
distilled by Goddard [409] as follows:]
The basic idea is that in saying a clause, and following it
with another ~lause, preceded by the word and, one signals
that the second clause is a continuation (something more),
added to the first clause.
In saying but, however, it is suggested that one signals
that what 1Oflows is not a contiruation of what went before,
that it is not something more.
(D.and) and (D.but) capture this ~ns1ght quite literally: and continues
a move addressed to a topic, while but moves to a coordinate but con-
trastive topic.
5. Applications of (O.but)
The contrary-to-expectation examples had as their defining
feature that the two sides of but are in inductive conflict. How does
this come about? Likely topics for (44)-(46) are (56)-(58), respectively:
(56) Who are you? Are you a boy or a girl?
(57) Is the president in full possession of his buttons?
(58) What did she say? Can we count on her?
These topic proposals have one important feature in common.
It is that the but clause actually constitutes a decisive answer to the
topic it addresses - an answer which entails a direct answer to the
question. This observation is nicely confirmed by the syntactic fact
that it is the but clause that forms the main clause when but is
..
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paraphrased by although or despite.
The dialogue structure of (44) might be
Who are you?
Igirl or are you a boy?
"
Are you a boy?
,
I am a boy.
(D. answer)
Are you a
Are you ~?
I
I am a 91 rl
I - but -
My name is Sue (D. argue)
(59)
A crucial point about (59) is that the but clause constitutes a decisive
answer to its topic. As a c~nsequence. any argument for a conflicting
ans,~er on the left side of but disconfinns the but clause itself. Compare
this to the situation in (53), where there is no necessity of inductive
relevance between argument and counterargument.
Another example of a slightly different character confirms the
observation. Consider
(60) She is exceptional. She is busy, but she helps us.
Clearly, the author of (60) has in mind an inductive generalization like
(61) Busy people do not help.
to which someone forms a brilliant exception. Here. the left side of
the but sentence, in virtue of the cond1t,Jnal probability statement (61)
strongly suggests ~ negative answer to the question
(62) Does she help us or not?
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On the other hand, the but sentence immediately clinches the argument
contrary to common expectation: that's where she is exceptional. The
structure of the dialogue could be described by something like
(63) What is she like? (D.question)
IShe is exceptional. (D.answer)
IHow? (D.question)
She is tusy
Busy people 1ave no time to help.
So she does not help? (D. infer)
~ (O.question)
- but - She helps us. (D.answer)
•
The structure of the dialogue here is hard to layout graphically without
repetition, as certain sentences play multiple roles in it. The left
side of but has the converse roles of raising the topic of the but clause
and providing an argument for a negative answer to it. The whole but
sentence (or the subdialogue which describes its function) provides an
explanation of the woman's exceptionality by answering a how question.
To sum up, a contrary-to-expectation but seems to arise in
that special case where the but clause constitutes a complete answer to
its topic. In that case, an inductive relation of d1sconf1rmat1on between
the two clauses conjoined by but logically follows. In other but
sentences, such an inductive tie is quite coincidental. For yet, it is
essential, that is why yet would serve to disambiguate but here.
The 'semantic opposition' but is not difficult to subsume under
{D.but}. Likely topics for (50)-(52), respectively:
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(64) How do you people like ice cream? Do you like it or not?
(65) Which way did they go? Did they turn left or right?
(66) What language did they speak? Was it Spanish?
What is common to (64)-(66) is a presupposition of shared taste,
destination or language: the first conjunct of the but sentence is
consistent with the presupposition of the question, the second conjunct
falsifies it. It is instructive to compare the topics in (64)-(66) to
(67) Who hates ice cream and who likes it?
(68) WhJ turned where?
(69) Who spoke what language?
Unlike (64)-(66), these questions make no assumptions about sharing;
accordingly, there is no need to resort to but in answering them:
(70) John hates ice cream and I like it.
(71) John turned left and Bill turned right.
(72) He spoke Spanish and she spoke Italian.
Logically. the difference between (64)-(66) and (67)-(69) is
quite subtle; it is essentially a matter of quant1f1~r ordering. In
(64)-(66). the job of singling out individual members of ~ and they
is left to the answerer. whereas in (70)-(72). d1stributivity is already
suggested in the question. The questions in (64)-(66) carry a stronger
presupposition. for in them the choice of answer is not assumed to
depend on the choice of individual subjects in the manner of (70)-(72).
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It is this quite subtle presupposition that but addresses in the 'semantic
opposition' examples.
If this explanation is right, we should expect the 'semantic
opposition l but to be odd when care is taken to cancel such presupposi-
tions. This prediction seems borne out in
(73) This ;s Wimbledon, the final in menls singles.
The finalists are Bjorn Borg and Jim Connors.
Borg is playing from left to right but Connors from
right to left.
Everybody knows that tennis players in singles mBtches play on opposite
sides. There is no need of put to point that out. As predicted, but
does sound oddly out of place here.
6. Implications of (D.but)
A peculiarity of but as compared with and which is of particular
interest is the following. While a whole sequence of sentences can
naturally be concatenated by and, several successive but sentences are
rare and when they do occur, appear curiously erratic. Here are some
live specimens of each from Marilyn French's best-seller The Bleeding
Heart:
(74) No, if we were together all the time, lid get to resent
quitting my work whenever he decided to come home. And held
get to resent my resenting quitting my work. And beSTaes, if
we lived together all the time, he wouldn't qu~early. And
I'd get to resent that he worked late. And then, 'if we were
together all the time, it wouldn1t be a holiday and he'd
expect me to cook him dinner. And lid resent coOkfng dinner
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every night, and he wouldn't be happy with a cheese sandwich,
as I am. And of course, held expect me to do the marketing.
(75) I don't want to burden you, but it's a terrible marriage, but
I can't leave because of the kids ( ... ).
(76) And I love Edith, but I love the kids more, but I love you
more than that.
(74) does sound repetitive, but it still concentrates on one definite
topic, while (75) and (76) seem to jump from one thing to another. This
intuition is explained by (D.but): each occurrence of but in (75) and
(76) requires a new topic arrangement.
The topic which exercised the author of (76) in the book could
be phrased as
(77) Who do I love most?
Three likely answers are weighed in (76) in turn: Edith (the speakerls
wife), his children, and th~ addressee.
However, the structural conditions of but do not allow
construing (76) as a three-term conjunction addressed to (77). (D.but)
demands that the three alternatives in (78) are actually taken up in
two successive pairs, each addressed to a different pair of complemen-
tary alternatives.
Thus, an admissible (and quite likely) dialogue reconstruction
for (76) is
(78)
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Who do I love most?
~~Is it Edith? Is It the kids?
,,/"- /~
It is It's not It is It's not
I " II love Edith - but - I love the kids more - but - I love you more
than that
(78) graphically shows why (76) sounds somehow shilly-shallying or out of
focus: there is a change of topic mid-sentence. the middle clause
straddling two topics at once.
Observe. too, that (76) can not be abbreviated by leaving out
the first but as a sequence of and's could:
•
(79) I love Edith, I love the kids ~re. but I love you more than
that.
(79) can not represent a three-way contrast either. There is one major
cutoff in it at but, dividing the first two·sentences into one argument
and the but clause into a counterargument. If the first co~a needs to
spelled out by a conjunction, that conjunction will be and. Then a
possible topic f~r (79) would be
(80) How about divorce?
family ties being a £2[, the new-found love a ~.
Another peculiarity of but that is explained by our formulation
of (D.but) are its implications of contrast. Consider the example
(81) This man is black, but that man is Polish.
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On cursory inspection, (81) seems to suggest strongly that being black
and being Polish are contradictory characteristics: no Poles are black.
This implication does arise if (81) is construed as disconfirming
evidence.
However, it is easy to cook up a context for (81) where there
is no such implication. A simple one would be
(84) Is this man black and that man Italian?
It is easy to see that the left side of (81) confirms a positive answer
to (R4) while the right side of (81) suggests a negative answer. There
•is no trace of any inductive relevance between the conjuncts of (81)
here, as there is none in (84).
7. But in Dialogue
The last mentioned example is a good reminder of the fact
that but is an entry in dialogue grammar. The acceptability of but
cannot be decided by looking at sentences actually conjoined by it in
abstraction of assumptions about dialogue context. With suitable
background assumptions, sense can be made of any concatenation. Take
for instance
(85) Two and two is four but Hitler was Austrian.
Though somewhat puzzling out of context, (85) makes perfect sense as
spoken by a teacher going over a test with a student. The student got
the arithmetic right, but made a blunder with Hitlerls nationality.
The topic might be:
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(86) Is everything right here?
Let us look more closely at the behavior of but in dialogue.
In contrast with and, but need not begin a continuation move. A but
sentence may well be meant to question or contradict its premise: 8
(87) A: He is extremely good.
B: But he is slow.
(87) leaves it open whether B accepts A's claim or not. B may think
that anyone extremely good should also proceed rapidly; in that case,
his ~ontribution may be a counterargument against the topic
(88) Is he extremely good or not?
Alternatively, he may consider the quality and the dispatch
of a person's work independent considerations relevant to some third
topic, say
(89) Should we give him tenure?
In this case, he may well accept A's contribution as well as his own.
Incidentally, the two interpretations are disambiguated by ellipsis.
The ell1pt~~ dial'gue
(90) A: He is extremely good.
B: B~t slow.
only has the latter interpretation. Yet, too, will disambiguate
in favor of acceptance. which points out another difference between
but and yet.
In contrast, a but sentence may downright contradict its
premise:
(91) A: Nohndy can do that.
B: But he did it.
~lhat but does only in extreme circumstances is introduce a flat denial:
(92) A: He is dead.
B: But he ;s not dead!
-Use of but in this context seems to indicate extreme surprise, indigna-
tion, or bafflement. t·'hy?
As comparison of (91) and (92) shows, the relevant difference
is not one between logical contradiction and inductive conflict, but
concerns rather the directness of the argument.
I submit that the reason why but is marked in (92) ~: the
availability of a simpler dialogue reconstruction for the exchange
which does not satisfy the structural description of (D.but). (92) is
most likely to form a typical assertion-reply dialogue with the structure
(93) A: He is dead.
B: He is not dead. (D. reply)
H~re, the successive moves by A and B are not parallel but sequentially
ordered as assertion and reply.
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Yet but can occur in (92), indicating surprise. Why? I
suggest that what the author of but is surprised at (and takes exception
to) here is not what his addressee says but that he should~ it,
given its patent falsity. The use of but in (92) is motivated, not by
the simple question Is he dead? but by the strategical question Should
one say (accept) that he is dead?
A says so; that is priMa facie evidence that one should - given
that A is generally a rational player. B, who knows better, is surprised
at A's mistake, and points it out by bringing the recalcitrant fact to
his attention, prefaced by but as is fitting given (D.but).
This explanation also accounts for the difference between (91)
and (92). There is nothing wrong with (91), for B's contribution does
not have to con~titute a direct reply to A's claim here. Rather, the
likely topic is whether someone did some remarkable feat or not:
(94) Did he do it or not~
He did notd~ ~ did it.
A: No one can ~o that - but -
(D. explain)
(D. but) is neutral with respect to the mood of the but clause.
However, unlike (D.and), it does restrict the character of the left
side of but: that sentence must be construed as a countermove to some
explicit or unspoken question. As a result, independent questions do
not get conjoined by but:
(95) Who are you but who is he?
(96) Did he try but did he fail?
- 277 -
The situation is different if tiMe ;s allowed for a response to the
fi rst questi on:
(97) A: Who are you?
B: I am Jack
A: But who is she?
(97) is intuitively quite well-formed. But what ;s the meaning of but
in it? The following is a possible reconstruction:
Who rs she?
Is She1hiS wife?
~
She is his wife. She is not his l<~;fe.
I I
For if he is Jack, For if she were I would
she must be his wife. know her, and I do rot
~ know her.
I am Jack. - but - A: Who is sJe?
Who are these people?
-- ~-----~----
B:
Who is he?
IA: Who are you?
(98)
Here, the fact that A still has to inquire about the identity of the
woman casts doubt on B's answer. For a slightly different case,
cons i der
(99) This is a dandelion, but what is that?
with the analysis
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(100) What are these flowers?
Are t~ ~andeJjonS?
=-..........
This is a ~ndelion This is not a dandelion
IFor if it were a dandelion,
I would know what it is.
And I do not know what it is.
- but - What is this?
This reconstruction shows why (99) seems to convey a suggestion that
the other flower cannot be a dandelion too. The suggestion ;s e3si1y
cancelled, however, by another reconstruction:
- but -
00 I kno\~ what flowers are?
--------
I do nOt ~now what that is
What is'that?
--I know what this is
I
This is a dandelion
(101 )
Here, but no lor.ger contrasts dandelions to other kinds of flowers,
knowledge to ignorance.
9. But and the Abstract Performance Hypothesis
The ability of but tJ depend for its nlotivat1on on dialogue
context has been construed by Robin Lakoff [411] as evidence for the
abstract performance hypothesis of generative semantics. The hypothesis
and the general form of argumentation for it have been spelled out peatly
by Sadock [175]:
In f ts s imp1 est form, the abstract··perfonnative hypothesi s
provides that every sentence contain as its highest deep-
syntactic (and semantic) clause a structure li~e those that
give rise to explicit performan~es. This contains a subject
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that refers to the speaker~ an abstract performative ve.-.b that
spec; fi\~s the force of t:,e .ientenc..e, an indi reet object t;~~t
refers t~1 the addressee, ard a clausal direct object. In
the case of explicitly pertormative sentences, no drastic
changes affect the performative clause during the syntactic
derivation. In the case of utterances that are not expli-
cit'ly per-fonnative. the highest clause is eventual 1)'
tie1eted. (p . 17 )
The greater number of syntactic arguments that have been
offered in support of higher abstract performative clauses
are of a si,,~le form: F~rst. it is shown that some parti-
cular ~ro~e'rty of emb~d(Jed sentences is d1re,:tly traceable
tu some pro~~rty or properties of the matrix sentence. Next
it 15 shown that the facts that held for embedded sentences
also characterize cert~in highest ~urface clauses. One
therefore concludes that a higher matrix structure with the
appropriate structural properties is present Jt the stage of
derivation at which the property of the embeuded sentence ;s
det£ nni ned. (p . 21)
R. Lakoff's arguMent from put follows precisely the same
lines. The examples she bases her arguMent on are the likes of
(102) George likes Peking Duck. but all linguists are fond of
Chinese food.
She notes that
An accurate pdraphrase ~f (102) entails brirlying ~nto
disc~ssion a nu~ber of ele~nts that have no su~erticlal
repre~entation .n this sencence: ~ likely candidate is a
senten~~ like (103).
(103) I say to you that George likes Peking Ouck, but I really
don't hJve to say this, because all linguists are fond of
Chirese food.
Tn~ other sentences of this type are also reducible to similar
par~phrases. In fact. if someone says. George likes Peking
Duck, a second speaker can say, as a rejoinder, But'all
iingu2_s_t_s _o.rc fond_9_.f............Ch_i_"_ese food. The purposeOthis
rejoinder, in its normal conversational use. is to ask
politely why the first ~peaker bothered to say anythlng~
rat~er than to cOI.trad1ct anything the first speaker said.
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(Compare another possible reply: "But he refused to eat
any at the restaurant last week. ")
From this observation, it is concluded, in accordance with
the general strategy of argumentation used, that the material made
explicit in the paraphi-ase (103) must appear in the deep structure
(semant1 c representati on) of (102).
To evaluate the argument, it is important to notice that it
is not logically conclusive, but an inductive one. The abstract per-
formative hypothesis is off~red as one p~~s;ble explanation for the
similarity of (102) and (103). In this work, anothe.tr approach has been
taken. It consists of (i) defining an independent set of structural
descriptions of contexts of use (theory of dialogue games) as an aut~­
nomous level of description. and (11) devising a set of rules which
interpret certain aspects of the syntactic structure of sentences with
respect to contexts of use. In this framework, the functional equiva-
lence of (102) and (103) is captured by identity of appropriate dialogue
contexts. In order to make sense of but, both (102) and (103) must be
embedded in a context which provi~es the structural conf1gJrat1on
required by (D.but). What distinguishes (102) in th15 respect is that
the necessary context arises via dialogical 1nferen'e (conversational
implication). Thus a natural topic for (102) would ne
(104) Who likes Chinese food?
Assume someone answers
(105) George likes Peking Duck.
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~f the author of (105) makes no reservations. one is justified to
assume that he is putting forward (105) as his epistemical1y optimal
answer. His interlocutor then has good reason to point out to him
that he should be able to say more. The structure of (102) will then
be
It isnot:
I
C: All linguists are fond
of Chinese food.
A:
B:
c:
Who likes Chinese food?
George likls Peking Duck.
I
Is that ~n 02!ima1 answer?
-------------It is:
I
8 said it - but -
B iJ well-informed
B iJrati ona1
(106 )
The second speaker's but thus indicates his surprise at the first
speaker's caution. lack of information. or irrationality.
Another possible context for (102) is the following:
(107) Who ate the Peking Duck?
Here. the second speaker's rejoinder is directed against the supposition
that George's partiality to Peking Duck is evidence for his guilt any
more than for that of any other 11ngu1s;. The structure of the dialogue:
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(108 ) A: Who ate the Peking Duck?
I
t ; ) B: George did. (O.answer)
I( i i ) B: George likes Peki~g Duck. (0. argue)
I
c: Does J..1 1Lmake ( i ) an optimal answer?
It does
.....
It does not:
B sa}d it
- but - c: All '1ngU1sts are I"ond
of Chinese food.
B is well informed
B ; s ra t i ona1
To sum up, the crucial feature of these examples 0.' but is that
the implicit topic address~d by it is a dialogue implicature based on
the assumption that players are following optimal strategies. The main
d1fferenc~ between the present account of such uses and the abstract
performative hypothesis concerns at what level of description such impli-
catures are captured. In the present account, such impl1catures ar~ not
part of the structure of the individual sentences of a dialogue, but
rather the other way round: individual sentences and th~1r implications
become part and parcel of the structure of a dialogue. Where the
abstract performat1ve hypothesis tends to build features of implicit
dialogue context into an abstract structural description of individual
se"tences. the d1 a1ague appr-oach takes the OPPOS 1te route and uses the
1~pl1catures of explicit performatives to reconstruct the dialogue
context they describe. Thus the paraphrase (103) too is embeddable into
the fo'llow1ng dialogue context:
do not:
II really don't have to say this.
t
All linguists are fond of
Chinese food.
Who likes Chinese food?
Do I have to say to yoy-l~t George likes Peking Duck?
I du:
I
I say to you that George
likes Peking Duck.
II am rational.
(109 )
Comparing (106) to (109). we can observe that the only
essential difference between (102) and (103) is that (103) is less
amtiguous than (102): part of the implicit structure that was postu-
lated in (106) to make but interpretable ;~ :iJid explicitly in so fnany
wo rds ; n (1 09 ) •
Another frequent species nf a dialogue motivated but could be
dubbed the subject-changing but. Compare the dialogues (110)-(111):
( 110) A: H· t how are you?
B: I dm fine. but how are you?
(111) A: Hi t how are you?
B: I'm fine, thank you. I'm through with my thesis. We're
going to have a baby in a month's time. Best of all t we
expect to be back in Finland for Christmas. - But how
are you?
(110) curiously suggests that there should be something wrong with A.
This suggestion is absent from (111). where but just effects a timely
change of topic from S's rather voluble answer to the polite t"ec1pro-
eating question. What B seems to be taking exception to by but in (lll)
is not what he says but rather his choice of dialogue subject: he is
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indicating that - despite his obvious eagerness to tell his own news -
he actually ought to be asking how things are with A. The implicit
topic structure which motivates but ;s something like
(112) What is the dialogue about?
~~ ~
The dialogue is about B The dialogue is not about B
on1 Y,/ only, '\
(8's answer) - but - (6's question)
The difference between (110)a-(111jb in conversational implications is
in good accordance with this analysis. S's answer in (110) ;s conven-
tional enough not to create any presumption for B's favor as the subject
of the dialogue, so that cannot be what explains but in (110). The most
likely reason for but here is that it suggests a denial of the conver-
tional expectation
(113) We are both fine. 9
9. The Logician's But
A particularly intriguing dialogue use of but was re~1stered
by John Locke:
(114) All Animals have Sense; But a Dog is an animal.
Here btJt signifies little more. but that the latter
proposition is join'd to the former. as the Minor of
a Syllogism. 10
A similar use of but is often encountered in modern expositions of
logical proofs.
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How is this use of but to be subsumed under our general
characterization in {D. but}? (D.but) already predicts that but indi-
cates a topic change. But what topics? In particular, to do justice
to the contradiction requirement of (D.but), we need to find two contra-
dictory topics WhiCh the two lines of argument conjoined by the
logicians' but are respectively addressed to. Note that here there need
not be any explicit contradiction between the actual conjoined premises.
there is none in Locke's own example. This again suggests that we are
dealing with a dialogue use of but.
My suggestion is that the logicians' but is used in logical
exposition to connect two prima facie unconnected lines of reasoning
whiCh on closer consideration turn out to lead to a common conclusion
after all: but serves to signal that surprising turn of the argument.
This suggestion provi~es the necessary implicit topic for but.
The prublem of a proof is whether a certain assertion follows from given
premises. To a certain point in the argument, that the conclusion f~llows
is not at all obvious: ,t may be difficult to see the relevance of the
preceding lemmas to the conclusion. At this point, the but sentence
serves to resolve the doubt by bringing in a missing link in the argu-
ment: the proof does go through after all!
This element ot ~"rprise is of course minimal in Locke's
trivial example. It is likely t~ be more perceptible in remote lines
of argument such as the following one concerning the properties of large
cardinals from Shoenf1eld's Mathematical Logic (p. 310):
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We claim that EC ;s an isomorphism of I and J. In view of
(14) and the definition of UJ1 it is only necessary to prove
(15) x£1 y ~ EC(x) £JEC(y)
The implication from left to ri9ht is ob~ious. Suppose
that EC(x) £J EC(y). Then EC(x) = EC(x l ). EC(y) = EC(yl).
and Xl £y yl. By (14). x = 1 Xl and y = 1 yl. Thus we need
only proQe
x = 1 Xl &y = 1 y' &Xl 1 yl ~ x £1 y.
But this is the interpretation of a theorem of ZF.
The last line is likely to come as a relief to Shoenfield's readers.
Out of historical curiosity. one may ask why this sort of but
should have become a favorite stylistic device of syllog;stic reasoning.
The following conjecture might be more than just amusing.
In the last chapter of Topics, Aristotle offers strategic
advice for a dialectician who w~nts to extract the premises of a proof
from a critical audien~e. He warns especially against committing the
mistake of begging the question, i.e. t asking the audience for too
immediate prem1ies to establish the conclusion (the extreme being
'begging the question' itself). The chances are that
the answerer refuses to admit them because they are too
close to the point of depart~re and he fore~ees what will
result from this admission. 11
Among other tricks to avoid this, Aristotle mentions that
it is also a useful practice not to establish the admitted
propositions on which the reasonings are based in their
natural order but to alternate one which leads to one conclu-
sion with another which leads to another conclus1oni for, if
those which are closely r~lated are set side by side with one
another. the concl~S1on which will result from them is More
clearly foreseen. .
Now let us ~ee how these precepts apply to Locke's example. It seems
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fair to take as the topic of a syllogism the validity of the conclusion
it tries to establish; in Locke's example~ the question is
(115) Does a dog have sense?13
A careless questioner would not stop to establish his premises
sep3rately, but would simply state the who·le syllogism as in (110):
(116) A dog does have sense. for dogs are animals, and all
animals have sense.
An Aristotelian dialectician, in contrast, will not reveal the whole
argument at once. the premises laid 'side by side' with and. He
proceeds piecemeal, obtaining acceptance for the major premise first
under the guise of irrelevance, and only then lashing out the middle
premise prefaced by but:
( 117) Do~~e?
no yes
I IAll animals have sense - but - A dog is an animal.
Putting the major premise first creates a confusion about
the subject of the discussion: how is a fact about animals relevant
to the properties of dogs? So far, it is not obvious that the conclu-
sion follows. What the but sentence does is provide the mi~s1ng link
in the argument: despite initial appearance. the proof does go through
after all.
In support of this analysis. two further peculiarities of the
use of but in syllogism can be mentioned. First, the two premises
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conjoined by but in (114) must be spoken as separate intonational
phrases, as reflecte~ in the use of semicolon in writing. These devices
serve to set off the two premises as ostensibly independent lines of
argument. Second, note that the order of premises and conclusion in
(114) cannot be inverted as in (116): the conclusion follows the argu-
ment as an ostensibly unforeseen result.
10. Russian Adversative Conjunctions
In the section on but, we remarked that but cannot serve to
LLnjoin more than two sentences around one and the same topic. From
the point of view of language typology, it is interesting to find in
Russian an adversative conjunction which can do that. This remarkable
conjunction is ~ land, yet, whereas I • Besides~, Russian has a more
well-behaved counterpa.'tt of but, namely no. No seems to follow the
same constraints as but, so (D. no) can copy (D.but) without more ado.
In order to watch a in action, let me first list a number of
representative examp1es. 14
(118) Etc jejo karandash, a ne tvai
This is her pencil, and not jours.
(119) On ne pridlot sevodnla, a zavtra
He won't come today, but tomorrow.
(120) Ona zan'ata, a pomogajet nam
She is busy, yet she helps us.
(121) Eta moj syn, a eta moja doch'
This is my son, anJ this is my daughter.
(122) Detej by10 v sem'e troje: Sasha xodil v politexnikum,
Tonja v konservatoriju, a Lilja konchala desjatiletku.
There were three children in the family: 5ashd went to
Tech. Tonja to a conservatory. and Lilja was finishing high
school.
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As examples (118)-(122) show, the Russian.! overlaps with Engl'ish but,
(instead), ~ and and (\·Jhereas).
Examp1e (120) is an already familiar sort: here, ~ pretty
wel~ ~uals the contrary-to-expectation but (~).
The examples where ~ does the duty of and are more interesting.
Unlike but, ! is symmetric in (118)-(119). It conjoins coordinate
answer's to multiple questions in (121)-(122): in (121), the ilnp1icit
question is who is who, in (122) it is who does what in the family.
On the other hand, ~ is not found in the rest of the natural
environments of the English but, but is replaced in them by no 'but,
however' .
So what is the difference between! and but? My proposal is
that therp are three jifferences. First, the notion of contradictory
topics must be weakened into a concept of disjointness of topics. Call
two questions disjoint if they share no direct answers: their presuppo-
sitions share no true disjuncts or substitution instances. The contra-
dietary disjuncts of a polarity question ~re obviously disjoint. So
are the two simple questions answered by (121), i.e. t
(123) Kta jest I kto? Kto eta? A kto eta?
Who is who? Who is this? And who is this?
For obviously, no one can be two different individuals at once. Similar
comments apply to example (122).
In order to abta 1n a di a1ague, game rul e for ~t we need
rewrite (D.but) only slightly:
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(D.a) When a pl~yer has addressed a move to a given topic, he may
conjoin to it a sentence beginning with a addressed to a
coordin~te but disjoint topic. -
The disjointness condition ensures that sentences conjoined by ~ will
imply a definite contrast, absent from sentences conjoined by i 'and'.
Consider examples
(124) Ja 1jublju tebja, i ty ljubish' menja.
I love you and you love me.
(125) Ja ljublju tchaj, a ty ljub;sh ' kafe
I love tea, but you love coffee.
In (124), ! would sound odd, while it is quite natural in (125). The
reason ought to be clear: ~ tells that our objects of love are disjoint,
while i allows them to overla~. A in (124) would imply that we do not
love ourselves, just as it implies in (125) that we love different
drinks. The semantic opposition but in the English translation of
(125) creates the very same implication.
The weakening of contradictory to disjoint topics allows!
to conjoin a plurality of answers to a mult~ple question. Although
there can be only two contradfctories, there may be any number of
disjoint questions,
The second difference between bu~ and ~ is already registered
in (D.a): ! must begin a continuation move. As a result, ! like and
or yet but unlike but or its Russian equivalent no implies acceptance
of its premise. For instance. in the dialogue
(126) A: Ja pokushalsja na ubijstvo.
I attempted murder.
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8: A tebja ne arestovyvajut!
Yet they do not arrest you!
S's response indicates surprise but not disbelief. No would allow
construing B's response as a counterargument or rebuttal.
The thi rd di fference between but and ~ ; s what pre'~'ents ~
from covering the tertium comparationis use of the English but. The
following restriction would seem to do the job:
(127) (An addition to (D.a):) A sentence begun by a must
constitute a decisive answer to its topic. -
This formulation evidently admits answers to multiple questions as in
(121)-(122), as well as the correction sentences in (118)-(119). As
for (120), it suffices to refer back to our analogous findings about
the contrary-to-expectation but.
(127) rules out the use of ~ when one is just weighing
independent arguments ~ and con concerning SOMe independent question,
as in
(128) Ja ljublju Natashu, eto tak, no inogda mne kazhetsja ana
udivitel 'no poshloj.
I love Natasha. it's true, but sometimes she seems to
terribly banal to me.
The author of (128) uses no instead of ~ in order not to suggest that
his love fo Natasha should make him blind for her faults. Rather, his
two sentences form independent arguments as to, say, whether he is happy
with her. As no direct conflict is implied between the two sentences
conjoined by no. no sounds less impetuous or lively than a.
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Chapter 3
OLD AND NEW INFORMATION
1. Sentence Grammar V5. Functional Syntax
Develo~1ng a theory of functional syntax is like planning a
route across a difficult terrain with lots of criss-crossing paths, some
of them worn wide by a multitude of wanderers. To stretch the simile,
one who wants to make good headw~j~ may be wise not to follow the foot-
steps of his predecessors before he has cast an independent eye on the
scenery. The path of least resistance may soon peter out. while the
straight route goes elsewhere.
Following the advice of my simile, I shall proceed into the
field paying little explicit attention to earlier approaches before I
have developed my own to some degree of detail. After thdt. I shall
retrace some of my steps and relate my proposals to main trends in the
literature.
Consistently with the theme of this essay, I shall only pay
attention to such aspects of syntactic structure as directly serve the
function of text organization, i.e., indicate the role of a sentence in
a dialogue. This means that I shall haVl~ to assume a lot of syntactic
and semantic information for granted. I shall not worry about explaining
choices of word order or syntactic configuration which are dictated by
sentence grammar (syntax and semantics). Rather. I assume that sentance
grammar tells me at the outset what ~~o1c~s of vlord order (or syntactic
structure) are available given a choice of wo 'ds (or lexi~al-functional
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str~Jcture). and how to compare them in terms of structural complexity
or stylistic markedness.
It may be good to mention some hypotheses I am not making here.
I do not mean to assume that there is. in English or other languages,
a basic word order or canonical surface structure guaranteed to pr0duce
context-free sentences whatever the choice of words. Neither do I
assume that functionally unmarked sentences always represent syntactic-
ally underlying forms. Such assumptions would actually disconfirm the
autonomy thesis.
Let us look at SOMe of the exceptions to these assumptions.
Trivially, most sentences are context-bound because ina1vidual words in
them are in need of context:
(1) But then you would need some of those, too.
More to the point. some choices of words require derived syntactic
configurations to obtain their idiomatic sense: (3) cannot replac~ (2)
nor (C), (4).
(2) There was a riot.
(3) A riot was (there).
(4) John was killed in action.
(5) They killed Jot.n in action.
Some constructions are at best very marked lr a transformational rule
fails to apply: (6) is less marked than (7).
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(6) What did I say?
(7) Did I say what? I said what?
Far from getting depressed about these and other similar
examples, I consider them somewh~t exceptional in~tances of a general
rule. The general rule is that in English (and 1~ other languages)
some set of rules, syntactic, semantic. or both, not only determines
for any given meaningful choice of words (lexical-functional structu"e)
its admissible syntactic realization(s) but. also, indicates differences
of structural complexity of stylistic markedness among them.
The essential feature of the rules which define such
grammatical word order constraints is that they are independent of
dialogue context: the notions referred to in those rules are chosen
from the primitives of syntax and semantics. There is no a priori reason
to assume that they will bear any resemblance to the rules whic;, will
govern the choice among the stylistically marked word orders, actually,
the autonomy of dialogue grammar would be weakened by such findings. 1
In English, a configurational language. grammatical constraints
on word order are induced by phrase structure grammar, by obligatory or
lexically governed syntactic processes exemplified by (2)-(7), and by
minor semantic ordering principles of the sort studied, e.g. I in Green
[452]. For languages with freer word order, principles referring to
diathetic concepts (agent. patient. instrument) have been cited as
central. 2
What I want to emphasize here is that sentence grammar is not
assumed to imply contextual judgments directly. What it does is induce
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some ordering of complexity among logically equivalent variants of a
lexical-functional structure: it may be stated in terms of complexity
of syntactic structure, markedness of diathesis (semantic case llnking),
or the like. The main thing is that there;s a distinction beo'leen simple
straightforward versions of a sentence, and those which, while not
ungrammatical, require some further reason to be resorted to. What
dialogue functional rules do is provide some of the reasons.
2. Stylistic Ruies
In transformational grammar, it is customary to make a
distinction between properly grammatical and merely stylistic rules.
Stylistic rules are said to share a number of formal characteristics.
They follow all other syntactic rules, including agreement and case
assignment; they are not conditional on the presence or absence of
specific morphemes in the sentence (i.e., not lexically governed);
above all, they are optional, i.e., their applicability .~ at best
constrained by functional considerations (contextual appropriateness,
avoidance of ambiguity).3
These criteria eliminate ma.1Y putative candidates for stylistic
rules from the class. In part1cular~ any structure-preserving cyclic
rules will belong to ~rammar proper, e.g. t wh-movement, passive and
existential sentencesexemp11f1ed in (2)-(7); yet another such rule is
the lexically governed rule of dative alternation exemplified by (8)-
(9) :
(8) We read Bill books.
(9) We read beoks to Bill.
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Although all of these rules are exploited for textual purposes, they
do not count as stylistic rules in the syntactic sense of recent trans-
fonmat1onal grammar.
Supposing that a division of syntax into proper "core" grafTlTlar
and an independent stylistic component can be justified on autonomous
syntactic grounds, the thought is close that one might characterize
grammatically unmarked sentences as sentences generated by core grammar.
This set would then be extended by the stylistic component into a set of
marked variants.
The foregoing observations cast doubt on such a syntactic
characterization of stylistic markedness. It seems to me that the
existence of gralTl11at1cal1y simpler equivalent variants !lakes a sentence
a functionally marked variant. whatever the character of the rules wh~ch
are responsible for the added complexity. For instance. passives ar~
functionally marked as compared to actives because of their marked
case linking. Thus the supposed division of labor within s~ntax does
not seem alone sufficient to define stylistic variance.
I shall not pay any further attention to the particular
syntactic distinction discussed here in the sequel. It suffices to
suppose that sentence grammar as a whole presents discourse grammar with
a range of options between different wordings of any given sentence,
indicating what variations in structural complexity or stylistic marked-
ness obtain among the variants.
Insofar as the autonomy of dialogue grammar can be upheld.
this is also all the information about sentence structure which functional
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rules need access to. Dialogue grammar need not care how word order
variants or markedness judgfTle·~".. s are generated.
Before embarking on functional problems, let us become clearer
about what structural options exist in English. English sentence structure
can be described schematically by the following formula:
(27)
(1) (11) (iii)
- [ [ ...
S S
( i v)
AUX
VP
(v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
[ ••• V ••• ] ••• ] ••• ] •••
In the schema (27). everythlng has been left out except the heads of th~
major constituents S ~hose head I assume to be AUX) and VP (head V).
The ~mpty spots indicate landing sites for movement rules. From left
to right:
(1) This position. outside of the sentence to the left,
belongs to such sentential satellites as attitude
adjuncts (frankly) and topic introducers (as for you).
Probably nothing ever moves here by grammatical rule.
I assume that left dislocated phrases are not dislocated
at all but simply adjoined in this position.
(11) Topic position. The landing site for question formation,
topica11zation. and VP preposing.
(iii) Subject position. The landing site for such lexically
governed rules as passive and raising to subject.
(1v) Sentential adjuncts are intricately interspersed here
adjacent to auxiliaries.
(v) Preverbal position in English occupied by adverbial
adjuncts. In Finnish, this position is heavily trafficked.
(vi) Postverb position, the home for the comp~ements and
adjuncts of the main verb. The order of complements,
if not grammatically fixed, is thematically significant.
(vii) Sentence end position. There is debate as to which of
the positions (v1)-(v11i) form landing sites for extra-
position. Another slot for sentential adjuncts.
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(viii) Postsentential position. See (vii).
(ix) Outside of the sentence. to the right. I assume that
right dislocated phrases are base-generated here.
These structural positions figure, as indicated. in various grafTlT1i\t1ca'l
rules or alternations which. where meaning-preserving, can be exploited
for the purposes of functional grammar. We already mentioned a few
structure-preserving processes which are so exploited (passive. raising
to subject, existential sentences ,dative alternation).
Among stylistic rules proper are usually counted such rules
or configurations as top1cal1zation (10). left (11) and right (12)
dislocation, it-cleft (13) and wh-cleft (14) sentences, VP prepos1ng
(15). word order inversion (this sentence), tag formation (16), extra-
position (17)-(19). and certain reshufflings of complaments and adjuncts
(20)-(23).
(10) These steps I used to sweep with a broom.
(11) This room. it really depresses me.
(12) It leaves a nasty taste in the mouth. this scheme.
(13) It is driving carelessly that upsets me.
(14) What upsets me is driving carelessly.
(15) Growl you will. but go you must.
(16) I guess he likes foreign beers. doesn't he?
(17) A person has arrived who we all like very much.
(18) It is a waste of time to read so many magazines.
(19) A new book has appeared by Chomsky.
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(20) I send every letter I receive to my lawyer.
(21) I send to my lawyer every letter I receive.
(22) It is not necessary on this campus to be very smart.
(23) It is no'~ necessary to be very smart on this campus.
In addition to these con!t~uctive processes. there are a number
of proposed stylistic rules of ellipsis. I shall not discuss ellipsis
at all in this work. To illustrate the structural effects of the
stylistic rules in (lO)-(3u), let me classify the examples in terms of
the scheme (27):
(10) These steps I used to sweep with a broom.
(1i) (111) V (vi)
(11) This room, it really depresses me.
(i) (iii) V (vi)
(12) It leaves a nasty taste in the mouth, this scheme
(111) V (vi) (ix)
( 13)
(14)
(15 )
It is driving carelessly that upsets me.
(iii) AUX (vi) (vi)-(vi11)
What upsets me is driving carelessly.
(iii) AUX (vi)
Growl you will. but ~o you must.
(11) (111) AUX (11) (111) AUX
(16) I guess he likes foreign beers, doesn't he?
(iii) V (vi) (1x)
(17) A person has arrived who we all like very much.
(111) AUX V (vii)
(18) It is a waste of time to read so many magazines.
(111) AUX (vi) (vii)
(19) A new book h~s appeared by Chomsky.(iii) AUX V (vii)
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(20) I send every letter I receive to my lawyer.
(iii) V (vi) (vi)
(21 ) I send to
(iii) V (vi)
my lawyer every letter I receive.
(vi)
(22) It is not necessary on this campus to be very smart.
(iii) AUX (vi) (vii) (vii)
(23) It is not necessary to be very smart on this campus.
(iii) AUX (vi) (vii) (vii)
3. Functional Definitions
Grammatical markedness considerations contribute to determining
the class of context-free sentences in English: sentences which. as
far as syntax and semantics can tell t are free to appear in the absence
of a preparatory dialogue context.
In particular. such context free sentences serve as discussion
openers or news headlines. They are, in other words. able to function
as uall-new sentences", sentences which answer such generic questions
as
(28) What is new?
(29) What happened?
(30) What do you want?
Campa ri ng poss 1b1e answers to (2 8) - (30 ), say
(31) I have been fired.
(32) There was a riot.
(33) Has anyone seen my hat?
to the respective questions, one fact immediately suggests itself: none
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of the answer is present in the question, but the whole answer is new
relative to the question.
This intuition is of course common to all approaches to functional
sentence p~rspective. Afunctional articulation of a sentence should deter-
mine what part(s) of a sentence constitute old (given, thematic) information
in it and what part(s) new (rhematic) information.
The crucial qUf3t1on is new in what sense: what is it really
that 'old' and 'new' are said of, and what does it mean for that something
to be old or new. 4
As for the first question, I take a hard line and construe old
(thematic) and new (rhematic) as properties of (occurrences of) surface
structure constituents of sentences, be they lexical, syntactic or phono-
logical.
As for the spcond question, it is important to realize that old
and new are relational concepts: more specifically, a constituent of a
sentence ;s old or new relative to some other sentence in a dialogue, to
which the former constitutes a countermove in th~t dialogue. It follows that
a constituent of a sentence may be old with respect to one premise of the
sentence and at the same time new with respect to another premise. (However,
it will follow from the definition of old and new that no constituent can
be both old and new with nespect to one and the same premise.)
The actual definitions of old and new in my approach will be
quite formal, with no explicit reference to meaning or dialogue function.
They are based on the familiar algebraic notion of substitution.
For mY purposes, a substitution can be thought of as an
arbitrary transformation between sentences, an arbitrary function in
the set of all strings in the alphabet of surface structure representa-
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tions. It nelps to think of that alphabet as consisting of an arbitrary
number of tokens of every symbol type and of surface structu\~es as
containing no repetition af symbols~ every copy of he or the empty
string in a se1tence is considered a distinct token of its type.
Given a pair of surface structures. there is an infinite
number of substitutions which include that pair. There;s no interest
in distinguishing substitutions which differ in their values for strings
absent from either member of the pair. We can limit attention to the
finite number of substitutions which differ in their assignments of
substrings of the input sentence to substrings of the output sentence.
In some of them. a substring of the input sentence is mapped to an
identical string in the output sentence. We say that the substitution
repeats that string. In others. the value of the function is distinct
from its argument; then the value is said to replace the argument
string. Some special cases of replacements may be singled out: if only
the input string is empty, we have an addition of a string; if only
the output string is empty, we have a deletion. If one and the same
constituent is added in one place and deleted in another place, we have
a movement. It makes sense to consider movement another instance of
repetition. These concepts of repetition, replacement, and movement
will figure in the functional rules and definitions.
Armed with these concepts. let us investigate a diagnostic
pair of sentences:
(34) A: Who would trust an idiot?
B: An idiot would trust an idiot.
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Intuitively, it is clear that if the B sentence is construed as an
answer to the A sentence, the first occurrence of an idiot in B is new
information, while the second occurrence is old information. This would
be puzzling. if we simple-mindedly defined a phrase as old if it makes
an appearance in u premise sentence and new if it does not. The noun
phrase (tyP€) an idiot obviously occurs in the question, yet one of its
occurrences in the answer is old and one new.
What we do instead is relativize old and new to substitutions.
In order to form a direct answer to A's question, B's sentence in (34)
must be a substitution instance of it by (C.wh-e) or (C.wh-u). There is
one $ubstitution transformation which satisfies this requirement.
namely one which replaces who from the question by the first occurrence
of an idiot in the answer and repeats the rest of the question in the
answer.
Generalizing from the example, I arrive at the following
definition of thematicity and rhematicity:
(35) A constituent h(C) in a sentence h(S) is thematic relative
to a sentence S = XCV and a substitution h if and only if
h(C) repeats C.
(36) A constituent h(C) in a sentence h(S) is rhematic relative
to a sentence S = XCV and a substitution h if and only if
h(C) replaces C.
The choice of substitution is controlled by dialogue functional
considerations. A player will try to choose a substitution which makes
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best functional sense of a move-countermove pair: in the example (34),
the obvious choice is dictated by the formulation of the question rules.
In the following examples, it ;s equally easy to glean from the formu-
lation 0+ other dialogue rules:
(37) Someone lives here. Who lives here? (D.question)
(38) Someone 1i yes here. For Bill 1i ves here. (D.exp1ain)
(39) Everyone 1; ves here. So Bill live~ here. (O.1nfer)
(40) Bill will live here. No, Bi 11 will not live here! (D. rep1y)
In these examples, the natural substitution is defined by
some dialogue game rule or other. Less obviously, perhaps, the same
is true in the following conjunctive examples.
(41) I turned left but you turned right.
It seems almost compulsory to arrange the subjects and complements of
(41) into contrastive pairs of rhematic constituents. This tendency
comes from ascribing to (41) the role of an answer to the multiple
question
(42) Who turned where?
whose question words are regularly replaced by the respective consti-
tuents in (41). However, it is easy to convince oneself that (41)
admits of other construals too. If (41) is offered as a reply to
(43) Did you tum right?
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then it is natural to construe right as thematic in (41).
Sometimes what looks like partial deletion will turn out to
be a replacement, given the functionally best motivated substitution.
For instance. one who answers
(44) Will you have tea or coffee?
by
(45) 11 11 have tea.
is not just deleting coffee from the question but rather replacing the
whole disjunction tea o~ coffee by one of the disjuncts in accordance
with (C.or). As a result, tea is rhematic in the answer in spite of
its presence in the question.
An important special case of this kind of instantiation is
the rhematicity of the auxiliary in a positive answer to a polarity
question:
(46) Will you come or not?
I will come.
Will is rhematic in the positive answer as one of the two alternatives
will and will not.
In the foregoing examples, rhematic constituents appear as
it were islands of new information in a wealth of thematic material.
The converse relationship is quite as common:
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(47) They used to 3dmire ~ach other.
Now they hate each other's guts.
The thematic noun phrases they and ~ach other appear surrounded by new
information here. I 3ee no redson to draw a theoretical distinction
between the two kinds of ca$es. 5
4. Matching
in the above definitions, the concepts of old and new depend
on a straightforward syntactic match between two sentences constituent
by constituent. That is often quite sufficient. as in all of the fore-
going examples. Thematic and rhematic constituents can be put into a
one-one correlation with corresponding constituents in a premise sentence
as in the structural description of a syntactic transformation, as in
(48) Who - said - what - to - whom
Bill - said - boo - to - a goose.
In the general case, however, this is not good enough. We
need to know more about the underlying structure of sentences. On the
syntactical side. obligatory transformations can cause trouule. Actually,
they otten don't w~en they could. For instance. there would be nothing
wrong functionally with matching question and answer in the following
way:
(49) What do - we have - e - 1" our pockets?
e e - we have - precious things - in our pockets.
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Here, preposed material is simply omitted and the gap left by the question
word replaced by the answer. This match gives just the right predictions
about old and new information.
Generally, however, the definitions (35}-(36) must be allowed to
s~e through a certain minimum of syntax and morphology. For instance, to
match th~ question and answer in (50', the sentences need to be brought to
the ,possibly underlying) fonns (51):
(50 ) Where di d he go?
He went home.
(51) where - e - do - past - he - go - e
e - he - do - past - e - go - home
where past is a familiar abstraction for the shared tense of the question
and the answer.
For another example, consider the exchange in
(52) He went home.
D; d he go home?
(53) he - do - past - e - go - home
e - do - pas t - he •. go - home
The thematicity of did in (52) makes it advisable to assume the
dummy auxiliary do to be underlying present in the premise as shown in (53).
A more radical departure from simple-minded syntactic matching
might seem to be the possibility of relating syntactically and even lexical-
ly dissimilar sentences on grounds of similarity of content:
(54) Janet likes beans.
She seems partial to all sorts of yukky legumes.
Intuitively, only all in the second sentence need be new 1nformatioft,
given the first sentence as premise. However~ this intuition needs a
lot of inferential backing. One has to assume, in particular. that the
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author of the second sentence considers beans to be a repulsive sort of
legume - a matter of taste rather than 3 conceptual necessity as far as
repulsiveness is concemed. This is an important observation, for it at
once shows that matching is not a mere matter of meaning any more than a
syntactic process. What is involved is just the sort of enthymematic infer-
ence that the first Part of this essay is concerned with.
This observation makes it clear that we already have a general
solution of the matching problem in (54) and in similar examples. The
point is to realize that the second sentence in (54) need not be directly
matched with its immediate predecessor. but that implicit steps of inference
may intervene. The following is as natural a reconstruction of (54) as any:
(55) Janet likes beans.
She is Janet. (~ntecedency assumption)
She 1i kes beans. (D. infer)
She seems partial to beams. (D. argue)
Beans are a sort of yukky legume. (assumption)
She seems parti al to a sort of yukky legume. (D.1nfer)
The last line of (55), arrived at by steps of deductive inference and
inductive reasoning, provides a syntactic match to the second sentence in
(54), which bears out the intuitive judgment of themat1c1ty relations we
started from.
Predictably, the more far-fetched the background assumptions and
the less warranteJ the inductive inferences that one has to interpolate in
order to bridge the gap between two sentences, the less natural beco~e
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thematicity assumptions based on them. A simple example:
(St) A: We have roaches.
B: We have no pets.
In order to construe pets as thematic, one would have to consider
cockroaches as pets rather than pests. It is more natur~l to interpret
pets as new to the dialogue.
An interesting plausibility argument for the syntactic nature
of thematicity comes from the so-called echo questions. These questions
(discussed in the first Part) are used in particu'(l~ when "we do not
understand a statement and ask for the repetition of it: 'He went
where?' = 'Where did you say he went1'U(Cunne [331], p. 353). Echo
questions, unlike normal questions, match the structure of their premise
constituent by constituent. This is apt to expedite finding the premise
if a syntactic matching principle of the sort we have defined is right.
A more straightforward argument is the fact that the
definitions of thematicity and rhemat1city need to be able to apply even
where there is no semantic relation between move and countermove, as
when one is correcting a misprint:
(57) This should read 'context', not 'content'.
As the example shows, themat1c1ty contrasts do not respect quotation
marks. They go all the way down to phonology, to corrections of pronun-
ciation'):
(58) Don't say "pronounc1 at1on" but "pronunc1at1on" .
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The second syllable of the last word is new information given the
mispronounced premise.
5. Word Order
So far. we have presented matters as if players hnd nothing
but their familiarity with the context to help determine the intended
function of sentences they hear. Of course, matters are not that bad.
For one thing, the syntactic structure of a sentence. featuring linear
order and specific grammatical constructions. may prejudge its thematic
structure and so restrict its functional options.
As everybody has observed who has given any thought to the
matter. the general word order tendency is as simple as it seems
universal: thematic constituents tend to appear early in a sentence.
while rhematic ones are left late. It is another thing to formulate
this tendency in tenms of grammatical rules so as not to do injustice
to the many real or apparent exceptions.
Two insights seem essential for a correct appraisal of the
situation. The first is that word order judgments are relative; the
second is that they are cancellable. Let me explain these ideas in
turn.
What functional word order rules do is make relative word
order comparisons: they check whether a given constituent in a sentence
appears to the left or to the right from its position in some given
premise. If the point of comparison is not obvious from context, it is
usually assumed to be a stylistically neutral. context-independent
variant of the same lexical-functional structure. This is where
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syntactic markedness considerations enter the evaluation.
The relativity of word order comparisons already explains some
failures of the left-to-right tendency mentioned in the second paragraph
of this section. If a sentence copies the syntactic structur£ 'f its
premise, no inferences from its word order to its information structure
are warranted, for nothing has moved:
(59) A: This gazebo was built by Sir Christopher Wren.
B: Which glzebo was built by Sir Christopher Wren?
While it is a fair guess that A ;s using the passive to introduce the
famous architect, nothing of the sort follows from B's similarly struc-
tured sentence. B is simply echoing A, with no textual intent of his
own in mind. All of his sentence is thematic with the exception of the
question word.
There is a second way in which inferences from word order to
theme-rheme structure are subject to failure. This pitfall is ,he fact
that word order does have other stylistic functions than indicating
theme-rheme articulation. The most conspicuous examples come from
poetry. whose requirements of rhyme and metre may effectively stamp out
any thematic implications. In prose. too. there are certain stylistic
preferences which may explain the choice of ordering of constituents.
Behaghel's Gesetz dar wachsenden Gl1eder, i.e., the preference to order
complex constituents late irrespective of their thematic nature is one
6
such com,eting factor.
We thus have to take care to formulate word order rules so that
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they do not elbow out other possible explanations for word order choices.
The way I choose to do it ;s to write word order rules as optional rules
of text strategy:
(D. left) Move a thematic constituent to the left.
(D. right) Move a rhemat1c constituent to the right.
In all their terseness, (D. left) and (D.r1ght) capture the salient
points we have been making. First, the dynamic formulation ('move')
presupposes a comparison (mapping) between an input structure (comparison
sentence) and an output sentence. I do not want to suggest that each
application of (D. left) or (D. right) matches a syntactic movement rule;
actually, I have expressed doubts about that. What is essential is that
(D. left) and (D. right) refer to a mapping between two sentences which
can be functionally interpreted as changing the linear position of a
designated constituent.
Second, the rules do not say where constituents move or how
they are moved: that is a matter of sentence grammar.
An archetypal example of the application of (D. left) and
(D. right) helps to appreciate these points. Consider the dialogue
(60) Who arrested Pongo?
Pongo was arrested by the constable.
In order to match question and answer as indicated in (C.wh-e), we may
unpack the passive transformation by an interpolated move of explica-
tion:
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(61 ) Who - arrested - Pango
1 2 3
The constable - arrested - Pongo
"
2 3
Pongo was arrested by - the constable
3 - 2
"
As (61) shows, the passive paraphrase of the direct answer repeats the
verb (up to predictable differences of morphology) and moves the remain-
ing constituents in opposite directions. Inspecting the question, it
is easy to ascertain that these movements are accounted for by the
themat1c word order rules (D. left) and (D.r1ght).
Third, the rules are optional. Therefore, there is no way
for the audience of a sentence to know for sure that a thematic word
order rule has applied in any given sentence. As a result, themati~ity
inferences from word order have the logic of an inductive what else
argument. (D. left) or (D. right) can be assumed to have applied if
there is no better explanation for a given word order. Thematicity
inferences thus constitute instances of dialogical (strategic) reasoning.
This insight explains an intriguing observation registered by
Susumu Kuno as a principle of
(62) Penalties on Discourse Rule Violations: An intentional
(active) violation of a discourse principle produces an
unacceptable sentence. but a non1ntent1onal (passive)
violation of a discourse principle does not affect the
acceptability of the sentence. 7
To see (62) in action, compare the dialogues in (63)-(66):
(63) Who did the constable arrest?
The constable arrested Pongo.
(passive application)
(64) Who arrested Pongo?
The constable arre~ted Pongo.
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(passive violation)
(65) Who arrested Pongo?
Pongo was arrested by the constable. (active application)
(66) Who did the constable arrest?
Pongo was arrested by the constable. (active violation)
Intuitively, dialogue (66) is clearly the odd man out: the use of the
passive voice seems completely unmotivated and confusing. Comparing
(66) with (64), we see that the answerer has gone out of his way to
violate the left-to-right tendency: instead of leaving well alone and
copying the active voice of the question, he has opted for a construc-
tion which puts rheme before theme. True. (64) violates the left-to-
right tendency too, but only passively. for the answer copies the struc-
ture of the question.
This intuitive account uses the left-to-right tendency itself
as an explanatory principle. Our account of (63)-(64) is slightly
different, though the spirit is the same. In (63)-(64), no word order
principle need be assumed to have applied or failed to apply. Nothing
has been moved: the form of the answer is dictated by the form of the
question in accordance with the game rules for questions.
The situation is different in (65)-(66), where the diathesis
of the answer has been changed. In (65). this change can be attribut~~
to applications of (D. left) and (D.right). That explanation is
impossible in (66), for the structural descriptions of the thematic
rules are not met. Unless some other explanation for the use of the
passive is in the offing, the choice of word order is not only left
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unmotivated but appears confusing and inappropriate, as it only
complicates the application of functional definitions.
6. Topicalization
Besides the left-to-right tendency of thematic organization,
specific structural configurations have specific textual function. A
conspicuous case is the topic position, the presentence position filled
by the first constituent of the examples (67)-(73).
(67) Of himself Heraclitus no doubt had quite a good opinion.
(68) About his life we know little of interest.
(69) Tomorrow I think she said she had an exam.
(70) These examples I found in Gundel.
(71) This sentence I invented myself.
Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, I propose to capture the
textual function of topicalization by the following rule of interpreta-
tion:
(O.topic) A constituent in the topic position is rhematic. 8
Yes. it reads rhematic, not thematic. (D. topic) predicts that a topica-
lized constituent cannot enter into a dialogue except as a repla~ement for
a corresponding constituent in some premise or other. But recall: old
and new in our approach are not exclusive concepts. for they are relative
to premises. A constituent which is new with respect to one premise may
at t~e same time be old with respect to another.
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That a topical constituent frequently if not typically is old
information as well is alre~dy predicted by the linear rule (D. left),
given the unmistakable fdct that topicalization movp~ a constituent
earlier in a sentence in addition to hanging it higher in the constituent
structure tree. If one wishes, (D. topic) can be thought of as accounting
for the promotion in ~onstituent hierarchy while (D. left) takes care of
linear precedence. 9
The foregoing leads one to expect that two premises are
relevant for figuring out the textual role of a topicalized sentence.
What could these premises be? It is not difficult to come up with very
natural candidates for each of (67)-(71). Let (70) serve as a repre-
sentative. As the author of (70), I have maker's knowledge of the
context I had in mind for it:
(72) Where did I find which examples?
Where did I find thes~amPleS? W~id I find the others?
/
These examples I found in Gundel.
The topicalized sentence here constitutes a partial answer to a multiple
question by directly answering a simple question entailed by it. It is
these two questions that the topic construction of (71) harks back to.
The double question provides the premise for (D. topic) to relate to,
while the simple question is what makes the preposed constituent appear
thematic.
To appreciate the fact that topicalization indeed manages to
make reference to the underlying multiple question, it is instructive
to compare how one would answer the simple question in isolation:
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(73) A: Where did you find these examples?
B: I found them in Gundel.
It would be odd to answer with
(74) B: Them I found in Gundel.
if one wants to avoid suggestion of further examples whose source one
might talk about. To mak~ intuitions sharper, choose an example where
it is vital to avoid such a suggestion:
(75) A: ~~hat did you hit the v;rtim with?
B: Him I hit with a bicycle-chain.
Here, topicalization embarrassingly suggests t~at the defendant did
some more hitting with other tools as well - a very unwise suggestion
to make 1n a court of justice. 10
Thus we see how a very natural suggestion of contrast arises
precisely from the fact that (D. topic) helps place a topicalized con-
stituent as a partial answer to a multiple question. As a partial
answer. a topic constituent immediately suggests a contrast to further
answers to the same question.
The feeling of contrast is very clear in the following literary
examples from Walpole:
(76) His life had been entangled with women; some he had loved.
others he had been in love with, others again had loved him.
and Dickens:
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(77) Talent, Mr. Micawber has; capital Mr. M;cawber has not.
But as expected, the feeling of contrast disappears if the
topicalized sentence alone forms an exhaustive answer:
(78) Each part John examined carefully.
There are no further parts to talk about, hence no contrast to other
parts is implied. ll
The importance of the contribution of (D. left) in topicalization
is evident when (72) is juxtaposed with a dialogue where the scope
relations of the question words are reversed:
(79) Which examples did I find where?
Which examples did I find in Gundel?
In Gundel, I found these examples.
As soon as the after of unpacking of the question words is reversed,
the natural choice of topicalized constituent changes. What gets
topicalized is the answer which already appears instantiated in the
intervening simple question, just as (D. left) leads us to expect. 12
Structurally the same explanation applies for most of the
remaining examples in (67)-(71). Thus (67) might be a partial answer
to
(80) What did Heraclitus think of whom?
contrasted, perhaps, to
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(81) Of others, Heraclitus had a low opinion.
Similarly, (68) could answer
(82) What do we know about his life and writings?
and (71) either of
(83) What do you think of which picture?
Which picture do you 1ike and which picture r.ot?
7. VP Prepos;ng
A particulat·ly interesting special case of top;calization ;s
found in the phenomenon called in transformational literature VP pre-
posing or fronting. 13 It is exemplified by
(84) "If you telegraph at once, he can be stopped," said the
Inspector. And stopped he was.
(85) Growl you will, but go you must.
(86) John tried to find his hat, but find it he could not.
(87) She needs to be free, so free she must be.
(88) She expects to be respected, and respected she will be.
(89) She seems to have left. Well, left she may have.
Very intuitively, the function of VP-preposing would seem to
be affinnation or denial of a suggestion, whether that suggestion be put in
so many words (84); inferred from observation (85) or implicit in
previous discourse, as in the rest of our examples.
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This intuition can b~ explained if VP preposing ;s assumed
to be nothing but a spe~;al case of topicalization. Let us see how.
It ;s easiest to start with example (85). as it makes the dialogue con-
text of a top1calized verb phr:~e most apparent.
Assuming that (D.topic) and (D. left) both apply to the preposed
verb phrases in (85). what would be a dialogue context which would satis-
fy their structural descriptions? The following seems to be appropriate
both structurally and intuitively.
(90) What will you do? Wnat must you do?
I IWill you growl? Must you go?
I I
Growl you will
- but - go you must. {D. answer)
As (90) graphically shows, both conjuncts of (85) furnish a partial
answer to the main topic of the sentence. An important subordinate
issue is whether you go ~r not - this is what motivates the use of but
between the conjuncts. Growling is notoriously a bad sign. but on the
other hdnd. what a man must do a man must do. As for the word order.
(D.top1c) is accounted for by the main question, while (0. left) is
taken care of by the explanatory moves immediately above the answers.
The answers seem to affirm a suggestion for the simple r~ason t1at this
is precisely what they do in (90): the auxiliary is rhemat1c in each
case. All the VP prepos1ng examples share this char'acterist1c 1nforma-
tion structure.
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Structurally similar reconstructions are easy to provide for
the rest of the VP preposing examples. I take just one more example:
(91) What did John do?
~What did John try to do? What was he able to do?
I coJld he find his hat?
John tried to find his hat - but - f1Jd it he could not.
I have proposed that functionally, at least, there is no
obstacle to subsuming VP preposing under the same principles as other
cases of topicalization. The question then arises, are there grammatical
reasons for distinguishing two rules here. One possible argument could
be to show that the structural description of VP preposing must specify
which sort of VP can be preposed by the rule, some choices of VP not
being available for topicalization.
Such an argument has in fact been put forward in Akmajian,
et al. [428], based on the acceptability difference between (87)-(S9)
and the sent~nces in (92)-(94):
(92) She needs to be free. so be free she must.
(93) She expects to be respected. and be respected she will.
(94) She seems to have left. Well, have left she may.
These examples are out because a copular or pass1vd be or an aspectual
have has 1ll1ct1ly been preposed along with a smaller phrase. This seems
to call for restricting VP prepos1ng to such specified phrases which are
allowed to move. At the other extreme, sometimes too little seems to
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have moved: (95) is also starred in Akmajian, et ale [428].
(95) They claimed he would be very shrewd, and very shrewd he looks.
A good affirmative sentence is obtained if the main verb is preposed
along with its complement:
(96) They claimed he would be very shrewd, and look shrewd he does.
This seems to establish a lower bound for the size of preposable VP's.
True. unless there is an independent functional explanation
for the restrictions. It seems to me, in fact, that there may be one.
For the upper bound. it starts from the observation that English (like
all languages t know of) has no question words for verb phrases. There
are no anaphoric, question, or quantifier words ranging over predicate
phrases. 14 Hence. the only way to ask for a VP is to question the com-
plement of some suitable semantically noncommittal verb. Unfortunately,
no verb in English is noncommittal enough for all intents and purposes.
As a result, there are a number of different VP questions. which all
in some respect prejudge the aspect and diathes1: of their answers:
(97) Who wa~ John? John was the baby.
(98) What was John? John was a doctor.
(99) What was John like? John was nice.
(100) How was John? John was 111.
(101) What did John think? John was pleased.
(102) What was John up to? John was reading.
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(103) What did John do? John built a house.
(104) What happened to John? John was fired.
Any permutations of the questions and answer's produce odd or ind1 rect
repl ; es.
In particular (and this is important). there is no way of
forming a question which would question copular be, the passive voice,
or the perfect aspect. There are no non-elliptic questions like
(105) What must (will, may) she?
which could be answered by
(106) She must be free
(107) She will be respected
(108) She may have left.
Admissible topics for (106)-(108), e.g.,
(109) What must she be?
(110) What will happen to her?
(111) What may she have done?
already incorporate the semantic contribution of the copula. the passive.
or the perfect. Hence there is no way of accounting for the presence
of these items in the topic position, which according to (D.top1c) is
reserved for new 1nfomat1on.
The converse restriction in (95) nas to do with the interaction
of the auxiliary system with rhemat1city. It is a peculiarity of English
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that polarity contrasts are carried by auxiliary verbs. A sentential
polarity question is formed by preposing an auxiliary verb (a dummy one,
if necessary):
(112) Did you see it?
and it is answered - emphatically or elliptically - by stressing the
auxiliary, not the main verb:
(113) I did (see it).
It would sound quite foreign to reply with I saw. To put the point
generally, if the sign of an English sentence is singled out for new
information. an auxiliary must appear to carry the stress. And this is
precisely the case in our VP preposing examples.
For some speakers. (95) may be questionable even in a context
where look is rhematic. For these speakers, top1calization of predica-
tive complements is likely to be restricted to copular or near copu1ar
verbs such as be. remain. as in (114)-(116), is likely not to be too
bad either:
(114) I am glad to see you free. and trust that free you will long
remain.
(115) If a person cannot be happy without remaining idle, idle he
should remain.
(116) She found him perfecti and perfect in her sight he rema1ned. 15
It might be argued that the functional specialization of VP
top1calization to affirmative repetition constitutes an argument for
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treating VP fronting as a syntactic rule on its own. However, not only
would such a conclusion go counter to the autonomy thesis~ it would be
simply false to fact.
In the following example, VP topicalization places a sentence
in a list of alternative plans of action:
(116) "Well, I'm 90;ng to tell you the truth. I was in a hole for
money .... I tried my uncle. Held no love for me, but I
thought he might care for the honour of his name. Middle-aged
men sometimes do. My uncle proved to be lamentably modern
in his cynical indifference.... I was going to try and have
a shot at borrowing from Dorthe;mer, but I knew there wasn't
a hope. And marr his dau hter I couldn't. She's much too
sensible a girl to take me, anyway. I Agatha Christie,
Thirteen at Dinner, ch. 21)
Consider next (117):
(117) Burrell picks only four new shows as "potential hits", and
gives only two others a "fighting chance". Four shows are
given a "fair" chance of success, and the rest are listed
as "likely failures".
Given a IIf1~htin9 chance" are "loday's FBI", an ABC update
of liThe FBI I • starring Mike Connors, and liShannon ll , with
Kevin Dobson as a police detective who moves from New York
to San Francisco with his young son after the death of his
wife. (Boston Globe, August 1981)
This rs~cnt newspaper cutting ~xemp11fies current use of VP
topica11zation to rhematic1ze a subject. In this example, there is no
feeling of affirmation at all, as it is the subject and not the auxiliary
that constitutes the rheme of the sentence. Again, what topica11zation
does is organize the sentence as a partial answer to a multiple question,
one easily recoverable from the structure of the paragraph:
(118) Which show got which ranking?
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For the purposes of the next section t I want to draw
attention to one iMportant property of the top;calization examples in
this and the preceding section. As we have emphasized, most of these
examples have answered double questions. Consequently, the sentences
have two rhematic constituents, one in the topic position and another
further down in the sentence. While the topical constituent repeats
an answer to a subordinate question word in a multiple question further
up in the dialogue, the sentential rheme answers an immediately preced-
ing simple sentential or search question.
8. Focus Top1ca11zation
It is in the just mentioned respect that the above examples
differ from another natural class of topical sentences. This class is
exemplified by
(119) John he called.
(12U) Our daughters we are proud of.
(121) Very grateful they were for my offer.
(122) Now I see what you mean.
(123) This also I have taken notice of.
(124) Only at sunset did I leave the house.
(125) Not another word did Mr. Dick utter on the subject.
(126) Pretty silly she made him look last night.
(127) A fine loyal bunch of pals they've turned out to be.
(128) It'll kill me; but a fat lot you care about that.
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In these sentences, the main news comes first, in the topical
constituent; if there are further rhematic constituents in the sentence
at all, they are subordinate to the topical rheme. Intuitively, when
compared to the previous examples, these sentences sound even more affir-
mative, sometimes even insistent or challenging. The last three examples
seem emphatic to the extent that they can be classed as exclamations,
sarcastic or otherwise.
Thus again, we face the task of figuring out what sort of
dialogue context would allow the dialogue rules (D. topic) and (D. left)
apply so as to justify the above intuitive judgments.
Again, we do not have to look very far. For instance, our
first example is very naturally embedded in the context of a choice
question followed by a guess at an answer to it:
(129) Did he call John or Mary?
Did he call John? Did he call Mary?
John he called.
John at the same time instantiates the choice question and repeats its
earlier mention in one of the alternative guesses, which provides the
foothold for the dialogue rules. As for the function of the topical
sentence in (129), it is a very common and typical one. The topical
sentence here pushes forward a certain alternative answer to a choice
question at the expense of other suggestions.
Thus the reconstruction (129) explains why a focused topic
sentence is particularly apt to be used as a corrective reply to a
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declarative premise, as in
(130) A: The chief called Mary.
B: John he called. not Mary.
For the dialogue reconstruction of (130) would be
(131)
A: He called ~ called John.
B: Did the chief call Mary or John?
B: John he called, not Mary.
A, who answers first, has no reason to use a topical construction:
he is answering a simple search question, whose most fluent answers
simply leave the answer constituent at the end of the sentence where
it belongs syntactically as well as functionally.
B would have answered with the same word order if he had gone
first, only he would have suggested John instead of Mary. But hearing
A's answer, B is induced to doubt: there are two answer alternatives,
both supported by one witness. Which one is true? Inspecting the
disjunctive question, B once more convinces himself that it is his
answer that prevails, and puts it forward. The topica1ized form of his
answer gives away his awareness of the rejected alternative by referring
back to the interpolated disjunction.
Now notice an important presupposition of the reconstruction
(129). We assumed straight away that acceptance of one of the alterna-
tives in (129) implied rejection of the remaining alternative. In other
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words, we assumed that the disjunction in (129) was exclusive, presumably
because the underiying ~earch question ca~r;ed a presup~os;t;on of
uniqueness. (Recall that any direct answer to a unique-answer question
is at once a complete answer to it and excludes any other alternatives.)
If this presupposition ;s rejected. there ;s no need for B to
consider his answer and A's proposal as alternatives to each other.
They may as well form two partial answers to a universal question. But
if that ;s the case, there is no need to use topica11zation, either:
(132) A: The chief called Mary.
B: And he called John.
Using focus topicalization in the addition would Q~tual1y be quite odd:
(133) And John he called.
Topicalization is also unnecessary if A's answer is obviously short of
being a complete answer. In that case too, it does not present a
challenge to B's more informative answer:
(134) A: The chief called Mary.
B: He called everybody.
The two answers obviously cannot be construed as exclusive alternatives,
as SiS answer even entails A's contribution.
Topical word order can make a comeback, however, if the
incomplete answer is offered as an exhaustive answer. As an example
of this, consider (135):
The topical sentence ;s in order here, for here the answer and reply
constitute two candidates for complete answerhood and as such wil' exclude
each other. In that case, it makes sense to weigh them against each
other as alternatives of a choice question.
The presence of other alternatives in the disjunctive question
explains the clear feeling of contrastiveness of focus topicalizat;on .
The accepted alternative contrasts with other proposals which are turned
down. Thus, (120) is likely to contrast with, say,
Similarly, (121) can reject the expectation
•
•
•
•
•
(135)
(136)
(137)
What have you taken notice of?
You have taken notice of that (only)/
This also I have taken notice of .
You must be proud of your sons.
They resented your offer.
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•
•
•
In the same vein, (122) is the natural order of words if the speaker
wants to contrast his sudden flash of understanding with
(138) I have seen what you mean all along.
(124) again creates a contrast with a more expected
(139) I left the house before sunset.
and (125) emphasizes the falsity of
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(140) Mr. Dick broached the subject again.
Conversely, if one wants to avoid suggestion of rejecting
alternative answers, it is wiser to shun topical word order. For this
reason, it is more polite to correct one with direct word order:
(141) A: You·ll have tea, won1t you?
B: Well, I'll have coffee, actually.
Topical word order would surely drive the point home as well
or better, but a little too forcefully for a polite occasion.
By the same token, a quiz contestant who is not supposed to
uverhear other contestants· answers would give away his unfair advantage
if he used topical word order:
(142) Q: When;s Fathers I Day?
A: It is in June.
B: In November it is.
The examples so far have been easy to characterize as
corrections of (implicit or explicit) suggestions. The rest of our
examples have a slightly different feel. They rather represent emphatic
affirmations of some more or less obvious suggestion. For them, I
propose a very similar dialogue reconstruction. Let us take (126) as
a representative:
(143) She made him look pretty silly last night.
Now how did she make him look last night again?
Yes, pretty silly she made him look last night.
••
•
•
•
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Here, the topicalized sentence affirms a suggested answer to a search
question by (D. reply). The topicalized constituent thus in effect puts
forward a given answer to a search question a second time around. The
message of topical word order could be conveyed by such expressions of
emphatic assent or approval as indeed. right you are or you can say that
again. If I am right, this is just what one ;s doing with topicalization
in the examples (126)-(128): one in effect is saying something again
in order to affirm it with emphasis.
Why should saying something repeatedly underscore its
importance? One might refer to affective causes. It is a law of
behavior that exciting things get repeated, whether in speech or in other
action. Here is a case in point:
(144) "Yes," he sa"id, "the mark is there. II There was jubilation now
in his voice and he came back to the table. "Good girl ,II he
said, "good girl, good girl! She managed it!" (Agatha
Christie: So Many Steps to Death)
That aside, there seems to be a quite rational connection
between repetition and emphatic affirmation. Whenever an answer to a
question has been put forward, a player has the chance of amending lt
by (D. reply). If the best a player can do on second consideration is
repeat an earlier answer. the implication is that he finds that answer
hard to improve on. The confidence the speaker has in the answer shows
in the fact that he "can say that again" even on second, more careful
consideration. 16 Conversely, using a form of words designed for repeti-
tions, a player can show that he accepts what he is saying with great
confidence.
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If he is being sarcastic, the indication is that he rejects
what he says with equal emphasis, as in the case in (127)-(128).
For later reference, again, it should not be missed that topic
as a rna; n rhe,ne does not exc1ude the pass; bi 1; ty of subordi nate rhemes
further down in the sentence. For instance.
~145) A fat lot you care about that.
can very well have~ as a subordinate rheme; in that case, (145)
actually affirms an answer to a double question:
(146) Who cares what about that?
There may be even three rhemes in (145), if it answers the question
(147) who cares what about what?
9. Other Uses of Topicalization
(D.topic) and (D. left) thus together explain why topicalized
sentences are particularly apt to confirm suggested answers to simple
or multiple questions. However, the rules do not require that top;calized
sentences can only refer back to questions. Any context which allows the
rules to apply would be as welcome. With this in mind, consider the
example
(148) III shall kick your spine through your hat! II shouted the
invalid. This threat he was quite unable to carry out.
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It seems to me that top;calization is quite natural in (143) without
any n~cessity of co~trast to othe~ implied threats.
The point of this exantple, too, is that the topicalized
constituent is both old and new. The preposed constituent makes refer-
ence to an implied threat but describes it for the first time ~s c
threat. These i~stitut1ons are accounted for if (148) is expanded so
as to allow (O.topic) and (D. left) to apply directly:
(149) II I sha 11 k1ck your spi ne through your- hat! It shouted the
invalid.
What was this?
This was a threat.
This threat he was quite unable to carry out.
The simple explanatory identity interpolated in (149) suffices to give
foothold for (O.left ). while (D.topic) uses the interpolated question.
As confirmation of trt~S te>etual analysis. note that nothing would be
more natural than actually in~erting the explanation parenthetically
in th~ topicalized sentence itself:
(150) This threat - for this was a threat - he was quite unable to
carry out.
A real-life example of this sort of explanatory top1cal1~at1on is I t~
fol1ow1n~ passage from Agatha Chris··~·s novel So Many Steps to Death
(P. 91):
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(151) Towards both Mrs. Baker and Hilary she displayed a certain
amount of contempt as towards people unworthy to associate
with her. This arrogance Hilary found very irritating.
The first sentence (whose topicalization ;s not relevant here) describes
the arrogance which the last sentence points out by name.
Further examples of e~planatory topicalization are the following
sentences from the same novel:
(152) The fact that Morocco was a French colonial possession did
not seem to count much with Miss Hetherington. Hotels
anywhere abroad she regarded as the prerogative of the
English travelling public.
(153) It seems possible that we may in the end so condition a human
being t~at while his powers of intellect remain unimpaired,
he will exhibit perfect docility. Any suggestion made to
him he will accept.
In these examples, a universal phrase is topical1zed as an instance of
a wider generalization made in the foregoing sentence. (153), for
instance. could be reconstructed into the following argument:
(154) ... He will exhibit perfect docility. This will show in
his reaction to suggestions. Any suggestion made to him
he will accept.
Another sort of case where no appreciable feeling of contrast
is involved was pointed out to me by Susumo Kuno (private communication).
An example is the following passage from Agatha Christie's novel They
Came to Baghdad:
(155) "You'll want the necessary visas," said Mr. Clipp, taking the
passport. It I '" run round to our fri end Mr. Burgeon in
American Express and he'll get everything fixed up. Perhaps
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you'd better call round this afternoon so you can sign
whatever·s necessary."
This Victoria agreed to do.
All the preposed demonstrative seems to do is connect the last sentence
to the previous paragraph. Or is that really all? Compare the effect
of replacing the last line of (155) by
(156) Victoria agreed to do this.
My s~ontaneous reaction is that (156) would make more of Victoria's
acquiescence than the topicalized sentence in (155). Whereas the girl's
consent comes through as more or less as a matter of course in (155),
it becomes news in (156). If so, why?
My explanation is this. Mr. Clipp makes a certain suggestion.
This raises the question, how does Victoria react to it? Does she agree
to do what she is told? Yes, that (is what) she does. Here again,
topicalization thus has the function of confirming an expectation
created by the context:
(157) This is what Mr. Clipp proposed
What did Victoria propose to do?
Did Victoria agree .) do this?
This Victoria agreed to do.
10. Functional Definitions Refined
The foregoing analysis of topical1zation suggests drawing a
further functional distinction among thematic and rhemat1c constituents
of a sentence. What we want to do is register the clear functional
contrast between the two uses of topicalization t Gundel 15 'top1calizat1on
of topic' and 'top1cal1zat1on of focus', in evidence in the following
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pair of dialogues from Gundel [453], p. 137:
(158 ) A: Did you see any kangaroos?
B: No.
A: What about monkeys?
8: A monkey I saw.
(159 ) A: What did you see?
What was it you saw?
B: A monkey I saw.
If our analysis of top1calization is right, the functional difference of
the two occurrences of A monkey I saw should be evident in a reconstruc-
tion of the dial~gues (158)-(159) along the lines explained in previous
sections:
(160 ) A: What did you see and what not?
~ -------------Did you see a kangaroo or not? Did you see a monkey or not?
/"(= Did you see any kangaroos?) (= What about monkeys?)
B: No. B: A monkey I saw.
(161 ) A: What did you see?
B: I saw a monkey.
A: What was it you saw?
B: A monkey I saw.
The reconstruction (160) for (158) construes the latter as a
fragment of a dialogue whose topic is a universal question: what did
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the addressee see on a trip to the zoo, say. The reconstruction (161)
brings out the feeling of insistence in S's answer in the dialogue (159),
and explains why Gundel lets A ask what seems the same question twice:
what B is doing in (159) with his topicalized sentence is repeating his
answer after a doubtful checking question.
Now there is a significant difference in the structural position
of a monkey in the two reconstructed dialogues (160)-(161). In (160),
it repeats from an immediately preceding premise an instantiation of the
double question one move up; in (161), it instantiates the immediately
preceding checking question by repeating an answer already given one move
earlier. This observation suggests refining the definitions of themati-
city and rhematicity as follows:
(162) A constituent C of a sentence 5 is a rheme is S iff C is
rhematic with respect to an immediate premise of S.
(163) A constituent C of a sentence S is a theme is S iff C is
thematic with respect to an immediate premise of S.
These definitions of course do not supersede the earlier definitions
of thematicity and rhematic1ty. On the contrary, they depend on the
earlier definitions. What they do is effect a further dichotomy within
the categories of thematic and rhemat1c constituents on the basis of
immediacy of premises.
Let us apply the new definitions to (160)-(161). The first
thing to note is what is common to both uses of topicalization in (160)-
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(161); in both cases, the topical constituent ;s functionally bivalent,
both thematic and rhematic. It is interesting that these cases constitute
examples of what in the literature is frequently referred to as contras-
tiveness. "In our approach, we can thus characterize the intuitive notion
of contrastiveness by functional bivalence.
However, there 1s an important di ffer'ence too. What
distinguishes the two cases is that in (160)~ a monkey is thematic with
respect to an illl11ediate premise, hence it is a theme. In (161), the
topical constituent ;s rhematic with respect to an immediate premise,
; .e., a rheme.
Applying the definitions further, we find that the predicate
saw is unambiguously thematic in (161), but a rheme in (160). This
explains the intuition that it is the verb which carries the nub of the
message in (160) while in (161), it is the topical constituent.
It is also interesting to compare the two answers of B in
(161): while on the first occurrence, a monkey is an unambiguous rheme,
it is thematic as well the second time around. This accords well
with our word order f~ndi~qs.
The new definitions of theme and rheme extend the earlier
functional dichotomy into a fourfold functional classification: we
distinguish
( i ) (simple or thematic) theme: saw in (161)
(11 ) rhematic theme: a monkey in (160 )
(111) thematic r,,~me: a monkey in (161 )
(iv) (simple or rhematic) rheme: saw in (160) .
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11. Kuno's Classification and Japanese wa vs. ga
The resulting fourfold classification bears a striking likeness
to the four functional categories introduced in Kuno [468] to account
for a number of functional phenomena. This is how Kuno ([468], p. 269)
describes his categories:
The English sentence John kissed Mary can be interpreted at
least in four different ways:
(i) theme: 'Speaking of John, he kissed Mary'
(ii) contrast: 'John kissed Mary, but Bill did not'
(iii) exhaustive listing: 'John (and only John) kissed Mary;
among those under discussion, it
was John who kissed Mary'
(iv) neutral description: 'What happened next? John kissed
Mary. '
The description is repeated, with slightly different paraphrases, on p.
297:
It is clear, given appropriate contexts, that sentences such
as Alexander kissed Mary can represent any of the following
four meanings:
(i) theme: 'Speaking of Alexander, he kissed Mary'
(ii) contrast: 'As for Alexander, he kissed Mary.' as in
Alexander kissed Mary, but Bill didn't.
(iii) exhaustive listing: 'It was Alexander who kissed Mary.'
as in Who kissed Mary? (Only)
Alexander kissed Mary.
(iv) neutral description: 'It happened that Alexander kissed
Mary. t as in What happened next?
Alexander kissed Mary.
These descriptions seem to match nicely our functional definitions. A
theme, in our terms, is a constituent which is repeated from an immediate
premise: Kuno's paraphrase 'Speaking of' for his theme provides the
necessary previous mention. Kuno's paraphrase for contrast adds beside
the previous mention another instance of the same sentence structure.
In our terms, this instance serves to induce a common underlying question
- 341 -
with respect to which the contrastive constituent ;s rhematic:
(164) Who kissed Mary and who did not?
For exhaustive listing, the it-cleft construction seems to
provide the best paraphrase. Later on, we shall find that it-clefts
indeed feature thematic rhemes. In a footnote, Kuno mentions that in
the exhaustive listing sense, John hit Mary implies 'no one else did'.
This implication of a thematic rheme was found and explained in the sec-
tion on focused topics.
The category of neutral description is illustrated by all-new
sentences, a special case of our notion of simple rheme. Kuno does not
consider other cases of simple rheme, apparently for the reason that he
is only concerned with different functional interpretations of subjects.
It is easiest to distinguish the neutral description use of a subject
constituent from the exhaustive listing use if the rest of the sentence
;s new as well. However, in the footnote we mentioned, Kuno admits that
English rhematic subjects are not restricted to the exhaustive listing
interpretation even if the rest of the sentence is thematic. Apparently,
then, such cases of rhematic subject will also belong to Kuno's fourth
category.
With this proviso, it seems that Kuno's four categories can be
mapped one to one on our functional distinctions. 17 Considering the
different routes the two classifications have been arrived at, this is
a remarkable convergence. It benefits the present approach by turning
Kuno·s observations into evidence for our functional definitions. It
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also consolidates Kuno's findings by offering them a systematic
theoretical basis in the theory of dialogue games. la
As an example of the advantages of our definition of the
four functional categories, consider Kuno·s analysis of the Japanese
subject markers wa and~. He finds that
(i) Wa marks either the theme or the contrasted element of the sentence.
(ii) Ga as subject case marker ;s either for neutral description or
for exhaustive listing.
Why just these natural classes of functional categories? The answer is
anticipated by Kuno who proposes that
(165) Ga as subject marker in matrix clauses always signals that
the subject conveys new information.
For some reason, Kuno refrains from making the complementary hypothesis
that wa always conveys old information. Gi~en our definitions, it seems
safe to go all the way and write for Japanese the functional principles
(D.wa)
(D.ga)
Mark a main clause subject with wa if it is a theme.
Mark a main clause subject with ~ if it is a rheme.
The simplicity of the rules for wa and ~ in our approach supports our
functional definitions. The functional definitions do not only single
out a number of functionally important ~~tegories, but also make correct
predictions about the natural classes these categories fall into. 19
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Chapter 4
GIVEN VS. KNOWN TNFORMATION
1. Subordination and Thematicity
It might seem at first that syntactic subordination too serves
the purposes of theme-rheme organization. I think that this impression
;s misleading. Subordination has another important function in textual
or'gan i zat ; on.
The way our dialogue rules are defined, subordinate clauses
cannot act as independent dialogue moves: they can answer questions,
supply explanations or draw inferences at best indirectly, by implication.
For example,
(1) Did he win?
is not directly answered by (2) like it is by (3):
(2) It is obvious that he won.
(3) Obviously, he won.
Understandably enough, (2) seems to change the topic if only
slightly, as it directly answers not (1) but
(4) Is it obvious that he won?
In order to obtain a direct answer to (1) from (2), the addressee must
remember that obvious has a success grammar, i.e., (2) sustains the
inference of
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(5) He won.
Yet the fact that subordinate clauses thus supply information only
indirectly, or by inference, should not be confused with calling that
information thematic. Won is rhematic in (2) if (2) ;s offered as an
answer to (1).1
Thematicity and subordination between themselves account for
a large share of the much-discussed pretheoretic distinction between
presupposed and asserted information in discourse. In our terms, a
declarative sentence S asserts (whatever ;s expressed by) another sen-
tence 5' if 5 constitutes a direct answer to the interrogative form of
5'. Thus (3) asserts (5) because it directly answers (1); in contrast,
(2) entails but does not assert (5).
Two frequently encountered senses of 'presupposition' are
appro~imated by the following characterizations: Sentence S logically
presupposes 5' if the interrogative form of 5 entails 5'; S pragmatically
presupposes S' if 5' is a necessary dialogue premise for S. These charac-
terizations, if appropriate, suggest that the notion of presupposition
is not needed a$ a primitive concept of our theory of discourse.
2. Factivity
Thematicity and subordination alike should be kept separate
from factivity. It seems to me a fair description of certain intensional
words that they are predicated (true or false) of true sentences only:
reveal and odd are such words. If their sentential argument is not true,
the question of their truth or falsity does not even arise. 2
I•
•
•
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There is a clear difference in the behavior of obvious and odd
in this respect. Both have a success grammar. Yet while (4) ;s non-
committal as to the truth of its complement, (6) must assume that its
complement is true:
(6) Is it odd that he won?
It has been argued that factivity is a myth. 3 If factive words
can nnly be predicated of true sentences, how can it be that one hears
sentences like
(7) It is not odd that he won, for he did not win.
Actually, (7) does not prove much, for we can also say
(8) Friday is not in bed, it is a date.
to point out a category mistake. Although (8) serves to correct a
conceptual error, it does not show t~at it is sensible to ask whether
Friday is in bed or not.
In general, any category mistake can be pointed out by denying
it. Thus if there are category mistakes at all, (7) may quite well
involve one too.
What is more important, I find (7) slightly uncomfortable in
a way absent from, say,
(9) It is not true that he won, for he missed .
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The difference cannot be in mere entailments, for true surely entails
truth if anything does. But unlike odd, it does not presuppose it.
To capture these intuitions, I join the school of
presupposition theorists which recognize a tertium quid in odd sentences
and their ilk, and the two sentences of negation which go with it: that
of a denial of a sentence (true if and only if the sentence ;s false)
and its rejection or categorical denial (true if and only if the sentence
is not true). The crucial difference between ordinary and categorical
denial is that categorical rejection of an ordinary negative sentence
does not amount to the same as dropping both denials: one who ca1cgor'ic-
ally denies
(10) It is not odd that he won
where not odd equals natural, does not wish to imply
(11) It ;s odd that he won.
All that is needed to recognize categorical denial in our approach ;s
to be careful not to apply the law of double negation in such cases.
This proviso will be assumed to be worked into the syntactic definition
of denial.
Categorical denial is surely a marked option, but so are
category mistakes. However, that it is a live option is shown by the
consistency of such apparently contradictory sentences like
(12) It is neither odd nor not odd that he won, for he did not win.
I assume that the factivity of odd is captured in the semantic
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component of grammar along with other sortal restrictions on predicates.
All of the foregoing establishes no direct connection between
factivity and thematicity. In fact, I do not believe there is one. What
was said of subordination already accounts for the fact that it is odd to
announce urgent news as the subordinate clause of an odd sentence:
(13) It is odd that your house is on fire.
However, that does not show that an odd clause could nut introduce new
information. It clearly does in the following example:
(14) It ;s not odd that math can be difficult for some people. What
is odd is that there are mathematical truths that no one can prove.
(14) could open a popular exposition of Godel's re~ylts. The main news is
construed as an answer to the question
(15) What ;s odd?
which clearly shows that the subordinate clause is rhematic. 4
3. Cleft Sentences
I
•
•
In our approach, the question-answer relationship plays an
important role in organizing the structure of a dialogue. Questions serve
to state the topic of a dialogue, in other words, what the dialogue ;s
about or what it wants to accomplish. An information sharing dialo~ue is
aimed to create a common understanding about its topics, expressed as
questions which the dialogue participants are interested in (accept). The
topical questions determine, by means of the dialogue rules and the defini-
tion of answerhood, which further questions and declarative sentences are
relevant to the dialogue. S
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The importance of the question-answer relationship for dialogue
structure is confirmed by the existence, in lnglish and in other languages,
of peculiar grammatical constructions which serv~ the purpos~ of articulat-
ing a sentence as an answer to a particular question. In English, they are
of course the much-discussed cleft sentences, the wh-clefts, exemp1ified
by (16;_(17), and the it· cleft~, represented by (18)-(19)
(16) What David wants is his wallet.
(17) His wallet is what David wants.
(18) It is his wallet that David wants.
(19) It is David who wants his wallet. 6
At first blush, (16)-(19) do not seem to add very much by way
of logical force to the simple sentence
(20) Da~id wants his wallet.
The near-synony~ of the cleft sentences (16)-(19) with (20) has actually
encouraged nearly every concei vable proposal for syntactically deri ving
(16}-(19) from (20). from one another, or from yet other textu~l variants
of (~O). 7
Faithful to the autonomy of dialogue grammar, I shall not pass
judgment on the syntactic derivation history of (16)-(19). It suffices to
be clear about certain syntactic and ~emantic properties of the resulting
configurations. however generated.
We start from wh-clefts. Wh-clefts have the structure of a
copular sentence, whose subject has the superficial form of a simple subor-
dinate search question. and whose complement is a syntactically and
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semantically appropriate substituend for the question word in the subject
ph rase.
Certain well-chosen sentences of this superficial form allow no
less than three readings:
(21) What I am looking for is a good question.
If the subject of (21) is co. ..,trued as a subordinate question t the
sentence can be paraphrased by
(22) One may well ask what I am looking for.
If, alternatively, the subject of (21) ;s construed as a
free relative clause, two further readings emerge depending on what is
..
being referred to: a particular question as in
(23) The question I am looking for is good.
or - most relevantiy to our present topic - good questions in general,
as in
(24) A good question is what I am looking for.
On this last reading, (21) is a simple identity between two noun phrases.
This last interpretation seems to me to capture precisely
the logical force of (21) as a wh-c1eft sentence. There seems to be no
objection to saying that, as far as their syntactic and semantic proper-
ties go, wh-clefts are simply identity sentences with free relative
su~ect.
Their semantic interpretation can then be accompanied by a
logical game rule copying the semantic game rule (G. free wh) of Hintikka
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[130]) p. 147. The rule instantiates a free relative by a phrase of the
category of its initial constituent, so as to explain (16) by (25) and
to infer (26) from it.
(25) This is his wallet, and David wants this.
(26) If David wants that, that is his wallet.
This interpretive move seems to capture the salient points
about the semantics of (16). It correctly predicts that (16) implies
the simple sentence (20). What is more, it also captures the slight
nuance that sets off (16) from (20): (16), unlike (20), implies that
his wallet ;s all David wants. This difference in entailment ;s due to
the fact, registered in the duality of outcomes (25)-(26), that the
quantifier character of free relatives is left open between existential
and universal force.
On the existential interpretation, (16) guarantees that one
thing David wants is his wallet; on the universal interpretation, it
says that all David wants is his wallet. By conjoining the two interpre-
tations, we obtain the uniqueness entailment which distinguishes (16)
from (20).
Akmajian [489] is a good source for arguments that wh-clefts
are identity sentences with free relative subject. Let me mention some
of them.
(1) Wh-clefts have free relative subject. Like other free
relatives, they cannot be done on sentential, which, or multiple ques-
tions:
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(27) Which book he read was liar and Peace.
(28) Whether he will go is yes.
(29) Who kissed whom was John kissed Mary.
Or on prepositional phrases:
(30) To whom I spoke was John.
(11) Wh-clefts are identity sentences. Unlike predicative
sentences, they freely tolerate reversel of subject and complement:
(31) Bill is the fool. The fool is Bill.
(32) What Bill is is a fool. A fool-is what Bill is.
(33) Bill is a fool. A fool is B111. 8
In a wh-cleft, as in any identity sentence, '~he subject must
match the complement in category:
(34) What he turned out to be was a fool.
(35) Who it turned out to be was Bill.
Exchange of what and who In (34)-(35) will destroy tile wh-cleft reading.
However, not all free-relative identities qualify for use as
cleft sentences. In addition to the syntactic and semantic constraints,
there will be further restrictions of a functional sort. Wh-clefts are
copular free relatives, but not all copular free relatives are wh-clefts.
Among the further restrictions are the following.
(i) The question phrase of a cleft cannot be modified by
~lse:
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(36) What else he did was a mistake.
Clefts cannot be formed from attributive what relatives:
(37) What mistakes remain are mine.
A cleft free relative cannot house negative polarity items:
(38) Whatever he did was a mistake.
Note a certain feeling of '1ffiness' about the free relatives in (36)-
(38): they seem to make universal clafms without existential commitme~ts,
unlike bona fide clefts.
(ii) There are certain restrictions on the tense and mood of
the copula in cleft sentences. For instance, (39) does not qualify for
a cleft, although (40) does:
(39) What I propose will be a new approach.
(40) What I propose is a new approach.
We shall see later if these further constraints are not entailed
by independently motivated functional properties of wh-clefts.
What is the function of wh-clefts anyway? I already gave away
my proposal in the beginning of the section: a wh-cleft is nothing else
than a question-answer dialogue condensed into a sentence. The free
relative subject introduces a question, and the complement constituent
answers 1t.'O
To capture this simple insight, I propose the following
dialogue rule for wh-clefts:
II
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(D.wh-cleft) A wh-cleft sentence of the form
(wh-word - X - t - Y) - be - A
answers the question
i(wh-word - X - t - V).
For instance, the dialogue function of our example
(41) What David wants is his wallet.
can be explained by expanding it into the following small dialogue:
(42) What does David want?
What Davia-wants is his wallet.
This explication of (41) makes an imporcant prediction about its
information structure. As (41) makes explicit, the complement of a cleft
sentence constitutes a main rheme with respect of its subject. It cannot
but be new information, for it carries along a dialogue context which
makes it so. By the same token, the question premise in (42) designates
the subject of (41) as inherently thematic.
Something equally important is predicted about the subject of
a wh-cleft. To justify the use of a wh-cleft in a dialogue, a direct
question structurally identical to the subject free relative has to ~ave
a place in the dialogue. In other words, to accept a wh-cleft is to
accept its subject as a topical question worthy of interest, or relevant
to the dialogue.
This requirement suggests an explanation to the restrictions
registered in (i) above. It follows from it that the existential
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presupposition of the cleft subject question must be established in the
dialogue context, whether independently or as a consequence of the cleft
sentence itself. Thus, I suspect, ;s why the free relatives in (i) do
not admit of a cleft reading. As we noted, these free relatives make
away with existential commitments, and this mil'itates the existential
presupposition imported by (C.wh-cleft).
Another corollary of (C.wh-cleft) is that the cleft sentence
must constitute a bona fide answer to its subject question. If I am not
mistaken, this is what distinguishes (39) from (40) in (;v). An
application of (C.wh-cleft) to (40) spells it out as
•
(43) I propose this, and this is a new approach.
(C.be) applies to (43) to give
(44) I propose a new approach.
which is a good answer to the question raised by (40):
(45) What do I propose?
In contrast, (C.wh-cleft) takes (39) into
(46) I propose this, and this will be a new approach.
But this time, the promissory identity in (46) does not warrant
substitutivity, so (46) gives no clue to what 'this' counts as now.
In other words, (40) answers the question it raises, but (39) does not."
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(C.wh-cleft) makes cleft sentences a powerful tool for
organizing the topic structure of a discourse. A wh-cleft sentence
at once indicates what question it ;s addressed to. Hence it ~/ill be
appropriate to a context only if its subject is a question that naturally
arises in that context.
This prediction is confirmed by the painstaking study of the
textual function of cleft sentences in Prince [531]. Prince summarizes
her findings as the following:
-
(47) Discourse condition on wh-clefts: a wh-cleft will not occur
coh~rently in a discourse if the material inside the (subject)
wh-clause does not represent material which the cooperative
speaker can assume to be appropriately in the hearerls
consciousness at the time of hearing the utterance.
It remains obscure in (47) what is meant by material inside sentences,
and what is it for that material to be appropriately in anyone's
consciousness. The dialogue reconstruction suggests a simple explica-
tion: the subject question must occur among the premises of the cleft
sentence in the dialogue game.
Let us look at some of the evidence, Sometimes, the premise
is put into so many words in the dialogue context:
(48) There's no question what they are after. What the committee
is after is somebody at the White House.
(Here, the idiom "there is no question" of course does not dismiss a
question but serves to introduce one.)
Another example:
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(49) H: I'm really very sorry to disturb you. It's just that
we're making a few inquiries about Margery Phipps.
K: What's this all about?
H: What I'd like to know is exactly what you did after
shooting finished on the day that Margery Phipps died.
Example (49) is taken, with abbreviations,from Patricia Moyes' novel
The Falling Star. The first speaker's cleft is clearly a polite para-
phrase of the witness' abrupt inquiry.
Often, the informational interest which motivates the cleft
can be inferred from the presence of alternative answers to the same
question:
•
(50) He did not fall accidentally. What happened was someone
pushed him.
Obv;ouslYt if it is worth while denying one account of the event it is
of interest to know what really happened. Other examples of this charac-
ter are
(51) Nikki Caine, 19 t does not want to be a movie star. What she
hopes to do is to be a star on the horse-show circuit.
and
(52) Precisely how pseudo-clefts are formed need not cancer·n us.
What is relevant is their dialogue function.
(52) is partlcularly interesting, as its underlying question
is motivated by properly dialogical considerations. A cleft like (52)
can occur anywhere in a dialogue. as it is addressed to a question which
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;s part and parcel of the decision problem of every dialogue game:
(53) What is relevant and what is not relevant?
•
I
Another constitutive question in any dialogue is what players
mean by what they say_ Hence any dialogue move can prompt a cleft like
Nixon's
(54) What I mean is we need something to answer somebody.
One more case of this sort: any dialogue overture immediately
raises the question of the author's aims. It is therefore natural to
start a discourse by answering that implicit question. This covers
informal appointments as well as lectures or scientific essays:
(55) What I wanted to ask you is could you read this draft for me.
(56) What we shall be talking about today is cleft sentences.
(57) What we have set as our goal ;s the grammatical capacity of
children - a part of their linguistic competence.
When asked for an opinion, one is entitled to clefts like
(58) What is appealing about your approach is its artlessness;
what makes it suspect is that it is not fully thought out.
(59) What I think is you should rewrite it.
Conversely, it is quite out of place to cleft where no one
is interested in your opinion.
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(60) A: Hello, operator. I'm trying to dial this number. Could
you please check it for me?
B: What I think ;s the exchange is overloaded. Hold on while
I check it.
Here, a rude caller might point out that no one had asked what the
operator thought.
Another telling example of a misplaced cleft is the following
dialogue opening:
(61) What I heard ;s you are expecting a baby.
There is no reason to suppose that the addressee of (61) is wondering
•
what the author has heard. So there is no explanation for the cleft.
(61) contrasts nicely with the following opening:
(62) Htt I1 • What I am calling about is we just had a baby.
It is a justifiable assumption that the receiver of a phone call wonders
what gives him the honor.
All the above properties of wh-clefts can be traced back to
(C.wh-cleft). But of course clefts are not exempt from the application
of other textual principles either. Intuitively, it ;s a complement of
a cleft sentence that announces i3main news, while the relative clause
houses subordinate information. This intuition is already accounted for
by the fact that the relative clause ;s a subordinate clause.
No wonder it is odd to hide the answer to a question in the
subject clause of a cleft as in
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(63) A: Wasn't that incredible when Mary called the boss a pig?
B: Yeah, what really shocked me was that she called him that.
An acceptable answer will make the answer a main clause:
(64) B: Yeah, it really shocked me that she called him that.
Another expectation is that (16)-(17) will differ in dialogue
function because of their different linear order.
(16) What David wants ;s his wallet.
(17) His wallet is what David wants.
(16) has its inherently rhematic complement on the right side of the
copula, where it syntactically belongs. No further thematicity predic-
tions are warranted. Consequently, as we saw in (55)-(57) and (62),
direct word-order wh-c1efts can quite well open a dialogue.
In contrast, in (17) the predicate complement is markedly
early. A likely explanation is that (D.topic) and (D. left) have been
applied, marking the complement as thematic as well as rhematic. We
would expect, then, that inverted wh-clefts share environments with
topicalized sentences. Indeed, they do:
(65) Does David want his passport?
No, his wallet is what David wants.
The cleft structure of the last line of (65) indicates that what the
author wants is at issue; the inversion contrasts his answer to the
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interlocutor's suggestion in the same way as topicalizat;on or
it-clefting would do:
(66) His wallet, David wants.
(67) It is his wallet that David wants.
Inverse wh-clefts are particularly idiomatic with a demonstrative or
anaphoric this or that as the preposed complement:
(68) lilt doesn't seem real. Tom." ... "There are so many things,
silly little everyday things, you don't even know about.
That's what s~ems so odd."
-
(69) No need to go outside ever again. No chance of ever going
outside again .... The well-appointed cage! Was it for
this, she thought, that all these varying personalities
had abandoned their countries, their loyalties, their
everyday lives? ... Would they be content? Was this what
they wanted?12
4. It-Cl efts
Let us oroceed to it-clefts like (18).
. -
(18) It is his wallet that David wants.
I make the relatively uncontroversial (or at least naive) syntactical
assumption that they feature obligatorily extraposed relative clauses:
in (18), the that-clause is bound to the subject 11 as its modifier,
whether or not it originated next to its head.
As for the semantics of (18), I sympathize with Bolinger's
thesis in [496], p. 66. He claims that
Sentences with it differ in meaning from sentences without
it, and that the-difference can be assigned to it as a member
of the set that includes he, she, and they.
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In accordance with Bolinger l s thesis, I assume that (18) means
just what it would seem to mean: the subject!! ;s a pronoun which picks
out something that David wants, and the rest of the main clause ident;-
fies that something as his wallet.
This ;n~erpret;ve strategy can be captured by the following
game rule for it:
(C.it) Explain a sentence of the fot'm
x - it - Y (- Comp - Z - t - W) - V
where it ;3 the head of the parenthetical clause (if any),
by a sentence
x - A - Y and Z - A - W,
whereupon infer any sentence
if Z - B - W, then B is A.
An application of (C.it) to (18) produces an explanation like
(70) This 15 his wallet and David wants this
and allows any inference of the form
(71) If David wants that, then that is this.
It seems to me that this galne strategy brings out all that ;s noteworthy
about the logical force of the it-cleft (18). We capture the fact that
(18) entails the simple sentence
(20) David wants his wallet.
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but we can a~so point out the logical difference between (18) and (20):
(18) makes it ~lear that his ~al1et is all David wants. This uniqueness
entailment, missing from (20)t is due to the final uniqueness clause of
(C.it) which registers the well-known fact that it is a definite pronoun.
The rule (C. it) succeeds in capturing Bolinger's observation that
the uniqueness entailment of the it-cleft construction is due to the
inh~re~t meaning of 11- To illustrate this, note that {C. it) applies
equally well tJ explain the uniquene~s entailments of the answer in
(72) - What are these things on my desk?
- It is my stone collection.
It indicates that only one object is present. (Cf. ~.)
An application of (C.it) explains the second line of (72)
by something like
(73) What you were pointing at is my stone collection.
and uniqueness of reference is ensured by the validity, where~er one
might point, of
(74) What you are pointing at is what you were pointing at.
The uniqueness im~11cat~on of it also explains why the
following dialogue pxample from Bo'linger [496] is wrong-hedded:
(75) - Who came?
- It was John.
- Who else came?
- It was Mary.
- 363 -
Since it makes clear that only John came, one should not inquire about
other comers, even less answer such inquiries.
There is one important respect in which the subject of an 11-
cleft is more versatile than other occurrences of it: it is not sensi-
tive to person, gender or number. It is stays put, whatever follows
(76) It is us that he means.
An equally topic-neutral it is found fre'!-standing in (77),
whet-e it identifies an answer to a guestion:
(77) - Who is calling?
- It is us.
The last observation, I believe. is diagnost1~. The topic-neutral it
in cleft sentences, - and in (77) - -identifies an answer - an abstract
object: that is why 11 is not sensitive to person, gender or number
here any more than in, say,
(78) - What is the last word of the previous example?
- It is us.
The affinity of (77) to cleft sentences is close: the answer can be
reconstructed into an it-cleft by appending the topical question to it:
(79) - Who is calling?
- It i~ us who is calling.
The following explanatory sentences could equally easily be
completed Vla it-clefts to question-answer dialogues:
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(80) Something it is still bothering me. It;s how he got in.
(81) If he had a friend, it was Winnie Nelson.
The same idea seems to explain the turn of phrdse in
(82) I am afraid that we have to let you go. It is not that we
do not like you. It is just that we can no more use you.
What this sort of it-sentence does is identify reasons or explanations.
That is, they supply answers to questions like
(83) What is the reason (explanat;nn) for this?
This underlying question is nicely in evidence in the following dialogue:
(84) H: Did you take the letter?
5: Why ever should I do that?
H: It is just that we can't lay hands 0:: it at the moment.
The second speaker is in effect wondering
(85) What is the reason for that question?
- at any rate this is the question H addresses his answer to.
Similar topical constraints seem involved in the difference
in acceptability between
(86) It w~s John who called
and
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(87) Only John called.
as answers to the question
(88) What is wrong? What happened?
Intuitively. (86)-(87) report different worries. If (86) is used. the
author probably expected just one caller, but not John. If (87) is used,
the author may be disappointed at just one caller instead of a number.
In popular terminology, (86) seems to presuppose uniqueness
while (87) asserts it. In dialogue terms, this amounts to the simple
fact that (86)-(87) constitutionally answer different questions: (86),
unlike (87), is limited to address
(89) Who called?
while (87) can also answer, among other questions,
(gO) How many people called?
Multiple questions bring in further evidence:
(91) Now, who wrote what again?
It was Jack who wrote the preface, it was Ernie who wrote the
text, and it was Tex who wrote the appendix.
It would be quite odd to cleft the other way round:
(92) It was the preface that Jack wrote, it was the text that
Ernie wrote, and it was the appendix that Tex wrote.
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To sum up, our datd seems to suggest the following dialogue rule for
it-clefts:
(D. it-cleft) An it-cleft sentence of the form
it be A (Camp X - t - Y)
answers a question af the form
i(Wh-phrase - X - t - Y)
where Wh-phrase = Camp if Camp is a wh-phrase.
The condition (D. it-cleft) immediately explains what is wrong with (92)
as an answer to the question in (91): what is a secondary question word
of the multiple question in (91). whose instantiations constitute
rhdmatic themes.
The formulation of (D.1t-cleft) is sufficiently loose to make
room for certain atypical uses of clefts. The following are pertinent
examples:
(93) It was a fine performance that he gave.
(94) It is not every man who makes his own meals.
(95) It is a good divine that follows his own instructions.
What is peculiar about (93)-(95) is that not all of the predicate
complement is rhematic, as is shown by the ~uest1ons which they are
likely to address, respectively:
(96) What sort of performance did he give?
(97) How many men make their own meals?
(98) What sort of a divine is a good divine?
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An even more intriguing example is the following:
(99) It ;s not I who have lost the Athenians: it is the Athenians
who have lost me.
(100) clearly addresses a double question with a unique pair presupposi-
tion:
(100) Who has lost (and) what?
An example which seems not to be an example at all is Prince's
(101) If I see a train crossing, I keep going. It's a game you're
playing.
It seems to me more natural to interpret a game you1re playing in (101)
as one constitue"t. The sentence is not a cleft sentence at all but an
ordinary identity sentence whose subject refers to the preceding sentence
and whose predicate complement is a noun modified by a relative clause. 13
As with wh-clefts, we can see the workings of other dialogue
principles in the textual use of it-clefts. It-clefts are currently
perhaps the most popular device for corrective remarks:
(102) Does David want his passport?
No, it is his wallet that David wants.
This is explained by reference to (D. left) exactly as in the section on
focal top1ca11zat1on.
The application of (D. left) also explains why clefts are
useful reminders. By moving an answer early in a sentence, it can be
marked as old 1nfonmat1on. This explains Bol1nger l s contrast
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(103) A: When will we know?
B: It's tomorrow we will know.
(104) A: When will you tell me?
B: It's tomorrow I shall tell you.
The cleft is queer in (104) if it is assumed that B is revealing new
information to A; in (103), it is motivated if it reminds B of something
he should already know. Focus topicalization of tomorrow would create
the same effect.
Yet clefting stays functionally apart from focus top;calizat;on,
as topicalization does not entail uniqueness (it only suggests a contrast
to possible alternatives). As a result, (105)-(106) are not at all
interchangeable functionally:
(105) Now I understand!
(106) It is now that I understand!
While (105) only suggests that the author did not understand earlier,
(106) restricts understanding to the present, excluding past as well as
future.
(D.1t-cleft) predicts that the relative clause of a cleft is
inherently thematic, as it repeats material from an implicit question.
However, (D. it-cleft) does not require that the underlying question itself
be familiar to the audience. To the contrary, a cleft sentence can
actually be used to suggest it as a topic worthy of attention. In fact,
clefts have an important function as rhetorical openings of literary texts:
•• (108)
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It was just about fifty years ago that Henry Ford gave us
the weekend.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Ellen Prince, to whom this observation is due. also neatly describes the
dialogue intent of this sort of all-new it-clefts:
Their function, or at least one of their functions, ;s to
mark a piece of information as a fact, known to some people
although not yet known to the intended hearer.
This it-clefts accomplish by the simple trick of embedding an assumption
in the subordinate clause of the cleft. As we have noted,what is said in
a subordinate clause is nut called into question: subordinate clauses
cannot constitute dialogue moves without intervening steps of inference .
••
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Chapter
ABOUTNESS
1. A Traditional Ambiguity in the Notion of 'Theme'
Despite individual differences, most approaches to text grammar
or functional sentence perspective share a number of basic insights and
distinctions.
A fundamental commonplace is the distinction between structure
(means of expression) and function (choice among means of expressions).
ThiS distinction is accepted in principle by all writers, although in
practice confusions occur. 1
Further, there is a consensus that the main problem of text
grammar is the characterization of functional notions. Behind confusing
terminology, there seems to be much more convergence on answers to this
problem too, than first meets the eye. A case in point is a traditional
distinction between two notions of theme, theme as givenness and theme
as aboutness. It is this distinction that I shall try to examine and
vindicate in this and following sections.
The roots of the distinction go back to the forerunners of
functional grammar. According to F1rbas [552], the true pioneer of text
grammar was the nineteenth-century French classicist Henri Weil [600].
According to Firbas, it was Weil who concluded from his
comparative word order studies that
A sentence contains a point of departure (an initial notion)
and a goal of discourse. The point of departure is equally
present to the speaker and to the hearer; it is their rallying
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point, the ground on which they meet. The goal of discourse
presents the very information that is to be imparted to the
hearer. 2
Referring to these functional notions, Weil described unmarked word
order, which moves from the point of departure to the goal of discourse,
as the proper movement of the mind. The inverse order which puts the
goal of discourse before the initial notion Weil described as the
"pathetic" order a vehicle of emotion. 2
From Weil, the basic functional division of a sentence into a
familiar point of departure and the newly introduced goal of discourse
has been inherited by most mode~ approaches.
Weil did not fix his ideas in technical terms. Other
nineteenth-century grammarians referred to the terms of the dichotomy
by the Protean names 'psychological subject' and 'psychologica1 predi-
cate'. For all its simplicity, this dichotomy was r'iddled by a crucial
ambiguity, brought out lucidly by Jespersen (1924:145· 146) in his
discussion of the received notions of subject and pr~dicate:
The subject is sometimes said to be the relatively familiar
element to which the predicate ;s added as something new.
Another definition that is frequently given is that the
subj ect is what we ta 1k about, and the predi cate 'i s what
is said about this subject.
The samp duality of definition is in evidence in the work of the founder
of the Czechoslovak school of functional grammar, V11em Mathesiu5 (1939,
1942) •
Attributing the observation to Dane~, Firbas [552] notes that
II
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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Mathes; us in fact offers tl..O concept; ons of the theme. Rough 1y
speaking, according to one of them the theme expresses some-
thing that is spoken about; according to the other it expresses
something that is known or at least obvious in the given s;tua-
t i on . (p • 23 )
Dane~ himself [547] elaborates his point as follows:
The distinctions known (given) information - new information
and theme-rheme go back to V. Mathesius. In his well-known
paper from 1939 he defines the "starting point of the utterance
(vjchodisko)" as IIthat which is known or at least obvious in
the given situation and from which the speaker proceeds",
whereas lithe core of the utterance (jAdro)" is IIwhat the
speaker states about, or in regard to, the starting point of
the utteran(;e. 1I
The same author defines (in 1942) lithe foundation (or the
theme) of the utterance (zAklad, t~ma)1I as something I'that ;s
being spoken about in the sentence and lithe core (jAdro)1I as
what the speaker says about this theme. (p. 106)
A similar duality has been recognized by several authors, including
Bene~ [542], Halliday [562], Sgall [592], Sgall, et al. [594], not to
forget Dane~ himself. In the American tradition, a similar distinction
has been made in the duality of term pairs topic-comment (Hockett [566])
and given-new (Chafe [432], [543]). Chomsky [434] has added to the
terminological confusion by yet another pair presupposition-focus, in
function similar if not identical to Chafels given-new distinction. 3
All of the above authors seem to agree that two independent
dichotomies are involved here, and that both playa part in text organiz-
at;on. This thesis is listed as the first item of "Main points of
Agreement" among text grammarians in Sgall, et ale [594], p. 17:
The distinction between topic and comment is autonomous, in
the sense that it cannot be derived from the distinction
between "given" (i.e., known from the precedin9 context or
situation, contained among the presuppositions) and "new u
(not given).
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Our definitions of theme (thematicity) and rheme (rhematicity) have
been contextual, i.e., based on the idea of given vs. new information.
A few sections later, I shall join the consensus and claim a place for
another distinction independent of the contextual notions, based on the
intuitive idea of 'aboutness'. Before doing so, however, I shall examine
some fallacious arguments for the duality of distinctions.
2. Invalid Arguments for Independence
As Dane~ ([547], p. 108) points out,
what makes the investigators differentiate between IIknown"
and II theme II is the fact that there exist cases where theme
does not convey known information or where the range of
both do not fully coincide.
However, the success of such applications of the Padodn principle depends
on how the relevant predicates are defined in the first place. If the
definitions are deficient, the independence argument may be fallacious.
In this section, I want to show that our contextual definitions of theme
and rheme are immune to certain arguments offered in the literature.
A case in point ;s the argument offered by Sgall, et al. [594],
p. 17-18:
What is perhaps most dec is i 'Ie as an ar~Jument for the autonorlly
of topic-comment articulation ;s that the preceding context
does "not always determine uniquely the choice of topic and
comment of a sentence.
For instance the statement (1-1) can be followed in a quite
natural way either by (1-2) or by (1-3) - not to speak of
other possibilities:
(1-1) Yesterday was the last day of the Davis cup match
between Australia and ROUMANIA.
(1-2) Australia WON the match.
(1-3) The match was won by AUSTRALIA.
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In such cases the speaker is free to choose any of the
previously mentioned names of countries or a word referring
to the match itself as the topic of thenext sentence. If he ;s
Australian, the choice of the name of his country readily
occurs, but this is not the only type of situation in which
the country is lI;n the speakers' minds" or is spoken about.
Similarly, after the statement (1-4) it is possible to choose
either (1-5) or (1-6):
(1-4) On Christmas Eve we expected our RELATIVES.
(1-5) Cncle Fred came FIRST.
(1-6) First came Uncle FRED.
Here one either speaks about Uncle Fred and states when he
came, or one speaks about the one who came first, and states
who he was.
The argument is somewhat inexplicit, but its point seems clear. In the
first example, both Australia and the match have been mentioned prev;0us-
1y, yet eith~r can be chosen as the first constituent of the next sen-
tence. In the second example, neither Uncle Fy·ed nor first have been
mentioned, yet either can begin the next sentence. It is assumed that
in these examples at least, the first constituent indicates the topic
of the sentence. In each case, the choice of topic depends on what the
speaker wants to speak about and not on the preceding text.
What is wrong with this ~rgument is its overly simplistic
construction of the notion 'given (new) relative to context'. It misses
the 1011owing insights of Dane~ [547J, p. 109-110:
It is evident that the notion IIgiven (know!:)" .; .. relative and
very broad (if not vague):
(1) Given or known is that ~nformation which is derivable
or recoverable (to use Halliday's wording) from the context,
situation and the common knowledge of the speaker and the
listener. Cer'tainly, there exist divergences between tne
two, due to differences in their experience, memory, atten-
tion, etc. But after all, it is the speaker's eval~ation
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that ;s ~he determining fac~or; this does not exclJde, uf
course, that the spt:aker takes, mor~ 0'- less, into account
the presupposed position of the listener.
(2) The communicat"tve feature of "givenness", assigned to
particular sentence elements, is a graded property.
(3) ItGivenness II depends on the length of the portion of
preceding text in relation to which the evaluation is being
~arrie~ out The upper limit of such a portion should be
empirically ascertained. We may tentatively assume, that
these portions or "intervals" are in a way correlated with
the segmentation of text into paragraphs, groups of para-
graphs, chapters, etc. We may even expect a kind of hier-
archy u." stratif1cat1o', of the fedtt.re "given": taking for
granted that not only p~rticular utterances but also th~
sc:tions of text, as paragraphs, etc., and the whole text
have IIthemes" of their own (lihyperthemes U ), wp can expect
that, e.g. t the theme of ~ chapter will be evaluated as
II]; len tl throughout the crapter, so that the "interval of
givenness" in respect to the information carried by this
"h,ypertheme" wi11 be the whole chapter.
(4) The contextual determination of givenness is far from
being a simple phenomenon. We might tentatively su~gest that
as I'contextually given" may be r'!garded such semantic infor-
mation that has been somehow mentioned in a qualified
portion (interval) of the preceding text. It can be men-
tioned directly, or indirectly. In the first case, it
can be mentioned not only with the identical wording, but
also with a synonymous expression, or with a paraphrase (cf.
Pike's IIhypermeaning" or "verbalized concept U ). The indirect
mentioning is based on semantic inference (vr semantic
implication, if viewed from the opposite point).
In ~his impv.~cant passage, Dane~ makes a number ~f observations that
have insp"r~(j the present opproach to tt:xt grafTIdar:
(1) Tt:xt'lal not1r:ns are relative to dialogue structur-e, not
just to previous text. What an appropriate reconstruction of a dialogue
context is depends on previous text. but only in pJrt. Further structure
can be 91 paned from the CIJntext t s i tuat 1on, and the COnJ11on knowl edge
between the participants.
(11) What is given tu o~e participant may be new to another.
Every player f)f ;l dialogue gi\me uses his own representation of the
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dialogue situation as his guide in planning his dialogue strategy. Yet
players aim at lommon understanding. It is in their interast to frame
their moves so that their relation t, earlier moves is obvious to the
audience.
(iii) Thematic1ty is a relative notion. What is old
information relative to one premise may be new with respect to another
premise. As a result, it is a graded notion. What is thematic with
respect to a smaller dialogue may be rhemat1c with respect to a larger
one, ~nd vice versa.
(iv) Previous mention may be indirect or implicit. Themat;city
may depend on implicit interpolated premises instead of the explicit sen-
tences of the preceding text.
Let us now see how these insights apply in Sgal1·s examples.
As the capitalizations in the example sentences indicate, these
sentences are clearly informational1y distinct. In (1-2), the verb
conveys the main news ~f the sentence, in (1-3) it is Australia.
Correspondingly, the two sentences address quite different informational
interests. or topical questions. I~ one is Austr~lian, one is indeed
likely to wonder
(1) How did Australia fare in the match?
in which context (1-2) is the expected form of answer, given our
contextual definitions. However, a more objective observer would put
another implicit question, duly answered by (1-3):
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(2) Who won the match?
Given these quite natural expansions of the implicit dialogue context,
we are able to t~ll apart the textual functions of (1-2) and (1-3) in
terms of contextual notions.
A simila." explication fits the second example as well,
Sentence (1-5) is appropriate as a move in the implicit context of
(3) When did each relative come?
When did Uncle Fred come?
whereas (1-6) fits the contex~ of
(4) In which order did the relatives come?
Who came first?
Again, the textual roles of Uncle Fred and first can be distinguished
in terms of contextual notions: one of them is a rhematic theme. the
other a simple rheme.
Another argument which can be tUt-ned against its premises is
the following from Reinhart [587]:
One of the clearest exaolples commonly cited for ne\'1 information
is the 11-c1ause of cleft sentences. as in (36).
(36) It was Ben who discovered the proo~ of the theorem.
Such sentences have a fixed information ~tructure. with Ben
as the new 1nfonnat1on (or for:us) expre',s1on: that someone
has d1scovered the proof 1s th~ old 1nfl\rmat1 on here and the
sentence introduces the 1dent1tj of this person. Note now
that (36) can be embedded in a ~.entence \+th1ch contains another
mention of the same referent, a!, in (37), where we intend
the pronouns to refer to Ben.
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(37) As for Ben, he insists that it was him who discovered
the proof of the theorem.
As we saw in section 3.1 t as for structur'es also have a fixed
information structure and they can only be used with the
fronted NP as topic. In terms of ref~rential information,
such sentences can be used only when the referent of the
fronted NP is 'old information'. So by what was said so
far the person denoted by Ben (and the first occurrence of
he) is the 'old informationr-but the person denoted by him
15 the 'new infonmation'. In our particular example, however.
the referent of all these expressions is the same person.
As Reinhart is well aware. this argument becomes a problem only
if the following two premises are accepted:
(i) Old and new information are properties of objects
referred to by constituents, not of constituents them-
selves.
(;1) Nothing can be at the same time old and new inforn,ation.
Both premises are rejected in our approach. which therefore constitutes
such a "radical (and non-obvious) modification of the definitions of
old and new information" as is needed to avoid the apparent contradic-
ticn.
3. Aboutness
Vet it is impressive how mJny writers on funct10nal grammar
agree that one question of great importance to text organization is what
sentences intuitively are about. The following is just a small selection:
An olJ maxim says that topic-comment articulation consists,
first of all, in the distinction between "what is spoken
about" and "what 1s ~ a1d about 1t" 1n a sentence. (Sga 11 •
et al. [594], p. 10)
Man w1rd also zugeben. dass die einfachste und oft benutzte
Character1st1k der Thema-Gl1e1erung - worUber man spricnt,
1s das Thema. was man de rUbe\' aussagt t 1s das Rhema It - 1m
Grunde richt1g 1st. (S~all [593], p. 55)
The subject is that which is spoken of. (Cunl~ [331], p. 1)
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Theme means what I am talking about now. (Halliday [562])
I suggest ... making explicit the notion that the fundamental
division of a sentence is between the topic, the element that
identifies what the sentence is about, and the comment, the
predication which is made of that object. (Gunaer-[453], p. 10)
So far as I can see at present, the best way to characterize
the subject function is not very different from the ancient
statement that the subject is what we are talking about ...
(Chafe [593], p. 43)
The concept of 'theme' cannot be given any precise formulation.
I can only say that the theme is what the rest of the sentence
;s about. (Kuno [470], p. 277)
Good, but how is one to characterize the notion 'about'?
Sgall, et al. [594]. p. 15) feel that lefor many sentence~ it is fairly
easy to ascertain that something is talked about in th~m and some (other)
thing is stated about it there", unfortunately. things are not always
that easy. I let Jespersen point out the difficulty with an appeal to
intuition here.
This is true about many, perhaps most, sentences, though
the man in the street would probably be inclined to say that
it does not h~lp him very much, for in such a sentence as
"John promise!J Marya gold ring" he would say that there are
four things of which something is said, and which might
therefore all of them be said to be "sub j ects"4 namely (1)
Jonn, (2) a promise, (3) Mary, and (4) a .-'1ng.
An 1nter~sting refinement uf unsc;,ooled intuitions of aboutr.ess
is ~uggested in Reinhart [587]:
To the question what sentence (1) is about, both (2) and
(3). among others, are appropriate ~nswers.
(1) Mr. Morgan is a careful researcher and a knowledgeable
sem1t1c1st, but his originality leaves something to be
desired.
(2) (1) is about Mr. Morgan.
(3) (1) is about Mr. Morgan's scholarly ability.
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Intuit;vel', it is not the same sense of aboutness that ;s
used in (2) and (3). (~) is about Morgan because it predi-
cates something of Morgan. On the other hand, (1) does not
explicitly predicate anything of Morganls scholarly ability,
though it provides some information about it ...
It is only the first of these uses of aboutness that the
technical term sentence-topic is intended to capture in
linguistic theory. For convenience, I will label the about-
ness relation expressed in (3) discourse topic, although
this is not a commonly accepted terminology.
Let us examine this proposal more closely. According to
Reinhart's explanation in the quote, Mr. Morgan is (or can be) the
sentence topic of her example (1) because (1) explicitly predicates
something of Morgan. Presumably, this is because the grammatical subject
of (1) actually picks out, or refers to him. In contrast, there is no
explicit mention of Mr. Morgan's scholarly ability in (1).
On the other hand, Mr. Morgan's scholarly ability is a
(possible) discourse topic for (1) because (1) provides information
about it though (1) does not make actual mention of it. In other words,
(1) is an informative although indirect answer to the following question,
whose grammatical subject does refer to Mr. Morgan's scholarly ability:
(5) What is Mr. Morgan's scholarly ability?
This observation suggests that a reduction of Reinhart's two concepts
of aboutness to on~ is possible given our notion of topic (or topical
question) of a dialogue.
What we have to do is make aboutness too depend on a1alogue
context. We may say that (1) is about Mr. Morgan in virtue of consti-
tuting a well-formed answer to the topic
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(6) What ;s Mr. Morgan like?
while it is about Mr. Morgan's scholarly ability in virtue of
constituting an answer to (5). What accounts for the feeling that (1) is
somehow more directly about Mr. Morgan is due to the simple fact that (1)
is a direct answer to (6) but an indirect answer to (5).
This relativ1zation at once sets to rest the question of how the
same sentence can be taken to be about a number of different :h1ngs at
once without compromising the conflicting intuition that we are dealing
wi~h a functional notion ('the' topic of a sentence). A sentence can
be about different things with respect to different topical sentences,
yet about some one thing with r~spect to each one topic.
So let us set about developin9 this insight. To fix our
terminology, let us tall what a sentence intuitively is about its
dialogue SUbj~~.5
As with thematic notions, the first question to ask is: what
sort of thing are dialogue subjects? For the thematic notions, our
answer was simple: thematic notiGns are properties of (structural)
constituents of sentences.
For the netion of dialogug subject, a different answer seems
forced upon us. Sentences are not ~bout their structural constituents.
What they are about - what they speak of - are thing~: objects in the
domain of discourse of language which the const1tuen'cs of sentences may
pick out, refer to, or stand for.
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The notion of picking out or standing for is a tricky notion.
Let us become a bit cleareraboutwhi\titinvolves. Actually, objects are not
picked out by noun phrases. Rather, players of semantic games pick out
objects following semantic game rules for noun phrases. For instance,
the subject of
(7) Lennon lives.
is agreed by players of a semantical game of verification to designate
a particular person, say the late Beatle. In the rest of the game,
'Lennon' stdnds for, or refers to him. In the game connected with
(8) A madman killed Lennon.
the proponent picks out an individual he thinks killed Lennon; for the
rest of the game, the subject of (8) is r~placed by some designation
of that individual. It would be misleading to ask simply who a madman
refers to in (8): that is up to the proponent to decide. If there is
one and only one individual for which the game connected with (8) has
a winning strategy, one might say that he is who (8) refers to, or picks
out. But if (8) is false, one is puzzled: ~hould one for instance root
for an individual which satisfies the main clause of (8)
(9) he killed Lennon
or one who satisfies the subject description
(10) he is a madman.
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Let us take a third example.
(11) No one wanted Lennon to die.
Who does the subject of (11) refer to? Here, no satisfactory answer is
forthcoming: (11) is about everyone in general or no one in particular,
take your pick.
Certain insights emerge from these examples. First, what a
nou~ phrase refers to is a function of the more fundamental question of who
does the referring. An objective sense to the notion is available when
one can point to a unique winning strategy, the rational player's choice
in a game of verification. In the absence of an objective basis, a subjective
interpretation prevails: what a noun phrase refers to is what, if any-
thing, its user refers to by it. What is that, then? Not necessarily
anytring, as (11) shows. One who puts forward (11) is not under any
obligation to provide substitution instances for it - that is a job
for an opponent of (11). The proponent of (11) ;s not likely to be
spea~ing of - or referring to - any particular ina1vidual at all.
But compare again (8). One who maintains (8) must accept
that its predicate is true of one particular individual. Does it follow
that he is speaking about anyone object whenever he puts forward (8)1
My intuitio~ says: yes and no. He is speaking about a particular
individual. namely ~he supposed murderer of John Lennon. No matter if
he knows nothing further about him, it suff1~es that he believes him to
exist and to be unique. No matter if he is wrong: he is still talking
about the murderer, whatever others may say.
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Yet, to do justice to the contrary intuition, he need not have
any particular person in mind, anyone he knows or could name or describe.
If he does, all the better; but that is not necessary. The object he has
in mind may well be just an individual concept. not an individuating func-
tion, to use the distinction made in Part I, Chapter 3.7.
This will henceforth be my construal of the objects nf about
ascriptions: what players speak are about individual concepts, repre-
sented by functions from epistemic alternatives to descriptions of
1ndividuals in them as explained in Part I of this essay.
Th1S reconstruction sheds some light on the question of when
two dialogue participants can be said to speak ~bout the same thing.
Two detectives who agree that a murder was committed but differ on the
identity of the murderer can ~aturally be said to talk about the same
person in two senses and about different persons in one. If a murder
was actually committed, there is an objective sense in which both
speak of the same flesh-and-blood individual, viz. the real murderer.
Even if they are mistaken, they still speak of the same person in a
loose but quite colloquial sense; they both speak of the imaginary
murderer, an individual concept which spans both participants' epistemic
alternatives. At the same time, they would emphasize that they refer
to different persons when they speak about the murderer, for the
concept 'the murderer' coincides with different well-defined individuals
in each speaker's ep1stem1c alternatives. It seems the present recon-
structioll of aboutness does justice to all of these aspects of ordinary
usage. 6
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To avoid conceptual confusion at the expense of proliferation
of terminology, let us call what (if anything) an author of a sentence
refers to by a noun phrase in a dialogue move, the value of the noun
phrase. It ; S l.nderstood that the va1U~ of a noun phrase may depend on
the author and tt.~ dialogue context of the move. For instance, in
(12) A: Your wife is very pretty.
B: Actually, she is not my wife.
the second speaker is not likely to be meaning to contradict himself: he;s
not speaking about his \~ife, but his companion, who he assumes his
interlocutor is referring to as well. The value of S's ~ffe is different
for A and Bt but the value of your wife for A can be cross-identified
with the value of she for B: the two are speaking of the same person
after all.
4. Dialogue Subjects
With the help of the notion of value, we are in a position to
formulate the following partial definition of the dia1cgue subject of
a sentence relative to a premise:
(13) The dialogue subject of a sentence S with respect to a sentence
S' is the value of the grammatical subject of 5' .
A dialogue subject of a sentence is what the ~entence intuitively is
about - or better, what its author speaks about in the sentence.
Formally, this connection would be made by letting the rule of interpre-
tation for the preposition about refer to the notion of dialogue subject
II
I
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so as to imply
(14) A sentence S in a dialogue 0 is about an object V if V ;s
a dialogue subject of S in D.
I shall not try to define the meaning of about further than (14) here.
(14) will ~uffice for a good intuitive test for dialogue subjecthood. 7
Now (13) does not (nor is it meant to) define more than a
partial function from pairs of sentences to individual concepts. As we
have seen, not all grammatical subjects of sentences have a value.
Such sentences cannot introduce dialogue subjects directly (though they
may inairectly, by implying further sentences whose subjects do refer).
A case in point would be
(15) It was raining.
whose gra~~1tical subject refers to nothing.
lute that (13) does not care whether S makes explicit reference
to its dialogue subject. Hence (15), although it has n~ referring noun
phrases, may have a dialogue subject. I~ is a good answer to the question
(16) How was the weather?
whose subject the weather does refer. Accordingly, in the context of
(16), (15) can perfectly well be said to speak about the weather, though
it does not mention the weather.
It was suggested in the preceding section that Reinhart's
notions of sentence topic and discourse topic might be reduced to one.
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(13) effects such a reduction. In its full generality, (13) seems to do
justice to Reinh~rt's notion of discourse topic. Her notion of sentence
topic can be defined in te~ms of (13): a noun phrase in a sentence
indicates its sentence topic if the value of that noun phrase ;s a
dialogue subject.
It is fair to ask if this notion of sentence topic, even as a
definable rather than a primitive concept, ought still be singled out as
a unit of dialogue grammar. Reinhart [587] has an ingenuous though
inconclusive argument that it snou1d. Compare again Reinhart's (1) to
(17) and (18):
(5) What is Mr. Morgan's scholarly ability?
(17) Mr. Morgan has a clear handwriting and he is punctual.
(18) r~y Aunt Rosa has a clear handwriting and she ;s punctual.
My Aunt Rosa is a careful researcher, but her originality
leaves something to be desired.
While all of (17;-(18) are rather unsatisfactory as responses to (5),
there is a clear difference. While (17) is ungenerous, (18) seems simply
irrelevant to the question. In Reinhart's terms, the difference ;s that
although (17) fails to assert anything about Morgan's
scholarly ability, it does assert something about Morgan,
while the answers in (18) fail even that. In other words,
(17) but not (18) sticks to the sentenc~-topic specified
by the request.
The contrast between ~ 7) and (18) is suggested to depend on this
theoretical difference, although it is left unclear just how.
Actually, it turns out that the difference between (17)-(18)
can be explained without reference to dialogue subjects at all. It
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suffices to pay closer attention to the relation of (17)-(18) to the
dialogue topic (5). It is true that none of (17)-(18) form a direct
answer to (5). Howeve~, (17) but not (18) answers directly a related
mJre general question:
(19) What qualifications does Mr. Morgan have?
This more general question implies ~he question (5) on the condition
that the presupposition of the latter is true: (19) entails
(20) What ;s Mr. Murgan's scholarly ability, if any?
If (19) is the fundamental question, (5) arises only if the conditional
'if any' is fulfilled. If not. (5) can be left unanswered. Now. to
understand why (17) as the sole response to (5) tends to be read as -
belittling remark on Mr. Morgan's scholastic ability,it suffices to
construe it as a complete answer to (19) rather than to (5). The
addressee dismisses the more specific question (5) by finding (17) a
sufficient answer to the more general question (19).
Now compare (18). In order to obtain an analogous
r~construct1on for (18), one should be able to figure out how Aunt Rosa's
abilities might nave the least bearing on Mr. Morgan's aptitude. Then,
perhaps even (18) might be redeemed as replies to (5). Be that as it
may, a clear difference still remains between (17)-(18).
Better evidence for the need for Reinhart's distinction will
emerge in the chapter on dislocations. For its purposes, we spell out
the requisite notion of direct dialogue subJ~ in
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(21) A dialogue subject of a sentence is a direct dialogue subject
if it ;s the value of some constituent of the sentence.
What, the question now arises, is the relation of the new
concept of dialogue subject to thematicity. One fact at once meets the
eye: with the relativization of dialogue subj~ct to dialogue premise in
the manner of (13), a reference to a dialogue subject is unavoidably
thematic with respect to that premise. We shall see consequences of this
thematicity prediction in the sequel.
But where do these premises for dialogue subjects come from?
This question will be asked and answered in ~he next section.
5. ~ect and Topic
An important distinction about about is reflected in the very
syntax of the praposition. The English preposition about (and its
synonym of) admits of two syntactically distinct constructions, nicely
brought together in Lewis Carroll's familiar poem: 8
liThe time has come", the Walrus said,
uTa talk of many things:
Of shoes - and ships - and sealing wax -
Of cabbages - and kings -
And why the sea is boiling hot -
And whether pigs have wings."
In the first construction, discourse is about things; the object of about
is then syntactically a noun phrase like shoes or kings. In the second,
talk is of topics, represented by subordinate questions like the last
two lines of the poem. That this distinction does amount to a genuine
ambiguity can be felt in an example like
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(22) We were talking about what you had suggested.
The object of about in (22) can ambiguously represent ~ free relative
clause or a subordinate question. In th~ first case, the object is
referential, and can be specified in virtue of the rule for free relatives
by some sentence like
(23) We were talking about this new approach, and you had suggested
this new approach.
In the second case, the topic of discussion is not any
particular suggestion: indeed, the speakers are wondering what the
addressee did suggest. This interpretation of (22) is nicely disambigu-
ated by
(24) We were talking about what it was that you had suggested.
Any further doubt about the reality of the question construction is
dispersed by observing that questions like the last line of Carroll's
poem could not possibly be anything but subordinate questions: there
are no free relative whether clauses. (Compare also the other tests
for free relatives in the section of wh-clefts.)
This syntactical distinction nicely tallies with the duality
of concepts of a dialogue subject and a dialogue topic. The subject
of a dialogue, as we have defined it, is some thing or other, an object
the dialogue participants have in mind. The topic of a dialogue is a
problem, represented by a question which dialogue participants are
interested in (accept).9 It seems that the syntactic ambiguity of about
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31ready provides indirect evidence for the importance of this d'stinction.
However, on a deeper level of analysis, I think the two senses
of abvutness are again connected in a definite way. (They are senses of
one and the same word. after all!)
A clue to the connecting link is the phenomenon of concealed
questions. 10 Noun phrases sometimes do duty for subordinate questions,
as in Grimshaw's
{27j Bill asked me the time, but I did not know.
(26) John refused to tell the police the fellows who were involved.
The phenomenon is no surprise to Hintikka's analysis of direct
object constructions with epistem1c verbs. According to him, such
constructions go back to 'concealed' questions anyway: even a straight-
forward direct object construction lik~
(27) I know Bill
goes back to an identity question:
(28) I know who Bill s.ll
The most s1c:w.lif1cant difference between (27) and (28) concerns, for
Hintikka. the sort of cross-world identification involved: for (27).
it is likely to be what H1nt1kka calls identif1cat1on by acquaintance,
while (28) suggests descriptive cross-identification.
Let us adopt H1ntikka's analysis. We need a rule whir~ takes
direct object constructions with certain epistemic words tack to identity
sentences in the style of
(C.wh-object)
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Explain a sentence of form
x - epistemic word - NP - Y
by the sentence
x - epistem1c word - wh-word NP be - Y
where 'wh-word' is of the category of NP and be
agrees with NP.
(I won't try to spell out instructions on the method of cro~s­
identification associated with the direct-object construction here.)
Now just as (C.wh-object) takes (27) to (28), it will take the
concealed questions (25)-{26) to appro~riate explicit questions:
(29) 8111 Jsked me what the time was, but I did not know.
(30) John refused to tell the police who the fellows were who
were involved.
Now assume that about constructions too conceal questions, i.e. t
(C.wh-object) applies to sentences like
(31) This sentence is about Mr. Morganls ~cholarly ability
with the output
(32) This sentence is about what Mr. Morgan's scholarly ability is.
Given this assumption, we have found a connecting link between the two
senses of about. According to (C.wh-object), that a sentence is about
a particular object means that it is addressed to a particularll simple
topical question whose sl:bject is that object, viz. the question what
that object is. This simple question of identity is thus found concealed
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in the notion of dialogue subject. A sentence is about an object if it
is addressed to the question what that object is.
Identity questions are exceptionally well suited for their
versatile role. Exceptional among search questions, identity questions
are sdfe, in terms of Harrah's erotectic logic:
(33) Who is A?
is safe to ask, for its presupposition
(34) A is someone
is provable from a minimum of assumptions about A: to deny (34) will
contradict the self-preservation principle (C.self) of Part I as soon as
A is as much as mentioned in the dialogue.
Note, too, that sentences of the form (33) are generated by the
logical ga~e rules from other search questions as well. To answer a
question by instantiating it with A immediately makes A a dialogue
subject with respect to a follow-up question about its identity.
Evidence for Dialogue Subjects: (D.subject)
Well t so we have a conce~t of dialogue subject. What is it
good for?
To find unambiguous evidence for the need for the new discourse
notion, it seems best to devise a controlled experiment. What needs to
be controlled is the implicit dialogue structure: specifically, we have
to make it absolutely clear, what is actually thematic or rhemat1c with
respect to what. If we succeed, keeping contextual properties of
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cons t ; tuents constant t ; n di seern ; ng further functi ana I di fferences, we
have evidence for a new distinction.
For this purpose, let us construct a set of textual variations
on a simple theme. Consider a simple business transaction, the sale Jf
a useful all-around brush to a housewife by a travelling salesman. What
happens can be described informally by the sentences
(35) The brush goes from the man to the woman.
(36) A dollar goes from the woman to the man.
(37) The man prefer~ the brush with the dollar to the dollar and
that to the brush.
(38) The woman prefers the brush with the dollar to the brush and
that to the dollar.
(39) The woman brings about (36).
(40) The man brings about (35).
The transaction can be looked upon as a simple bargaining game. The
salesman's strategies are (40) and its negation: ~e may give or not
give the brush to the woman; the woman's strategies are (39) and its
negation: she may give the man a dollar or not. Given the pldyer l s
preferences in (37)-(38), the game has a solution in (39)-(40).
Now how would one describe the transaction more colloquially?
By ~ny of the following textual variants:
~41) The man sold the brush to the woman. He charged her a dollar
for it.
(42) The woman bought the brush from the man. She pa 1d hi'.1 a
dollar for it.
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(43) The man sold the brush to the woman. She ,aid him a dollar
for it.
(44) The woman bought the brush from the man. He chargPG her a
dollar for it.
In each case. the man and the woman ar~ equally thematic as far as our
contextual definitions go: whatever difference there is between the
variants, it wi'l not be due to differences in thematicity.
Is there any funct10nal difference among (41)-(44)? I think
there is. (41) considers the transaction consistently from the man s
point of view. describing his choices of strategy_ (42) takes as
consistentl' the woman's point of view, while (~J)-(44) feel more
objective or impartial. ThEse feelings can be sharpened by considering
(4l)-(44) in turn as dnswers to the questions
(45) What sort of a deal did the man make with the woman?
(46) What ~ort of a deal did the woman make with the man?
(47) What ~ort of a deal did the man and the woman make?
It seems undeniable that (41) is the best form of answer for (45) and
(42) for (46), while (43)-(44) are more apt to answer (47). (44) seems
the least felicitous of all. for its unmotivated use of the diathetically
marked converses of sell and ~.
Intuit1vely~ these most fluent combinations appear to follow
consistently one particular perspective. Other combinations are not
excluded by any mf·ans, but they seem to involve a slight chang~ of
subject in miJ-dialogue.
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Let us try to clarify some of these further nuances by making
the changing topics explicit. For exa~ple, consider the variant
(48) A: Did the man give the brush to the woman for free?
B: No, the woman bought the brush from the man. She paid
him a dollar for it.
This combination suggests thdt A sides with the man and B with the woman.
A is worried about the man:
(49) Did the man lose in the deal?
B in turn fixes upon the nearly equivalent suggestion
(50) Did the woman ta~e advantage of the man?
and takes pains to point out that the woman kept her side of the bargain.
What gives away the auxiliary premises (49)-(50) in (48)1
The choice of gra~tical suoject, obviously. The dialogues seem to
follow a rule of dialogu~ strategy to the following effect:
(D. subject) Indicate the dialogue subject of a sentence by its
grammatical Subject. 12
Let us apply (D.subject) to our experimental dialogues. (41)
and (42) preserve the dialogue subject, this property extends throughout
the dialogue if (41) is paired with (45) and (42) w~th (46). The d1a-
logues are about the man and the woman, respectively, in virtue of the
rule of meaning for about in (14).
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The situation is more interesting in (43). If (43) is
addressed to (47), is there a change of subject or not? The intuitive
answer is, yes and no: the dialogue subject of (47) is a pair of people.
while each sentence in (43) speaks of one of them in turn. The structure
of a dialogue is made clear by noting that (47) implies a conjunction
of two sent~nces with the desired subjects:
(51) What did the man do and wha 4 did the WOW~fl do in the deal?
(51) has two dialogue subjects, one of which is pursued by the first
sentence of (43) and the other by the second sentence of (43). Thus each
sentence of (43) preserves a dialogue subject introduced by the topical
question, albeit indirectly by inference. This is why (43) seems intui-
tively to preserve the subject of (47) despite first appearances.
Finally, the partiality of the participants in (48) is
explained by interpolating (49)-(50) as topics for each player to pursue
independently. The fact that the choices of subject in (48) can tease
out implicit premises like (49)-(50) is good evidence for the reality
of the new discourse notion. (D. subject) together with the definition
(13) of dialogue subject can be considered a tribute to "the ancient
statement that subject is what we are talking about ll • 13 For consider a
sentence like (52) in abstraction of dialogue context:
(52) Charles married Diana.
Who is (52) about? The unschooled intuition i~ clear: about Charles.
For if one wanted to talk about Diana, nothing c~uld be easier than putting
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it the other way round:
(53) Diana married Charles.
These prima facie impressions are explained given (D.subject).
It goes without saying that (D.subject) cannot be an obligatory
rule. For one thing, we already recognized that some sentences refer to
nothing, for instance,
(54) It was raining.
The resultant failure of (54) to conform to (D. subject) does not render
it useless. Or consider the dialogue
(55) A: Why is 8111 flustered?
B: I hurt his feelings.
Surely, B is not changing the topic here: his comment is as much about
8111 as the question. Here, other, independent considerations of subject
choice overrule the reco.mendation of (D.subject). The first considera-
ticn is the choice of wording. There is no word-preserving paraphrase
of S's explanation which would get Bill in the subject position. Even
if this obstacle is removed, by substituting nose for feelings:
(56) He WaS hurt on the nose by me.
the resulting sentence may still violate other preferences (say a
preference for assentive subjects or to have first person first).14
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The logical conclusion from these observations is that the
status of (D.subject) is precisely like that of the thematic word order
principles. They represent optional strategy choices which have to com-
pete with other strategic considerations, with the result that they are
reliable guides into dialogue structure only where they constitute the
best available explanation for a choice of textual variant.
6. Eviaence from Anaphora
(D. subject) registers a certain referential preference: other
things being equal, the subject of a sentence ;s likely to indicate what
the sentence is about. Thi~ referential preference can be expected to
show when doubt arises as to what a noun phrase refers to. Such referen-
tial ambiguities often arise with anaphoric personal pronouns.
As Smaby [595] poi"ts out, resolving anaphoric ambiguity is
quite a complex decision probl~m whose dimensions incluce syntactic
constraints of admissibility of cross-reference, categorial information
(gender and number), discourse grammatical constraints, and last but not
least a mixed bag of extralinguistic considerations of what people are
likely to say and to be interested in.
This comes as no surprise to a dialogue grammarian. As we
noted, what a subject does who forms a dialogue grammatical judgment on
a piece of discourse is look for a likely dialogue reconstruction for it.
The question he asks implicitly is "Why should anyone say this?"~ the
answer is apt to be some specific dialogue situation which the subject
finds natural as to its necessary background assumptions, the functional
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connections between the different sentences in it, and the
characterization of the dialogue participants.
Let me illustrate this with an example.
(57) The doctor showed the ba~y to her mother.
Wh1se mother? The baby's, of course. This;s the interpretation which
first springs to mind if (57) is ~nderstood to describe a childbirth. As
everybody knows, babies are shown to their mothers when they are born.
Could it be the doctor's mother? That woul~ make no sense at all. Why
on earth should the doctorls mother be present at a delivery? Surely,
doctors are past showing off their ach;eveme~t to their mothers: Look,
Momma, I can deliver! Besides, the stereotype doctor is male anyway.
Now consider two possible continuations of (57):
(58) She felt just great.
(59) She looked just great.
Don't you agree that (58) is more likely to speak uf the mother, while
(59) is most likely to describe the baby? Here~ we are concerned with
guessing at the likeliest focus of interest or topic, of the passage
given (57). Our guesses are based on commonplaces like
(60) Mothers wonder how their babies look.
(61) Never mind how the mother looks.
(62) No one knows how newborns feel.
(63) Mothers feel great about their babies.
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(64) Never mind the doctor's looks or feelings.
As Smaby points out, what we are watching out for here ;s not
just what is likely to be true given a certain premise, but what ;s
likely to be interesting: what questions are likely to arise. This;s
why
(65) She felt d~pres~ed
in the context (57) can also describe the mother. however uncommon or
shameful the feeling. (65) too is relevant in the context of (57) because
~t answers a question (57) is likely to give rise to, viz.
(66) How did the mother feel?
In explanatory discourse, a leading consideration in the
choice of antecedents ;s the search for a likely major premise.
Consider for instance
(67) Why did John hit Bill?
Because he insulted him.
Because he was insulted by him.
There is little doubt about antecadency, for one tries to construe the
explanation as an instance of well-known laws of human behavior:
(68) If one is insulted, one h1t~.
If one insults, one gets hit.
Only if Bill is construed as the insulting party will (fi8) explain the
hitting.
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Two more eXdmples of this sort.
(69) John and Bill fought. Who won?
Well, John is older than Bill, so I guess he won.
Well, Bill is younger than John, so I guess he won.
In each case, he seems pretty unambiguously tu pick out the subject of
the Well clause. Here, unlike the previous example, worldly knowledge
amounts to little, for which explanation is likely depends on the ages
of John and i.ill: are they youngsters or oldsters?
What seems decisive in this example is the syntactic complexity
of the necessary major premises. The intuitive antecedency is established
by the interpolation of
(70) Whoever is older (vs. younger) wins.
as an enthymematic premise. The converse antecedency would require a
rather more awkward wording:
(71) Whoever the opponent is older (vs. younger; than ~ins.
(71) ;s hard to figure out even when spelled out· not a likely major
premise to spring to mind on hearing (69).
For a final example, consioer a third person report of (72)-
(74):
(7,) Why do you always bother me?
(73) You are my brother.
(74) I am your brother.
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For ease of exposition, I shall discuss the example in terms of its
direct-discourse counterpart (72)-(74). Although (73)··(74) are logically
equivalent among men, they have a quite different feeling to them. What
is more, the intuitive feeling depends on what sort of bothering ;s
going on. If one is offering help, (73) seems to point out brotherly
rights ana (74) brotherly duties; if help is being ~sked for, the intui-
tions are reversed. ~hy?
Again, implicit general premises are at work. The intuitions
arise from a need to construe (73)-(74) as instantiations for the two
ethical principles
(75) People should help their brothers.
(76) People should be helped by their brothers.
(75) points o~t brotherly duties, (76) their rights. Now if (72) means
(77) ~Jhy should you help me?
it ;s directly explained by (74) and (7~), or by (73) and (76). If it
means
(78) Why should I help you?
the direct explanation consists of (73) and (75) or of (74) and (76).
This seems as neat an explanation of the subtleties of (72)-(74) as one
could wish for.
Implicit premises also have a sway in inferential dialogue.
In Smaby'c example
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(79) John tickled Bill. He squirmed.
there is a strong inclination to take Bill to be the squirmer, for this
will allow construing (79) as an inference from the premise
(aD) People who are tickled squirm.
This analysis is supported by the fact that (81) makes Bill pretty
unambiguously the squirmer:
(81) John tickled Bill. So he squirmed.
Of course, the inclination to apply (80) can be stifled by explicit
explanations to the contrary: perhaps John and Bill are an exceptional
couple - when John tickles Bill, it is John who squirms. This fact
only constitutes further proof of the power of intervening premises
to guide inferential discourse.
All of the above shows that not too much should be expected
of the force of subject choice to dictate antecedency. (D. subject) is
an optional rule after all I easily overruled by more pressing consider-
ations. To find unambiguous evidence for its operation, care must be
taken to play down such other considerations.
One way to accomplish this is to make it explicit that no
logical connection is intended. For instance, compare (81) to
(82) John tickled Bill. And then he squirmed.
And shows that the two sentences in (82) are not arranged as premise
and conclusion, but as coordinate answers to a common topic. The
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temporal then helps play down any causal implications. When this trouble
is taken, John does emerge as the likelier candidate for antecedency in
(82). Why? Because of {D.subject}. (D.subject) suggests looking for
the common topic of (82) among questions about John, say
(83) What did John do?
If (83) is the topic of (82), (D.subject) is satisfied by
both of the partial answers.
One more example:
(84) The father took the daughter from the mother.
She did not like that at all.
Who didn't? One is pretty much at a loss to say. But the situation is
cleared up when the right topical sentence is prefaced to {84}:
(85) How was the daughter treated in the divorce?
(86) How was the mother treated in the divorce?
In the context of (85), we are speaking about the daughter, so we
expect to hear her reactions. If (86) is the topic, we are talking
of the mother, which makes her the likely value of she. Here again,
(D.subject) helps determine antecedency.15
7. So-called Dislocations
Since Ross [590], a distinction has been maaa in
transformational grammar between syntactic movement rules like topical-
1zation and another group of phenomena which exhibit quite different
grammatical properties, called d1s]gcat1Qns:
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(87) Quine, he is a character.
(88) He is a character, Quine.
(87) exemplifies a left dislocation and (88) a right dislocation.
The most obvious syntactic difference between movement rules
and dislocations is that movement rules are subject to certain con-
straints on what can move where. One cannot, for instance, topicalize
'Quine' as shown in
(89) Quine, who cares what says?
For more than one reason. 16 However, the sentence is saved if a
personal pronoun is as it were "left behind" to mark Quine's place in
the predication:
(90) Quine, who cares what he says?
What Ross suggested to mark the distinction was to consider dislocations
the result of a copying rule: guine in (90) is copied from its original
subject position outsiue the sentence and the source is replaced by a
personal pronoun.
A simpler alternative, that (87)-(88) are base-generated,
is argued for at length in Rodman [589] and Gundel [453]. A particular-
ly straightforward argument is that the replacement is not predictable
by rule: all of (91)-(93) are functioning "dislocations",
(91) Quine. that guy is a character.
(92) Your mother, is your darling mother coming?
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(93) Roaches, America teems with these foul pests.
What conditions there are relating the prefaced phrase to its pair inside
the sentence seem corollaries of more general interpretive constraints
on ~ross-refer~nce.
A fact missed by most discussions of dislocations is that
the simple dislocations (91)-(93) are very different from such
ornate sentential satellites as
(94) As for Quine, he is a character.
(95) 3peaking of Quine, he is a character.
For one thing, a simple dislocation requires a later cross-reference:
if we leave out as for or speaking of from
(96) As for the zoo, the animals seemed healthy enough.
(97) Speaking of Quine, have you read Word and Object?
we get only false starts and vocatives, not dislocations. We do well
to keep (94)-(97) clearly apart from dislocation proper in the sequel.
Also, dislocations are to be distinguished from elliptic
sentences, which have the earmarks of independent dialogue moves:
they have separate prosody and independent dialogue function.
(98) What are you looking for?
My pen. Have you seen it?
Your pen? It is in your breast pocket.
As false starts and vocatives witness, dislocations ar r not
set apart by structural considerations alone. What makes them a natural
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class is some shared functional characteristic. But what ;s it?
Let us start our investigation from left dislocation.
Traditional grammars tend to construe left dislocation as a slip of the
tongue, occasioned by a speaker's eagerness to blurt out what is foremost
in his mind:
A speaker begins a sentence with some word which takes a
prominent place in his thought. but has not yet made up his
mind with regard to its syntactical connexion; if it is a
word inflected in the cases he provisionally puts it in the
nom(inative), but is then often obliged by an after-
correction to insert a pronoun indicating the case in which
the word should have been. This phenomenon is extremely
frequent in the colloquial forms of all languages, but in
literary language it ;s often avoided. (Jespersen 1949:223)
Under the pressure of thought or feeling the subject here
springs forth before the usual grammatical structure cccurs
to the mind, and is later repeated in the usual prsition of
the subject in the form of a personal pronoun. (Curme 1935:4)
This seems an overly narrow charact@rization of left dislocation. Not
all leftward satellites are false starts. though some certainly are.
For one thing, the case of a d1~~ocated personal pronoun by now is
accusative, which sets off a dislocated pronoun from a false start:
(99) Oh, him, he is an asshole. I - he's always bothering me.
For another thing, an element of design is clearly apparent
in the following examples, where a phrase has been prefaced to its
sentence instead of embedding to ease processing:
(100) The Lord your God, which goes before you, he shall fight for
you.
(101) He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone
at her.
- 409 -
(102) But we indeed who call things good and fair, the evil is upon
us while we speak.
(103) Very good orators, when they are out, they will spit.
(10~) Not to follow your leaderwmthersoever he may think proper
to lead; to back out of an expedition because the end of
it frowns dubious, and the present fruit of it is discomfort;
to quit a comrade on the road, and return home without him;
these are tricks which no boy of spirit would be guilty of.
It would not do to accuse the authors of these sentences of careless
language. Nor;s there anything slipshod about the use of dislocation
in poetry to satisfy metrical requirem~nts:
(105) For the deck it was their field of fame, and ocean was their
grave.
However, such syntactical motivation of left dislocation
seems to me incidental to its main dialogue function. It seems to me
that the traditional grammarians' description, despite its defects,
is on to something essential. A left dislocated phrase is indeed apt to
indicate what is foremost on the mind of the author - viz. the dialogue
subject he is speaking about in the sentence following. This is my
proposal for a functional game rule for dislocation:
(D. dislocate) A noun phrase adjoined to a sentence indicates its
direct dialogue subject.
Dislocation is optional - most sentences are not explicit about their
dialogue subjects. When 1~ 1tadvisable to be that explicit, then? Of
course, when one's subject is not otherwise obvious: when one embarks
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upon a new subject, or changes subject in mid-dialogue. To see this
effect of left dislocation, compare the dialogues (106)-(107):
(106) - Who is Goofy·s oldest friend?
- Goofy's oldest friend is Mickey Mouse, Mickey is Disney's
oldest character.
(107) - Who is Goofy's oldest friend?
Goofy's oldest friend is Mickey Mouse. Mickey, he is
Disney's oldest character.
What is the function of the last sentence of these dialogues? For (104).
it seems simple: the answerer haitens to answer the implicit identity
question
(108) Who is Mickey Mouse?
occasioned by his answer to the original question in virtue of (C.wh-e).
Mickey's identity is kept in low profile here. as it is only a subordin-
ate matter. In (107), in contrast, Mickey seems to become a main charac-
ter: the speaker drops Goofy as the subject of the dialogue and takes
up M1c::ey. This intention of his is conveyed by (D.dislocate).
Alternatively, the questioner might have effected the change of subject
by asking, instead of (108), the dislocated question
(109) Mickey Mouse, who is he?
whereupon the change of subject could very naturally be confirmed by
the answerer as in (105).
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Left dislocation ;s common in interrogation, where changes of
subject are frequent. Typically, a previous answer suggests a new
subject to the questioner, who seizes upon it by left dislocation:
(110) - These persons who have just gone - had they anything to do
with your quarrel?
- Not at all - it was strictly a matter between Lizzie and
me.
- This girl Lizzie, how old is she?
We said that left dislocation is a means of taking up a new
dialogue subject. Does it follow that a left dislocated constituent
can be all new information? We alread~ know that the opposite is the
case: dialogue subjects are constitutionally given. 17
This accounts for the curious feeling of familiarity which
surrounds dislocated sentences. One cannot just go and accost an
unsuspecting audience with
(111) Inferiority complex, what exactly does that mean?
For instance, if one wants to start a treatise with (111), one will have
to think up a title which is suggestive of the subject.
Otherv,i se, di s1ocat 1on has 11 tt1e to do wi th themati ci ty.
The adjunction of a dislocated phrase leaves the then.Jtic character of
its intrasentential pair quite free: all of (112)-(115) are quite
natura1.
(112) - What did the Bishop do in the actress' boudoir?
- The Bishop, he admonished the actress (theme)
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(113) - Who admonished the actress?
- The Bishop, he admonished the actress. (rheme)
(114) - Did you admonish the actress?
- No, the Bishop, he admonished the actress. (thematic rheme)
(115) - Who did what? What did the Bishop do?
- The Bishop, he admonished the actress. (rhematic theme)
This is why left dislocation and topica1ization are not
interchangeable in
(116) Our daughters we are proud of.
(117) Our daughters, we are proud of them.
Only in the topica11zed sentence does the leftward position of the
object create a contrast. This is predicted by our rules. While
topicalization, via (D. topic) and (D. left) marks a constituent contras-
tive (thematically ambivalent), dislocation does not fix thematic struc-
ture beyond the thematicity of the adjunct Phrase. 18 In order to make
(116) contra~tive, one can topical;ze the pronoun inside the sentence:
(118) Our daughters, them we are proud of.
The fact that a dislocated constituent indicates a dialogue
subject explains why it has to be referential, i.e., have a value.
We do not dislocate noun phrases whose reference is not clear, e.g.,
(119) - Did you buy anything?
- Some books, I bought them.
There is no way for the addressee to guess which books are being
discussed here. Compare
-
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(120) - Aren't those people disgusting?
- Yeah, some people, they think they know everything.
where it is obvious ~'f'lO (what kind of people) the speaker means by some
people. As is clear from the examples, tn~ difference here is not a mat-
ter of syntax or truth conditions, but a question of dialogue grammar.
The above examples were carefully chosen to avoid the intrusion
of more general constraints on anapho·~. Thus no considerations specific
to dislocations are needed to explain why (121)-(122) are unacceptable -
it suffices to refer to general constraints on discourse anaphora.
(121) No explanations, they are necessary_
(122) Everyone of my friends, he is married.
What is wrong with (122), in particular, is not the dislocation but the
singular cross-reference; (123) is quite all right.
(123) Everyone of my friends, they are married.
This property of left dislocation also serves to set it off
from topicalization. Topicalization does not care about reference.
So there is nothing odd with
(124) Some Cupid kills with arrows, some with traps.
whereas left dislocation would be quite out of its depth here:
(125) Some, Cupid kills them with arrows, some, with traps.
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The cleft construction, too, remains distinct from left
dislocation on this count. (126)-(127) are not interchangeable, for they
answer the different questions (128)-(129):
A wonderful place, you have it here, sir.
Itls a wonderful place you have here, sir.
What sort of place do I have here?
Where do I have a wonderful place?
only the left dislocated version (127) which r.1U~t be construed as
speaking of wonderful places. 19
- (126)
(127)
(128)
(129)
It ;s
I
•
8. Right Dislocation
I The formulation of (D.dislocate) was left vague on the dir"ection
of dislocation, and that on purpose. As Gundel [453] argues at length,
left and right dislocations share all the properties predicted by
I (D. dislocate). Right dislocations too prejudges the dialogue subject;
that is why there is a feeling of conflict in Gundel IS example
(130) - What about your nerves?
- He's beginning to get on my nerves, that dog. 20
The first speaker wants to talk about nerves, but the addressee speaks
of the dog.
As further evidence of the independence of dislocation from
thematic word order principles, a right dislocated phrase too must be
thematic, not rhematic as one would expect if (D.right) were applicable
to it. One would not answer the question
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(131) What depresses you?
by
(132) It depresses me, this room.
To answer (131), one must change the wording inside the sentence, e.g.
(133) This depresses me, this room.
Instead of dwelling on the similarities of left and right
dislocation, let us try to ferret out their functional differences. It
seems to me that they are in a large measure due to a simple fact of
discourse anaphora. While a leftward adjunct can serve as an antecedent
to fix the reference of its sentence internal reflex, a rightward adjunct
can not. Hence the user of right dislocation must assume, justifiably or
not t that the context already makes clear what he is talking about. 2l
It follows that right dislocation, unlike left dislocation, is not suited
for indicating explicit changes of subject. Compare in this respect (130)
to
(134) - What about your nerves?
- That dog, he's beginning to get on my nerves.
(134) suggests, but (130) simply assumes, that the dog is what should
be talked about. In othe\~ words, right dislocation can not affirm a
dialogue subject, it can only confirm one.
When is there a need for such confirmation? Two distinct cases
may be discerned. Frequently, right dislocatioil secures a reference
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which may have rema1n~d vague to the audience after all. This sort of
sentence is colloquial and intimate, particularly when the subject is
elliptic:
(135) "1'11 say I'm stiff", said Mrs. Baker. "Gets you kind of
cramped, riding along the way we·ve been doing."
(136) Must have cost a pretty penny that thing tonight.
(137) All, all are gone, the familiar faces.
(138) Are they learned me~t your priests?
This construction is frequent in reports of internal dialogue:
(139 )
(140 )
-What did it do to people, she wondered, living like this.
Perhaps an hour later his nostrils began to twitch. A
delicious aroma was being carried towards him by the breeze.
Kidneys and bacon, he was certain. Devilish cruel to an
empty stomach, tantalizing it with the sn1el1 of other men's
breakfasts. How long would he have to endure this?
As Vygotsky once observed, sub.1ect1ess sentences are common in
internalized speech, obviously because there is no need to spell out to
oneself what one is thinking about. That information, however, may be
necessary for one's audience. This is p~obably why right dislocation
is so common in spontaneous speech where thoughts are outputted with
less preplann1ng than in writing. Right dislocation may involve quite
deliberate planning, too.
It is a common stylistic trick to use right dislocation to
avoid the suggestion of opening a new subject. A good example of this
comes from Patricia Moyes· novel Dead Men Don't Ski. A detective wants
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to interview a woman on the subject of a murder without letting on that
he is pumping her. This is how he proceeds:
(141) His next objective was the Gener1 Mist1 run by Signora Vespi.
He purchased a fresh supply of American cigarettes, and then
said casually, in Italian, "Bad business, this death on the
ski-11ft." "Terrible, signore, terrible. 1I
(141), unlike a straightforward subject-predicate sentence, gives the
impression that the death is already established as a common subject of
speculation.
In the preceding examples, the right dislocated phrase is
pronounced with moderate or no emphasis. In this respect, they contrast
with another batch of examples:
(142) They are no ordinary hou~es, those.
(143) It is entirely of the earth, that passion.
(144) He was not going to be a snuffy schoolmaster, he.
(145) IIAnd yet, if you say to people, lIa leper colony" they will
shudder and give it a wide berth. It is an old, old fear
that."
In these examples, the right dislocated phrase can well be emphatic.
Intuitively, the sentences sound emphatic or impressed. often admiring
or boasting. Here, there is not likely to be any unclarity of reference -
for instance. the right dislocated phrase in (143) adds nothing to what
transpires from the preceding sentence. Rather, the subject of discus-
sion is pointed out for contrast: the subject at hand satisfies the
sentence said of it, but what about certain other subjects that might
spring to mind? These further subjects are suggested by a simple
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strategical argument: if the present dialogue subject were the only one
to consider, there would be no need to point it out; however, it is
being pointed out, hence other candidates must be in the offing.
9. As for
We already found a warning against a too easy identification of
as for with dislocations in the contrasts like
(146) As for the weather, I think it will rain tomorrow.
(147j The weather, I think it will rain tomorrow.
As (146)-(14ZJ show, as for is freer with its subject than left
dislocation: a left dislocated phrase introduces a direct dialogue
subject, where~s as for may broach a subject obliquely.
This is not the only difference, either. ~ f·or, u. ;;ke left
dislocation, does not like to pick up a subject from an immediate
premise:
(148) - Where is John?
- John, he is at home.
- As for John, he is at home.
What is most significant, as for sentences are constrained as to what
they can say of a subject, unlike left dislocations. Compare
(149) - Who is Goofy's oldest friend?
- Goofy's oldest friend is Mickey Mouse. Mickey, he is my
favorite character.
(150) - Who is Goofy's oldest friend?
- Goofy's oldest friend is Mickey Mouse. As for Mickey, his
oldest friend is Minnie Mouse.
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As for would sound oddly out of place in the first dialogue, while
left dislocation would do in both dialc;ues.
Compare also
(151) - Holmes, who do you think is the murderer?
- Well, Watson, the man who the poli~e suspect is out of
question. As for lestrade, he is all too stupid for
the job.
(151) curiously suggests that Holmes finds Lestrade (the police
inspector) a~ong the suspe~~s. Left dislocation would not force such
a construal (although it would allow it).
Note, finally, that as for is nearly interchangeable with but
in
(152) This one will do.
This one will do.
them.
But the others, you may as well forget them.
As for the others, you may as well forget
To account for these observations, I suggest the following
dialogue rule for as for:
(D.as for) When a player has put forward a move addressed to a topic,
any player may.address a coordinate topic by a sentence
prefaced with as for NP, where NP is a direct dialogue
subject of the new topic.
In our analysis, as for is not only a subject-introducer, but also a
topic-introducer: what it suggests is not just a subject of the follow-
ing sentence but its topic as well, the question it is addressed as ~1
answer to. Let us consider how it does this in example (151):
(153)
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Who is the murderer?
/ '"Is Jones the murdrrer? II Lestrade the murderer?
Jones has an alibi He is all too stupid.
•
What (153) construes Holmes as doing in (151) is going through the
suspects one by one. Jones, the obvious suspect, has an alibi. If it
weren1t for the unfortunate as for, Holmes I last statement in (151) could
be construed as an impatient comment on police incompetence. As it is,
(O.as for) forces the audience to look for a coordinate topic structure
in which Lestradels name figures as a fresh substituend, only to find
(153) as the simplest candidate .
Let us go through our other observations to see if they are
accounted for by (D.as for). We have first the freedom of as for sen-
tences with their dialogue subjects as in example (146). This freedom
is allowed for by (D.as for). All the rule requires is that the sentence
following an as for phrase can be construed as an answer to the question
indicated by it - and that leaves quite a lot of leeway.
The inappropriateness of as for in (148) is also easily
explained: (D.as for) reserves as for phrases for changes of topic,
not for keeping one.
As for the ability of as for to do duty for but in (152), it
suffices to compare the respective game rules (D.but) and (D.as for) to
see that they indeed apply in overlapping dialogue environments.
A number of further observations can be predicted still.
The unacceptab1lity of
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(154) As for some people, I like them, as for oth'~rs, I donlt.
is explained by the requirement that the object of as for must have a
value. (154) backfires as an attempt to addres~ the topic
(155) Do you like people or not?
because (155) gives no clue who some people and othel's might refer to.
A better fit to (155) is obtained by using topicalization:
(156) Some people, I like; others, I don It.
As we observed earlier, topicalization does not care about reference.
Finally, (D.as for) explains why objects of as for phrases
have a contrastive feel about them, as the rule marks them thematically
ambivalent by definition. To appreciate this point, consider the
example dialogue
(157) - Who invented penicillin? Was it Nobel?
- No, penicillin was invented by Fleming.
As for Nobel, he invented dynamite.
The f~llowing is a likely reconstruction for (157):
( 158)
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Who invented what?
/'
Who invented penicillin?
(What is penicillin?)
Was it Nobel? (Who is Nobel?)
No - I
Penicillin was invented by As for Nobel, he invented
Fleming. I dynamite. I (What is dynamite?)
What was invented by Fleming? What was invented by Nobel?
(Who is Fleming?) (Who is Nobel?)
~ ~
What was invented by who?
The initial topic of discussion is who invented what. The questioner
instantiates it with penicillin and conjectures Nobel as its inventor.
Penicillin is indicated as a subject of the discussion by being the
subject of a concealed identity question. The answerer recognizes this
in his correction of the questioner's conjecture. The correction in turn
suggests a new twist to the topic: echoing its syntactic form, it is
~'ow asked what was invented by who. This question is instantiated by
the questioner's conjecture and duly answered. Nobel is recognized as
a dialogue subject in virtue of another concealed ;de~tity question.
The as for phrase serves to indicate the new topic configuration with
Fleming and Nobel as coordinate subjects generated by a common topic.
Note, in contrast, that
(159) As for dynamite, it was invented by Nobel.
would be out of place in (157), as dynamite has not yet been suggested
as a possible dialogue subject.
- 423 -
The thematic ambivalence of Nobel in (157) vis-a-vis its
dialogue premises ;s apparent ;n the reconstruction (158). The name at
once repeats an earlier mention and contrasts with another instance of
the same common topic.
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FOOTUOTES
PREFACE
1. For surveys of the field, see Dressler (7) and Hendricks [13].
2. Much of recent text linguistics is vulnerable to the candid
criticism of Hannes Rieser [7], p. 15:
In hindsight it can be said that text lingulstics tried
to apply formal apparatus too early, perhaps because in
general the role of formalization in theory construction
was grossly ~verrated. Also, everybody tried to use
formalisms w1~::')ut considering whether this was really
appropriate. -.. The precise explication of one's
linguistic intuitions should come first, and only then
does formalization make sense. Formalization alone
cannot be equated with theory ... nor can it be used -
as is frequently the case - to cover up the neglecting
of empirical data.
Cf. also Pierrehumbert [367].
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER
1. Hendricks [14]. p. 31, quoting Archibald Hill.
2. Quoted in Hendricks [14], p. 31.
3. Coulthard's reference is to Labov [22].
4. Wittgenstein [38], Part I. §134. For a dissenting opinion, see
M. Gee [26].
5. Wittgenstein [38], Part I. §23.
6. For further discussion, see J. H1ntikka, "Language-games" in
Saarinen [32] p. 1-26.
7. W1ttgenstein [37], §7.
8. §23.
9. Coulthard [6]. p. 7, quoting Labov [24].
10. Grice [10].
11. W1ttgenstein [38], Part I §29.
12. Ibid., Part I §32.
- 425 -
13. Ibid~ Part II §ll.
14. Ibid., Part I §33.
15. Ibid., Part I §140.
16. Ibid., Part I §140.
17. Ibid., Part I §137.
18. Wittgenstein [37], §130.
19. Ibid. t §66-67.
20. For an introduction and critical survey of game theory, see Luce
and Ra i ffa [25].
21. For references, see Saarinen [32].
22. Quoted, with minor changes of wording, from p. 297 of J. Hintikka,
"Quantifiers in Natural Language, some logical problems", in
J. Hintikka et al. (ed.) Essays on Mathematical and Philosophical
Logic, D. Reidel, Dordrecht 1979, p. 295-314, reprinted in
Saarinen [32] p. 81-117.
23. Quoted from p. 119 of C. Peacocke's article in Saarinen [32],
p. 119-134.
24. (In mathematical logic:) L. Henkin, G. Kreisel, V. Rantala and
others; (In philosophical logic:) K. Lorenz [244], P. Lorenzen
[245-6] and their associates; see also D. Lewis [167], [147],
Stalnaker [34] and Harrah [11].
25. See Hintikka [16-21].
26. For further discussion, see Stenius [35], Carlson [3], Lewis
[147].
27. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1355b. For a more recent def1nit1on t see
Young et a1~
28. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1354a.
29. Charles Morris's definition. See Morris [28-9].
30. See Introduction to Searle at al. [318], p. 1x.
31. See Part I, Chapter IV.4-5, for these rules.
32. W1ttgenstein [37], #24. Cf. Llewelyn [148].
33. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1403b.
34. Cf. Enkvist [8], p. 25, Enkvist [9], Andersson [1].
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PART I
CHAPTER I
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
For discussion, see e.g. Chomsky [39].
Cf. Schiffer [47], p_ 30-31, Lewis [167], p. 52-60.
The first sentence of Metaphysics (g80a).
See e.g- Levi [46], Hilpinen [42-3], Swain [48], Cohen and
Hesse l40].
Cf. Section 2 of Introduction.
CHAPTER II
1. Cf. Luce and Raiffa [25], p. 269-271.
2. A better way of looking at the situation here may be to construe
the players· misperceptions as illicit idiosyncratic truncations
of an identical overall game. E.g. a poker player knows what
cards other players might hold (as far as the rules of the game
are concerned), but he may still (mistakenly) believe that they
actually hold certain particular hands, and plan his strategies
on his mistaken assumptions. This way of looking at the
situation preserves standard game structure; however, we still
need to redefine the concept of a solution of such a
subjectively truncated game.
3. There is a growing literature on this problem. 3ee e.g.
Cresswell [56-7], Eberle [58], Goddard and Routley [60],
Hintikka [70-71], Purtill [90], Rescher and Brandon [94], Routley
and Routley [95], and Thomason [105].
4. For these insights, see Hintikka [61-62], [65-68], [72]. Cf.
Chisholm [54], Kaplan [76], Kripke [79-80], Lewis [81],
Parsons [87], Quine [92], Saarinen [96], Scott [97], for a few
of a legion of papers on quantification in intensional contexts.
5. See e.g. Hint1kka [66]. For a set of model set conditions,
see Appendix II.
6. For one version, see Appendix II.
7. For different approaches, see fn. 3 above. Ours seemS closest
to Eberle [58], Goddard and Routley [60] and Routley and Routley
[95] .
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8. What it means to accept or reject a question will be discussed
in Chapter VII.4.
9. A dialogue based on this game situation ;s described in
Chapter VIII.S.
10. I call a question true if its presupposition is true (if it has
a true answer). ~Belnap and Steel [113], p. 116.
CHAPTER III
1. See Hintikka [129-130]. For criticism, cf. Karttunen [139].
2. J. Higginbotham (private conversation) has suggested treating
question quantifiers as a type of nonstandard quantifier of its
own. Rather than being ambivalent between existential and uni-
versal force, a question quantifier would be semantically vague;
criteria of complete answerhood would be a function of a
questionerls informational interests. In the present approach,
questions are used to represent informational interests. It
;s therefore necessary to fix beforehand what interests they
do represent. Hintikka's two-quantifier analysis is adopted
for definiteness. Nothing crucial depends on this particular
assumption. Cfw Higginbotham and May [240].
3. See Hintikka [131], Kamp [137-8], Lewis [147].
4. Cf. Hintikka [130], p. 22-29.
5. Cf. Appendix II.
6. Cf. Hintikka [68], Chapter XIV.
7. See Hintikka [65-68], [70], [72].
8. See Hintikka [65], [68].
9. Cf. Boer and Lycan [116]. Two senses of knowing who are
nicely contrasted in the following passage from Agatha
Christie's The Clocks (Ch. 20):
III don't believe you know a thing, Poirot~ This is all
bluff. Why, nobody knows yet who the dead man ;s _II
II I know."
"What's his name?"
III have no idea. His name is not important. I know, if
you can understand, not who he is but who he is. 1I
IIA blackmailer?" -
Poirot closed his eyes.
"A detecti ve?1I
Poi rot opened his eyes.
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10. Different methods of cross-identification ar~ distinguished in
Hintikka [127-128].
CHAPTER IV
1. Grice's first maxim of quality is somewhat weaker: "00 not say
what you believe to be false". Grice actually voices doubts
whether this principle is on a par with other conversational
maxi""~: "Other maxims come into operation only on the
assu•.,ption that this maxim is 'atisfied u (p. 46 of Cole and
Morgan [29]).
2. Cf. Quintilian, lib. viii cap. 6 #2: uln eo vera genere quo
contraria ostenduntur, Ironia est. Illusionem vacant, quae
aut pronuntiatione intelligitur, aut persona, aut rei natura.
Num si qua earum verbis d1ssentit, apparet diversam esse
oration; voluntatem. H See also Brown and Levinson [288],
Grice [257].
3. Cf. Lewis [167] for a good discussion of conventionality.
4. Searle [314], p. 66.
5. Searle [314], p. 57.
6. Here is an example from Rex Stout's novel The Gambit. Archie
Goodwin impersonates a police officer by denying that he is
one:
"Are you from the police?"
"No", I said, "I'm a gorilla. How often do you have
to see a face?"
For similar examples and insights, cf. W. Abraham's paper
in [373].
7. Wittgenstein [38], #28-32. Of course, (D. perhaps) can be
rewritten in the form of a truth definition if players'
beliefs are treated as another index of context (point of
reference). This does not make perhaps any less pragmatic,
however.
8. (6) is consistent on an exclusive interpretation of quantifiers
(if the range of no one include the substitution value of a
person). This is how (6) and its likes are u~ual1y understood.
9. There is a rich philosophical literature on subjunctive and
indicative conditionals. See e.g. Adams [151-2], Ayers [154],
Braine [156], Chisholm [158], Goodman [163], Harper et al.
[164], Karttunen [165], von Kutschera [166 ], Lewis [168],
Pollock [170], Rescher [173], Stalnaker [177], or Tichy [179].
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10. For a clear exampl~ of an elliptic subjunctive, witness the
following passage from Agatha Christie's novel The Clocks
(Chapter 76):
1I0h dear me, I don't know what to dOt I'm sure."
"I should go home and have a nice kip", said the barman
kindly.
Of course t the barman ; s not annCJf.nci ng that he is qui tti ng - the
implicit condition "if I were you" has appeared repeatedly in
his previous exhortations to the drunken lady. (D. earnest)
and (D. subjunctive) are not mutually exclusive. Use of the
subjunctive does not in itself imply that the user rejects or
even doubts a sJpposition he is mak~ng - although he of cour~e
often conversat 1onally implicates as much (why use subjunctive
where indicative would do?). The implication is cancellable,
as in the following example from Patricia Moyes' novel The
Black Widower: ---
"Tell me, sir - this is a merely hypothetical question -
but what effect would it have on these talks if it came
to light that certain ~~l;tical figures in Tampica had
financial interest in t,~e Jevelopment company you
mentioned yesterday?"
Despite the subjunctive, the addressee has good reason to ask,
"SaYJ do you have infonnat1on on this?"
11. Wunderlich [323], ~. 295.
12. That conversational implicatures get conventionalized is
something of a commonplace by now. See Grice [9] (p. 50 of
Cole and Morgan [29]), Searle [315], p. 76, Sadock [175], p. 78,
van der Auwera [283], p. 44-45.
13. Repetition of a ~laim is not a totally pointles~ move. If caution
is lncreaserl between repetitions, the number of repetitions
indicate the stnength of the player's confidence 1n his claim.
That 'second thoughts' in fact indicate increased caution is
nicely witnessed in Agatha Christie's Funera1i are Fatal
( Ch • XI V) : .-
"She d1dn 1 t take it seriously?"
"Oh, no. No, 11 m sure she didn't .....
The second tina", Poirot thought had sounded suddenly doubtful.
But was not thaw almost always the case when you went back over
somethi~g in your mind?
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CHAPTER V
1. According to G. Hankamer and I. Sag, "Deep and Surface Anaphora lt ,
Linguistic Inguiry 7 (1976), p. 391-428, certain types of ellipsis
requine an ex~l;cit antecedent, while others don1t.
2. On the structural complexity of conversation, see e.g. Paun
[210], Ritchie [214], Ch. 9, or We1zenbaum [229].
3. IIFunct1c",lal diagrams" like this are for illustration only. They
play no essential part in my framework. As a systematic method
of representation, I prefer sequences of moves annotated in
the manner described in Section 2 of this Chapter.
4. Similar criticisms are raised in Mohan [207]. Note that the
vicious circle in (13) could be widened to include any number
of players.
CHAPTER VI
1. Cf. our notion of elementary question to Bennett1s [114]
"basic question" and Karttunen's [139] "proto-question".
Our notion is distinct from its namesake in Belnap and
Steel [11 3] .
2. The present definition of presupposition is the only technical
sense of this overwrought term in this work. For the rest, I
am in sympathy with attempts like Wilson and Sperber [537]
or Bickerton [491] to trade in the notion for diverse more
tangible distinctions. Cf. Chapter IV of Part II.
3. See e.g. Chang and Keisler [237], p. 228.
4. HirschbUhler [241], p. 49. Cf. Karttunen [243], Bennett [233].
Higginbotham and May [240]. My discussion of Karttunen [243]
is based on HirschbUhler [241].
5. Carlson [236].
6. The notiun of a self-answering identity might explain the use of
certain tautologies as discussion-stoppers. E.g. "war is war"
as an explanation of a cruelty indicates that cruelty belongs
to the very concept of war: II war is war ll effectively equals
"you know what war is (like)".
7. Cf. (C. wh-1d) to Belnap and Steel's notion of d1st1nctness-
claim (p. 60-61 of [113]).
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CHAPTER VII
1. See G. Moore, Ethics, Harper and Row 1946, p. 67. Cf. Hintikka
[63] and W. Kummer [269].
2. Dascal [159], p. 322, makes the same point.
3. Hintikka's defense of the transitivity axiom in [63] is not
based on the argument from introspection. See also
Hintikka [66], Ch. 1, Hint1kka [260-262], and works by
Castaneda, Collins, Geach, G1net, Hilpinen, Lehrer, Pail thorp,
de Sousa, and Wiggins in the references to this Chapter.
4. The failure of transitivity means that the players of a dialogue
game need not have perfect information of their own epistemic
alternatives. Cf. Ch. II.l.
CHAPTE R VI I I
1. Searle [314]. p. 16-17.
2. Ibid., p. 21.
3. Ibid., p. 19.
4 . I bid., p. 37.
5. Cf. Wunderlich [321], [323]. Ferrara [294-5] has attempted to
extend speech act theory to discourse analysis.
6. Cf. Hintikka, "Language-games", in Saarinen [32], esp. p. 13-14.
7. Searle [314]. p. 54. Searle is actually speaking of promises
in the passage quoted. I have taken the liberty of replacing
'promise' by 'question' throughout. I trust the substitution
is warranted by the context.
8. A good discussion of the meaning of questions is Huason [136],
esp. p. 4-6.
9. Cf. Sadock [175]. p. 138-139, R. Lakoff [304], p. 455, Pope
[310], p. 36, 44.
10. Chapter 11.6.
11. My example is a restatement of the familiar puzzle of three
wise men. lowe the example and its solution to McCarthy [307].
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12. An interesting analysis of politeness in decision-theoretic
terms is Brown and Levinson [288]. See also Fraser [297] and
R. Lakoff [305].
13. Cf. Jespersen [357], p. 304, Pope [310], Ch. 3, Culicover
[292], Ch. 2.
14. The pretheoretic characterization of rhetorical question as a
question which is not in need of an answer covers a
heterogeneous class of cases, including different sorts of
eliciting questions (Ch. VIII.4, n. 9 above), pleas of ignorance
(Ch. VIII.2) and sarcastic and perfunctory questions
(Ch. VIII.9, Ch. VIII.B). For a good list of examples, see
Quintil1an, Book ix, Ch. II. Cf. also Pope [310], Ch. 2,
Schm1dt-Radefe1t [313].
15. See Chapter IV.3.
16. Observe that this conversational implication can in turn be
understood ironically: the author of (82) may be playfully
conveying that he knows a whole lot. Such double irony ;s
obvious in
Aren't you c1ever~
which actually reads
You are not clever at all.
17. See e.g. Klima [302], Cu1icover [292], p. 187.
18. Courtesy of Ksn Hale (personal communication). Culicover,
Syntax, Academic Press, New York 1976, p. 132, maintains that
sentence~ like (10lb) are not acceptable for mo~t speakers
of English. My informants have accepted (lOlb) to a man.
19. For good discussions of tag questions, see Bolinger [117],
Ch. 2, and Hudson [136].
20. I use the term 'echo question' in a syntactic sense. Echo
questions are direct questions which match their presupposition
without an application of wh-preposing or auxiliary inversion.
21. Kuno and Robinson [144], p. 466 fn. 5.
22. Bolinger [287]
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APPENDIX I
1. See Levi [46], Ch. VII, esp. p. 106-108. Note that caution
increases in inverse proportion to the index q.
2. See Luce and Raiffa [25], Ch. 13 for a survey.
APPENDIX II
1. For further discussion, see e.g. Hintikka [66].
2. Cf. Hintikka [61-8]. See also Sleigh [101].
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PART I I
CHAPTER I
1. For similar ideas, cf. Gray [343-4], Christensen [183], Young
et ale [388], Clark and Haviland [437] and Warren et al. [385].
If my approach is right, there ;s reason to doubt any
simple-minded approach to characterizing textual cohesion in
terms of, say, surface repetition of lexical material or
frequent anaphor1c connections. I suspect that such
regularities, though undeniably real, are just epiphenomena of
more fundamental requirements. To put the point roughly, any
nontrivial piece of discourse will exhibit logical connections
among its sentences. There is a theorem in first-order
quantification theory (known as Craig1s interpolation theorem)
which states in effect that there is no logical entailment
without shared vocabulary: sentences which share no nonlogical
words cannot enter into logical relations. I suspect that
regularities of lexical and anaphor;c repetition in a connected
text can be traced back to this simple truth of logic.
2. Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland.
3. Cf. Bolinger [327], Householder [354], Labov [22], Enkvist [9],
01 nsmore L336].
4. For the notions of coherence and cohesion, see Halliday [349-50],
Halliday and Hasan [351], Coulthard [6], p. 10, Enkvist [337],
Grimes [345], p. 113, Gutwinski [348], p. 25-33, Hendricks
[14], p. 39-41.
5. On autonomy of grammar, cf. Chomsky [544], Dascal and Margalit
[332].
6. This paragraph exhausts my intentions with the term functional.
In particular, my explanations of functional contrasts are not
functional explanations, but structural.
7. Structuralist approaches prefer to treat of discourse phenomena
on an intermediate lev~l of representation which, as a part of
the structural description of a sentence, relates grammatical
structure to context. The mapping from the discourse
grammatical representations to contexts of use is often left
unspecified. See e.g. Chomsky [434], Karttunen and Peters
[267], cf. Williams [386]. The present approach does not make
this assumption. The rules of dialogue grammar defined here
relate grammatical structures directly to dialogue context.
Nothing crucial depends on this issue, however.
8. Cf. K. Hale, L. Jeanne and P. Platero, "Three cases of
overgenerat1on" , in P. Cul1cover, T. Wasow and A. Akmajian (ed.)
Formal syntax, Academic Press, New York 1977 and Chomsky [435].
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9. The omission is part due to the absence of a suitable
phonological theory of intonational contrasts until very
recently (see J. Pierrehumbert, The hono10 and honetics of
English intonation, MIT Press, forthcoming, part to crude
considerations of space. For preliminary work on this topic,
see Carlson [4].
CHAPTER II
1. Cf. Posner [421], p. 187.
2. Chapter VIII.4. of Part I.
3. See McCawley [416], Gazdar [407].
4. McCawley [416] attributes this observation to Hans Reichenbach.
5. I leave out of consideration here uses of but in the senses of
1 only', 'except' and 1 instead' . The last mentioned use can
probably be subsumed under (D.but). It;s omitted here
because an adequate discussion of it would require an analysis
of elliptic sentences.
6. For other analyses of the different senses of but, see
Abraham [390], Bellert [394], Dascal and Katrier-[398], Halliday
and Hasan [351], R. Lakoff [411], Spencer [486].
7. Leibniz [413], Ch. vii, #5.
8. According to Piaget [420], French mais 'but' is actually first
acquired in countermoves. ----
9. On discourse uses of connectives, cf. also Halliday and Hasan
[351], van Dijk [399].
10. Locke [415], Ch. vii, #5; cf. n. 7.
11. Aristotle, Topics, Book VIII.
12. Ibid.,
13. The conclusion of a syllogism was even called Ithe question l :
cf. Robinson [423J.
14. Many of my observations and examples are due to Olga Yokoyama
(lecture notes, Harvard 1980). The mistakes are my own.
- 437 -
CHAPTER III
1. On the problem of basic word order, see es~. Firbas [552],
p. 33-34. On this issue, I side with Isacenko [457-8] against
Firbas. Firbas' primitive concept of communicative dynamism
seems apt to explain obscurum per obscurius. Cf. also
Hein~mKki [456].
2. See e.g. Sgal1 et a. [593], p. 67, Hakulinen [455], p. 90. My
term 'diathetic' is designed to cover the sort of 'deep
(semantic) case' relations Jackendoff [355] infelicitously
calls thematic relations. For a recent discussion of these,
see Ostler [477]. For terminological priority, cf. e.g.
Firbas [550], p. 112:
Very roughly speaking, thematic elements are such as
convey facts known from the verbal or situational
context, whereas rhemat;c elements are such as
convey new, unknown facts.
For even more ancient history, see Danes et al. [445].
3. See Emonds [446], p. 9, Chomsky and Lasnik [436],
Chomsky [435], p. 18.
4. Cf. Dahl [439].
5. Here, as elsewhere, intuitive thematicity judgments are
correlated with judgments of stress prominence: rhematic
constituents receive emphasis while thematic ones avoid it.
Cf. Carlson [3].
6. Otto Behaghel, Indogermanische Forschungen 25 (1909), p. 110-
142. Cf. Jespersen [3561 #2.15.
7. Kuno (class notes, Harvard 1980).
8. The precise interpretation of (D. topic) is somewhat tricky.
Not all of a topical constituent need be new (see text for
counterexamples). Vet it would be misleading to say that
it suffices for some constituent of the preposed phrase
to be rhematic. The right interpretation seems to be that
the topical phrase must be the smallest preposable phrase
containing the rhematic constituent.
9. The dual1tl of functions of topicalization is an old observation.
Sweet [384J notes that "In some of these cases (of top1calization t
L.C.) the front-order is emphatic, in others connective." I
differ only in claiming that topicalization always creates a
rhematic constituent.
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10. (D.topic), as an obligatory rule t predicts that mere thematicity
does not warrant the use of topicalization: some sort of
emphasis or contrast is always involved. This may explain why
the constitutionally thematic pronoun it is ungrammatical in
topic position: --
As for the last example, it I invented myself.
11. On contrastiveness, see Chafe [543], Spencer [486].
12. Cf Bolinger [287], p. 132-5, Chafe [543], p. 49.
13. See ~sp. Akmajian et al. [428]. Cf. Jespersen [356], #2.32,
2.37.
14. Ken Hale (personal communication) tells me that Navajo has
question verbs (yet no interrogative predicate phrases).
15. In support of a functional explanation of the constraints on
VP top;calization, consider the following facts from Finnish.
The Finnish auxiliary system ;s radically different from the
English. Yet the upper limit restriction holds in Finnish too:
*olla lahtenyt han saattaakin cf. *mita han saattaa?
be left he may - too what he may
lahtenyt han saattaa ollakin
left he may be - too
On the other hand, the lower limit restriction does not hold:
ovelalta h!n n~yttaaKin
shrewd he looks - too
This is not surprising, as there is no dummy auxiliary in Finnish
to carry affirmative emphasis.
16. Cf. Part I, Ch. IV fn. 13 and Ch. VIII.7.
17. Another qualification is in order. Kuno's own characterization
of his theme in [469], p. 302 rather suggests our notion of
dialogue subject.
18. According to Kuno (class notes, Harvard 1980 and private
conversation) the following elliptic dialogue proves the need of
distinguishing new information from another notion of important
information:
A: Did you stay in a hotel in Paris?
B: No, I didn1t stay in a hotel - I stayed with my friends.
A: How about London?
B: I stayed in a hotel because I didn't have any friends
there.
Kuno's rule of ellipsis says that important information cannot
be omitted before less important information. In the last
line of the dialogue, B omits London though it seems newer
information than in a hotel; this shows that importance cannot
in which city?
How about London?
Where did you stay in London?
I stayed in a hotel because I
did not have any friends
there.
- 439 -
be defined in terms of new information. It seems to me that
the conclusion follows only if the definitions of old and new
information are applied mechanically on the surface of the
dialogue. If they are applied in a well motivated
reconstruction of ~he dialogue, it turns out that the omitted
constituent in Londun is actually a theme, and the retained one
in a hotel a rheme:
Where did you stay
Where did you stay in Paris?
Did you stay in a hotel in Paris?
No, I did not stay in a hotel -
I stayed with my friends.
19. Cf. also Kuroda [471], Janos [459], Oh [476].
CHAPTER IV
1. On subordination, cf. Bickerton [498], Bolinqer [495], Green
[509], Ross [532], Sledd [533], and Wilson and Sperber [537].
2. See Kiparsky and Kiparsky [520]. For the extensive follow-up
literature, see the bibliography in Oh and Dinneen [527].
3. For a recent attack, see Boer and Lycan [492], p. 28-41. I
should mention that I do not think know is a factive verb.
4. Cf. Bolinger [496], p. 68: uA factive verb implies the
factuality of its complement in the mind of the speaker, not the
shared knowl edge of 1t between the speaker and hearer". Cf.
also Prince [531], p. 897.
5. For the role of questions in the organization and understanding
of discourse, see Hatcher [508-9], Gray [343-4], Christensen
[183], Warren et al. [385], Young et al. [388].
6. Cf. Grimes [345], p. 338-342 for a similar suggestion.
7. Faraci [502] suggests a syntactic derivation of wh-clefts from
questions. Gundel [453] derives it-clefts from right
dislocated sentences by an optional rule. This analysis is
faulted for functional reasons: the two constructions are
function~lly quite different. (See text for arguments.) Higgins
[510] defends the base generation hypothesis.
8. To be accurate, predicative complements can be characterized in
English:
Fortunate are the parents with a strong religious faith.
Convenient is a dressing table with a waterproof changing
pad, safety strap, and storage shelves.
- 440 -
(These examples come from Dr. Spack's Baby and Child Care.)
The precise difference ;s that in virtue of (D.top;c), a preposed
predicative complement must be rhematic, whereas an identity
sentence can be simply reversed without prejudging its
thematic properties.
10. This analysis is confirmed by the occurrence of "pseudo-clefts"
likF!
What the paper is after, it wants to publish your story.
What lid like, lid like to tell you to go somewhere and
scratch your ass with your elbow.
Here the complement of the cleft is not syntactically fit to
replace the question phrase of the subject; still it answers the
subject question all right. (The examples are from Rex Stout·s
novel Plot it yourself.)
11. Yet another peculiarity of clefts is the treatment of anaphora
across the subject and complement. To put the point simply,
anaphora ;n a cleft like (27) ;s determined by reference to
the full answer (30) implicit in it.
12. The first two examples are from Agatha Christie's So man ste 5
to death; the other two from Patricia Moyes· The Back Widower.
13. For more examples of this character, see Jespersen [356], #4.68.
CHAPTER V
1. For ; nstance, Ha 11 ; day [562] has been cr; ti ci zed for "defi ni ng
theme as the first elerrent of a sentence". Actually,
Halliday's functional definition of theme is "what I am talking
about (now)". What;s taken exception to is his assertion
that theme is always sentence initial.
2. F; rbas [552J, p. 12.
3. This distinction is contrasted with the topic-comment
distinction in Chomsky [434], fn. 32. For the latter
distinction, see Chomsky [544].
4. Jespersen [569], p. 146. Jespersen is actually criticizing
the traditional definition of subject as what a sentence talks
about.
5. The tenn 'topic' is all'eady reserved for the topical question
of a dialogue. Cf. Section 5 below. My usage here conforms
with that of Chafe [543].
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6. In other words, the object position of about exhibits the same
range of intensional (de dicto - de re) ambiguities as other
propositional attitude contexts. For discussion, see Heny
[564] (esp. papers by E. Saarinen and D. Smith), Donnellan
[548-9] and Kripke [575].
7. Conversely, objects of about phrases serve to indicate dialogue
subjects. For instance, beer is the subject of discussion in
How about beer?
8. Lewis Carroll, Through the looking-glass.
9. Keenan-Ochs and Schieffe1in [573] definition of topic as a
"question of immediate concern" resembles mine.
10. See Grimshaw [558], Richards [588], and Ross [591].
11. See Hintikka [565], [127-8] and his paper "Knowledge by
Acquaintance - Individuation by Acquaintance" in D. Pears (ed.)
Bertrand Russell: a collection of critical ess~, Doubleday,
Garden City, N.J. 1971 (reprinted in Hintikka L70]).
12. Mathesius [582], p. 61, anticipates (D.subject) in his
observation that
... Modern English shows a characteristic tendency for the
thematical conception of the subject. In English
sentences, accordingly, the theme of the enunciation is
expressed as a rule by the grammatical subject ...
(He adds in a footnote that his "theme" here is what is usually
called the psychological subject.)
13. Chafe [543], p. 43.
14. See Kuno and Kaburaki [576].
15. Cf. Chafe [543] for observations to the same effect. For
further discussion of ambiguous anaphora, see Lakoff [577-579],
Akmajian [539], Akmajian and Jackendoff [540], Gundel [560],
Clark and Haviland [437]. On the role of subject in
paragraph organization, see Young et a1. [388], Ch. 15.
16. For the relevant constraints, see e.g. Chomsky [435] and
references therein.
17. See last paragraph of this Chapter, section 4.
18. Note that dislocations cannot be analyzed as movements in terms
of our functional definitions in Chapter 111.3 on account of the
anaphoric copy in the main clause.
19. As Cf. Gundel [453], Ch. 3.3.1. observes, indefinite noun phrases
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can be dislocated when they are generic (refer to a kind)
Abottle of Scotch, I have not been abie to find one~
On left dislocation, see also Gundel [559], Keenan-Ochs and
Schieffelin [573-574J, Ochs [583], and Rodman [589J.
20. Gundel [453], p. 121.
21. Cf. Kuno (class notes, Harvard 1980): U(In right dislocation),
the speaker assumes that the hearer can determine the referent
of the pronoun from the left context, but adds the full-fledged
noun for confi rma ti on/ c1ar; fi cat ; on .•1
..
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